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The study of the eastern dynasties that ruled Khurāsān and Transoxania during the 
third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries - most notably the Ṭāhirids (r. 205-259/821-873), 
Ṣaffārids (r. 247-393/861-1003), and Sāmānids (r. 204-395-819-1005) - has traditionally 
focused on the relationship between these dynasties and a weakened ‛Abbāsid Caliphate 
(r. 132-656/750-1258). This approach understands this period as a time when provincial 
governors sought to break away from a declining Caliphate in order to form their own 
independent dynasties. This project offers a different approach to the study of Khurāsān 
and Transoxania during the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, one which focuses on 
the role of these provinces as a frontier.  
Through the end of the fourth/tenth century, Khurāsān and Transoxania made up 
the eastern frontier of the Islamic world, facing the Turks of the Inner Asian steppe. This 
frontier created a unique set of circumstances in these provinces which affected the 
political, social, and economic networks of the region. This project applies a frontier 
studies approach to the eastern frontier during the reign of the eastern dynasties in order 
to present an alternative view of the history of these provincial dynasties. 
To achieve these goals, this project is divided into two major sections. The first 
(Chapters Two, Three, and Four) examines the “environment” of the frontier, exploring 
xi 
 
issues of how the eastern frontier was conceived by contemporary writers, the built 
environment of the frontier through a study of networks of fortifications, and the political 
and economic networks of the region, examined through minting practices. The second 
section (Chapters Five and Six) moves the focus onto the “frontier processes” of 
settlement, integration, and acculturation that shaped the eastern frontier from the time of 
the Arab conquests of the first/seventh and second/eighth centuries, through the reign of 
the eastern dynasties, and to the end of the fourth/tenth. This project seeks to place the 
eastern dynasties within local and imperial networks that developed along the eastern 












1.1 The Waning of ‛Abbāsid Authority and the Rise of the “Independent” Provincial 
Dynasties 
The history of Khurāsān and Transoxania in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries is 
dominated by the rise of the “independent” eastern dynasties, most importantly the 
Ṭāhirids (r. 205-259/821-873),
1
 Ṣaffārids (r. 247-393/861-1003)
2
 and Sāmānids (r. 204-
395/819-1005).
3
 The period during which these eastern dynasties ruled the eastern 
provinces of the Islamic world is most often portrayed as a response to or as a result of 
the central narrative of ‛Abbāsid history. At its peak, the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate (r. 132-
656/750-1258) controlled territory stretching from modern Algeria to Afghanistan from 
its capital in Iraq. Less than a century after the ‛Abbāsids rose to power through a violent 
revolution which overthrew their predecessors, the Umayyads, the ‛Abbāsid Caliphs‟ 
relationship with the furthest provinces of their empire began to change. As early as 
                                                 
1
 These dates are only for Ṭāhird rule in Khurāsān, which was ended by the Ṣaffārid Ya‛qūbī b. al-Layth‟s 
conquest of the Ṭāhirid capital of Nīshāpūr. Another branch of the Ṭāhirid family held onto power in 
Baghdad until 278/891. 
2
 The real peak of Ṣaffārid power lasted only until 287/900, when the second Ṣaffārid amīr ‛Amr b. al-
Layth was defeated and captured by the Sāmānid Ismā‛īl b. Aḥmad. The latter half of the Ṣaffārid period 
saw the dynasty confined to their native Sīstān. 
3
 The Sāmānids were little more than vassal lords in Transoxania until Ismā‛īl b. Aḥmad‟s victory over the 
Ṣaffārids in 287/900, which allowed the Sāmānids to expand their territory into Khurāsān. 
 2 
184/800, the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 170-193/786-809) had granted Ibrāhīm b. al-
Aghlab (r. 184-197/800-812) the governorship of the western province of Ifrīqiya and, in 
return for an annual payment of tribute, the right to bequeath this position within his 
family. With this transition from governors who were appointed, typically from among 
the caliph‟s inner circle in Iraq, and who were recalled by the caliphs, remitted taxes to 
them, and received orders from them, to governors who operated largely of their own 
account and were able to develop multi-generational relationships in the provinces they 
governed, we see the rise of the “independent” provincial dynasty. The first of these, the 
Aghlabids ruled Ifrīqiya from 184/800 to 296/909 and even expanded their territory into 
Sicily. 
The Aghlabids were the first, but, certainly, not the last dynasty to flourish in the 
provinces of the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate during the third/ninth century. In 205/821, the Caliph 
al-Ma‟mūn (r. 198-218/813-833) invested his former military commander and the 
governor of the western provinces Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn Dhū al-Yaminayn (d. 207/822) 
with the governorship of Ṭāhir‟s native Khurāsān and, along with it, Transoxania and 
Sīstān. This position became hereditary, with Ṭāhir followed as governor of Khurāsān by 
two of his sons, one grandson, and one great-grandson. From this point at the beginning 
of the third/ninth century, the eastern domains of the Islamic world saw themselves under 
a succession of provincial dynasties with the Ṣaffārids and Sāmānids being the most 
notable of the numerous smaller dynasties that followed the Ṭāhirids. 
 The history of these dynasties is, as I have said, most often tied to the fortunes of 
the ‛Abbāsids themselves. The third/ninth century is, correctly, seen as a period of 
waning power for the ‛Abbāsids. Following the civil war between the sons of Hārūn al-
 3 
Rashīd, al-Amīn (r. 193-198/809-813) and al-Ma‟mūn, the authority of the caliphs 
increasingly fell into the hands of military commanders and administrators, such as the 
third/ninth century Turkish military commanders of Sāmarrā‟ and, later, the Būyids (r. 
334-447/945-1055),
4
 and the territory which was directly under ‛Abbāsid authority 
gradually shrank. During this period, the authority of the ‛Abbāsids is thought of as a 
“caliphal fiction,” with the ‛Abbāsids becoming little more than figureheads and often 
prisoners in their own palaces while effective power was spread through other groups in 
the imperial administration and military. It is in this context of waning ‛Abbāsid authority 
that many have seen the eastern provincial dynasties as being pushed towards 
independence from the caliphate by centrifugal forces. With central authority weakening, 
the governors of those provinces furthest from the centers of power saw an opportunity to 
break free of the center and to create their own kingdoms on the fringes of the Islamic 
world. 
 Because of this focus on the relationship between provincial governors and 
central authorities, the specter of ‛Abbāsid decline has always lurked behind the history 
of both the eastern provincial dynasties and the eastern frontier itself. The way these 
histories have been understood has often been dependent on and tangential to the history 
of the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate. Much of this is the result of historiographical contingencies, 
most importantly a historical record which was primarily written at the political center 
with the primary interest of telling a universal history of the Islamic world. In this 
context, the dynasties which came to rule Khurāsān and Transoxania in the third/ninth 
and fourth/tenth centuries are portrayed as peripheral to events taking place in Iraq and 
their rise is understood as a symptom of a failing caliphate. This focus overlooks 
                                                 
4
 The dates given are only for the years of Būyid authority in Baghdad. 
 4 
indigenous historical trajectories in the eastern provinces themselves and replaces them 
with a master narrative of the Islamic world.  
 While the current project is not directly a study of the eastern dynasties, it 
introduces an alternative approach to the study of Khurāsān and Transoxania during the 
period during which they ruled the eastern-most provinces of the Islamic world. Instead 
of looking at this period as largely the result of weakness at the center of the ‛Abbāsid 
Caliphate, this project focuses on the role of Khurāsān and Transoxania as frontiers, and 
connects the rise of the eastern provincial dynasties to developments related directly to 
the eastern frontier, rather than developments taking place in Iraq. This alternative 
reconstruction of the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries in Khurāsān and Transoxania 
highlights the roles of local populations and communities and their interactions with the 
forces around them; including the ‛Abbāsids, the Turks of the Inner Asian steppe, and the 
larger Islamic world. 
 
1.2 A Frontier Studies Approach 
The study of the frontiers of the Islamic world has become increasingly important in 
recent years. While a full discussion of frontier approaches to Islamic history, as well as 
frontier studies in general, will appear in Chapter Two, a few comments about the role of 
frontiers in the study of Islamic history are important here. The Islamic world was shaped 
by the series of conquests of the Byzantine and Sāsānian Empires by the Arabs, 
expanding out from the Arabian Peninsula, in the first/seventh and early second/eighth 
centuries. Through these conquests, the Islamic world which formed in the first centuries 
after the establishment of the Muslim community consisted largely of areas which had 
 5 
only recently been incorporated into the Islamic political and cultural sphere and were 
therefore engaged in a process of integration into the larger Islamic world over the 
following centuries. This process of integration may be described as a frontier process. 
 Frontiers are liminal zones where dynamic territorial change is possible; this 
definition will be more fully articulated in Chapter Two. As frontiers expand or contract 
and territory and populations are brought under the authority of new political and cultural 
spheres, frontier zones and their populations go through a process of integration and 
acculturation until the new political authorities and dominant culture achieve a degree of 
dominance and acceptance within the area. For the early history of the Islamic world, this 
process is an important underlying factor in almost every part of the Caliphate. For this 
reason, the study of developments along various frontiers at particular moments in history 
has become increasingly important to the broader study of Islamic history. 
 Associated with the history of the early caliphate, from the post-conquest period 
through the ‛Abbāsid period, two frontiers have become the subjects of major studies 
which have addressed these frontier processes. The Arab-Byzantine frontier or thughūr, 
running through south-eastern Anatolia, has been the focus of studies which have often 
focused on the relationship between the state and the conduct of jihād against the 
Byzantines.
5
 The eastern frontier of Central Asia has also received recent interest with 
studies focusing on questions of settlement following the Arab conquests
6
 and others 
                                                 
5
 See Michael Bonner, “The Naming of the Frontier: Awasim, Thughur, and the Arab Geographers,” 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 57 (1994), 17-24 and Aristocratic Violence and Holy 
War: Studies in the Jihad and the Arab-Byzantine Frontier, (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 
1996); and A. Asa Eger, “The Spaces between the Teeth: Environment, Settlement, and Interaction on the 
Islamic-Byzantine Frontier,” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, (2008). 
6
 Parvaneh Pourshariati, “Iranian Tradition in Ṭūs and the Arab Presence in Khurāsān,” Ph.D. diss., 
Columbia University, (1995) and “Local Histories of Khurāsān and the Pattern of Arab Settlement,” Studi 
Iranica 27 (1998), 41-81; and Mark D. Luce, “Frontier as Process: Umayyad Khurāsān,” Ph.D. diss., 
University of Chicago, (2009). 
 6 
addressing the role of the eastern frontier and the conduct of warfare across the frontier in 
political legitimation.
7
 The dynamics and patterns of frontier societies are unique, both in 
comparison to those of political centers and from one frontier to the next, and, by 
addressing historical frontiers directly, studies such as these bring those unique dynamics 
of the frontier into our understanding of the history of the Islamic world. As frontiers and 
frontier actors become objects of study, the patterns found on the fringes of Islamic 
society enhance our understanding of particular historical patterns in the broader Islamic 
world as well. 
 In this project, a focus on the eastern frontier, on the dynamics of frontier 
societies, and on the populations who lived together along the frontier will allow us to 
look at Khurāsān and Transoxania in a way which removes (though not entirely) the 
master narrative of ‛Abbāsid decline that has influenced previous studies of the eastern 
dynasties. By looking at the “environment” of the frontier, the way it was structured 
physically and socially, we can set the stage in which the history of the eastern provincial 
dynasties played out. Then we will be able to look for those local patterns which 
contributed to the rise of groups such as the Ṭāhirds and Sāmānids in Khurāsān and 
Transoxania. This approach transfers the focus of the history of the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries away from the ‛Abbāsid courts of Iraq and centers it on the 
political, economic, and social networks of contemporary Khurāsān and Transoxania, 
providing alternative explanations for the development of these dynasties. 
 
                                                 
7
 For a study focusing on the Ṣaffārids and their role as frontier fighters, see D.G. Tor, Violent Order: 
Religious Warfare, Chivalry, and the ‛Ayyār Phenomenon in the Medieval Islamic World, Istanbuler Texte 
und Studien, 11 (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2007). For a later study see Ali Anooshahr, The Ghazi Sultans 
and the Frontiers of Islam: A Comparative Study of the Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods, (New 
York: Routledge, 2009). 
 7 
1.3 Previous Scholarship on the Eastern Dynasties 
While this project does not focus directly on the histories of the eastern dynasties, they 
have dominated the study of third/ninth and fourth/tenth century Khurāsān and 
Transoxania. For this reason, it is important to look at the major themes in modern 
studies of the eastern dynasties at the outset of this project, in order to understand how 
my approach differs or complements the current views. Typically, the various eastern 
dynasties have been studied as individual entities,
8
 and particular issues or ways of 
understanding have been attached to each individual dynasty. The study of the Ṭāhirids, 
for example, has largely focused on their relationship to the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate as the 
most “Arabized” of the eastern dynasties and the dynasty whose origins are most closely 
tied to a personal relationship with the caliphate. These studies have addressed the 
question of the Ṭāhirid‟s “independent” streak, whether or not they ever intended to 
throw off the overlordship of the ‛Abbāsids,
9
 the cultural orientation of these “Arabized” 
Persians,
10
 and the relationship between their governorships in Khurāsān and high offices 
in the imperial center of Baghdad.
11
  
                                                 
8
 The one notable exception is the combination of the Ṭāhird and Ṣaffārid periods into a single narrative in 
more general historical works. Here, it is the conquest of Ṭāhirid Nīshāpūr by the Ṣaffārids in 259/873 
which connects the two narratives. For example, see C.E. Bosworth, “The Ṭāhirids and Ṣaffārids,” in The 
Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4, The Period from the Arab Invasions to the Saljuqs, ed. R.N. Frye, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 90-135. 
9
 Earlier studies often viewed the Ṭāhirids as rebellious and intent on breaking free from ‛Abbāsid 
authority. See V.V. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, 3
rd
 ed., ed. C. E. Bosworth, (1968; 
repr., New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Pub., 1992), 207-218. This reading of Ṭāhirid loyalties is best 
expressed by C.E. Bosworth, “Soon after his arrival in the east, Ṭāhir began leaving al-Ma‟mūn‟s name out 
of the ḵẖuṭba, and certain coins minted by him in 206/821-2 also omit the caliph‟s name; both these actions 
were virtually declarations of independence from Baghdad. However, at this point he died in Marv 
(207/822). It is obviously difficult to gauge Ṭāhir‟s motives, since we do not know how events might have 
turned out.” Bosworth, “The Ṭāhirids and Ṣaffārids,”  95. This quote appears paraphrased in C.E. 
Bosworth, “Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muṡ‛ab b. Ruzayḳ,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition. 
10
 C.E. Bosworth, “The Tahirids and Arabic Culture,” Journal of Semitic Studies 14 (1969), 45-79 and “The 
Tahirids and Persian Literature,” Iran 7 (1969), 103-106. 
11
 Mongi Kaabi, “Les Origines ṭāhirides dans la da‛wa ‛abbāside,” Arabica 19 (1972), 145-164 and Les 
Ṭāhirides: Etude historic-littéraire de la dynastie des Banū Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn au Ḫurāsān et en Iraq au 
IIIème s. de l’Hégire/IXéme s. J.C., (Paris: Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1983). 
 8 
In studies of the Ṣaffārids, on the other hand, this question of their relationship 
with the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate is almost completely one-sided. As C.E. Bosworth wrote, 
“The dominant motive behind Ya‛qub‟s
12
 actions, in addition to this hatred of the 
‛Abbasids, seems to be a sheer love of military conquest.”
13
 The Ṣaffārids rose from 
plebian roots, the name of the dynasty comes from Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth‟s profession as a 
coppersmith (ṣaffār) before he established himself as the leader of a band of ‛ayyār and, 
eventually, the founder of a political dynasty. They are portrayed as military adventurers 
taking advantage of a weakened caliphate to carve out their own personal domain. The 
earliest studies of the dynasty focused primarily on constructing a historical narrative of 
the Ṣaffārid dynasty, including a lineage of the Ṣaffārid amīrs.
14
 The problems of a 
Ṣaffārid dynastic history became much fewer with the discovery of a unique manuscript 
of the anonymous Tārīkh-i Sīstān in Mashhad in 1925;
15
 and, following this discovery, 
C.E. Bosworth has been at the forefront of creating an authoritative narrative for the 
dynasty.
16
 Recently Deborah Tor has taken up the topic of the Ṣaffārids, focusing on their 
early history as ghāzīs and ‛ayyārs and the religious ideologies which drove them, in 
contrast to their earlier image as pure military adventurers.
17
 Another thread which 
                                                 
12
 Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth (r. 247-265/861-879), the founder of the Ṣaffārid Dynasty. 
13
 C.E. Bosworth, “The Armies of the Saffarids,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 31 
(1968), 536. 
14
 Th. Noldeke, “Yakub the Coppersmith and his Dynasty,” in Sketches of Eastern History, trans. John 
Sutherland Black (London, 1892), 176-202; V.V. Barthold, “Zur Geschichte der Saffariden,” in 
Orientalische Studien zu Theodor Noldeke gewidinet, ed. C. Bezold (Giessen, 1906), 1:171-191 and 
Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasions, 215-218; and Richard Vasmer, “Uber die Münzen der Saffariden 
und ihrer Gegner in Fars und Hurasan,” Numismatiche Zeitschrift 63 (1930), 131-162. 
15
 Tārīkh-i Sīstān, ed. Malik al-Shu‛ara Bahar (Tehran, 1314/1935). 
16
 First with his article Bosworth, “The Armies of the Saffarids,” and later with his book C.E. Bosworth, 
The History of the Saffarids of Sistan and the Maliks of Nimruz (247/861 to 2949/1542-3), (Costa Mesa, 
Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 1994). 
17
 D.G. Tor, “Historical Representations of Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth al-Ṣaffār,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic 
Society, 12 (2002) 247-275; “A Numismatic History of the First Saffarid Dynasty,” Numismatic Chronicle 
162 (2002), 293-314; and Violent Order: Religious Warfare, Chivalry, and the ‛Ayyār Phenomenon in the 
Medieval Islamic World. 
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emerged within the study of the Ṣaffārids focused on their role as Persian nationalists. 
Coming from lowly roots, the Ṣaffārids, in contrast to the highly cultured Ṭāhirids, are 
portrayed as unlearned in Arabic and many have seen them as the first expressions of a 
growing Persian nationalist sentiment.
18
  
The history of the Sāmānids has similarly focused on the role of Persian 
nationalism during their reign. Much of this concern has come from the emergence of 
New Persian as a literary and courtly language under the Sāmānids.
19
 Often, this 
scholarship has focused on particular literary traditions associated with the Sāmānid court 
and has not delved far into the history of the Sāmānid dynasty itself. The political history 
of the Sāmānids themselves has not received much attention.
20
 What has been written 
tends to focus on the Sāmānid military
21
 and their relationship to the rise of the 
Ghaznavids
22
 and the Qarakhānids.
23
 Much attention has been paid to the numismatic 
history of the Sāmānids, especially the unique oversized dirhams containing four to six 
                                                 
18
 Y. Armajani, “The Saffarids: A Study in Iranian Nationalism,” Trud. XXV. Mezhdunarodnogo Kong. 
Vostokovedov, Moscow, 1960, (1963), 168-173; S.M. Stern, “Ya‛qub the Coppersmith and Persian National 
Sentiment,” in Iran and Islam: In Memory of the Late Vladimir Minorsky, ed. C.E. Bosworth (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1971), 535-553. 
19
 Richard Frye, “The Sāmānids,” in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4, The Period from the Arab 
Invasions to the Saljuqs, ed. R.N. Frye, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 136-161 and The 
Golden Age of Persia, (London, 1975), 200-207; Marilyn Robinson Waldman, Towards a Theory of 
Historical Narrative: A Case Study of Perso-Islamicate Historiography, (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1980); Julie Scott Meisami, Persian Historiography to the End of the Twelfth Century, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 15-46; and James E. Montgomery, “Ibn Rusta‟s Lack of „Eloquence,‟ 
the Rus, and Samanid Cosmography,” Edebiyat 12 (2001), 73-93. 
20
 A single large scale study has looked at the political history of the Sāmānids, W. Luke Treadwell, “The 
Political History of the Sāmānid State,” PhD Diss. Oxford University (1991). 
21
 Jürgen Paul, The State and the Military: the Samanid Case, (Bloomington: Indiana University Research 
Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1994). 
22
 E.E. Oliver, “The Decline of the Samanis and the Rise of the Ghaznavis in Mawaraun-Nahr and Part of 
Khurasan,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal 55 (1886), 89-135 along with more general 
works on the Ghaznavids, especially C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and 
Eastern Iran, 944-1040, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1963). 
23
 Sergej Klâštornyj, “Les Samanides et les Karakhanides: une étape initiale de la géopolitique impériale,” 
Cahiers d’Asia centrale 9 (2001), 35-40. 
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times the silver found in other contemporary coins,
24
 and the large numbers of Sāmānid 
dirhams found in Northern and Eastern Europe, evidence of long distance trade between 
the Sāmānids and the Volga Bulghars and Vikings.
25
  
 If we consider the corpus of literature on these three dynasties as a whole, we see 
that the major themes which arise also relate to the role of Khurāsān and Transoxania as a 
frontier region. There are center-periphery questions, focused on the relationship between 
these eastern provinces, the dynasties which ruled them, and the political center in Iraq, 
often phrased in terms of “independent” dynasties acting against the caliphate. The theme 
of Persian nationalism similarly involves integration and acculturation with the Islamic 
world, related directly to the notion of a frontier process. Early Ṣaffārid military interests 
stem from a particular relationship between the dynasty and the frontier itself, as does the 
role of Turkish soldiers and commanders within the Sāmānid military. Finally, there is 
the issue of long distance trade between medieval Central Asia and Northern and Eastern 
Europe, made possible by the particularities of the eastern frontier. 
 This project will pose questions that are not the same as those asked by scholars 
working directly on the histories of these provincial dynasties, but they will address 
similar topics as well as a shared geographical and temporal scope. By preferring to focus 
on the frontier itself rather than the political bodies which ruled it, this alternative 
                                                 
24
 Gilles Hennequin‟s “Grandes monnaies Sāmānides et Ghaznavides de l‟Hindū Kush, 331-421 A.H. – 
Étude numismatique et historique,” Annales Islamologiques 9 (1970), 127-179; Michael Mitchner, The 
Multiple Dirhams of Medieval Afghanistan, (London: Hawkins Publications, 1973); Stephen Album, 
“Sāmānid Oversize Dirhams of the Fourth Century A.H. (Tenth Century A.D.),” The Numismatic 
Chronicle 16 (1976), 248-254; and N.M. Lowick, “On the Dating of Samanid Outsize Dirhams,” The 
Numismatic Circular, 85 (1977), 204-206. 
25
 Tadeusz Lewicki, “Le Commerce des Samanides avec l‟Europe orientale et centrale à la lumière des 
trésors de monnaies coufiques,” in Near Eastern Numismatics, Iconography, Epigraphy and History: 
Studies in Honor of George C. Miles, ed. Dickan K. Kouymjian, (Beirut, 1974), 219-233; Michael 
Mitchiner, “Evidence for Viking-Islamic Trade Provided by Samanid Silver Coinage,” East and West 37 
(1987), 39-150; and Thomas S. Noonan, “Volga Bugharia‟s Tenth-Century Trade with Samanid Central 
Asia,” Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 11 (2000-2001), 140-218. 
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approach should highlight new ways of thinking about some of the questions common 
between the study of the eastern frontier and the study of the eastern dynasties. One 
important difference will be that the histories of each individual dynasty will not be 
treated separately. While it is understood that the Ṭāhirds, Ṣaffārids, and Sāmānids, as 
well as the numerous smaller dynasties found along the eastern frontier, were each unique 
in their approaches to ruling Khurāsān and Transoxania, by approaching them 
collectively, larger dynamics and patterns which developed over the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries can be better observed. 
 
1.4 Scope and Outline 
The overall focus of this study is the eastern frontier of the Islamic world in the 
third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. For the purposes of this project, the region of the 
eastern frontier is being defined as Khurāsān and Transoxania, the easternmost provinces 
of the Islamic world which faced the Inner Asian steppe. Sīstān, which is often connected 
politically to Khurāsān, is excluded for a number of reasons, primarily due to its 
geographical orientation towards the Indian subcontinent.
26
 The focus here will be on the 
northern half of the eastern frontier, the part of the frontier facing the Inner Asian steppe. 
Refining this geographic scope further, the primary focus will be placed on what 
Parvaneh Pourshariati has called “Outer” Khurāsān, those regions of Khurāsān east of the 
Bālkhān, Kürendagh, Kopet Dāgh, and Bīnālūd mountain ranges.
27
 Important urban 
centers in “Inner” Khurāsān, most notably the Ṭāhirid capital of Nīshāpūr, will also be 
                                                 
26
 The omission of Sīstān from the scope of this project also means that the Ṣaffārids, whose homeland was 
in Sīstān, will play a lesser overall part. 
27
 For a description of “Inner” and “Outer” Khurāsān, see Parvaneh Pourshariati, The Decline and Fall of 
the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab Conquests of Iran, (New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 2008), 417-420. 
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discussed, but the primary focus will be on the northern and eastern reaches of the 
province. In the second half of this project, the temporal scope will expand to include 
earlier developments in the region that had important effects on the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries, especially those related to the Arab conquests of the region. 
 This project is organized into two major parts. The first part examines the 
“environment” of the eastern frontier in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, 
focusing primarily on the descriptions of Khurāsān and Transoxania in contemporary 
geographical texts written in Arabic and Persian.
28
 Chapter Two looks at the ways the 
eastern frontier, specifically as a frontier, is represented in the geographic literature. This 
is prefaced by a more theoretical discussion of the nature of frontiers which will provide 
a framework for examining the language of our medieval sources. In Chapter Three, the 
physical make-up of the frontier is examined through a study of the networks of 
fortifications which covered the eastern frontier and connected the urban nodes of 
Khurāsān and Transoxania. This chapter connects the building and maintenance of 
fortifications with the defining of the frontier itself. Chapter Four acts as a transition 
between the first and second parts of the study. Focusing on coinage minted in Khurāsān 
and Transoxania during the third/ninth and fourth/tenth century, this chapter uses 
numismatics to examine the development of economic and political networks across the 
eastern frontier. 
 The second part will take a broader historical approach and focus on the progress 
of certain frontier processes from the Arab conquests to the period of the Sāmānids. 
Chapter Five focuses on the role of the dihqāns, the native Persian landed gentry, as 
landholders and political figures from the Arab conquests until the Sāmānid period. The 
                                                 
28
 A full discussion of the relevant geographical sources appears in Chapter Two. 
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study of this particular social group will compare their positions along the eastern frontier 
with those of the Arab settlers who came to Khurāsān and Transoxania during the 
conquests of the first/seventh and second/eighth centuries and other social groups who 
lived in the region. The sixth chapter looks at the frontier process following the Arab 
conquests which converted not just the populations of Khurāsān and Transoxania to 
Islam, but also redefined the eastern frontier as a specifically Muslim frontier. 
 Throughout this study, the histories of the eastern dynasties will be in the 
background of the discussion, coming to the forefront at times. This is the story of the 
political, cultural, and economic networks which existed in Khurāsān and Transoxania 
during the reign of the eastern dynasties. The concluding chapter will explore the impact 
of the frontier “environment” and the frontier processes which were the focus of the 
earlier chapter on the rise of the eastern dynasties.   
 
1.5 The Geography of the Eastern Frontier 
Before proceeding, a few brief words on the geography of the eastern frontier, Khurāsān, 
and Transoxania are necessary. The eastern frontier of the third/ninth and fourth/tenth 
centuries did not become a frontier with the arrival of Islam; it had been a frontier region 
for as long as historical records are available. The limits of Alexander‟s conquests laid 
roughly along the same frontier. Later it was the frontier between Iran and Tūrān 
immortalized by the Shāhnāma. The geography of the region is essential to understanding 
its role as a frontier and how it retained its frontier status for such a long time. Two 
distinct environmental zones meet along the eastern frontier. To the south, there are the 
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river valleys of Khurāsān and Transoxania. Dominated by the Oxus River/Amu Darya
29
 
and the Jaxartes River/Syr Darya,
30
 “Outer” Khurāsān and Transoxania are watered by 
numerous rivers whose origins are found in the mountain ranges of the Pamir Knot.
31
 
Along these rivers, in river valleys, and around oases, agricultural communities and large 
cities developed as early as the seventeenth century BC.
32
 The rivers and oases provide 
the necessary irrigation for settlement and agricultural production even in the midst of the 
Karakum and Kyzlkum Deserts where large and important cities such as Marw were able 
to grow. The people who lived along the rivers of the eastern frontier before the arrival of 
Islam were primarily of Persian or other Iranian background, such as the Soghdians. 
The river valleys and oases of the south are juxtaposed by the grassy Inner Asian 
steppe to the north, stretching from the Crimea to Manchuria. Unlike the settled 
communities of the south, the steppe was historically dominated by pastoralist nomads. 
The pastoralists of the Inner Asian steppe living closest to the eastern frontier primarily 
belonged to numerous Turkic groups and were referred to collectively by our medieval 
sources as the Turks. Historically people had interacted across this frontier. Merchants 
from the south traded with the Turks and the Turks would venture south and, on 
occasion, had conquered large parts of Transoxania. For example, in the sixth and 
seventh centuries the confederation of the Türk Qağanate ruled Soghdia and Ṭukhāristān.  
The division between the well irrigated river valleys of the south and the dry 
steppe of the north created a geographic division which lasted millennia. The different 
lifestyles which developed on either side of this divide contributed to the sense of this 
                                                 
29
 Called the Jayḥūn by our medieval sources. 
30
 Sometimes called the Sayḥūn by our medieval sources. 
31
 Including the Pamir, Himalayas, Tian Shan, Karakoram, Kunlun, and Hindu Kush ranges. 
32
 Rafis Abazov, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), see notes to “Map 6: Political Map of the Ancient World.” 
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region as a frontier. From the perspective of the Islamic world in the centuries following 
the conquests, the difficulties inherent in expanding agricultural development into the 
steppe made the limits of the fertile regions of the south a somewhat “natural” point at 









Viewing the Eastern Frontier 
 
 
2.1 al-Rāsht and the Gate of Iron 
“[Khurāsān] is the Gate of Turkistān.”
1
 
A number of geographic writers working in Arabic and Persian during the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries refer to al-Rāsht as the furthest point of Khurāsān in its particular 
direction. By describing al-Rāsht in this manner, they define the city as a border. In 
political terms, this is the end of an imperial administrative unit, Khurāsān, the grand 
province of the East. Culturally, it is the dividing line between the Islamic world, 
signified by those areas under a Muslim ruler, and the bilād al-Turk, “the lands of the 
Turks.” The earliest extant author who describes al-Rāsht in these terms, Ibn 
Khurradādhbih (d. 300/911), also tells us that this is the point where the Turks used to 
enter the Muslim territories in order to raid, until al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā b. Khālid b. Barmak 
(d. 183/808), governor of Khurāsān under the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd from 177/792 to 
180/796, built a gate there to protect against such incursions.
2
 These details accentuate 
                                                          
1
 Ḥudūd al-ʽālam, ed. Manūchihr Sutūdih (Tehran: Chāpkhānah-i Danīshgāh-i Tehran, 1340/1962), 88. 
2
 Ibn Khurradādhbih, Kitāb al-masālik wa‟l-mamālik, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, 6. ed. M.J. 
de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1889), 34. 
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the dynamic of this border; first the Turks raid the lands of Islam, and then the Muslims 
take control of the border, in this case by building a gate. Ibn al-Faqīh (d. after 290/902-
903), writing a few decades after Ibn Khurradādhbih, gives a similar description of a gate 
being built to prevent raids by the Turks.
3
 This description of al-Rāsht will continue to 
reappear in geographical texts until the seventh/thirteenth century, when Yāqūt (d. 
626/1229) states in his geographical dictionary that al-Rāsht is where al-Faḍl al-Barmakī 
built a “strong gate.”
4
 
 Other authors who place al-Rāsht at the borders of Khurāsān do not provide these 
same details. al-Yaʽqūbī (d. after 292/905), a contemporary of Ibn Khurradādhbih and 
Ibn al-Faqīh, tells of a “Gate of Iron,” giving both the Persian Dar-i Āhanīn and the 
Arabic Bāb al-Ḥadīd, located north of al-Rāsht, which is the border with the lands of the 
Turks.
5
 Clearly, al-Yaʽqūbī is describing the same place as our previous authors, but 
without the historical details of the construction of the gate or any indication that he 
means this to be a real gate. Qudāma (d. before 337/948), writing in the early fourth/tenth 
century, describes al-Rāsht as “the most distant land of Khurāsān from this direction; it is 
what borders Farghāna, and it is from where the Ghuzz Turks enter.”
6
 Here any mention 
of a gate, real or figurative, is absent.   
The notion of a gate along a border is not entirely unique to al-Rāsht in these 
sources. Ibn Khurradādhbih mentions a Bāb al-Ḥadīd two miles from “the mine of 
                                                          
3
 Ibn al-Faqīh, Mukhtaṣar kitāb al-buldān, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, 5. ed. M.J. de Goeje 
(Leiden: Brill, 1885), 324-325.   
4
 Yāqūt, Mujʽam al-buldān, (Beirut, 1957), 3:15. 
5
 al-Yaʽqūbī , Kitāb al-buldān, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, 7. ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 
1882), 290. 
6
 Qudāma, Kitāb al-kharāj wa ṣinā‛at al-kitāba, ed. Muḥammd Ḥusayn al-Zubaydī, (Baghdad: Dār al-
rashīd li-l-nashr, 1981), 109. 
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silver,” seven farsakhs from al-Shāsh.
7
 Ibn al-Faqīh also mentions a Bāb al-Ḥadīd two 
miles from a silver mine near al-Shāsh, specifying that this silver mine is al-Fanjahīr.
8
 al-
Iṣṭakhrī mentions a Bāb al-Ḥadīd on the road from Bukhārā to Balkh, placing it in 
roughly the same area as al-Rāsht, without describing al-Rāsht or the region as a border 
of any kind.
9
 The fourth/tenth century Persian Ḥudūd al-ʽālam mentions a place known 
as Dar-i Tāziyān, “the Gate of the Arabs,” located on the fringes of Khurāsān. This may 
or may not be al-Rāsht, as it is difficult to tell from the text, but in any case it is here a 
gate through which the caravans go out, having been built between two mountains by the 
Caliph al-Ma‟mūn.
10
 The same text mentions a similar gate far to the east called the Dar-i 
Tubbat, “the Gate of Tibet,” where watchmen levy tolls.
11
 We may even look at modern 
nomenclature and find a place known as Dar-i Āhanīn, a defile in the Baysuntau 
Mountain Range between Balkh and Samarqand, near the modern village of Derbent in 
southern Uzbekistan. 
 All of the authors mentioned here tell us that al-Rāsht is the border of Khurāsān 
while a number of them place a “Gate of Iron” at this location. We can be fairly certain 
that no such gate existed and that the name, either Bāb al-Ḥadīd or Dar-i Āhanīn, was a 
figurative reference to a narrow passage through the mountains.
12
 If these texts are 
therefore not necessarily describing a geographic or historic reality, what do the stories of 
                                                          
7
 Ibn Khurradādhbih, Kitāb al-Masālik wa‟l-mamālik, 27. 
8
 Ibn al-Faqīh, Mukhtaṣar kitāb al-buldān, 327. The location of this mine near al-Shāsh means this is not an 
odd spelling of the famous silver mine of Panjhīr, which is closer to Balkh. 
9
 al-Iṣṭakhrī., al-Masālik wa‟l-mamālik, ed. Muḥammad Jābir ‛Abd al-‛Āl al-Ḥīnī (Cairo: 1381/1961), 188. 
10
 Ḥudūd al-ʽālam, 105. 
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 Ibid., 121. 
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 Barthold does take these passages at face value and states that “To protect the country from their raids 
walls were built in Rāsht, in the neighbourhood of Bukhārā, and in Shāsh.” Vasily Vladimirovich Barthold, 
Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, 3
rd
 ed., ed. C.E. Bosworth, (1968; repr., New Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal Pub., 1992), 201. 
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the gates north of al-Rāsht say about the situation on the ground in the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries along the eastern frontier of the Muslim world? 
 First and foremost, these descriptions of the “Gate of Iron” are evidence for the 
existence of a frontier and a border, a dividing line between the lands of Islam and the 
lands of the Turks. These authors attempt to denote a place where these two realms meet, 
namely al-Rāsht, where people from one side (either raiding Turks or traveling 
merchants) can enter the other side. The way the situation at this particular site along the 
border is described points to the issue of the meaning of borders and frontiers to the 
Islamic world. In all of the sources, with the exception of the Ḥudūd al-ʽālam, this border 
represents danger through the raiding Turks. In some of the sources, this danger can be 
overcome if the Muslims take physical mastery over the border, through the construction 
of a gate. Even in those examples where the frontier is not an actual danger, the frontier is 
still physically mastered through the construction of gates which allow the collection of 
tolls from merchants. 
 
2.2 What Do We Mean by “Frontier”? 
This chapter focuses on a conceptual analysis of the image of the eastern frontier of the 
Muslim world as we find it in the works of contemporary medieval geographers writing 
in Arabic and Persian. The Muslim world can be seen as synonymous with the ʽAbbāsid 
Empire and its successor states such as that of the Sāmānids in the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries for our intents and purposes. This chapter will not be a summary of 
the history of the eastern frontier or its development, which will come in later chapters, 
but will rather provide a conceptual framework for understanding how contemporary 
20 
 
authors viewed the eastern frontier. In order to address this issue, we must first articulate 
the meaning of the term “frontier” itself. The French jurist Geoffre de Lapradelle, writing 
in the early 20
th
 century, explained the necessity of this inquiry. 
Le caractère marquant de la notion de frontière est son universalité d‟acception. De 
l‟homme de rue ou du paysan jusqu‟au politique et au savant, elle est susceptible, selon 
les categories et les classes, de rencontrer les interpretations les plus diverses.
13
 
Lapradelle‟s statement, coming from an interest in the proper application of international 
law, is concerned with the situation in the early twentieth century as colonial empires 
were dissolving and reconfiguring and European border disputes continued until and after 
the First World War, but it can still apply to the present day.   
J.R.V. Prescott, in reviewing theories related to frontiers and boundaries in 1965, 
including Lapradelle‟s, highlighted not just the different meanings people hold for 
frontiers and borders, but the different ways people interact with them in a practical 
sense, in a manner which expands upon Lapradelle‟s sentiment. 
Lawyers, soldiers, and politicians have a practical interest in boundaries. For the lawyer 
they mark the area of contact between separate sovereignties and judicial systems. To the 
soldier they represent the first area which must be defended and the position from which 
attacks must be launched. Lastly, to the politician boundaries mark the limits of 
administration which should be maintained or extended, and the sensitivity to the state‟s 




When we look at ancient and medieval frontiers and borders, we need to approach these 
questions of what we mean by and how we look at borders and frontiers from two 
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 Geouffre de Lapradelle, La frontière: étude du droit international, (Paris: Editions internationales, 1928), 
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directions; one which clarifies our modern understanding of these terms and another 
which focuses on medieval terminology. 
 
2.2.1 Frontiers, Borders, Borderlands, and Boundaries 
First, it is important to clarify the meaning of “frontier” and to disarticulate its meaning 
from the similar concepts of border, borderland, and boundary in a modern, twenty-first 
century context. Often, these terms are treated as interchangeable, but the distinctions 
between them are important and meaningful. Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, 
looking beyond the preference of American scholars for “frontier” and of British scholars 




The terms also imply a conceptual difference. Boundary is often used in diplomatic 
discussions on the precise location of borders, but it also has the more general meaning, 
pointing at the dividing line between different peoples or cultures. When discussing 
psychological differences and when emphasizing regions rather than lines drawn on the 
maps, the term border is normally preferred. Frontier commonly refers to the territorial 
expansion of nations or civilizations into “empty” areas.
16
 
For the purposes of the project at hand, “boundary,” as distinct from “border,” is the least 
applicable term, insofar as we want to use Baud and van Schendel‟s definitions. The idea 
of a diplomatically negotiated boundary existing over a millennium ago in Central Asia, 
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 Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,” Journal of 
World History 8 (1997): 213. For a detailed discussion of the development of the differences between 
British and American uses of the term “frontier,” see Fulmer Mood, “Notes on the History of the Word 
“Frontier”,” Agricultural History 22 (1948): 78-83. 
16
 Baud and van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,” 213. 
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much less anywhere else in the world, is highly improbable, even if we can use the 
concept of boundary to identify, by distinction, the definition of frontier. 
It is clear that the eastern frontier of the medieval Muslim world through Central 
Asia is a division between two political and/or cultural zones, not necessarily marked on 
a map, but rather negotiated, and constantly negotiating, through a series of historical 
circumstances. It is important to keep in mind that, in a real sense, borders are defined by 
the actual power that states wield over their own societies.
17
 Thus the border, as a 
meaningful expression of the extent of a state, represents the extent to which a state can 
convince populations, forcibly or not, that they belong to and should participate in life on 
one side of a border as opposed to another. The definition of a physical border is often a 
negotiation between a centralized authority and the populations living in proximity to the 
border, in the borderlands, and may remain open to negotiation indefinitely as people 
choose to accept or ignore a border as it suits them.
18
 In cases where another political or 
military power lies across the border, borders also represent a point of equilibrium 
between the strengths of the two powers, as argued by Jacques Ancel in 1938 in response 
to German designs on French territories.
19
 The difference between border and frontier, as 
we understand it, often pivots on how one sees the territory on the other side of the line.  
Borders divide two groups that are differentiated politically, culturally, or by a 
combination of the two.   
                                                          
17
 Ibid., 215.  Here Baud and van Schendel are discussing formation of borders in a modern, and 
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Frontiers on the other hand mark the limit of a state, or at least its ability to wield 
power, into an “empty” space open to expansion. Frontiers, in this sense, do not 
recognize those people living across the line as having an equal standing or claim to 
sovereignty; they convey an understanding of dynamic territorial change. This is best 
illustrated by those frontiers which stand out most clearly in our mind. For example, the 
American West, where a whole continent stretched out inviting territorial expansion by a 
state which claimed a manifest destiny to master the land; or Space, the “final frontier,” 
where a whole universe seems open to mankind‟s exploration and exploitation. 
 
2.2.2 Ḥadd and Thaghr: Classical Arabic Terminology for Borders and Frontiers 
The second way we must look at the question of what we mean by frontier and border is 
to examine how such terms were understood by our literary sources and by the people 
inhabiting this study. As we move backwards in time and think about the terminology 
applicable to the third/ninth and fourth/tenth century geographers, we should think about 
how the differences between our understandings of borders and frontiers have developed 
since then. The conceptual divide between a line separating political and cultural groups 
organized around centralized states and an opening into land available for territorial 
expansion depends upon an understanding of an inalienable sovereignty of states. On the 
one hand, this is the fulcrum on which the distinction between boundary and border made 
by Baud and van Schendel lies. A boundary is the result of a “Westphalian concept” of 
sovereignty and territoriality, which turns a conceptual border into a diplomatically 
negotiated line. The sacrosanct status of boundaries, borders, and the states defined by 
those boundaries and borders – a sacrosanct status which requires us to think of spaces 
24 
 
open to territorial expansion in different terms, frontiers - is a function of a world which 
encourages international cooperation towards maintaining peace. Of course, such a 
situation which promoted the mutual sovereign rights of nations did not exist in medieval 
Central Asia.   
The terms that the medieval geographers used for borders and frontiers have their 
own nuances which need to be examined. Ḥadd (pl. ḥudūd) is most often translated, in a 
geographical context, as border, boundary, or limit. In more general usage, including the 
realm of theology, ḥadd denotes a limit or finiteness, which then carries on to mean 
“definition” in that the limits of a thing define that thing.
20
 Defining ḥadd in such a way 
gives us a meaning similar to our understanding of border as a dividing line between 
political and cultural groups in that such a border defines the limits of a state and 
therefore the state itself. In the sense that a ḥadd is a limit, it also fits with our 
understanding of a border as being defined by the extent to which a state can effectively 
wield power. The border is the physical representation of that limit of power.   
The Arabic term ḥadd should be paired with thughūr, the plural of thaghr, usually 
defined as frontier. As ḥadd has a basic meaning of “limit,” thughūr has a basic meaning 
of “gaps,” “breaches,” or “openings” and typically applies to “points of entry between the 
Dār al-Islām and the Dār al-Ḥarb beyond it.”
21
 More specifically, al-thughūr, as a 
definitive or specified noun (i.e., “the frontier”), points to one of two frontier regions of 
pre-modern history, the Arab-Byzantine frontier in south-eastern Anatolia and the 
marches between Arab and Christian kingdoms on the Iberian Peninsula. However, Arab 
and Persian geographers use the term more widely to discuss any point on the fringes of 
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the Dār al-Islām or Islamic world from the Mediterranean coast of North Africa to the 
eastern frontier of Central Asia where invasions from the outside may take place. As gaps 
or openings, thughūr are focused on potential entry points for foreign threats but also 
potential exit points for aggressive military action. 
The difference between the conceptual meaning of frontier and thughūr is 
important for us to consider. Frontier is a word which implies expansion into “open” or 
“empty” territory. Thughūr implies the danger of outside intrusion through “openings,” 
meaning that there is someone occupying the opposite side who desires your territory 
and/or property. Yet both include an idea of the potential for dynamic territorial changes, 
unlike border and ḥadd which have a more static resonance. Keeping in mind that both 
frontier and thughūr hold a potential for changes in territorial possession, we need to 
think in terms of the changes in geopolitical notions that took place between the tenth and 
twenty-first centuries. For the English speaker, “frontier” implies the possibility of 
territorial expansion because the territory beyond the frontier is seen as open, vacant, and 
available because no one has legitimate claims to it. Thughūr implies the possibility, and 
perhaps the imperative, of territorial expansion, or simultaneously the threat of 
contraction, for the very reason that the territory beyond the frontier is occupied by 
someone else.  
In his article “Jihad and the Modern World,” Sherman Jackson explains the effect 
of the changing historical dynamic at play here in the context of the role of jihād as “holy 
war,” in order to address the post-9/11 “mantra” that “Islam is a religion of peace.”
22
 The 
important argument to understand here is that the pre-modern world existed in a constant 
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“state of war,” compared to the modern assumed “state of peace” assured by institutions 
like the United Nations. Jackson notes Jonathan Fletcher‟s summary of the situation in 
pre-modern Europe, namely that “individual lords had to engage in warfare to save 
themselves and their families.  If they did not, then sooner or later they would be 
overtaken by another lord and have to submit to his rule or be killed.”
23
 Such dynamics 
between neighbors drives the idea that a frontier, which exists in a situation where 
dynamic territorial change is a possibility, is actually defined by the presence of a 
competing power, whereas a border is defined by the lack of a competing power, and thus 
symbolizes the extent to which a state may actually wield effective power. Without 
assured sovereignty, a shared border represented a danger that can only be completely 
removed through aggressive action. 
There is one serious drawback to understanding the idea of frontiers and 
borderlands in such terms as these. By proceeding in this way, we define the physical and 
geographic frontier and borderland in terms of a centralized state versus its periphery. 
Studies of frontiers, borders, and borderlands have indeed tended towards a focus and 
view from the center, privileging the role of borders in defining centralized states. Much 
as the term ḥadd can mean the definition of a thing by exposing the limits of that thing, 
frontiers, borders, and borderlands are examined in an attempt to define the centralized 
state by the limits of its periphery. If one is to work from this perspective, it is the 
presence of a state, or states, which cause a frontier, border, or borderland to exist in the 
first place; similarly, these regions are important because of their relationship to the state. 
It is difficult to move away from such an image since, in fact, these phenomena are 
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intimately tied to the existence of a territorial entity like a state. At the same time though, 
this view of frontiers, borders, and borderlands privileges the presence of the center in the 
periphery in a way that seeks to homogenize the state in unrealistic ways. 
 
2.3 The Modern Historiography of Frontiers and Borders 
You may ransack the catalogues of libraries, you may search the indexes of celebrated 




Lord Curzon made the preceding remarks on the subject of frontiers at a time when four-
fifths of all political treaties and conventions concerned frontiers and the British Empire 
controlled twenty-one thousand miles of frontier in Canada, India, and Africa.
25
 He was 
also making this statement in the midst of a growth of literature on this topic, much of it 
interested in the political importance of frontiers. The following portion of this chapter 
will provide a largely chronological examination of the theories on frontiers and borders 
developed over the last century and a quarter among American and Western European 
scholars. The intent of this discussion is to provide a framework for examining and 
understanding the ways our medieval authors viewed the eastern frontier. 
 
2.3.1 Frontiers and the American West 
The historiography of frontier studies in the United States has been largely driven by the 
historical experience of westward expansion. At the center of this has been Fredrick 
Jackson Turner whose thesis, summarized as “The existence of an area of free land, its 
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continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain 
American development,”
26
 has become so familiar in studies of the American West that 
some have declared that “even to summarize it is to engage in ritual.”
27
 Turner first 
presented his argument in a lecture entitled “The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History” given in 1893, a year after the U.S. Census Bureau had declared the American 
frontier closed. Turner delivered this lecture at a meeting of the American Historical 
Association in Chicago, held in conjunction with the Columbian Exposition. He argued 
that the frontier is a “process” whereby people of different cultures struggle with each 
other over economic resources and political power across a frontier zone and that these 
struggles are reflected back upon the political center, often driving the political and 
economic development of that center.
28
 For the American West, the key part of this 
process is that the interaction between European immigrants and the wilderness of 
America created an American identity distinct from its European origins. However, what 
is of primary interest to this study is the more general notion of a frontier process: that the 
frontier is a zone in which negotiation occurs between conflicting parties over limited 
resources and that such interactions generate a specific frontier society uniquely different 
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from the society of the center. Even though many aspects of Turner‟s work have been 
debated over the years,
29
 his idea that the frontier creates competition which results in the 
creation of a unique, hybrid identity has survived and flourished.   
Following Turner in the American historiography of frontier studies, Walter 
Prescott Webb, writing in the 1930‟s through the 1950‟s, brought to light a number of 
important points related to the distinction between the American frontier and the 
European use of the term frontier, which was often more akin to the American usage of 
border. 
The American thinks of the frontier as lying within, and not at the edge of a country. It is 
not a line to stop at, but an area inviting entrance. Instead of having one dimension, 
length, as in Europe, the American frontier has two dimensions, length and breadth. In 




Webb reinforces the notion that the frontier is a zone, with depth as well as length. He 
also brings forward the important idea that frontiers move outward as states expand. In 
describing frontiers as both transient and temporal, he not only emphasizes the movement 
of the frontier, but also the process by which a frontier matures beyond its frontier status. 
 
2.3.2 European Frontiers 
The European historiography of frontiers and borders has focused more on conditions 
where states meet at the frontier or border. In this way, the densely-packed European 
continent has flavored writing and thinking on the topic as much as the open spaces of the 
American West have influenced American writers.   
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 Contemporary with Frederick Jackson Turner, Friedrich Ratzel demonstrated how 
these differences between conditions in Europe and America developed different 
arguments about frontiers and borders. Writing in 1895, Ratzel described how national 
borders were arbitrary when it came to the identities and cultures of the people on either 
side of the border. He argued that borderlands (Grenzraum) have three distinct parts, two 
of which are peripheries of the two states which meet at the border and the third is a zone 
which crosses the political border where elements of both sides have mingled.
31
 With this 
understanding, he describes the border (Grenzlinie) as an abstraction of a complex and 
intermingled borderland (Grenzraum).
32
 Ratzel emphasizes the concept of the borderland 
to express the unique zone surrounding the linear national border where the influences of 
the two neighboring states are in active competition. This is similar to the arguments of 
Turner and Webb, but the wilderness has been replaced with a foreign state.   
 The recognition that borders are abstractions and do not accurately reflect geo-
political and cultural realities led to many discussions of natural versus artificial borders. 
Charles Bungay Fawcett made an interesting contribution to this discussion in 1918. By 
demonstrating that no natural phenomenon has hard and fast linear borders, he argued 
that all intersections between two phenomena result in a transitional zone, as in the tidal 
zone between the ocean and the land. Following this reasoning, Fawcett argued that, 
while all geographic regions are transitional, it is only when the transitional feature is the 
dominant characteristic that the region becomes a true frontier.
33
 Fawcett argued this 
point mainly on the basis of cultural, linguistic, and ethnic conditions, demonstrating that 
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it was the transition between different groups of people in a super-national manner that 
defined a frontier zone. 
 Lucien Febvre, one of the founding figures of the Annales School of history, 
argued against the notion of natural borders in his 1922 work La terre et l‟évolution 
humaine, a work that is framed largely as a refutation of Ratzel, stating that so-called 
natural frontiers are themselves goals of expansion and limits of desire which can be 
violated at any time, citing the example of the Normans‟ violation of the natural border of 
the sea to conquer the Saxons.
34
 It is the people behind state expansion and formation 
who set the so-called natural borders, not the natural borders that determine the shape of 
the state or its ambitions, and as expansion continues, new natural borders may be 
defined. Accordingly, it is not the study of borders and frontiers that are most important 
to Febvre but, rather, it is their development and the histories and motivations of the 
people who formed the states which are at the center of these borders and frontiers. “La 
chronologie des limites, rien de plus important. Il ne faut jamais ratiociner sur des limites 
considérées comme constantes.”
35
 Borders and frontiers are constantly moving as states 
expand and contract. 
Febvre‟s description of the movement of borders and frontiers has implications 
for the people living in proximity to a border or frontier. Returning to Ancel‟s argument, 
written in 1938, that a border represents an equilibrium between two states, we find that 
the border is the line between two states negotiated at their centers.
36
 Because this 
process is largely a political negotiation, the intermingling of cultural elements from both 
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sides of the border does not receive the preeminent consideration. Therefore, the line 
drawn on a map is an abstraction of a complex zone of exchange which crosses the 
border, the frontier zone or borderland, leaving a mixed population who may have more 
in common with similar populations living on the other side of the border than with their 
fellow countrymen. Such sentiment can be seen in the work of Stanley R. Ross on the 
Mexican-U.S. border, which he describes as “a region where two different civilizations 
face each other and overlap.”
37
 The defining characteristic of a borderland, then, is that it 
is a zone defined by a border which runs through it. The assumption here is that there are 
shared traits within the borderland, found on both sides of the political border, which 
make the borderland culturally distinct from the political centers lying on either side. 
Borderlands “have their own social dynamics and historical developments”
38
 which differ 
from the more centrally located regions of the states found on either side. 
 
2.3.3 The Frontiers and Borders of the Roman Empire 
Growing out of these theories came a sub-field of borderland studies which has sought to 
apply these ideas developed around particular contemporary issues to historical 
circumstances. The main argument of borderland studies has emphasized the transitional 
and liminal natures of borderlands as well as of frontiers. For instance, recent studies of 
the Roman frontiers have tried to disentangle borders (and thereby borderlands) from 
frontiers as well. Green and Perleman in their work on the archaeology of frontiers and 
boundaries have argued that frontiers reflect political and economic expansion, whereas 
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boundaries concern the interaction and exchange between two social and economic 
systems.
39
 Here Green and Perleman rely on that primary function of frontiers discussed 
earlier, as places where territorial expansion and contraction are possible, while they 
continue to emphasize the necessary dialogue between two or more states to constitute a 
border. C.R. Whittaker, writing on Roman frontiers, has responded to Green and 
Perleman by saying that “while Roman boundaries could be identified territorially 
(sometimes by marker stones, cadasters, monuments and the like), frontiers remained 
dynamic, but ill-defined zones of power.”
40
 
Taking these ideas as a whole, we may define frontiers as loosely-organized 
liminal zones of transition on the periphery of states where territorial expansion or 
contraction is possible. From our understanding that these are ill-defined zones of 
transition, we may infer that there exists a dynamic whereby the central authorities strive 
to become the dominant force, even as the extent of their power remains in a process of 
negotiation. During this period of negotiation, it is often noted that those people living 
along a border or frontier tend to resemble those immediately on the other side of the 
border or frontier more strongly than they resemble those living at their respective 
centers.
41
 As frontier zones mature, the state may expand into new frontier zones which 
will then begin a similar process all over again. 
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2.4 Frontiers and the Muslim World   
As we move back towards the question of the eastern frontier of the medieval Muslim 
world, we find that many scholars have taken an approach which privileges the frontier in 
their studies of Islamic history, putting the agency for state and cultural development in 
the hands of actors living on the edges of the state or cultural sphere. These scholars have 
applied such an approach to various aspects of Islamic history, some more directly than 
others. Khalid Yahya Blankinship‟s study of the fall of the Umayyad Dynasty has created 
an image of the Umayyad collapse as the result of the end of imperial expansion and the 
inward redirection of efforts by people living along the frontiers.
42
 For Blankinship, the 
end of expansionist jihād meant that attentions and energies were now re-focused on the 
proper organization and establishment of the center, resulting in the ʽAbbāsid Revolution. 
Such a view is shared by Patricia Crone, who, while not directly addressing the frontier, 
has argued that major political upheavals in early Islamic history were primarily 
concerned with renegotiating and reorganizing the dynamics of the center rather than 
overthrowing, avoiding, or doing away with it.
43
 Accordingly, for both Blankinship and 
Crone, the greater narrative of early Islamic history is one which is based primarily in 
negotiations taking place on the frontiers of the Muslim world. Here, however, we need 
to keep an important distinction in mind. While we often see frontiers as the very 
periphery of states, the experiences of the Arab-Muslim conquests of the first/seventh and 
second/eighth centuries rapidly created an empire which consisted largely of frontier or, 
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at least, of territory that had recently been conquered and whose relationship to the Arab-
Muslim powers had to be negotiated at a time when territorial expansion was still moving 
forward at full force. Linda Darling has pointed out, for example, that the assassination of 
the Caliph ʽUthmān in Medina in 35/655 was the result of frontier interests coming to 
roost in the capital.
44
 
Using a less political approach, Richard Bulliet has made a convincing argument 
for the preeminent role of the frontiers in defining religious doctrine, in his Islam: The 
View from the Edge.
45
 Bulliet argues that too much attention has been paid to the effect of 
political centers on the development of Muslim belief and that real power of change and 
evolution were located away from the political center, among groups of believers brought 
together by local religious leaders. At its core, Bulliet‟s argument is very much like 
Turner‟s. It is in the process of frontier, where various groups - in his case Arab Muslims 
and Persian converts - intermingle and compete, that a new and distinct identity is 
developed. Bulliet‟s thesis can also be connected to the ʽAbbāsid era and frontier warfare, 
specifically along the Arab-Byzantine frontier, in the work of Michael Bonner who 
shows the defining of the frontier and the motivations for volunteer fighters of the jihād 
as paralleled with the development of the more scholarly and legalistic traditions in Sunni 
Islam and the resulting reactions and responses of the political centers.
46
 
Bonner‟s writing on the Arab-Byzantine frontier is of further importance here due 
to his interest in the region attached to the frontier known as the ʽawāṣim. The ʽawāṣim 
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was the region south of the Arab-Byzantine thughūr or frontier and was often considered 
to be a buffer zone between the frontier and the political centers of Syria during the 
Umayyad period and then Iraq during the ʽAbbāsid era. It was a place of retreat and a 
final line of defense beyond the directly militarized frontier. In Bonner‟s argument 
though, the ʽawāṣim become something more akin to the peripheries of state in Ratzel‟s 
three-tiered borderland. While the thughūr are a frontline frontier where fighting and 
expansion takes place, the ʽawāṣim are a place of settlement, where the negotiations of 
frontier are becoming more finalized in favor of the Caliphate.
47
 Bonner‟s arguments here 
highlight the possibility that if a frontier as a zone of possible expansion and territorial 
dynamism exists, then what lies behind it may be former frontiers which are maturing 
and where the negotiations about political power which take place along frontiers are 
coming to a conclusion.  Bonner‟s argument, however, focuses on these developments 
from a legalistic perspective rooted within particular textual traditions, leaving many 
questions as to how such a development may have actually occurred on the ground. 
Linda Darling has shown in her study of Ottoman origins a particular tension - 
visible in different literary genres, epic poems and religious catechisms - between the 
inhabitants of frontiers and borderlands and representatives of the central Ottoman 
authorities typical of the tensions at the heart of many of the issues important to 
borderland studies. 
The epic celebrated individual heroism that took advantage of the boundarylessness of 
border society to make friends, converts, and marriages among the putative enemy, 
extolled the bonds of comradeship and the acquisition and generous disposal of personal 
wealth, and in general embodied the romantic and individualistic aspects of border 
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warfare. The catechism, on the other hand, sought precisely to set controls on the fluidity 
of border society, to impose boundaries between warriors identified primarily as Muslims 
and their unbelieving opponents, and to interpose the state and its demands into the 
collection of wealth and the disposition of the spoils of campaign.
48
 
Darling‟s case study of frontier warfare in the early Ottoman period demonstrates this 
tension between the realities of frontier society and the ideals imposed upon it by the 
constraints of a centralized state. While she emphasizes the tensions at play, she also 
brings to light the fantasy of a state which shares a homogenous identity from center to 
periphery. 
For many of these approaches, the role of the frontier which emerges is one which 
reflects back upon the political center. Blankinship‟s thesis results in a revolution which 
overturns the center, while Crone argues that revolutionary movements did not seek to 
remove themselves from the center, but rather to alter the center. Bulliet‟s argument 
shows the frontier acculturating itself with the dominant society of the center, in this case 
through certain expressions of Muslim religion and culture, but then reconfiguring the 
culture of the dominant society to meet its own needs. Bonner focuses on the interaction 
between what is often seen as the predominant occupation of frontiers, warfare and its 
conduct, with the expression of dominant religious and political ideologies at the center at 
a time when a frontier is maturing into a region without the characteristic attributes of a 
frontier. Similarly, Darling shows the tension between the dominant ideologies of the 
center and the lived experiences of the frontier. All told, the focus here is on a dichotomy 
between the center and the periphery, but with an emphasis on the agency of the 
periphery in determining the direction of the center. Accordingly, these studies overturn 
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long-held views of the periphery as entirely subjected to the center, while still preserving 
an emphasis on the relationship between center and periphery.   
 What stands out in the work of Blankinship, Crone, Bulliet, Bonner, and Darling 
is the role of conquest in defining the extent of frontier. If frontiers are ill-defined zones 
of transition and negotiation, then the whole of the Muslim world in the first centuries of 
its history can be seen as either one large frontier or as a series of frontiers.
49
 Seeing the 
Muslim world in this light gives us an understanding of just how much geographic depth 
a frontier may have and how long this period of negotiation along the frontier may last. It 
may even be possible to read the history of the various civil wars and revolts of the first 
centuries of Muslim history in a manner similar to Blankinship and Crone, as a period in 
which the center itself was also a frontier. It is also possible to read the development of 
early history of the Muslim world through Turner‟s ideas and see the availability of land 
open for conquest, the spoils produced by this conquest, and the negotiation between the 
Muslims and conquered peoples as the key factors in the development of the Muslim 
world in this early period. These ideas of geographic depth and long duration of 
negotiation must be kept in mind as we proceed to the eastern frontier itself.  
 
2.5 The Arabic and Persian Geographical Writers of the Third/Ninth and 
Fourth/Tenth Centuries 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the conceptual understanding of the eastern 
frontier found in a series of works, primarily geographic in content, written in Arabic and 
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Persian from the third/ninth to fourth/tenth centuries. These works are considered 
geographic because they take as their primary focus the description of the world of their 
time. Within this broad framework there is much variety from one author to the next as to 
how this material is presented. Before continuing to a discussion of these authors‟ 
presentation of the eastern frontier, a brief note regarding each author and his work is 
necessary. 
Here we will divide these authors between the two schools of thought into which 
the Arabic geographical writers of the medieval period tend to be categorized, the so-
called Iraqī and Balkhī Schools. We will present them in roughly chronological order 
within each school. The identification of an Iraqī and Balkhī School of geographic 
writing is largely a modern construction. The Balkhī School, which begins with the 
founding figure of Abū Zayd al-Balkhī (d. 322/934), shows more signs of consciously 
being a school of thought, with each subsequent member of the school working closely 
with and borrowing heavily from the texts of his predecessors. The Iraqī School, in 
contrast, is largely defined by those geographers who went before the Balkhī School; 
many of them lived and wrote in Iraq and made Iraq the center or starting point of their 
texts. Brief biographies of the authors and the influence of their background on their 
approach to geography will be covered. Their texts will then be presented with special 
emphasis on their systems for organizing the world between itineraries which move 
readers through both the text and the world described by the text and administrative 
districts which try to organize the world into discrete units. The place of the eastern 
frontier within the grand itineraries of these texts will be explored, demonstrating how the 
region fits within a particular author‟s greater understanding of the world. 
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2.5.1 The Iraqī School of Administrative Geography 
Beyond the fact that the majority of the geographical writers of the Iraqī School were 
associated with imperial administration - especially Ibn Khurradādhbih (director of the 
posts and intelligence), al-Ya‛qūbī (secretary of the Ṭāhirid Dynasty in Khurāsān), and 
Qudāma (bureaucrat in the office of control and audit) – the texts produced by these 
authors appear to have an administrative purpose and style. Adam Silverstein has 
suggested that the emergence of this genre of literature within an administrative context 
is not the product of an imperial administration “whose empire is still being built of 
whose borders have yet to be fixed. Rather, these works set out to delineate in a practical 
manner the various regions of the known world and the major routes that link them as a 
summary of the status quo…”
50
 In this sense, the tradition of medieval geographical 
literature in the Islamic world is one of the end results of a long process of empire 
building. These texts lay claim to a territory which is under Muslim authority and, in a 
symbolic or figurative manner, play out the successes of the Arab-Muslim conquests and 
the consolidation of political authority under the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate by systematically 
describing the territories which make up the Islamic world. Insomuch, Silverstein makes 
a strong connection between the production of the earliest administrative geographical 





 geographical work in Arabic which has survived 
in something resembling its original form is the Kitāb al-masālik wa‟l-mamālik of Abu 
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„l-Qāsim ʽUbayd Allāh b. ʽAbd Allāh b. Khurradādhbih (b. 205/820 or 211/825, d. 
300/911).
53
 Ibn Khurradādhbih holds a unique place in the medieval Arabic geographical 
literature not only for the earliness of his text but also for his position as the ṣāḥib al-
barīd wa „l-khabar (director of posts and intelligence) under the Caliph al-Muʽtamid (r. 
256-279/870-892). Many of Ibn Khurradādhbih‟s writings, of which we know of nine but 
only have access to four, appear to be strongly influenced by his relationship with the 
court of al-Muʽtamid and his official role as ṣāḥib al-barīd.
54
 The text of the Kitāb al-
masālik wa‟l-mamālik itself takes on a form which implies a strong connection to Ibn 
Khurradādhbih‟s official function as ṣāḥib al-barīd, consisting primarily of itineraries 
which we can safely assume to be related to the ʽAbbāsid postal routes of the time. While 
presenting the lands of the caliphate, Ibn Khurradādhbih‟s approach is far from 
descriptive. Instead, the text tends towards long lists of cities, villages, and resting places 
with distances between each, a rather traditionally-formed itinerary.
55
 What details are 
given tend to be associated with the needs of travelers, most commonly highlighting 
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difficulties a traveler may encounter on a particular stage of an itinerary, or provide some 
information about political situations along a given itinerary.
56
 His itineraries are divided 
up as they reach major stopping points, usually defined by their role as local 
administrative centers. When he reaches such an administrative center, he may break 
from the straight itinerary and give a short description of the city, typically focusing on 
the presence of different military or government facilities, and a list of cities and villages 
which are dependent upon the city. Ibn Khurradādhbih begins his description of the 
Mamlakat al-Islām, “the Realm of Islam,” with Iraq and then proceeds to the other 
regions of the Islamic world. After Iraq, however, lands to its east, al-Mashriq, receive 
pride of place. Ibn Khurradādhbih‟s initial itineraries follow the path from Baghdad to 
Khurāsān and then across Transoxania. It is only after this description of the itineraries in 
the points furthest east that he returns west to fill out Fārs and southwestern Iran. 
 Contemporary with Ibn Khurradādhbih was Abu „l-Abbās Aḥmad b. Abī Yaʽqūb 
b. Jaʽfar b. Wahb b. Wādiḥ, more commonly known as al-Yaʽqūbī (d. after 292/905). 
Like Ibn Khurradādhbih, al-Yaʽqūbī came from an administrative background. He was a 
trained member of the secretarial class and served under the Ṭāhirids in Khurāsān until 
259/872-873, when the Ṭāhirids fell to the  affārids.  al-Yaʽqūbī then settled in Egypt 
where he wrote and lived until his death. This administrative background is apparent in 
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al-Yaʽqūbī‟s two major works: his Ta‟rīkh,
57
 a universal history from Creation to the 
reign of al-Muʽtamid that employs such administrative sources as letters, speeches, and 
lists, and his Kitāb al-buldān,
58
 an administrative geography of the Mamlakat al-Islām 




 Much like Ibn Khurradādhbih, al-Yaʽqūbī begins his Kitāb al-buldān with 
descriptions of Baghdad and Sāmarrā‟ followed by a long itinerary leading from Iraq to 
Transoxania and the lands of the Turks. His itineraries are nowhere as detailed as those of 
Ibn Khurradādhbih, his focus is on administrative centers and, instead of measuring 
distances in farsakhs, al-Yaʽqūbī measures his stages in days traveled between 
administrative centers, leaving out the smaller villages and way stations that Ibn 
Khurradādhbih includes. al-Yaʽqūbī has a greater interest in administrative divisions, 
making administrative centers the key organizing feature of his geography. As he reaches 
each administrative center, he gives information about the cities and districts which 
depend upon it (these are often overlooked in his itineraries), key political figures who 
reside in the city or have authority over the region, and the land tax for the region. For al-
Yaʽqūbī, administrative districts are organized around large and important cities with a 
number of dependent cities, villages, and agricultural regions under their authority. al-
Yaʽqūbī is keenly interested in the history of these regions, explaining the conditions 
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under which a region was conquered but also giving long and detailed accounts of the 
succession of governors over a given province.
60
 These histories begin with the initial 
conquest of the province and continue up to the author‟s lifetime. Within this long list of 
governors, al-Yaʽqūbī gives details about the conditions under which they were appointed 
and by whom as well as the conditions under which they lost their position. The 
narratives provided here give a great amount of detail about the complex politics of the 
region for roughly two centuries. al-Yaʽqūbī‟s descriptions of cities show a fairly regular 
pattern, with his primary interests being the date and situation under which a place was 
conquered by the Muslims and by whom, the condition of its water, the ethnic makeup of 
the population, and its annual kharāj or land tax. The social and historical focus in al-
Ya‛qūbī‟s work highlighted by these interests is noted by André Miquel as a key step in 
the development of a field of human geography in the medieval Islamic world.
61
 
 Writing around the same time as Ibn Khurradādhbih and al-Yaʽqūbī is Abu Bakr 
Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Hamadhānī, known as Ibn al-Faqīh. Little is known of the life 
of Ibn al-Faqīh. Only his Kitāb al-buldān
62
 survives but in an abridged form, taken from 
four known manuscripts. A few bits of information about his life have been culled from 
this text and references found in the works of Ibn Nadīm, al-Muqaddasī, and Yāqūt. On 
this basis, it is estimated that he compiled his Kitāb al-buldān sometime around the years 
289-290/902-903, on the basis of his references to the caliphs al-Muʽtaḍid (r. 279-
289/892-902) and al-Muktafī (r. 289-295/902-908). What is most noted about his text is 
that, especially in comparison to his contemporaries and predecessors, Ibn al-Faqīh had a 
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strong interest in adab, which al-Muqaddasī referred to as a series of irrelevant 
digressions.
63
 It is somewhat ironic but certainly not absurd or impossible, then, that 
Miquel has identified Ibn al-Faqīh as the model which bridged the gap between earlier 
technical and administrative geographies and the later human geographies epitomized by 
al-Muqaddasī.
64
 In many ways, it can be said that Ibn al-Faqīh‟s text is much closer to the 
works of the Balkhī School than the Iraqī School. This interest of Ibn al-Faqīh‟s brings a 
combination of folklore, poetry, history, and religious traditions into his text. These 
traditions span the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods, emphasizing, at least in his 
discussions of Khurāsān and Transoxania, the origins of cities, the deeds of pre-Islamic 
rulers, the conquest of Khurāsān, the role of the Khurāsānīs in the ʽAbbāsid revolution, 
and the origins of important Khurāsānī families such as the Barmakids and the Ṭāhirids. 
Ibn al-Faqīh‟s interest in poetry is apparent in a work of Ibn al-Faqīh‟s listed by Ibn 
Nadīm as a no longer extant “work on the best recent (Arabic) poets.”
65
 Another aspect of 
Ibn al-Faqīh‟s broader interests is found in his inclusion of discussions on Qurʽanic 
passages, ḥadīth, and other religious traditions referring to the geographic regions he is 
describing, but here we should note that, as Yāqūt mentions, both Ibn al-Faqīh and his 
father were well-known traditionists and that the inclusion of such material relates to this 
aspect of his life.
66
 
 In understanding the content of Ibn al-Faqīh‟s Kitāb al-buldān, it is important to 
note that the text we are working with is based on four manuscripts, all of them 
                                                          
63
 al-Muqaddasī, Aḥsan al-taqāsīm fī maʽrifat al-aqālīm, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, 3 ed. 
M.J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1906), 5, a. 
64
 Miquel, La géographie humaine du monde musulman jusqu‟au milieu du 11e siècle, 187-189. Miquel 
dedicates an entire chapter, chapter five, to Ibn al-Faqīh and the development of human geography. 
65
 H. Massé, “Ibn al-Faḳīh,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition. 
66
 Yāqūt, Irshād al-arīb ilā maʽrifat al-adīb [Muʽjam al-udabā‟], ed. I. ʽAbbas (Beirut, 1993), 1:459-460; 
Massé, “Ibn al-Faḳīh.” 
46 
 
abridgements of the original text.
67
 This makes it difficult for us to understand the 
organization of Ibn al-Faqīh‟s text with any certainty. In de Goeje‟s edition, Khurāsān, 
Transoxania, and the lands of the Turks come at the very end of the text, but the loss of 
the introduction and conclusion makes it difficult to say if this was the author‟s original 
intent. In comparing Ibn al-Faqīh‟s coverage of different regions, we see that Iran 
receives pride of place in terms of numbers of pages, followed by Arabia and Iraq. When 
it comes to the actual content of the text, Ibn al-Nadīm noted that much of Ibn al-Faqīh‟s 
work is a compilation of previous authors, especially al-Jayhānī,
68
 and in reference to the 




 Qudāma b. Jaʽfar al-Kātib‟s biography is similarly difficult to decipher from the 
limited and often contradictory information we have available. He was born as early as 
260/873-874 and died as late as 337/948. He was a convert from Christianity, having 
converted during the reign of al-Muktafī (r. 289-295/902-908).
70
 He appears to have been 
a life-long bureaucrat in Baghdad, and around 297/910 he was appointed to the majlis al-
zimam (the office of control and audit) in the dīwān al-mashriq under Abu „l-Ḥasan b. al-
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Furāt‟s son al-Muḥassin. While he is credited with numerous works on a variety of 
topics, one of the few works that we can assign to him with certainty is a Kitāb al-kharāj, 
which has only survived in part (more on this following). His other works include the 
Kitāb al-alfāẓ or Jawāhir al-alfāẓ, which “lists synonyms and phrases in sajʽ for use by 
orators and writers of artistic prose,”
71
 and the Kitāb naqd al-shiʽr, which explains how to 
distinguish between good and bad poetry.
72
 Throughout his works, Qudāma has a strong 
interest in composition and literary and oratory style, an interest which has led some to 
label him the master of eloquence.
73
 
 Qudāma‟s Kitāb al-kharāj originally consisted of eight manāzil,
74
 but only the 
fifth through the eighth have survived in a unique manuscript.
75
 The full title of the work 
is Kitāb al-kharāj wa-ṣināʽat al-kitāba (Book of the Land Tax and the Arts of the 
Secretaries), and the work, at least as much of it as is extant, covers a variety of topics 
which would have been important to a member of the secretarial class of the central 
administration including various governmental departments, the historical, geographical, 
and legal foundations of taxation, linguistic usage, literary traditions, and the proper 
forms of official correspondence. This text appears to be heavily influenced by Qudāma‟s 
life in the ʽAbbāsid administration in Baghdad. Selections from the fifth and sixth 
manāzil have been edited and published by De Goeje as part of the Bibliotheca 
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Geographorum Arabicorum. This portion is a geographical study of the Mamlakat al-
Islām similar to the work of Ibn Khurradādhbih, to the extent that De Goeje assumed 
them to be at least working from the same sources.
76
 Still, the content of the texts are 
distinct enough that Qudāma‟s text should not be considered an edition of Ibn 
Khurradādhbih‟s. Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Zubaydī edited a new edition, published in 
1981, which contains the entire known text, including manāzils five through eight.
77
 
 Regardless, Qudāma‟s work is rather similar to Ibn Khurradādhbih‟s in content 
and style, focusing primarily on itineraries in his geographical chapters. Qudāma‟s 
itineraries begin with the pilgrimage routes from each region to Mecca, starting with the 
route from Baghdad. He then provides an itinerary, starting from Baghdad, traveling 
across southern Iran, through Fārs, Isfahān, Kirmān, and Sīstān. From there Qudāma 
employs a repeated element of his itineraries, returning to a node where multiple 
itineraries meet, in this case Hamadhān, and then following a new itinerary in a different 
direction, in this case toward Khurāsān and Transoxania. Throughout the text, these 
nodes are a key organizing feature. Qudāma will often “return” to a spot, initially 
describing it as the intersection of two or more itineraries, after having taken one of these 
itineraries to their conclusion, along with all the “tributary” itineraries which branch off 
from the main itinerary, and then following another itinerary. These itineraries do extend 
beyond the Mamlakat al-Islām, into the lands of the Turks and China, but only to the 
edges of Chinese territory in the case of the latter. 
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2.5.2 The Balkhī School and the Geographical Sciences 
The Balkhī School, named after its founder Abū Zayd al-Balkhī (d. 322/934), developed 
later than the Iraqī School and its work is primarily focused on the Islamic world, 
describing each province as its own clime.
78
 The authors of the Balkhī school are said to 
have given a more Islamic emphasis to the study of geography, primarily by restricting 
their work to the lands of Islam (bilād al-Islām), and by emphasizing geographic 
concepts more in line with Qur‟anic cosmology and notions found in hadith of the 
Prophet and the Companions.
79
 For example, many authors describe the world‟s land-
mass as a large bird whose head is in China, its right wing in India, its left wing in al-
Khazar, its chest in Mecca, Hijaz, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, and its tail in North Africa (on 
the authority of ʽAbd Allāh b. ʽAmr b. ʽĀs), although the world maps of the Balkhī 
school tend to show the head of the bird in Arabia with Asia and Africa as the wings and 
Europe as the tail.
80
 Similarly, Mecca is assigned the preeminent place among the writers 
of this school. The Balkhī School also developed its own method of division of the world, 
not based in the Greek climes but rather the Persian keshwar systems, even though they 
still used the term “iqlīm” (“clime”). In their writings they deal only with the bilād al-
Islām and divided it into twenty iqlīms, based upon territorial and physical boundaries. al-
Muqaddasī differs here from the other Balkhīs by dividing the world into only fourteen 
iqlīms, seven of them ʽarab (Arab) and seven ʽajam (non-Arab). In this way, the writers 
of the Balkhī School presented the concept of regions with defined geographical 
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boundaries, which they often described in detail. This school is likewise credited with an 
attempt to popularize geography by expanding the scope of information that it contained, 
so as to make it useful and interesting to a wider audience.
81
 The wider audience the 
Balkhī School was attempting to appeal to was most likely the educated classes of 
contemporary Muslim society. Their hope was to elevate the standing of geography as a 
legitimate and praiseworthy science (‛ilm) alongside such fields as mathematics, 
astronomy, and medicine. Geographical writing in the al-masālik wa‟l-mamālik tradition 
appears to have already had a wide, but more popular, audience who used these texts for 
purposes of travel and trade, as mentioned earlier. 
 One of the more unique aspects of the Balkhī School compared to the Iraqī School 
is its use of maps. Few if any of the original works by the Iraqī School seem to have 
included maps. On the contrary, the works of al-Balkhī, al-Istakhrī, Ibn Ḥawqal, and al-
Muqaddasī were all illustrated with numerous regional maps and their texts make the 
necessity of the inclusion of maps quite apparent. These maps were meant to provide the 
audience with an idea of the relative size and position of each of the regions discussed by 
the authors and were based primarily on physical evidence instead of mathematical 
formulas, unlike the mathematical Ptolemaic tradition. Maps were produced in the 
Muslim world during the heyday of the Iraqī School, such as the famous world map 
produced for the Caliph al-Maʽmun, but the literary tradition of the Iraqī School appears 
to be separate from the contemporary cartographic tradition. The maps produced prior to 
the advent of the Balkhī School were not created by the writers of geographical texts nor 
were they included in geographical texts. 
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 Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Fārisī al-Karkhī al-Iṣṭakhrī, a native of Fārs, 
is the earliest author of the Balkhī School whose work is extant, writing in the 
fourth/tenth century. Little is known about his life. His Kitāb al-masālik wa‟l-mamālik
82
 
takes as its basis al-Balkhī‟s, Ṣuwar al-aqālīm, a work which is no longer extant although 
much of it can be reconstructed from the works of his successors.
83
 Despite its title, al-
Iṣṭakhrī‟s work, belongs to the “atlas of Islam” tradition,
84
 in which the text focuses 
almost exclusively on describing a series of maps. al-Iṣṭakhrī‟s adherence to this model 
has sometimes been seen as extreme, so that al-Muqaddasī described his work as “a book 
with very carefully prepared maps, but confused in many places and superficial in its 
commentaries, and it does not divide the provinces into districts.”
85
 al-Iṣṭakhrī‟s text and 
maps, like those of the Balkhī School in general, show considerable Persian influence, 
most notably in the use of the Iranian keshwar as a model for organizing the world into 
countries rather than the Ptolemaic “climes,” even though al-Iṣṭakhrī still uses the Arabic 
term iqlīm. In a similar vein, the Persian world receives the fullest coverage in al-
Iṣṭakhrī‟s text and his work was translated into Persian and later into Turkish, unlike any 
other work in this genre.
86
 
 As a school developing from the work of a founding figure, al-Balkhī, the writers 
of the Balkhī School show a definite trajectory of development from one author to the 
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next. Following al-Iṣṭakhrī in this tradition is Abu „l-Qāsim b. Ḥawqal al-Naṣībī, a 
younger contemporary of al-Iṣṭakhrī. Ibn Ḥawqal is noted for his reliance on first-hand 
observation in preparing his text. As a merchant, and possibly a missionary for the 
Fāṭimids,
87
 Ibn Ḥawqal traveled from his native al-Jazīra as far west as Morocco and 
Spain, including a later trip to Sicily, and as far east as Transoxania during the middle of 
the fourth/tenth century. He wrote his Kitāb ṣūrat al-arḍ
88
 in a series of successive 
redactions from sometime before 356/967 until 378/988. This work was initially intended 
to be a series of additions and corrections to previous works of the Balkhī School. In a 
famous passage, Ibn Ḥawqal describes how he met al-Iṣṭakhrī in Sind and how the latter 
designated him as intellectual heir. 
I met Abu Isḥāq al-Fārisī [al-Iṣṭakhrī] and he had drawn this map of Sind, but he had 
mixed it up, and he had drawn a map of Fārs, which he had done very well. As for me, I 
had drawn a map of Adharbayjān, which is on the following page and of which he 
approved, and al-Jazīra, which he approved of very much. He dismissed [the map which I 
had drawn] for Egypt as rotten and [the one for] al-Maghrib as mostly wrong. He said “I 
have looked into your birth and your astrological sign. I ask you to correct my book 
wherever I have erred.” I made corrections to it, but not to the form (ghayr shakl), and I 
attributed it to him. Then I decided that I should stand alone [as the author] in this book.
89 
Ibn Ḥawqal‟s work relies heavily on al-Iṣṭakhrī‟s but his additions and modifications, 
many of them presumably based on his travel experiences, make this a work of his own. 
He moves further away from the annotated maps of the “atlas of Islam” tradition, and 
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focuses more on the text, although he still discusses his maps explicitly in his text. Ibn 
Ḥawqal‟s use of first-hand experiences allows him to describe the current conditions of 
the Muslim world, to a greater extent than other geographical writers who worked largely 
from older texts and traditions. This appears especially in his discussions of economic 
conditions, where he focuses on day-to-day issues of agriculture and manufacturing, 
more than on the rare and precious goods which so interested other writers. 
 A contemporary of Ibn Ḥawqal, Shams al-Dīn Abū ‛Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad b. Abī Bakr al-Bannā‟ al-Shāmī al-Muqaddasī is often considered the culmination 
of geographical writing of this period. al-Muqaddasī‟s work, Aḥsan al-taqāsīm fī ma‛rifat 
al-aqālīm
90
 written sometime between 375/985 and 380/990, presents a systematized 
geography containing elements of physical, economic, political, and human geography in 
a manner unlike previous authors. Whereas earlier geographical writers either organized 
their texts around routes and itineraries (the al-masālik wa „l-mamālik or “routes and 
kingdoms” tradition) or universal cosmographies (the ṣūrat al-arḍ or “image of the 
world” tradition), al-Muqaddasī works to create a scientific and systematic ordering of 
the world based on a number of principles. Beyond dividing the mamlakat al-Islām 
between its Arab (mamlakat al-‛arab) and non-Arab (mamlakat al-‛ajam) provinces, al-
Muqaddasī creates a vocabulary for understanding each individual iqlīm, seen here as 
individual geographic wholes. Each province is centered on a metropolis (miṣr) 
surrounded by several districts (kūra) which each contain a qaṣaba or major city 
surrounded by other main towns (madīna). Beyond this, further distinguishing terms are 
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used to bring out the individuality of relationships between the various provinces. Within 
each province and each subdivision of a province, al-Muqaddasī provides specific local 
details which have wide-ranging use for various classes, from merchants to men of 
letters. Because of his systemic approach and his use of authorities and the challenges he 
makes to them, it has been argued that it is his work that gave the field of geographical 
writing its literary and scientific legitimacy.
91
 
 The anonymous Persian geographical text, the Ḥudūd al-ʽālam,
92
 known through 
a unique manuscript copied in 656/1258, was compiled in 372/982-983 and dedicated to 
the ruler of the Farīghūnid dynasty of Jūzjānān Amīr Abul-Ḥārith Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. 
We know very little about the anonymous author, but previous scholarship has given us a 
good idea about his sources.
93
 An interesting aspect of the Ḥudūd al-ʽālam, is that its 
author was most likely reading a map while composing the text: this was noted initially 
by Abul-Faḍl Gulpāyagānī, who originally brought the manuscript to the attention of 
A.G. Toumansky in 1892, and later by V. Minorsky in the introduction to his translation 
of the text.
94
 This map appears to have contained detailed itineraries, not all of which 
made their way into the text itself. For example, the route from Rukhud to Multān 
appears on the map but not in the text.
95
 The author does not give distances or travel 
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directions in the kind of programmatic manner used by other authors such as Ibn 
Khurradādhbih. Instead, he lists places that fall within a single geographic region, making 
the administrative divisions the primary operating system for his discussion. 
 A primary aim of the Ḥudūd al-ʽālam is to define the boundaries of the various 
regions of the world, thus, making administrative districts the most important organizing 
element of the entire work. All told, the Ḥudūd al-ʽālam lists fifty-one countries or 
nāḥiyāt covering the entire world, and not just the Muslim world. For each of these, the 
author begins his descriptions of the countries with a detailed look at the limits (ḥudūd) 
of each territory, making this the key element of each entry. Within his discussion of each 
region, the author is interested in a number of its attributes, including but not limited to 
important administrative centers, markets, agriculture, water sources and irrigation, and 
descriptions of the inhabitants. The Ḥudūd al-ʽālam gives some of the most detailed 
descriptions of places and people found within the entire tradition of geographic writing 
under study here. 
 
2.6 Defining the Eastern Border 
In discussing our sources‟ views of the eastern frontier, it is important first to understand 
how our authors define the frontier itself. Where do they specifically place it? What 
defines it as a frontier, and what distinguishes one side of the frontier from the other? 
Here, these questions will first be addressed by identifying where our sources specifically 
state a place to be on, along, or near a frontier. The description of the frontier will then be 
analyzed to understand what kind of frontier they are writing about and what defines the 
entities on either side of the frontier. This look at how our sources define the eastern 
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frontier is divided into two parts, based largely on the preceding discussion. The first part 
will look at situations in which our sources define the eastern frontier in terms of borders. 
Borders, again, are defined here as linear phenomena indicating either the dividing line 
between two states or societies or the extent to which a state can wield effective power. 
For the eastern frontier of the Muslim world in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, 
to imagine a border in this region meant to define a limit of Muslim political authority in 
territory inhabited primarily by various Turkic groups. Such definitions of the borders of 
the Muslim world are a key element in many of our sources, which take as their focus a 
description of the Muslim world and the regions around it. These sources are interested in 
cataloguing and categorizing places and, in doing so, in defining the extents and limits of 
regions. 
 For our earliest authors, borders do not seem to be a primary concern. The worlds 
they describe are largely “borderless” societies. Ibn Khurradādhbih‟s focus on itineraries 
and roads leaves him primarily discussing just those places along major roads. Except 
where a road crosses a border, as in the case of al-Rāsht mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, he has little interest in defining borders. On the other hand, al-Ya‛qūbī, who 
is very much interested in defining administrative units, is more focused on defining 
centers and webs of dependents around administrative centers. His geography is 
centripetal, or perhaps even fractal, down to the local level, and is not so much concerned 
about extreme limits as about relationships towards the center. When references are made 




When they describe specific places, our authors may associate a particular place 
with a border. Again, the discussion of al-Rāsht which began this chapter is an excellent 
example of this, where a single place becomes representative of the entire border or 
frontier. Our sources are filled with other examples of this phenomenon. Qudāma 
describes Qum as situated between Ṭarāz and Kūlān to the north and lying two farsakhs 
from the border (ḥadd) of the Kīmāk.
96
 al-Muqaddasī says that Badhakhshān is adjacent 
to the land of the Turks (mutākhim li-bilād al-turk) above Tukhāristān and is a first-rate 
ribāṭ with a fortress.
97
 The Ḥudūd al-ʽālam says that Azīv is a town at the end of (bi-
ākhir-i) the province of Gūzgānān.
98
 Samarqandāq is described as the furthest limit (ākhir 
ḥudūd) of Transoxania in its direction.
99
 Ūzgand is the border (ḥadd ast) between 
Farghāna and the Khajand Turks.
100
 Isbījāb is a region on the border between the 
Muslims and the infidels (ḥadd miyān-e musulmānān va-kāfirān).
101
 Internal borders 
between administrative divisions within the Muslim world may also be defined in this 
way. Ṭāyaqān is at the border (bar ḥadd) between Ṭukhāristān and Khuttalān.
102
 
Vayshagirt is at the border (bar ḥadd) between Chaghāniyān and Khuttalān.
103
 Vāthkath 
is the border (ḥadd ast) between Khujand and Farghāna.
104
 Yahūdliq, Abarliq, Itlukh, 
Alkh.n.jās are at the border (bar ḥadd) between Farghāna and Īlāq.
105
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These instances of specific places being marked as borders demonstrate an 
important aspect of medieval political geography. Despite our desire to see pre-modern 
states as fully-formed polygons on a map, it is in cities and towns and possibly the roads 
connecting them where state authority is concentrated and expressed. The border between 
Khunjand and Farghāna actually extends beyond the town of Vāthkath, but our sources 
identify this town - the inhabited place along that border and the place where state 
authority may be manifested - as the border itself. 
Qudāma, perhaps because he is one of the earlier authors who is not overly 
concerned with defining borders, gives us an example of a location which fits this 
understanding of the extent of control within pre-modern states rather clearly. Kashmīhan 
is a great village five farsakhs from Marw and six farsakhs from al-Dīwān on the road 
from Marw to Amul, along a path of continuous desert, which happens to be in the land 
of the Ghuzz (bi-l-ghuzz).
106
 Here the issue can be as simple as the Muslims‟ ability to 
control a city and maintain a path of travel without actually taking full control of the 
region from the Ghuzz. In other situations, Qudāma marks places as important points for 
the Turks moving through Muslim lands, such as Jīnānjakat, four farsakhs from Banākat 
and across the Syr Darya from Satūrkat, which is where the Turks would cross the Nahr 
Turk (the Jaxartes or Syr Darya River).
107
 Further on, Qudāma provides descriptions of 
an elongated type of frontier, where an itinerary connects a number of places, but only a 
few farsakhs to the north lie the lands of the Kīmāk.
108
 Here the roads or paths and major 
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points along these roads and paths are under Muslim control, but this tells us nothing 
about what lies immediately beyond these specific locations. 
One place where a border is described as linear and is defined in concrete terms is 
where it corresponds to a particular geographic feature. Qudāma describes Kūk as being 
north of mountains which marked a border with China (wa-mā yalī al-janūb min hadhā l-
mawḍi‛ jibāl ilā bilād al-Ṣīn).
109
 The Ḥudūd al-ʽālam sees the northern border of 
Khurāsān as the Jayḥūn or Oxus River.
110
 The Jayḥūn also marks the northern border of 
Gūzgānān.
111
 Herat is connected with a river which comes from the border (az ḥadd) 
between Ghūr and Gūzgānān and waters the district.
112
 Īlāq is bordered by the Khashart 
River.
113
 The rivers which mark borders, especially the Jayḥūn, are often associated with 
internal borders between different administrative divisions of the Muslim world. 
Mountain ranges are similarly used to define borders in a linear fashion. Sūkh lies in the 
mountains which form the frontier between Buttamān and Farghāna.
114
 Though not 
strictly described as a border or frontier, watchers (pāsbān) and scouts (dīdabān) are 
posted in the mountains around Ūsh to observe the infidel Turks, making the mountains 
as an important feature in observing a “foreign” threat.
115
 Our sources also frequently 
note natural phenomena shared between the Muslims and others. A river passes between 
Panjhīr and Jāriyāna and then travels into Hindūstān.
116
 Ūzkand is watered by two rivers, 
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 For the earliest of our sources, the discussion of borders seems subordinate to the 
description of specific places. It is only when a place that is of interest to the author on its 
own merits happens to be on or along a border that the border itself is defined. As the 
field of geographical writing developed over the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, 
writers attempted to apply a larger conceptual framework to the world they were 
studying. We can see this phenomenon in the beginnings of the Balkhī School, but the 
concept of borders and regions at that point was dominated by the structures of the maps 
which were the major focus of their works. Ibn Ḥawqal, for example, will begin his 
discussion of each region with a reference to the map of that region. He will then give a 
detailed explanation, often lasting several pages, of the layout and design of the map.
118
 
While such a description does provide borders to a region and, in the cases where a 
geographic region is along the frontier of the Muslim world itself, the Dār al-Islām, it is 
not the realities of administrative geography on the ground which matter, but rather the 
form of the maps which determines where borders are located. By the time of al-
Muqaddasī‟s writing, the organization of the world into pre-conceived discrete units was 
a major part of geographical writing. 
al-Muqaddasī‟s interest in the proper organization of the world breaks it down 
into smaller units, as implied by the title of his work Aḥsan al-taqāsīm fī maʽrifat al-aqālīm 
or “the Best Division for Knowledge of the Climes.” Instead of focusing on the limits and/or 
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borders of these units, however, al-Muqaddasī organizes the world around central cities 
and the cities, towns, and villages which are dependent upon that central city. In this 
framework, individual units, taken as a conglomeration, may be described as a frontier or 
border region. Farghānā is the first of the districts of Haytal or Mā warā‟ al-Nahr 
(Transoxania) towards the point where the sun rises and the border with the Turks.
119
 
Isbījāb, as a region (not just the city), is the border of Transoxania.
120
 Speaking more 
generally, the border with the Turks is important in defining the region of Mā warā‟a l-
Nahr as a whole, as the area between the Jayḥūn River and the border with the Turks.
121
 
The definition of Mā warā‟a l-Nahr as the region between the Jayḥūn and the land 
of the Turks is not uncommon and shows the indefinite nature of the borders of this 
region. It has often been noted that the limits of Mā warā‟a l-Nahr were defined by the 
point “where the power of Islam ceased and depended on political conditions” for much 
of the period in which this term was used.
122
 Such a definition is, in the truest sense, an 
example of ḥudūd or borders defined by limits: the region is defined almost entirely by 
the ability of the state to wield effective power to a particular limit. 
 Among our sources for this chapter, the Ḥudūd al-ʽālam is the text most focused 
on the idea of borders (ḥudūd), beginning each section with a description of the borders 
of the region under study. These are usually broadly defined, quite unlike the earlier 
authors who would define borders by the specific places which fell along the border. 
Khurāsān is bordered by Hindūstān on the east, its own borders (ḥudūd) and the 
Kargaskūh Desert to the south, Gurgān and the limits of the Ghūz to the west, and the 
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Jayḥūn River to the north.
123
 The Khurāsānian Marches are bordered by Hindūstān to the 
east, the deserts of Sind and Kirmān to the south, Herat to the west, Gharchistān, 
Gūzgānān, and Ṭukhāristān to the north.
124
 Transoxania is bordered by Tibet to the east, 
Khurāsān and its Marches to the south, the Ghūz Turks and the borders of the Khallukh 
Turks to the west, and the Khallukh Turks to the north.
125
 The Marches of Transoxania 
are divided between the eastern and western marches. The eastern marches are bordered 
by Tibet and Hindūstān to the east, the marches of Khurāsān to the south, Chaghāniyān to 
the west and Surūshana, which belongs to Transoxania, to the north.
126
 The western 
marches are not given borders, but seem rather to consist of the entire region of 
Khwārazm.
127
 These descriptions can be given for smaller regions as well. For example, 
Gūzgānān is bordered on the east by the borders of Balkh and Ṭukhāristān down to 
Bāmiyān, on the south by the borders of Ghūr and Bust, on the west by the borders of 
Garchistān down to the borders of Marw, and on the north by the Jayḥūn River.
128
 These 
descriptions of borders demonstrate the notion of ḥudūd rather nicely. Instead of speaking 
about specific locations along the border or the way these borders function, our authors 
provide broad descriptions of the limits of each region, which define the region itself. 
Many of these borders are mutual, in that they define one another: the borders of one 
region are defined by the borders of another and vice versa. 
 These questions that arise from looking at the ways borders are presented and 
described by our sources may lead us to wonder how closely these descriptions 
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corresponded to what was actually on the ground and whether or not they mattered. It is 
only the Ḥudūd al-‛ālam which is really concerned with defining borders, but even its 
borders are broadly and vaguely defined. In other words, these are ideals at best. Our 
earlier authors speak of specific borders at specific locations, leaving us with many 
questions about what happened immediately outside of those places. As we dig deeper, 
the realities no longer appear so neat. 
 
2.7 Nūshjān and the Border of China 
The location of Nūshjān and its role as a border highlights many issues related to the 
defining of borders at a particular point across a number of our sources. Ibn 
Khurradādhbih describes Nūshjān as the border (ḥadd) of China, but unlike many other 
examples of crossing a border or frontier, it is Nūshjān, presumably located on the 
Muslim side of the border, which is at a great distance from other points on the itinerary” 
fifteen days‟ journey by the caravan route and three by the path of the Turks.
129
 In 
another itinerary which ends at the city, in this instance originating in Farghāna, Nūshjān 
lies six days away from Uṭbāsh with no villages along the way.
130
 Qudāma also describes 
Nūshjān as the border (ḥadd) of China and at a great distance from other locations on his 
itinerary, fifteen days‟ travel by the caravan route and three days‟ travel by the path of the 
Turks from Sāghūr Kubāl.
131
 These passages are claiming Nūshjān as a limit or furthest 
extent of the Muslim territories, but its distance from nearby settlements makes this a 
border or limit in the extreme. Nūshjān is so distant as to be practically isolated from the 
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rest of the Muslim territories. How realistic is it, then, to say that Nūshjān is actually a 
border of the Muslim world? In other instances where a place is said to be along a 
frontier or border, we may be informed which side it is on. For example, the Ḥudūd al-
ʽālam describes Ṭālaqān as lying on the border of Gūzgānān and belonging to its king.
132
 
Ṭavāvis belongs to Bukhārā and is on the border with Sughd.
133
 Dar-i Tubbat is on the 
border of Vakhān toward Tibet and is under the control of Muslims who levy tolls and 
keep watch over the roads.
134
 This question of which side of the frontier Nūshjān belongs 
grows more complicated when we look in detail at the itineraries leading there.   
Ibn Khurradādhbih places the city of the Khāqān of the Türgesh in an itinerary 
with three more stages, including stops at Nawākat and Kubāl, before arriving at Nūshjān 
which, again, he identifies as the border (ḥadd) of China.
135
 This complicates both 
Qudāma‟s and Ibn Khurradādhbih‟s descriptions of Nūshjān as a border, leaving us with 
the question of how the Turks living west of Nūshjān fit into their itineraries and schemas 
for the region. Similarly, Ibn Khurradādhbih lists Ūzkand, the city of the Khūrtakīn, on 
the path from Farghāna to Nūshjān, again with a number of stops between Ūzkand and 
Nūshjān.
136
 Qudāma also identifies Ūzkand as the lands of Khūrtakīn the dihqān,
137
 along 
the road from Farghāna to Nūshjān. Here, in any case, we are dealing with a valley which 
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is impassible for most of the year because of the deep snow between Ūzkand and 
Nūshjān, making Nūshjān seem even more remote.
138
   
At other points, Nūshjān‟s border status is made clearer by references to Turkish 
lands beyond Nūshjān. For example, the journey from Nūshjān to the city (madīna) of the 
Khāqān of the Tughuzghuz, better known as the villages of Kubār and Khaṣab, requires 
three months, marking the city as the last bastion before a long trip to a remote, alien 
location.
139
 Ibn al-Faqīh identifies Nūshjān as the border to the lands of the Turks, also 
citing the distance from Nūshjān to the city of the Khāqān of the Tughuzghuz as a 
journey of three months if you travel through the villages with fertile agricultural 
lands.
140
 Qudāma puts the distance between Nūshjān and the city of the Khāqān of the 
Tughuzghuz as only six days.
141
   
Nūshjān appears to be surrounded by “foreign” lands, Turks to the west, north, 
and east and China to the east. This leaves us with the question of what it means for this 
place to be described as a border. Is Nūshjān some kind of outpost, rather than part of the 
larger body of Muslim-controlled territories? It is important to think about the possible 
intents our sources may have in laying claim to a place like Nūshjān. By placing it at the 
border of the Muslim world, our sources are stating that everything to the west of 
Nūshjān belongs to the Muslims and everything to the east belongs to China, despite the 
presence of Turkish rulers in several specific locations. The presence of these Turkish 
rulers west of Nūshjān demonstrates that while Nūshjān may be the furthest point where 
Muslims can effectively wield power, it does not necessarily mean that they can do so in 
                                                          
138
 Qudāma, Kitāb al-kharāj wa ṣinā‛at al-kitāba, 105. 
139
 Ibn Khurradādhbih, Kitāb al-Masālik wa‟l-mamālik, 30-31. 
140
 Ibn al-Faqīh, Mukhtaṣar kitāb al-buldān, 328. 
141
 Qudāma, Kitāb al-kharāj wa ṣinā‛at al-kitāba, 105. 
66 
 
all the points contained within these limits. These areas that lie within the physical limits 
of the Muslim world but not completely under Muslim rule are in a process of becoming 
a part of the Dār al-Islām. The areas west of Nūshjān that are under Turkish rulers are 
still parts of a frontier and are still in the process of political negotiation as Muslim power 
solidifies in the lands where the Muslims have made political claims. In defining the 
limits of the Muslim world, our sources make claims about the extent to which Muslim 
rulers may wield effective power, but they are not necessarily saying that that power is 
spread evenly throughout the territory within its limits. 
 
2.7.1 al-Ghūr and the Dār Kufr 
We may compare the way Nūshjān is presented in our sources with the way al-Iṣṭakhrī 
and Ibn Ḥawqal describe al-Ghūr. They express no claim for Muslim political control or 
sovereignty over al-Ghūr. In fact, they clearly state al-Ghūr is a part of the Dār Kufr 
(Abode of the Infidels), but because of the presence of Muslims living in the area, our 
authors include it in their descriptions of the Muslim world. This is the case even though, 
as al-Iṣṭakhrī later states, al-Ghūr is situated in mountains surrounded on all sides by the 
Dār al-Islām, implying that the only reason it is still a place inhabited by infidels is 
because the mountains themselves are insurmountable (jibāl manī‛a).
142
 According to Ibn 
Ḥawqal, this is a situation that is repeated nowhere else in the Dār al-Islām, with the 
possible exception of certain tribes living in al-Maghrib.
143
 He (and his fellow-authors) 
recognize that al-Ghūr lies beyond the reach of Muslim political authority and, therefore, 
is outside the geographically defined domains of Islam, but he still considers it part of the 
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Muslim world because of the presence of Muslims and because of its location firmly 
within the Muslim side of the frontier and surrounded by Muslim controlled territory. 
These arguments for the inclusion of al-Ghūr within the lands of Islam are somewhat 
circular; al-Ghūr is among the lands of Islam because it is physically surrounded by the 
lands of Islam. Nevertheless, al-Ghūr presents an interesting challenge to our sources in 
defining the Muslim world. There is not the pretention found in the description of 
Nūshjān to push the limits of the Muslim world and Muslim political authority beyond 
the point where such control is effective, but there is also recognition that this is an 
anomalous situation. In grappling with the presence of al-Ghūr, as a land under the 
authority of non-Muslims, fully within the Dār al-Islām, our sources must address 
questions of how the Dār al-Islām is defined and the relationship between Muslim 
political authority, the places where Muslims live, and the presence of non-Muslims and 
especially non-Muslims with political authority within the lands of Islam. al-Ghūr 
requires a mixed approach. Our sources recognize that al-Ghūr is outside the Dār al-
Islām, it is in fact Dār Kufr, but they also acknowledge that it is a place connected to the 
Muslim world and a part of the Muslim world due to its geographic position and the 
presence of Muslims living there.  
 
2.8 The Eastern Frontier 
If our sources call a place such as Nūshjān a border and mark it as the furthest extent of 
Muslim power, we must then ask what is this Muslim-controlled territory bordered by 
Nūshjān and what do the lands west of Nūshjān, on the Muslim side of the border, look 
like. What is the entity whose furthest extent is Nūshjān? What our sources tell us is that 
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these places look like a frontier: a zone of negotiation where political power is often 
tenuous and uneven, as described earlier in this chapter. At this point, we will shift our 
focus to those areas that are not directly called a border, but are rather referred to as a 
frontier, in order to see how their representations differ from those areas which are used 
to define the borders of the Muslim world. 
 The terms thaghr and thughūr are used rather infrequently in comparison with 
ḥadd or ḥudūd, and they tend to require a pairing of groups facing off against each other 
at the point in question. Sometimes this pairing is made explicit. The towns of Tīl and 
Durghush are frontier forts directed against (bar rūy) Ghūr, for example.
144
 Sh.lāt is a 
frontier post situated towards the Turks.
145
 al-Muqaddasī specifies Sawrān in Isbījāb as 
the frontier against the Ghuzz and Kīmāk. Turks
146
 and Shaghlajān as on the frontier 
against the Kīmāk only.
147
 Ūshar lies in the direction of the Turks.
148
 Jīt is a fortified 
frontier town close to the lands of the Ghuzz and the point where one enters Ghuzz 
territory.
149
 These pairings tend to be in an oppositional relationship, befitting the sense 
that a frontier is defined by the potential for conflict and territorial expansion or 
contraction. Unlike those cases where cities and towns represented specific points where 
the furthest extent of Muslim power could be seen, whenever frontiers are defined by 
single locations, they have a military purpose, whether defensive, offensive, or both.   
al-Yaʽqūbī describes al-Wāshjird as a city of the great frontier (madīna thaghr 
ʽaẓīm) four farsakhs from Turkistān, the center of Khuttal, a region with seven hundred 
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fortresses for the purposes of raiding against the Turks.
150
 Here the city is only a part of a 
broader frontier, defined by the presence of the Turks against whom military action is 
organized and taken, and the city in al-Yaʽqūbī‟s description becomes emblematic of the 
broader region. At the same time, the identification of Wāshjird as a frontier shows the 
frontier to be a space with depth. Wāshjird is a part of the frontier, but it lies four 
farsakhs from the opposing side of the frontier, Turkistān.  
Furthermore, as a frontier, this region is ill-defined in many ways. So for instance, 
Wāshjird is part of a frontier, but is not the border. The border, if we want to say that one 
exists in this area, lies somewhere between Wāshjird and Turkistān; Wāshjird‟s role as a 
marshalling point, together with the presence of so many fortresses intended presumably 
both for defense and for the organization of raids against the Turks, all shows that a 
military negotiation over the border is taking place between the Muslims of Khuttal and 
the Turks. al-Iṣṭakhrī calls Farāwa the frontier facing the Ghuzz in the steppe (Farāwa 
thughur… fī wajh al-Ghuziyya).
151
 al-Muqaddasi describes Sawrān as the frontier against 
the Ghuzz and Kīmāk Turks, yet he also describes the rural village of Turār Zarākh as 
lying beyond Sawrān towards the Turks.
152
 While Sawrān is considered the frontier city, 
there is still plenty of territory found between Sawrān and the border itself, including 
settled communities. Samarqand is similarly described, but rather casually, as part of a 
frontier with the Turks.
153
 We may assume that this means similar actions to those 
ascribed to Wāshjird are taking place in and around Samarqand. 
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2.8.1 Crossing the Frontier 
Beside the oppositional and military nature of many frontier locations, the ill-defined 
nature of the division between opposing sides is a key attribute of frontiers, as compared 
to borders. In his itineraries Ibn Khurradādhbih will at times appear to traverse a border, 
or at least a division between different political or cultural groups, without actually 
marking a location for the border, highlighting the ill-defined nature of such divisions 
along a frontier. Sometimes these “foreign” lands are marked by vast distances between 
them and other stops on his itinerary. For example, the “place” (mawdiʽ) of the king of 
the Kīmāk is eighty days‟ travel from Kūykat
154
 in an offshoot of an itinerary originating 
in Ṭarāz from the road that leads from al-Shāsh to the lands of the Turks; in none of this 
is a border specifically crossed.
155
 Any claim to the territory covered in these eighty days 
of travel is complicated and, presumably, of little importance to our authors. Qudāma 
discusses two villages at a place known as Kawākat near Ṭarāz which is eight days‟ 
travel on a fast horse, during which time you must carry your food, from the place of the 
king of the Kīmāk.
156
 Ibn al-Faqīh also describes the place of the king of the Kīmāk as 
eighty days‟ travel, packing your provisions, from Isbījāb, citing this as a very truncated 
itinerary from al-Shāsh to the place of the king of the Kīmāk.
157
 We may assume that this 
open territory is of little consequence since these stretches are typically described as 
lacking cities or villages and the traveler must carry his own supplies for the entire 
journey. Defining a precise border in such areas is not a key concern for either side.   
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At other times, it appears as if the traversing of a border is taken for granted. 
Though he never mentions actually entering the lands of the Tughuzghuz, Ibn 
Khurradādhbih gives a detailed discussion of them and the Khāqān‟s capital. The people 
there are Turks who are fire-worshipping Magians and Manichaeans, which marks them 
as distinct from the Muslims, and the city is great with twelve iron gates.
158
 Even though 
at some points Ibn Khurradādhbih defines these places as foreign, i.e., the land of the 
Turks in contrast with the lands of Islam, he does not emphasize the existence of a border 
between these two. He seems to imply a situation in which the lands of the Turks are 
interspersed within Muslim-controlled territory. Qudāma will provide a similar example 
in the case of the village (qarya) of the Khāqān of the Turks, lying four farsakhs from 
Sārgh and two farsakhs from Karmarāw along the road from al-Shāsh to the border of 
China.
159
 Here you have the cities and places not only of Turks but also of Turkish rulers, 
khāqāns for example, described as falling between Muslim-controlled territories along an 
itinerary. What does this mean for the division between the two entities assumed to be 
found on either side of the frontier and the necessity of an actual defined border in the 
midst of the frontier at all? 
 This strange phenomenon of areas which seemingly belong to one side of the 
frontier but which are actually located on the other leads us to further questions: What 
exactly is meant by border and frontier? And what is meant by the two geopolitical 
entities on either side of the border or frontier? Our sources give the impression, through 
the language they often use (lands of Islam versus lands of the Turks) that one side of the 
frontier is subject to some form of Muslim political authority, namely through the 
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ʽAbbāsids or their successor states such as the Sāmānids, while the other side consists of 
largely nomadic Turkish tribes. We have already seen points where this is obviously 
difficult to visualize, given the information we have. Places such as “the city of the 
Khāqān of the Turks” appear to be fully within the Muslim side of the frontier, from the 
perspective of a Muslim writer, but the very fact that it is referred to as the capital of a 
Turkic ruler puts its place within a realm of Muslim political control into flux. Similarly, 
Ibn Khurradādhbih lists Ūzkand, the city of the Khūrtakīn, on the path from Farghāna to 
Nūshjān.
160
 Here is another situation in which an area under a Turkic ruler seems to fall 
within the Muslim-controlled territories, more precisely on the itinerary between Muslim 
territories, which indicates that movement from one Muslim-controlled territory to 
another can require travel through “foreign” lands.   
In the context of this question, Ibn Khurradādhbih does not necessarily see the 
lands of the Turks as entirely beyond the reach of Muslim rule and authority. For 
example, when he reproduces his tax registries, he says that 46,400 dirhams are collected 
in kharāj or land tax from the cities of the Turks (madā‟in al-Turk) including both 
Khwārizmī and Musayyabī dirhams, as well as 1,187 rough cotton robes and 1,300 pieces 
of iron.
161
 He gives no indication of precisely which Turkic cities these may be, but 
instead includes them together as a lump payment. Of course, Ibn Khurradādhbih often 
refers collectively to tribute payments coming into the ʽAbbāsid domains as kharāj, as for 
example in his inclusion of Kābul which had yet to be brought under Muslim control at 
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the time when his registries supposedly were written, though Kābul was known to be 
making tribute payments to the Muslims at that time.
162
   
Kābul makes for an interesting case here. We understand that the city was beyond 
Muslim control at the time Ibn Khurradādhbih describes, yet he not only claims that 
Kābul makes payments of land tax to the ʽAbbāsids, but he also uses the city to define the 
borders of the Muslim world, with Kābul specifically on the Muslim side.
163
   
The possibility of Turks living within the lands of Islam is taken as a matter of 
fact by the Ḥudūd al-ʽālam, which describes the Khallukh Turks living in the steppes of 
Ṭukhāristān.
164
 The Khalaj Turks live in Ghaznīn, Balkh, Ṭukhāristān, Bust, and 
Gūzgānān.
165
 Sometimes these Turks do not simply live within Muslim lands, but do so 
under an agreement with the Muslims. Sutkand, for example, is described as the home of 
the trucial Turks (jā-yi Turkān-i āshtī), many of whom have converted to Islam.
166
 These 
converts inhabit a thousand felt tents on the grazing land around Isbījāb.
167
 Shiljī, Ṭarāz, 
Takābkath, Farūnkath, Mirkī, Navīkath, and Afrūnkat are also home both to Muslims and 
to numerous Turks.
168
 Khwārazm is home to a number of Ghuzz and other Turks, to the 
extent that the local Persianate population is said to have Turkish features.
169
 Meanwhile, 
not all the Turks living on the Muslim side of the frontier do so under the terms of a 
truce. The Kunjīna Turks live in the mountains between Khuttalān and Chaghāniyān and 
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are professional thieves and looters of caravans, conducting predatory expeditions at a 
distance of forty to fifty farsakhs from their district, even though they make a show of 
loyalty to the amīrs of Khuttalān and Chaghāniyān.
170
 Furthermore, even the converts to 
Islam may be a danger. Barūkat and Balāj are described as frontier posts against the 
Turkomen, indicating a need to defend against these people, but it is also said that the 
Turkomen have converted to Islam out of fear.
171
 
The desire to see the lands of Islam as culturally different from the lands of the 
Turks is an understandable impulse but, as we understand from the previous discussion of 
the nature of borderlands and frontiers, homogeneity is rarely, if ever, a reality. What is 
most important for defining opposing sides of a frontier is the issue of political authority. 
In our sources we see situations where Turks living within Muslim territory pay taxes or 
tribute to Muslim authorities or have entered into truces with local Muslim authorities. 
Actions such as these do more to cement a group‟s belonging to one side of a border or 
frontier than do any cultural similarities. Those Turks who have yet to convert to Islam 
but have entered into truces with local Muslim populations have a more stable place 
within the lands of Islam than those Turks who have converted to Islam but continue to 
raid Muslim communities.   
Other non-Muslim, non-Turkic populations live within the Muslim side of the 
frontier as well. The Kumījiyān, who are considered remnants of the Hephthalites,
172
 live 
within the limits of Khuttalān and Chaghāniyān in the mountains and dales, but under the 
orders of the amīrs of Khuttalān and Chaghāniyān and are liable for military service 
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 R.kht.j.b. is a village of Vakhān where the vakhī gabrakān 
(“infidels,” probably Zoroastrians) live.
174
 The capital of Vakhān is a mixture of Muslims 
and the gabrakān (again “infidels,” probably Zoroastrians).
175
 Khamdādh is the location 
of Vakhī idol-temples where Tibetans are also found in sufficient numbers as to occupy a 
fortress there.
176
 Samarqandāq has a mixed population of Indians, Tibetans, Vakhīs, and 
Muslims.
177
 Andrās, two days travel from Kashmir, is home to Tibetans and Indians.
178
 
Takābkath in Isbījāb is said to have a population which is half non-Muslim.
179
 Harrān, 
also in Isbījāb, has a population which is mostly non-Muslim but has a Muslim ruler.
180
 
This variety of peoples living in close proximity is an attribute of a frontier society, 
especially in areas which have recently been brought over to one side or another. 
 
2.8.2 The shīr of Bāmiyān and the Survival of Pre-Islamic Local Rulers 
In order to demonstrate another variant of the complexity of this question of 
heterogeneity and political authority on the Muslim side of the frontier, we may turn 
away from the case of the Turks and instead look to the position of pre-Islamic Persian 
ruling classes in the descriptions given by our geographical writers. Bāmiyān
181
 is a 
mountainous city overseen by a dihqān who holds the Persian title of shīr (which al-
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 Bāmiyān, located today in central Afghanistan, is perhaps best known for the giant standing Buddha 
statues carved into the cliff walls of the Bāmiyān Valley. The two largest of these statues, both built in the 
sixth century, were the largest standing Buddha statues in the world until they were destroyed by the 
Taliban in March, 2001. The Ḥudūd al-ʽālam is the only one of our geographic sources that makes direct 
reference to these giant Buddhas, referring to them as the Red Idol and White Idol (surkh-but and khing-
but). Ḥudūd al-ʽālam, 99-100. 
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Yaʽqūbī mistakenly wants to associate with the literal Arabic translation of asād or lion, 
the term itself being a local royal title) and who converted to Islam at the hands of 
Muzāḥim b. Bisṭām during the reign of al-Manṣūr (136-158/754-775). It seems this 
dihqān was allowed a certain level of independence until al-Faḍl al-Barmakī put 
Muzāḥim‟s grandson, Ḥasan, in charge of the region.
182
 In 176/792-793, al-Faḍl sent 
troops under the command of Ibrāhīm b. Jibrīl, together with the kings and dihqāns  of 
Ṭukhāristān, including Hasan the shīr of Bāmiyān (the only participant specifically 
named),
183
 against the Kābul-Shāh, whose capital at Jurzabadīn was considered 
unapproachable and impregnable. They went on to conquer Ghūrawand, Sārḥūd, 
Badīlistān, and Shāh-Bahār where they destroyed idols and captured prisoners.
184
 The 
Ḥudūd al-ʽālam describes Bāmiyān as under the rule of a king called shīr and places it on 
the border between Gūzgānān and Khurāsān.
185
 Here we have clear examples of areas 
which are under Muslim political control, but still maintain a pre-Islamic local political 
structure, including persons and titles, though now as converts to Islam. These groups 
presumably recognize Muslim rule and will respond, as in the case of the invasion of the 
lands of the Kābul Shāh, to orders sent from provincial governors such as al-Faḍl al-
Barmaki.   
 As we think about this region as a frontier zone, we need to remember that the 
key elements of a frontier zone are their transitional nature and the political negotiations 
occurring within the region. These areas were conquered by force and brought under 
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Muslim rule through a process of imperial expansion.
186
 In our sources we see that this 
military expansion reached certain limits, points which our sources like to define as the 
borders of the Dār al-Islām. However, the process bringing both the newly-conquered 
areas and areas which remain unconquered (despite their being surrounded by conquered 
areas) into alignment with the new state is uneven, leaving areas whose position within 
the Muslim political structures remains tenuous. An important part of the frontier process 
along the eastern frontier is thus the integration of these areas and populations into the 
Muslim political system, as we see in situations like that of the shīr of Bāmiyān. On the 
one hand, our literary sources‟ desire to declare hard limits to the lands of Islam at 
particular places leads to the creation of a border which they can point to clearly. But on 
the other hand, the uneven application of Muslim political leadership within these borders 
creates a world of transition and negotiation, the characteristics that we associate with a 
frontier zone. 
 
2.9 Is There a Distinction Between Borders and Frontiers? 
In our sources, the creation of an eastern border by our literary sources appears to be an 
attempt to quantify the extent of the Muslim world, setting an extreme limit to the object 
under examination by these geographical texts. The descriptions of what falls on the 
Muslim side of this border, however, shows us an ill-defined zone of negotiation or a 
frontier, with various groups in competition over the political and economic future of the 
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region. Our sources‟ intense interest in listing and describing borders may grow directly 
out of their desire to organize their world and to make sense of it. Accordingly, they place 
much value on establishing borders and limits for a region. But when our sources move 
from this abstraction of the world into discrete units meant to help organize and describe 
a particular region and to provide details about specific places, we see that these borders 
are less than firm or determinative as to what one might expect to find on one side of the 
border or the other. Is there a distinction, though, between what our sources call a border 
and what they call a frontier? 
Certain locations may be described as both of these. Ibn Khurradādhbih describes 
Kābul as part of the frontier of Tukhāristān (min thughūr Tukhāristān) and a border of the 
land of Hind.
187
 al-Shāsh is a frontier on multiple levels. First, it is two days‟ journey 
from the frontier of Isbījāb. Second, it is the furthest principality of Samarqand.
188
 In both 
these cases, there are distinctions between the descriptions of a place as a frontier and as 
a border. The frontiers of Tukhāristān and Isbījāb are presumably not so well-defined, 
facing areas which have a potential for territorial change. As the border of the land of 
Hind, Kābul faces a more clearly-defined region, where expansion, at least at the time 
when Ibn Khurradādhbih wrote, was not a primary concern. al-Shāsh, as the limits of 
Samarqand, demonstrates the furthest extent of a political unit, Samarqand. These two 
phenomena are conceptually different, though they both appear in the same place. 
Qudāma describes Kūk, three farsakhs from al-Ṭuwāwīs and four farsakhs from Kirmīnīa 
on the road from Bukhārā to Samarqand, as being regularly subjected to raids by the 
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Turks and north of a mountain which leads to the land of China.
189
 Here Kūk is a border 
as a point of political division and simultaneously a frontier as a point open to outside 
attack. Dāwar is an important frontier post with a well-organized garrison at the border of 
Ghūristān.
190
 It functions as the limit of Ghūristān, but also as a frontier, since, it has an 
important military role. 
The image of frontiers that we find in these texts does not necessarily give us a 
single definition. We may come away with a basic understanding that the frontier is an 
area between or at the intersection between two political entities, which most often (along 
the eastern frontier) are the lands under the authority of a Muslim ruler and the Turks. 
Such a frontier can be visualized as occurring at a specific point, or it can be seen as a 
line of locations running parallel to the frontier, or it can be a broadly-defined zone 
represented by particular points. Since frontiers can have depth, an area identified as 
being on the frontier may actually lie at some distance from an actual border where this 
political transition takes place or from any identifiable point on the opposing side of the 
frontier. Finally, the opposing sides of a frontier are not necessarily homogenous and one 
may find Turks holding political authority in areas which are clearly on the Muslim side 
of the frontier, or you may find Muslim outposts, such as we may hypothesize is the case 
with Nūshjān, on both the Chinese and Turkish sides of the frontier. The idea that a 
frontier represents a boundary between two opposing political spheres may be fairly 
accurate and broadly useful, as for instance when we think about the totality of the Dār 
al-Islām, but on the ground the situation is much too complicated to allow us to see it as 
an absolute line with a clearly defined location. 
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2.10 From Frontier to Border 
It is much more favorable in the minds of those who are either in charge of maintaining 
the political or cultural unit delimited by a border or are attempting to catalogue and 
describe such a unit that the border be a firmly-defined line containing a unified political 
or cultural unit rather than the messiness of an ill-defined zone of transition. It is the goal 
of those political authorities charged with maintaining authority and those writers looking 
to describe and catalog the world to transform frontier areas and define with certainty the 
borders of different regions. This is the end result of the process of frontier, a point where 
negotiations of power have come to a resolution. Our sources, especially al-Muqaddasī, 
show this preference in their comparisons between the Khurāsānī side of the Jayḥūn 
River and Mā warā‟ al-Nahr.  
 The preference of our sources tends to fall towards the Khurāsānī side of the 
Jayḥūn because it has been under Muslim rule longer and has adopted more Muslim and, 
by extension, Arab customs and practices. al-Muqaddasī describes Khurāsān as follows; 
You should know that the territory on this side of the [Jayḥūn ] river is indeed Khurāsān, 
and it is the more important of the two sides, since, the larger metropolis is here, its 
people are more elegant, wiser, and more knowing about good and evil. They are, 
moreover, closer to the regions and the customs of the Arabs; their capital is more 
pleasant and better, and they have the least cold in the weather, and in the disposition of 
the people. They are more honorable, have more righteous and intelligent people, and 
profound knowledge, and remarkable mental retention of the Qur‟an; they have wealth 
aplenty, and right mindedness.
191
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Besides the presence of larger, more pleasant cities, it is the adaption of Arab customs 
and particular Muslim practices, such as the memorization of the Qur‟an, which set 
Khurāsān apart from Mā warā‟ al-Nahr. The adoption of these practices is attributed to 
the duration of time spent under Muslim rule. “Since [the Khurāsān side of the Jayḥūn 
River] was delimited first, was introduced to Islam first, and is nearer to the regions of 
the Arabs, it has been mentioned and known by its nisba.”
192
 The Arabization of 
Khurāsān is more complete than the similar process taking place in Mā warā‟ al-Nahr, 
because of the different amounts of time spent under Muslim rule. Certain practices, such 
as dress, are perceived as different because of the different circumstances seen on either 
side of the Jayḥūn. “No one wears the ṭaylasān in Mā warā‟ al-Nahr, unless he be an 
important doctor of the law or a foreigner; they just wear the qabā‟, because this side is in 
the area of the jihād.”
193
 Finally, it is the exposure to Arabs from the more centrally 
located lands of Islam which encourages this transformation. “My own impression is that 
the people [of Balkh] only adorned themselves, and adopted Iraqī habits because of the 
stopping-off of the caliph [al-Ma‟mūn] there, when the people of the country adopted 
from his mercenaries and followers the manners of al-Iraq.”
194
 Here the people of Balkh 
adapt Iraqī customs in imitation of a caliph and his entourage. 
 Alongside this process whereby frontier territories become more engrained in the 
politics and culture of the center is the presumed hope that borders and frontiers will keep 
expanding as ill-defined frontiers become more stable and formalized borders. Ghaznīn, 
for example, described as lying in Hindūstān and formerly belonging to it, is now 
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included among the Muslim lands, on the frontier between the Muslims and the 
infidels.
195
 Gurgānj formerly belonged to the Khwārazmshāh but is now under the mīr of 
Gurgānj.
196
 As the frontier pushes outwards and older frontiers mature, the process of 
frontier is replicated in newly-conquered and incorporated territories. 
 The longer a region stays under centralized control and the more direct interaction 
people have with representatives of this authority, the greater the homogeneity between 
center and periphery. Khurāsān, having been conquered first and being closer to Iraq, is 
further along in this process and is losing many of the frontier attributes which formerly 
defined it. Transoxania is still a frontier and engaged in frontier activities, like the jihād, 
and has therefore not adopted the practices and customs of Iraq so completely, but if the 
process of frontier succeeds, someday Transoxania may follow Khurāsān‟s example, 
which for our authors would be the most favorable outcome. 
 
2.11 Return to al-Rāsht and the Gates of Iron 
Having gone through a discussion of frontier and borders and how they operated along 
the eastern frontier of the Muslim world in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, we 
may ask if we see anything new or different in the descriptions of al-Rāsht and the Gates 
of Iron presented by our sources. al-Rāsht, in almost all our sources, represented a 
frontier by virtue of it being a point through which the Turks used to enter the Muslim 
world in order to raid. It was an opening and a place where territorial expansion or 
contraction were possibilities. All this changes, however, with the building of a gate, 
which closes the opening and keeps the Turks from entering the lands of Islam through 
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al-Rāsht. At the same time, the gate prevents the Muslims from moving against the Turks 
through the same point. As a symbol, it fixes the border between the lands of Islam and 
the lands of the Turks in an overtly physical manner. It is important in this context to see 
that the building of this gate is attributed to important political figures, such as governors 
and caliphs. The frequent mention of al-Faḍl al-Barmakī is significant, since he was of 
local descent and became a part of the administrative machinery of the caliphate. al-Faḍl 
represents not just the transformation of frontier into border, but also the incorporation of 
the frontier into the cultural and political center of the Dār al-Islām. 
 If the process of the frontier favors the solidification and delimitation of borders 
and the integration of frontier regions into the political and cultural center, then the story 
of al-Rāsht can be emblematic of the frontier as a whole. The frontier is dangerous, ill-
defined, and under constant negotiation and conflict. The building of a gate keeps the 
dangers at bay and defines the place of the border and, by association, the place of those 
on each side of the border. Even if the Gates of Iron did not really exist, the building of a 








Defending the Eastern Frontier 
 
 
3.1 A Turkish Raid 
In al-Jāḥiẓ‟s Risāla ilā al-Fatḥ ibn Khāqān fi manāqib al-Turk wa-‛āmmat jund al-
Khilāfa (Epistle to al-Fatḥ ibn Khāqān regarding the Traits of the Turks and the Peoples 
of the Army of the Caliphate), al-Faḍl b. al-‛Abbās b. Razīm narrates a story about a band 
of Turks raiding a group of Muslim fortresses. 
One day some horsemen from the Turks came upon us. Not one of us remained outside 
but each man entered his fortress (ḥiṣn) and locked its gate. They surrounded one of those 
fortresses. One of the horsemen saw an old man looking at them from above. The Turk 
said to him, “If you do not come down to me, then I will kill you in a way I have never 
killed anyone.” He came down to him and opened the gate for him. [The Turks] entered 
the fortress and plundered everything that was in it. [The Turk] laughed at his coming 
down and his opening [the gate] for him because [the old man] had been in the strongest 
and the securest place.
 1
 
The old man was then brought before al-Faḍl, who was in another fortress, and the Turk 
released him for a ransom of a single dirham. The Turk was paid and went away with his 
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companions, only to return briefly and announce that the old man was not worth a full 
dirham, calling it “a shameless swindle” (hadhā ghabn fāḥish). The Turk broke the coin 
in half and threw back one of the halves. al-Faḍl and his companions then interrogated 
the old man.   
And we knew that man was a coward. He had heard of the cunning of the Turks in 
entering cities and crossing rivers in war. The opinion had come to him that they 




In the end, the old man had decided that the Turks must have had a trick for breaking into 
the fortress and so opened the gates for them. If the Turk had a trick up his sleeve, it 
seems to have been convincing the old man that he had a trick so that he would open the 
fortress. 
 Here al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868-869) provides us with a rare look into a Turkish raid on 
a Muslim fortress complex along the eastern frontier. The story presented here is 
entertaining, featuring a foolish old man tricked by an arrogant Turkish raider. Within the 
broader contexts of al-Jāḥiẓ‟s text, it also demonstrates the cunning of the Turks, the 
fearsome opponents of the Muslims across the eastern frontier. Certain details in this 
narrative are useful in understanding how a frontier outpost may have operated in the 
third/ninth century, details which create a believable setting for the narrative and are 
therefore unlikely to have been greatly embellished. The primary audience of this work 
would have been familiar with conditions on the eastern frontier, especially since this 
work was dedicated to al-Fatḥ b. Khāqān (d. 247/861), the son of Khāqān b. ‛Urṭūj, a 






descendant of Turkish ruling family of Farghānā.
3
 In response to the arrival of the raiding 
Turks, fortresses acted as refuges behind whose gates people would take shelter. These 
fortresses may be manned by as few as a single individual. At least in this narrative, no 
fighting seems to take place during these raids and the Muslims appear to be simply 
waiting out the Turks who cannot enter their fortified positions without some form of 
trickery. There are goods worth plundering inside these fortresses and when the Turks are 
successful and get their plunder they take off, not concerning themselves with the 
contents of other fortresses or the people who were manning them. These details 
highlight the types of raids which might occur along the eastern frontier, the role of 
fortifications in preventing these raids, and the systems for manning such fortifications. 
Our sources often describe the eastern frontier as a dangerous place where fighting 
between the Muslims and their Turkish neighbors is a common occurrence. Encounters 
like the one just described took place across the region on a regular basis, though with 
varying results.   
 The previous chapter explored the conceptual understanding of frontiers and 
borders in both our own modern perception and, more importantly, in the writings of 
third/ninth and fourth/tenth century geographers writing in Arabic and Persian and their 
application to the eastern frontier. This chapter will focus on a more specific aspect of the 
eastern frontier, namely its military function. Just as the previous chapter was not a 
history of the development of the eastern frontier, this will not be a history of military 
exploits. Instead, this chapter will examine the ways in which the eastern frontier was 
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defended against Turkish raids and how these defenses shaped the region. After a 
discussion of the Turks and the raids which they conducted in the region, this chapter will 
then move to a discussion of the defensive infrastructure in place throughout the eastern 
frontier. This discussion will look at the eastern frontier as a series of interconnected 
nodes and networks focused on the major urban centers which worked their way outward 
towards the actual physical frontier. Finally, the chapter will examine the people who 
manned these defenses, focusing on both the practicalities of recruitment and supply and 
the motivations of those who fought along the frontier. 
 The Arabic term thughūr, as discussed in the previous chapter, has the basic 
meaning of “gaps, breaches, or openings,” most often implying points of entry between 
the Dār al-Islām and the Dār al-Ḥarb. For these reasons, the term is most often translated 
as “frontier.” More often than not, in actual usage, the term is applied to the fortifications 
defending these openings rather than the openings themselves (a single place along the 
frontier is called a thaghr instead of the entire line of the frontier).
4
 In the previous 
chapter, frontiers were defined as loosely-organized liminal zones of transition on the 
periphery of states where territorial expansion or contraction is possible. Here we can see 
that the use of the term thughūr clarifies certain aspects of the military nature of the 
frontier. This is an area where there are openings that enemies may exploit to raid and to 
seize territory; accordingly, self-defense is necessary. These are also openings which may 
be used to raid and to seize the territory of one‟s enemies. The gate swings both ways. 
Frontiers are simultaneously the first line of defense against outside aggression and the 
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marshalling point for offensive military action against an outside foe. The potential for 
military activity taking place along the frontier was thus a defining aspect of frontier 
society. Along the eastern frontier, the depredations of the Turks and the need to defend 
against them required particular infrastructures, including both physical structures such as 
fortresses and the organized manpower to maintain and to operate such edifices. In turn, 
the need to maintain such defenses affected the society of the eastern frontier in 
meaningful ways. 
 
3.2 The Turks 
We find that the Turk does not fight in his land for religion nor for interpretation [of 
Scripture] nor for sovereignty nor for taxes nor out of esprit de corps nor out of jealousy 
– except in the case of women – nor for defense nor out of hostility nor for homeland nor 
for denying [his] home [to others] nor for wealth, but he fights only for plunder and the 
wealth [he can carry] in his hand.
5
 
The most common enemies reported by our sources along the eastern frontier are the 
Turks. Turk, as an ethnonym, was used by the Muslims to refer to a number of Turkic-
speaking, pastoralist, nomadic tribes across the Central Asian steppe.
6
 Our sources often 
speak of the Turks as a collective, as are the lands they occupy (bilād al-Turk). At the 
same time, our authors will, on occasion, enumerate the many divisions among the Turks, 
such as the Toghuzghuz, Yaghmā, Ghuzz/Oghuz, Kīmāk, and Qarluq, and will speak of 
them inhabiting particular lands, thus showing an understanding of some of the 
complexities of the Turkic world. Political unification among the Turks was uncommon 
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but not out of the question, as it had happened previously with the Türk Qağanate in the 
sixth and seventh centuries.
7
 Bathold has argued for a new set of Turkic kingdoms in the 
late eighth century, one led by the Qarluqs on the Kazakh steppe spreading into 
Semirechye and the other of the Oghuz or Ghuz “on the lower reaches of the Syr-Darya” 
or Jaxartes River.
8
   
The Turks living along the eastern frontier in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth 
centuries were largely pastoral nomads traveling from the Central Asian steppes down 
into the settled communities along the Oxus and Jaxartes Rivers. Their interactions with 
the settled communities of the Dār al-Islām are akin to the relationships between 
nomadic and settled peoples in many parts of the world throughout history. While there 
are peaceful interactions, particularly for the purposes of trade, the most noticeable 
element of their interactions are the nomads‟ predatory raids against the settled 
communities. Predatory raiding is, after all, a key element of the nomadic economy. 
Nomads tend to travel light and survive on what they can carry with themselves, creating 
an economy and society centered on their animal herds. The trading with and raiding of 
settled communities provides those things that such a lifestyle lacks, primarily 
agricultural goods. It has been argued that the decision to raid or to trade is often based 
upon the relative strengths of the nomads versus the settled populations and each side‟s 
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ability to define the terms of interaction. When nomads are stronger, raiding occurs. 
When the settled communities are stronger, trading occurs.
9
  
 Descriptions of the Turks in the medieval Islamic world and beyond often focus 
on their strength and military prowess.
10
 Their skills as mounted archers had made them 
an asset to the armies which recruited them as fighters throughout history and a threat to 
the settled communities who lived in proximity to the Central Asian steppes. Even early 
Islamic prophetical traditions recognize the Turks as mighty warriors. The Prophet 
Muhammad is said to have encouraged his followers to avoid the Turks, as in his 
alliterative command to “leave the Turks alone as long as they leave you alone” (utruku l-
atrak ma tarakukum). 
11
 Other prophetical traditions associate fighting the Turks with the 
coming of the end times. “The Hour will not come until the Muslims fight with the Turks, 
a people whose faces are like hammered shields wearing clothes of hair and walking 
(with shoes) of hair.”
12
 
 This dichotomy of respect for the military skills of the Turks along with fear for 
those same skills can be seen in al-Jāḥiẓ‟s Risāla ilā al-Fatḥ ibn Khāqān fi manāqib al-
Turk wa-‛āmmat jund al-Khilāfa, an epistle written to al-Fatḥ b. Khāqān, a secretary and 
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close companion of the caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-247/847-861)
13
 of Turkish (but not 
slave) origins.
14
 The first two parts of this work discuss the status of Arabs and non-
Arabs in Islam, the groups who made up the armies of Sāmarrā‟ such as the Khurāsānīs, 
the mawali of the Arabs, and the Abnā’, in the end coming to the conclusion that all 
peoples give credit and honor to the Muslim community when they serve the caliph, even 
the Turks
15
 (an appropriate message in an epistle written to a powerful Turk who is also a 
close confidant of the caliph). The third and longest portion deals with discussions of the 
military prowess of the Turks, focusing primarily on the Central Asian steppe Turks, but 
also including examples of the Sāmarrān Turks. This third part is divided itself into two 
main parts, the first of which deals with the Caliph al-Ma‟mūn asking a group of men “at 
the forefront in the science of war” (al-mutaqaddimīn fī-l-‛ilm bi-l-ḥarb) who is the more 
dangerous enemy, the Khārijites or the Turks. The military commander Ḥumayd b. ‛Abd 
al-Ḥamīd al-Ṭūsī, who had led al-Ma‟mūn‟s forces to victory over Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī in 
202-203/818-819, gives a long description of the superiority of the Turks which al-
Ma‟mūn chooses as the correct response.
16
 The second part consists of a number of 
sayings by various individuals, including a number of noted soldiers and commanders, 
about the military prowess of the Turks.
17
 The text balances the two images of the Turks 
as warriors who must on the one hand be feared and on the other be respected and 
admired. 
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 The fearsome image of the Turks of the eastern frontier that we find in our 
geographical sources is unflattering to say the least. Here we see, in the words of Rudi 
Lindner, “the prejudices of their literate, fleeing enemies.”
18
 The Turks left little written 
record of themselves before the Seljūqs established themselves as the masters of the 
eastern half of the Muslim world in the late fifth/eleventh century, assuming the trappings 
of sedentary kingship along the way, including literary production.
19
 The result is a 
portrayal that is biased from the perspective of the victims of the Turks‟ depredations. 
The Turks often appear as the counterpart of the settled, civilized Muslims. al-Ya‛qūbī, 
for example, describes them as possessing no fortifications, but rather camping in felt 
tents; they subsist on millet, mare‟s milk, and wild game and, since they lack iron, they 
make their arrows of animal bones.
20
   
The Ḥudūd al-ʽĀlam gives a more detailed discussion of the Turks and other 
peoples living beyond the realm of Islam, providing individual descriptions of the lands 
of various Turkish tribes and confederations, and portraying them as warlike peoples. The 
Toghuzghuz are said to be “warlike people possessing great numbers of arms.”
21
 The 
Yaghmā are “strong, warlike, and have plenty of arms.”
22
 The Khallukh (Qarluq) are “a 
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warlike people, prone to forays.”
23
  Not surprisingly, given their proximity to the lands of 
Islam and the regularity of their incursions, the Ghuzz receive what is probably the 
harshest treatment in this sense. They are described as having  
arrogant faces and [they] are quarrelsome, malicious, and malevolent… They possess 
arms and implements and are courageous and daring in war. They continually make 
inroads into the lands of Islam, whatever place be on the way, and (then) they strike, 
plunder, and retreat as quickly as possible.
24
   
The Turks are also seen here as fighting among themselves, with the Kīmāk, Khallukh 
(Qarluq), and Yaghmā Turks all plundering J.mlīkath, the village of the Yabghū, a title 
which indicates a Turkish population.
25
 This rivalry can reach the point of breaking down 
the peace within a single Turkish group, such as the Ghuzz, who must have a separate 
chief for each of their tribes “on account of their discords with each other.”
26
 In other 
places however, various Turkish groups may live together in peace, as in Khīrm.kī, where 
Yaghmā, Khallukh (Qarluq), and Toghuzghuz all live together with the Artūjians.
27
 This 
condition does not have to be permanent or regular, as in the case of the Kīmāk who 
winter near the Ghuzz “whenever there is peace between them.”
28
   
When positive traits are ascribed to the Turks, they have to do with their military 
prowess. Their fighting can sometimes be seen as simultaneously a negative, since it 
tends to be against the Muslims, and a positive, or at least they can be said to fight in a 
manner which deserves a certain level of respect and admiration. For example, the 
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Kumījiyān Turks who live in the mountains between Khuttalān and Chaghāniyān are 
“professional thieves and looters of caravans and look arrogant” but “in their predatory 
expeditions they behave gallantly”
29
 and they are later described as being “courageous 
and warlike and professional thieves.”
30
 Similarly, the Khallukh (Qarluq) Turks of Tūn.l 
and Tālkh.za are “warlike, courageous, and valiant.”
31
 The Turks constitute a threat in 
this scheme, but they may commit their acts of violence in a gallant, courageous, or 
valiant manner. Their conduct and ability in war is admirable, even if dangerous. 
In the period under study here, it is important to underscore that the threat the 
Turks represent is largely one of small scale raids. These are not forces of conquest. It is 
not until the end of the fourth/tenth century when a confederation of Turks - under the 
Qarakhānid dynasty - began to capture Muslim territories and to create a state of their 
own carved out of Muslim lands. Where the Turks had made inroads into the Muslim 
world during the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries it was through the armies of the 
caliphs and various provincial governors, usually as slave soldiers.
32
 For those authors 
who spent time in Khurāsān and Transoxania, it is the raiding steppe Turks who are 
probably at the forefront of their minds. The majority of our sources, however, were 
written by individuals from Baghdad, whose experiences of the Turks was primarily with 
the slave soldiers of Sāmarrā‟. Of course, as Matthew Gordon has argued, the differences 
between the steppe Turks and the Sāmarrān Turks was often negligible in the minds of 
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the Baghdadī authors who viewed even those Turks employed in the service of the 
caliphate as savages, unfit for urban, civilized life.
33
 
In the view of our authors, even though the Turks are primarily predatory raiders, 
they are a threat to the Dār al-Islām as a whole. al-Ya‛qūbī says that the Turks “surround 
the province of Khurāsān and make incursions into all parts; in this way there is not a 
region of Khurāsān where the inhabitants are not in combat with the Turks and where the 
Turks of all races do not perform raids.”
34
 The previous chapter has demonstrated that the 
Turks were not entirely a foreign enemy crossing the frontier to raid, but a threat within 
the lands of Islam as well. This situation, in which the Turks are intermixed with other 
ethnic groups within the Muslim territories, finds expression in al-Ya‛qūbī‟s fears and 
warnings. It is not only those places directly along or within striking distance from the 
frontier that are objects of concern; it is rather the frontier region as a whole which is 
threatened by these raids. The dangers resulting from this intermixed population are all 
the greater because of the mobility of the Turks and the distances they are willing to 
travel on their raids. The Kinjīna Turks, located between Khuttalān and Chaghāniyān, 
will travel forty to fifty farsakhs (approximately 120 to 150 miles) on their predatory 
expeditions, for example.
35
 Even if they were not already living on the Muslim side of the 
frontier, they could still loot far within the lands of the Dār al-Islām. 
 The threat of such raids was not illusory. Places where Turkish raids occurred 
with greater regularity could see entire communities disappear if they were not equipped 
to defend themselves. Qudāma refers to Kūk, on the road from Bukhārā to Samarqand, as 
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being deprived (jarrada minha) by the king of the Turks (malik al-Turk) who conducts 
raids there.
36
 Tirmaqān similarly suffers from raids and, according to Qudāma, people 
would not settle there for fear of the Turks.
37
 While these aren‟t raids of conquest, the 
disruptions they cause can make certain territories completely useless to the Muslims, 
having the same effect of territorial regression as out and out conquest. Precautions must 
be taken to prevent such disruptions. 
Ibn al-Faqīh quotes Sharīk b. ʽAbdallāh,
38
 in describing the Turks as “the most 
powerful enemies in strength,” who encroach upon the people of Khurāsān. They use 
rude language towards the Khurāsānīs and blaspheme against them.
 39
 Luckily, the people 
of Khurāsān are well suited for this fighting because they are “the protection for the 
Muslims against the Turks and are firm in killing and capturing them.”
40
 A dichotomy 
found in Ibn al-Faqīh‟s statements here is important for understanding the role of the 
eastern frontier within the greater Muslim world. The frontier acts as the first line of 
defense against the Turks and it is the bravery and skill of the Muslims of the eastern 
frontier which protect the rest of the Muslim world from them. al-Iṣṭakhrī gives us a 
similar description of Transoxania, saying that there is not in Islam an enemy stronger 
than the Turks who face the frontier of Transoxania. Since the majority of Transoxania is 
frontier, the people of Transoxania are thus the defenders of Islam.
41
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 Keeping in mind the threat posed by the steppe Turks of Central Asia, we must 
next examine how this threat shaped the eastern frontier. Now we will shift our focus the 
Turks themselves to the ways in which the Muslims sought to protect themselves from 
them, including defensive infrastructure and the enlistment of warriors in defense of the 
Dār al-Islām. 
 
3.3 The Military Frontier 
The medieval geographical texts under examination here are filled with sites which either 
have names that indicate a military function, such as places with the terms ḥiṣn, qaṣr, 
qal‛a , or ribāṭ as a component of their names, or are explicitly described as having 
certain pieces of military or defensive infrastructure, such as fortresses or city walls. The 
assumption is that these sites played a role in defending the region against the raids of the 
steppe Turks and in organizing counter raids as well as defending against any other 
military threat which may appear in the region. Our sources give few details for most of 
these sites and we have little information about what may have actually happened at any 
of them. As Paul Wheatley pointed out, “In the medieval Islamic world, fortification was 
an almost universal attribute of settlement.”
42
 Therefore, overly-detailed descriptions of 
such fortifications may not have appeared important to the authors of our sources. In a 
frontier context, however, the nature, use, and importance of these fortifications take on 
different forms and duties, all related to the frontier itself. Therefore, despite the fact that 
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fortifications were “an almost universal attribute of settlement,” it is important to 
consider the specific attributes of these fortifications within the frontier context.
43
 
The following sections will look at these examples of fortifications in the eastern 
frontier and examine their roles in the larger frontier society. These fortifications created 
an interconnected defensive network across the eastern frontier which also represented a 
larger network connecting cities, villages, and agricultural regions. Cities appear to act as 
nodes, much as they do in the itineraries provided by our geographical sources, while 
roads lined with defensive structures branch out from the cities creating a frontier 
defensive network. The following sections are organized based upon this principle. 
Beginning with a discussion of the defenses found in cities and their immediate suburbs, 
this chapter will move on to discussions of the agricultural hinterlands found around the 
cities, then the roads which connected these urban nodes, and finally the broader frontier 
itself.   
Before discussing individual sites and their defensive infrastructures, a general 
word regarding certain types of military or defensive architectural edifices is in order. 
Two Arabic terms are commonly translated as fortress, ḥiṣn and qaṣr. Ḥiṣn, related to the 
root ḥaṣana (to be well fortified, strong, or inaccessible), clearly connotes a fortress, a 
fortified place, or stronghold. Qaṣr has a similar meaning to ḥiṣn, with the general 
meaning of a fortified place.
44
 It may also have a meaning that is more akin to a castle or 
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palace (as in the residence of a governor).
45
 While both ḥiṣn and qaṣr are common 
components of Arabic place names, ḥiṣn appears much less frequently in the Persianate 
world.
46
 Conversely, when a site is mentioned as possessing a fortress, without a fortress 
word being a part of its name, ḥiṣn appears almost exclusively along with other adjectival 
forms of the same root, generally marking places which are fortified. The term qal‛a  
may also appear in our texts, referring to fortresses. 
The ribāṭ is an architectural form which has left scholars with a number of 
questions. At its base, the ribāṭ is a kind of frontier guard post or small fortress which 
takes on a number of different architectural forms found from Andalusia in the west to 
Transoxania in the east along both land and sea-based borders. A number of other 
functions may be given to these edifices, creating confusion in giving a precise definition 
to the term. Due to the complexity of these issues, the ribāṭs of the eastern frontier will be 
given their own detailed treatment later in this chapter.   
Citadels, known as quhandiz, are a widespread part of the defensive infrastructure 
of cities along the eastern frontier. The quhandiz is a particularly Persianate form of 
military edifice, a citadel often found near the center of the city. These structures appear 
to be found only in cities with a pre-Islamic foundation and take on a number of different 
roles in urban life after the conquests. The term quhandiz is frequently glossed or 
misunderstood by modern scholars and is often left untranslated. In many cases, scholars 
have followed the lead of Barthold, who argued that both quhandiz and ḥiṣn, when 
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attached to a city, imply simply a walled inner city.
47
 A quhandiz may look or act like a 
ḥiṣn, but our sources will take special note when this occurs as in al-Iṣṭakhrī‟s description 
of Kābul, where the quhandiz is described as a fortification (lahā quhandiz mawṣūf bi-l-
taḥaṣṣūn),
48
 indicating that this is an anomaly. The location and appearance of these 
quhandiz indicate a difference from ḥiṣn and a structure more particular than that of a 
walled urban quarter. First, we have a number of locations which feature both a quhandiz 
and a ḥiṣn, signaling a distinction between the two.
49
 Second, we have the locations 
provided for quhandiz in our sources; either within a walled madīna, thus making the 
definition of a walled inner city redundant;
50
 or outside the walls of the madīna or in the 
suburbs making it distinct from the walled inner city;
51
 or outside the city entirely.
52
 The 
quhandiz is certainly a fortified part of the urban infrastructure, but it resembles a citadel, 
a strongly fortified edifice with a commanding position over a city, rather than a walled 
inner city. The role of the quhandiz will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In order to provide some insight which may be helpful in looking at the 
fortifications of the eastern frontier, especially when thinking about roads and agricultural 
hinterlands, we may compare them with the forts of the Roman and Byzantine limes 
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arabicus. The limes arabicus was a 1,500 km frontier zone
53
 containing numerous 
fortifications running from northern Syria to southern Palestine through the Roman 
province of Arabia Petraea until the early sixth century, when troops were progressively 
withdrawn. The 150-kilometer “outer limes” or “central sector” of the limes arabicus, 
consisting of the major forts Qasr Bashīr, Lejjūn, Jurf al-Durāwish, and Da‛jāniyeh, have 
been seen by some as a defensive zone against raids by Arab tribes coming out of the 
desert.
54
 The exact nature of these fortifications has been subject to a lively debate in 
recent decades,
55
 which we will recall further on as we discuss the fortifications of the 
Muslim eastern frontier. There are numerous similarities between the fortifications of the 
limes arabicus and those of the eastern frontier of the Islamic world, particularly in that 
both were located along imperial frontiers and, presumably, used for defense against 
nomadic or semi-nomadic raiders coming from beyond the frontier. A major difference 
between them is the much greater amount of scholarly attention the limes arabicus have 
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3.4 Defending the Cities 
In a variety of ways, the cities of the eastern frontier formed the nodes of political and 
economic networks across the region, as cities did throughout much of the medieval 
world. Urban centers of varying sizes dominated smaller villages and rural communities 
in their vicinity, most notably in their roles as centers for trade and tax collection. The 
responsibilities of some cities in this regard may stretch farther than others, as in the case 




 and Transoxania in 
Bukhārā.
58
 Other cities dominated smaller regions within these larger provinces.   
The actual physical make-up of the cities of the eastern frontier is often difficult 
to decipher from our sources. A number of these cities are rather ancient, such as Balkh, 
Samarqand, and Marw which date back to the third century BCE and earlier. Over the 
centuries, as different powers rose and fell in the region, cities expanded, fell into ruin, 
and were rebuilt. By the third/ninth century, Marw, for example, had three distinct layers 
of development; the Achaemenid city of the fifth century BCE which was later converted 
into a citadel, the Seleucid city of the third century BCE, and the neighboring Islamic city 
of the eighth century CE which quickly overshadowed the older cities and relegated them 
to the status of suburbs (see figure 3.1). Our sources do not regularly provide us with 
descriptions of these cities which would allow us to reconstruct them in detail, but they 
do provide lists of notable places and infrastructures within them sometimes with details 
of these specific places. Archaeological reconstructions are also difficult as centuries of 
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development, destruction (both natural and man-made), and new construction (often 
currently inhabited) stand in the way of the ancient remains. For these reasons, the 
defensive infrastructures of the cities of the eastern frontier will be discussed here in 
almost abstract generalities, as this is the best we can achieve with our sources. 
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 Very broadly, the cities of the eastern frontier take on an urban form typical of the 
cities of the Persianate, world composed of concentric rings of urban development. The 
inner city, known as the shahristān in Persian or madīna in Arabic, stands at the center 
surrounded by the arbāḍ or suburbs and then finally an agricultural hinterland. 
Sometimes the quhandiz is included as a fourth layer in this schema, forming the absolute 
nucleus of the city, even though in actuality the quhandiz is not always so centrally 
located, as mentioned earlier. These divisions are often separated by walls of some sort. 
Standing over these cities are citadels and fortresses, quhandiz and ḥiṣn. 
 
3.4.1 The Quhandiz 
Though the role of the quhandiz is primarily defensive, it appears to have a number of 
other functions within the cities where it is found. One of the most common of these non-
military functions is housing the residence of the governor or local ruler. The quhandiz of 
Samarqand holds the residence of the ṣulṭān.
60
 The quhandiz of Tirmidh holds the dār al-
imāra or governor‟s palace.
61
 The dihqān of Ḥarrān resides in the quhandiz.
62
 The dār al-
imāra or governor‟s palace of Tūnkath is in the quhandiz.
63
 Qāyin, the capital of 
Qūhistān, has a quhandiz which houses the governor‟s palace (sarāy-i sulṭān).
64
 
According to al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal, it also contains the congregational mosque in 
addition to the dār al-imāra.
65
 Beyond the palaces of local rulers, the quhandiz of 
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Bukhārā is said to hold the palace of the Sāmānid governor over all of Khurāsān.
66
 Other 
administrative buildings may also be found in the quhandiz. Though the quhandiz is 
outside the city proper, the sulṭān of Numūjikath has taken over the quhandiz and placed 
the treasury and prison inside it.
67
 He has also placed his palace outside the city, across 
from the quhandiz.
68
 While not residing in the quhandiz proper, he still maintains a link 
between it and his palace. Those institutions which are then placed within the quhandiz 
still have a strong link to the position of the local ruler, housing his treasury and prison. 
Though he is a non-Muslim ruler or at least a ruler outside the structures of the caliphate, 
the quhandiz of Urduwā is the residence of the king of the Turkmen.
69
 
 Other quhandiz are noted as being generally inhabited without specifying who 
inhabited them. Thus, according to al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal, both the quhandiz and 
madīna of Nīshāpūr are inhabited.
70
 This quhaniz is in the suburbs, specifically noted as 
being outside the madīna.
71
 Besides the possibility that the quhandiz may be inhabited 
beyond the palace of the local ruler, it may be a large part of the urban infrastructure. The 
quhandiz of Bukhārā, for example, is said to be about the size of a small city itself.
72
  
The quhandiz as a citadel is a defense of last resort, potentially behind the city 
walls and other defenses. As such, the palaces and other government buildings found 
within the quhandiz are those institutions which would traditionally be the centers of 
resistance during an invasion or siege. The quhandiz is not there to protect the city per se, 
but particular portions of it, especially the palace of the ruler (and the ruler himself) and 
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the treasury. In this case, the term “citadel” stands as the strongest definition for these 
very reasons, but the presence of government institutions within its walls must be 
reinforced. In this sense, the quhandiz also acts as a political focus in the city by 
representing the local ruler through his residence within it. 
 In every case, it is clear that the quhandiz is a pre-Islamic architectural form 
appearing only in cities with pre-Islamic foundations;
73
 sometimes these quhandiz have 
rather ancient origins. Following the arrival of Islam, the quhandiz appears to undergo a 
slow death. Marw is an excellent example of a city with an ancient quhandiz which 
declined following the arrival of Islam, even though the city itself continued to flourish. 
Ibn al-Faqīh and al-Muqaddasī both report a story in which Ṭahmūrath, the second king 
of the ancient and legendary Pīshdādid dynasty of Iranian kings, built the quhandiz of 
Marw with the aid of 100,000 men.
74
 This tradition cannot be rooted in historical fact 
since, besides the lack of attestation for the Pīshdādids outside of literary traditions, the 
earliest firm evidence we have for the foundation of the city is during the reign of the 
Achaemenids in the fifth century BCE; subsequently we see the transformation of this 
original city into a citadel during the reign of the Seleucid king Antiochus I Soter (r. 280-
261 BCE).
75
 All this does, however, is reinforce the notion of an ancient foundation for 
the quhandiz of Marw. al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal address this matter in an interesting 
way by ascribing the quhandiz to Ṭahmūrath while stating that the old city was built by 
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Alexander the Great, who was in fact much closer in chronology to Antiochus I.
76
 This 
dating actually fits with the archaeological evidence which shows a fifth century BCE 
Achamenid city, not nearly as old as Tahmūrath but sufficiently ancient, being converted 
into a citadel, with a Seleucid city being built around it in the third century BCE. In the 
Ḥudūd al-‛Ālam, the latest of our sources, the quhandiz of Marw is filled with numerous 
castles (kūshk, which may also mean “fortress” similar to the duality of Arabic qaṣr 
which may mean either “palace” or “fortress”).
77
 Within the Balkhī traditions, the 
quhandiz lies in ruins. al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal state that the quhandiz is similar in size 
to the inner city, except that it lies in ruins.
78
 al-Muqaddasī reports that the quhandiz of 
Marw is situated on an elevation in the inner city and in ruins.
79
 These reports place the 
quhandiz firmly in the past. In Marw, the quhandiz is a magnificent construction, built by 
an ancient, legendary king and filled with castles, but by the fourth/tenth century it has 
fallen into disuse and disrepair. 
 Ruined quhandiz are found throughout the region. Isfījāb has a ruined quhandiz, 
which seems to have been replaced by a number of ribāṭs.
80
 It is an area noted for its role 
in frontier fighting, but what one would assume to be an important part of the defenses in 
the case of an attack directly on the city itself have been left to ruin. Both Kish‟s 
quhandiz and the entirety of its madīna are in ruins, but this does not mean that the area is 
completely unused since the congregational mosque is still found in the madīna.
81
 Nasaf 
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has a ruined quhandiz.
82
 Evidence from Kāth shows that the destruction of a quhandiz 
can be the result of mere neglect rather than of war or purposeful destruction. In this case 
it is the river flowing too close to the walls of the quhandiz which has ruined it.
83
 The 
ruined and outmoded condition of a quhandiz can be so extreme that sometimes our 
authors think it is important to mention that a quhandiz is still functioning. al-Muqaddasī 
notes that Farabr‟s quhandiz is still active, but also mentions that the quhandiz is 
furnished with fine ribāṭs.
84
 That so many of these quhandiz are left in a state of ruin 
shows that they had lost much of their utility by the third/ninth century. That quhandiz 
were important at some point in time is apparent through specific mentions of places that 
lack one. Khūrlūgh is said to have neither a fortress nor a quhandiz, for example.
85
  
The decline of the quhandiz can most likely be associated with the changing 
nature of warfare in Central Asia once the Muslims had established control over the area. 
Instead of the defense of cities against invading and besieging forces, we find the need to 
defend cities and, perhaps more importantly, their agricultural hinterlands from raiding 
nomads, for which an urban citadel is notably less useful. All this may also result from 
the changing political and military order of the region as armies of Arab Muslims took 
control of Transoxania and Khurāsān and integrated the area south and west of the steppe 
into the Caliphate, bringing an end to a period of individual kingdoms in Transoxania and 
on the fringes of Khurāsān. 
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3.4.2 Urban Fortresses 
Other forms of fortresses are associated with cities, typically with the Arabic term ḥiṣn. 
As mentioned earlier, these appear to be distinct from the quhandiz, but we must ask in 
which ways. Frequently ḥuṣūn (plural of ḥiṣn) are described as being “over” or “near” 
(‛alā) a place compared to other types of urban infrastructure, including the quhandiz, 
which are typically described as being “in” (fī or bi-) or “for” (li-) a place.
86
 The term 
‛alā seems to imply that the fortresses are actually outside the city itself, unlike the 
quhandiz which, it seems to be assumed, is normally placed within the city. The clearest 
example of this is found in Mazdākhkan which has twelve thousand fortresses over it in 
all directions.
87
 On occasion certain ḥuṣūn will be specifically mentioned as being inside 
the city, as in the fortress of Nīshāpūr, which is located at the center of the city,
88
 or the 
fortress of Herat which has four gates corresponding to the city gates which surround it.
89
 
The wording that these fortresses are “over” a city conveys the sense that their role is to 
oversee or observe the city, instead of providing the kind of last-ditch defense provided 
by a citadel in the middle of the urban center.   
 Like the quhandiz, which often houses the local ruler‟s palace, the ḥiṣn also has 
non-military functions. In this case, however, the most common functions are religious 
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and economic rather than political. The congregational mosques of a number of cities are 











 Sometimes you find the congregational mosque paired with a 
market in the fortress, reminiscent of the pairing of the two in the early Islamic garrison 
cities of Iraq. The congregational mosque and markets may be found in the ḥiṣn of 
Bārāb.
95
 The fortress of Baykand (which has only one gate indicating either limited 
access or small numbers of visitors) contains both a busy market and the congregational 
mosque (whose mihrāb is noted for being decorated with jewels).
96
 Unlike the quhandiz 
whose non-defensive functions focus on the ruler, the non-military functions of the ḥiṣn 
appear to focus on those aspects of communal life which have a close tie to Islam and the 
Muslim ruling establishment. Therefore, these ḥuṣūn seem reminiscent of the amṣār 
garrison cities of the early conquests which became a focus for Muslim spiritual life 
through the construction of congregational mosques and trade through the establishment 
of highly regulated and taxed markets while maintaining a physical separation between 
the Muslim conquerors and the local populations. If these ḥuṣūn were in fact outside 
conquered cities, then they would have provided separation for the soldiers occupying the 
fortresses from local populations, even while drawing local populations into the fortresses 
through the markets and, as conversion happened, the mosque.   
 Narratives from the Muslim conquests of the region provide evidence that, at least 
in some cases, this is exactly what happened initially in the east. For example, after 
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conquering Balkh in 43/663-4 the Arabs built a garrison two farsakhs from the city at a 
place called Barūqān. Later, under the governor Asad b. ‛Abd Allāh al-Qasrī, the garrison 
moved into Balkh itself in 107/725.
97
 While many of these garrisons may have been 
integrated into local urban communities by the  third/ninth century, the physical and 
architectural remains of these earlier extra-urban garrisons still dotted the region and may 
very well still have served a defensive (or other) function.   
Our sources show that there were locations outside of the cities with a military 
presence, along with fortresses with a standing military presence. According to Qudāma, 
outside the walls of al-Shāsh and two farsakhs from the city is a military encampment 
(muʽaskar).
98
 al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal also mention a place known as al-mu‛askar as a 
neighborhood in the suburbs of Nīshāpūr where one would also find the congregational 
mosque.
99
 Though this military encampment lies within the suburbs of the city, it 
resembles the garrisons mentioned above, inasmuch as it contains the congregational 
mosque. Its presence in the suburbs may be the result of sprawl consuming an area which 
previously, most likely at the time of the Muslim conquests, lay outside the limits of the 
city and its suburbs. Other locations have armies attached to them, even if they do not 
have encampments. al-Iṣṭakhrī notes a place along an itinerary as the ‛askar of Panjhīr, or 
army of Panjhīr, separate from the city itself.
100
 The fortress of Wasīj, which hovers over 
(‛alā) the city, has a strong military commander (amīr qawi) presiding over it.
101
 These 
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were sites of standing armies which continued to remain outside the city, even as 
Muslims became integrated within the cities themselves. 
 As with the quhandiz, you can also find a number of fortresses in ruins throughout 
the region. The fortress of al-Ṭubas is in ruins.
102
 Both Balāj and Barūkat‟s fortresses are 
in ruins, even though they are a frontier against the Turkmen. It may be that they remain 
in this state because, as al-Muqaddasī points out, the Turkmen have converted to Islam 
(out of fear) and are therefore no longer a threat requiring the maintenance of these 
fortresses.
 103






 and Abīward are 
similarly in ruins.
107
 These do not appear to be the results of willful neglect or of their 
replacement by other structures, as in the case of certain quhandiz, but rather of particular 
developments on the ground. If these fortresses did function in the manner of amṣār, as 
mentioned above, their use would necessarily change over time as the populations 
became more integrated and the locals converted to Islam. This would open the door for 
the ḥiṣn to be slowly replaced by other forms of defensive architecture, as the garrisons 
integrated into local communities and moved into the pre-existing cities, as we have seen 
in Balkh, or for the fortresses to develop into settled communities in their own rights as 
local populations began to move into the ḥiṣn and the surrounding areas, losing their 
specifically military purposes along the way. It is possible that the garrison built on the 
outskirts of a city may grow until it becomes more important that the city itself. In the 
diagram of Marw discussed above (see Figure 3.1), the second/eighth century city built 
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by the Muslims (marked as the Sultan Kala) replaced the pre-Islamic towns of Erk Kala 
and Gyaur Kala, which became suburbs of the newer Muslim city. 
 
3.4.3 City Walls 
As mentioned above, the cities of the eastern frontier can be described in terms of 
concentric rings of development; the shahristān or madīna, the arbāḍ (plural of rabaḍ) or 
suburbs, and the agricultural hinterland. Each of these areas can be separated by or 
surrounded by walls of various kinds. The walls surrounding the agricultural hinterland 
and the make-up of concentric rings of walls will be discussed shortly. Here we examine 
the walls surrounding the shahristān or madīna and arbāḍ. 
 When it comes to the inner city walls, we see that they employ a variety of 
defensive measures beyond a simple wall. City walls are often matched with a second set 
of defenses in the form of either a trench (khandaq)
108
 or moat (khandaq mal’ān min al-
mā’, khandaq wa-l-mā’, or khandaq yadūru fihi al-mā’).
109
 The moats can be associated 
with the systems of canals which bring water into the city, channeling water into the moat 
as it travels through the city. Sometimes these are rather large, as in the case of 
Ghardamān whose moat is the width of an arrow‟s flight.
110
 In other instances, the 
difficulty in passing through them is shown by the presence of bridges
111
 or drawbridges 
which are raised at night (jisr yurf‛u kull layla).
112
 These are measures meant to limit 
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access to the walls, or more importantly the gates of the city, and they appear to be 
designed for these defensive purposes. 
In other locations, natural features are similarly employed. Ibn Khurradādhbih 
describes al-Tirmidh by saying that the Jayḥūn or Oxus River strikes al-Tirmidh‟s walls 
and that its inner city (madīnatahā) is made out of stone.
113
 This placement of the city 
walls along the banks of the river, so that the river strikes the walls themselves, seems 
like a more traditional defensive measure, somewhat similar to the Propontis and Golden 
Horn Walls of Constantinople which prevented seaborne attacks. Unlike trenches or 
moats, which limit access to the city‟s walls, walls built put to a river, especially a river 
as large as the Jayḥūn, blocks access from that direction entirely. The construction of city 
walls up to the banks of a river takes forethought at the foundation of a city, in order for 
the city to come up to the riverbank without crossing it. While this brief description is 
almost all that Ibn Khurradādhbih has to say about al-Tirmidh, it emphasizes the city as a 
strong point with a wall and stone structures. Ūzkand also makes use of rivers. Its wall, 
which encircles the suburbs, is surrounded by a stream without any bridge, so that people 
must wade across it to pass through the city gates.
114
 
The walls of Akhsīkath, the capital of Farghāna and the furthest city of 
Transoxania, have an interesting relationship with the Jaxartes, according to al-Iṣṭakhrī. 
Here we are given two routes for approaching the city from Khawākand. The first has the 
traveler reaching the gate of Akhsīkath before crossing the Jaxartes and then entering the 
city itself. The second has the traveler crossing the Jaxartes and then going a further five 
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farsakhs until he reaches the gate of Akhsīkath.
115
 The walls of the city appear to cross 
the river with gates appearing on both sides as one approaches the city from different 
directions. 
In only two instances do we see walls in situations where specific military 
capabilities are mentioned.  Samarqand is unique in that its outermost walls are 
specifically noted as designed for fighting.  Ibn al-Faqīh says that the towers of the walls 
are towers for fighting (abrāj lil-ḥarb).
116
 This “fighting” wall, however, is the wall 
surrounding the city‟s agricultural hinterland, not the urban center itself (on which see 
below). Wāyikhān is noted for having onagers
117
 or small catapults (‛arrādāt) upon its 
gates.
118
 An interesting example of city-walls with combined military purposes is found 
in Herat, where a wall taller than a man‟s height at all points (kulluhu aṭwal min qāma) 
surrounds the ḥiṣn, which is inside the city itself.
119
 These walls have a defensive 
character and they are designed with fighting in mind. It does not appear, however, that 
fighting along city walls in this region took place with much frequency or in many 
different locations during the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. The remainder of the 
walls, trenches, and moats have the effect of limiting access to the cities, but there is little 
discussion of their being useful in preventing concentrated attacks. 
 The cities of the eastern frontier make use of a variety of defensive measures. 
Concentric circles of walls protect not only the city, but also its suburbs and agricultural 
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hinterlands. Quhandiz and fortresses are found within and attached to a number of cities. 
It appears, however, that quhandiz tend to be defenses of last resort, located within the 
cities themselves while other fortresses are often found outside of the cities and may have 
had earlier histories as garrison points. In these fortified sites, particular urban 
infrastructures are protected, such as palaces, mosques, and markets, with the quhandiz 
being attached to those institutions most closely connected with the local ruler and the 
ḥiṣn with more communal institutions such as mosques and markets. All in all, hovewr, 
the defense of cities does not seem a major priority. Fortifications are allowed to fall into 
ruin and there is little talk of recent construction. The concern is not with the possible 
siege or conquest of cities, but rather with protecting the dependent regions around them, 
a defensive concern born from the experiences of real military threats found in the region. 
The cities of the eastern frontier act as the nodes of regional networks, and as we go 
further out along the branches of these networks we see a greater emphasis on 
functioning defensive infrastructures against the raiding Turks. 
 
3.5 Defense of Agricultural Lands 
It has been argued that the forts of the Roman and Byzantine limes arabicus would have 
been connected by a via militaris (military road) which ran along the imperial frontier. 
David F. Graf has built a counterargument around archeological evidence to the effect 
that there was in fact no continuous via militaris directly connecting the frontier forts 
which these forts were meant to defend.
120
 What he finds instead is that the individual 
forts and watchtowers of the region were located at the edge of wadis which penetrated 
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into the desert, with the major highway passing several kilometers behind the forts. Graf 
has connected this layout of forts and highways with an imperial policy which 
encouraged the development of agriculture on the margins of the empire by creating 
agricultural estates in border regions.
121
 Graf then argues from the presence of the 
remains of agricultural estates along these wadis that “in many cases, the cultivated zone 
itself extends eastward into the desert along the wadi formations with the military 
structures, leaving the clear impression that the forts are associated with the enterprise, if 
not the instigators, of this thrust outward.”
122
 In Graf‟s argument, the fortifications of the 
limes arabicus were meant to protect agriculture and not the roads. Now if we ask what is 
the greatest threat posed by small raiding bands of nomads on the fringes of a settled 
society, the likely answer is that the threat to outlying agricultural communities is 
comparable to the threat to caravans traveling on roads near the frontier. Regardless of 
the results of the modern debates about the purposes of the frontier estates of the Roman 
Empire, these estates would have needed protection. 
 Along the eastern frontier of the Islamic world, we see a similar interest in 
defending agricultural land from raids and other (possibly environmental) threats. The 
clearest evidence for this, however, involves the construction of city walls surrounding 
massive areas of agricultural land. The urban centers of the eastern frontier tended to be 
surrounded not just by a single wall protecting the center of the city (as discussed above), 
but rather by concentric circles of walls dividing the shahristān or madīna from the 
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suburbs, the suburbs from the rural areas beyond, and in some instances the rural areas 
from the areas beyond the “limits” of the city. The use of such concentric walls shows 
that if these walls were meant to have a defensive function, it was not necessarily the city 
itself that was important to defend, but rather an entire urban network including the 
agricultural hinterland. 
Descriptions of a number of cities along the eastern frontier feature these 
concentric rings of walls. al-Yaʽqūbī describes Balkh as having two sets of parallel and 
concentric walls, with the inner wall having three gates and the outer having twelve.
123
 
He then goes on to describe a situation where Balkh is actually surrounded by three walls. 
The central wall circles the city. A farsakh further out stands a wall which surrounds the 
suburbs of the city. This wall has four gates. The third wall is five farsakhs further out 
and surrounds the villages and cultivated lands of Balkh, beyond which there is only 
sand. This wall has twelve gates.
124
 Ibn al-Faqīh describes the walls of Samarqand; a wall 
with twelve gates, designed with towers meant for fighting, surrounding agricultural 
lands, developed suburbs, and irrigated lands (some 6000 plots). Another wall with four 
gates surrounds the suburbs, which includes 5000 plots. A third wall brings you into the 
inner city and the quhandiz where the sulṭān resides.
125
 Smaller cities and towns may also 
have multiple walls in a similar configuration. Sawrān has seven fortifications, not 
necessarily walls, one behind the other, with suburbs within them (ḥuṣūn sab‛a ba‛ḍuha 
khalfa ba‛ḍ wa-l-rabaḍ fīhā).
126
 These types of fortifications are important because 
Sawrān is also the frontier against the Ghuzz and the Kīmāk. Other towns have large 
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If we consider the danger of predatory raids by the Turks on the agricultural lands 
of the eastern frontier, we see that the outermost of these concentric circles is the most 
important. These walls can deny easy access to farm lands and agricultural communities, 
while providing for multiple layers of defense in case the city itself falls under attack. If a 
siege takes place, the outer walls may prevent the besiegers from starving the city while 
living off of the city‟s own resources, a common tactic of besieging forces. Accordingly 
these walls demonstrate that the cities of the eastern frontier absolutely did not stand 
alone. They were the centers of networks made up of the villages and rural areas on 
which the cities depended. 
Although the itineraries do not state explicitly that a city‟s wall functions in a 
similar way, at times they can provide us with evidence of these concentric rings. In Ibn 
Khurradādhbih and Qudāma‟s reports, the gate of the wall of Bukhārā stands two 
farsakhs away from Baykand. The itinerary then goes on to describe the village of 
Māstīn, a farsakh and a half from the gate, after which come another five farsakhs from 
Māstīn to Bukhārā itself.
128
 al-Iṣṭakhrī confirms our reading here, saying that Bukhārā, its 
villages, and agricultural lands are surrounded by a wall of ten farsakhs within which 
everything is populated (kulluhā ‛āmara).
129
 He later goes on to include buildings, 
fortresses (quṣūr), gardens, postal stages, and a walled madīna including fortresses 
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(ḥuṣūn) within this wall.
130
 al-Muqaddasī adds that Bukhārā has a wall of twelve farsakhs 
surrounding five dependent towns within which there is no untilled land (laysa fīhi arḍ 
bā’ir).
131
 The Ḥudūd al-‛ālam also mentions a wall built around the whole of Bukhārā, 
without any interruption, and all of the city‟s ribāṭs and villages are within the wall.
132
 
The situation resembles that of the walls of Balkh (see above). In this case, there are at 
least six and a half farsakhs (over twenty miles) between the wall and the city itself, with 
entire villages existing within the wall‟s outer circumference. The implication is clear 
that walls were not meant to protect the cities alone, but rather an entire network of 
dependent lands and villages. The city gate of Akhsīkath, here simply called Farghānā, is 
similarly described as standing four farsakhs from the city according to Ibn 
Khurradādhbih‟s itinerary.
133
   
al-Iṣṭakhrī gives detailed descriptions of the hinterlands around Bukhārā inside the 
city‟s walls, focusing on what lies along the various tributaries of the Zarafshān River. 
Here we see a situation similar to the fortresses at the heads of cultivated wadis found 
along the Roman limes arabicus, where fortifications were connected to areas with 
numerous agricultural estates. Along the river Nūkandah there are nearly two thousand 
gardens
134
 and fortresses (naḥwa alf bustān wa-qaṣr).
135
 Along the river Nuwaybār there 
are also a thousand gardens and fortresses (alf bustān wa-qaṣr).
136
 Along the river 
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Kushnah there are many fortresses, estates, and gardens (quṣūr wa-ḍiyā‛ kathīra wa-
basātīn).
137
 The river Rabāḥ, which reaches Qaṣr Rabāḥ, irrigates a thousand gardens and 
fortresses (alf min al-basātīn wa-l-quṣūr).
138
 The river Zaghārkandah flows along many 
fortresses, gardens, and estates (‛alīhi quṣūr wa basātīn wa arāḍī kathīra).
139
 This pairing 
of fortresses with agricultural lands implies a relationship between the two, with the 
fortresses in place primarily to protect the agricultural lands. Furthermore, when specific 
fortresses are mentioned out of the thousands scattered across the agricultural hinterlands 
of Bukhārā, they are identified with particular individuals or families. References are 
made to Qaṣr Abī Hishām al-Kinānī
140
 and Qaṣr Jalāl Dīzah,
141
 for example. These 
appear to be private estates with their own personal and privately-owned fortifications. 
The use of the term qaṣr further supports this conclusion through its identification not 
only with fortifications but also with palaces or mansions.
142
 
Such a defensive system, surrounding not only the city but also its associated 
network of agricultural lands, is a necessary and effective defensive measure, given the 
conditions of the region. The walls make it difficult for raiders to abscond with 
agricultural products, but do not prevent invaders from conquering the city outright. 
Combined with the networks of fortresses described later in this chapter, the purpose of 
this system is to deny the Turks easy pickings when they conduct their raids. An example 
is the tale which began this chapter, where the defenders planned to stand behind their 
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fortifications and wait out the Turks. Further demonstrating the importance of preventing 
such raids before they even reach the agricultural lands, military installations, such as the 
ḥiṣn discussed above, are often located outside the city walls themselves. However, this 
does not mean that the villages and smaller cities found within these large encircling 
walls were not individually defended. al-Iṣṭakhrī says that each of the cities (mudun) 
within the wall of Bukhārā has its own fortress (li-kullu minhā ḥiṣn).
143
 al-Ṭawāwīs, 
within the walls of Bukhārā is also specified as having a quhandiz of its own as well.
144
 
 Such walls surrounding not only a city but its suburbs and agricultural hinterland 
as well bring to mind the forts found at the end of wadis along the limes arabicus. A 
raiding band - the typical threat in both regions – would usually be neither large enough 
to attack large population centers, nor interested in taking control of settled communities. 
Instead, the band would typically aim to capture the moveable goods that it needed to 
supplement whatever it produced through pastoralism. And these moveable goods were, 
for the most part, the agricultural produce that the forts of the limes arabicus and the city 
walls of the eastern frontier were intended to protect. 
Our geographical sources‟ descriptions of the walls of Balkh gives us a clue to a 
secondary function for the outermost walls surrounding large swaths of agricultural land, 
namely, protection against environmental threats. The outermost wall is said to 
encompass an area of cultivated lands with only sandy desert found outside of it.
145
 In 
other words, this wall appears to be important in preventing the spread of desertification 
in the cultivated lands of the city. Accordingly, al-Iṣṭakhrī says there are neither 
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mountains nor deserts within the walls of Bukhārā, reinforcing the idea that the area 
within the wall is dedicated to agriculture and settlement.
146
  
Desertification can occur where winds blow sand across cultivated or fertile lands. 
As the sand builds up, it covers the soil and thus prevents the growth of plants. A simple 
wall may act as a breaker, keeping sand from spreading into an area at rates high enough 
to cause desertification. The evidence from cities where walls have been destroyed by 
invaders shows that agricultural zones may turn into desert in a very short period of time. 
In discussing Dandānqān, near Marw, for example, Yāqūt‟s firsthand observation is that 
the desert has taken over the urban site entirely in the century since its destruction.
147
 
Accounts of areas where the Turks, Mongols, or later invaders have caused wholesale 
destruction of walls and buildings regularly tell of lush agricultural regions turning to 
desert in a generation or two from this type of process. A similar phenomenon of using 
walls to prevent desertification can be seen in other regions of the world in different eras, 
for example ancient Mesopotamia. 
Cities dependend upon the villages and agricultural regions which make up their 
suburbs and hinterlands. It is not enough to think of a city by itself in this sense, but one 
must also consider those areas which have a mutual dependence on the city as an 
interconnected network. The construction of city walls took the interconnected nature of 
these metropolitan areas into account. With regard to the threat posed by the Turks, it was 
really the walls surrounding the outlying agricultural regions that provided the primary 
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line of defense to insure the safety and longevity of the city, and not the walls around the 
inner city itself.  
 
3.6 Defensive Networks 
Benjamin Isaac has argued that in order to understand the forts of the Roman limes 
arabicus, one must first understand the road networks that connected them. “Mapping 
and dating forts without considering the road-network is an unstructured procedure which 
can not lead to an understanding of the system.”
148
 Isaac argues that the roads are the 
reason for the forts and not the reverse. In other words, the forts were built in order to 
protect roads which then supplied the forts, rather than roads being built to supply the 
forts which then protected the roads. More specifically in the case of the limes arabicus, 
the forts have been viewed as associated with an “outer road” between Amman and 
Udhruh which would have functioned as a via militaris used for movement of troops 
between a number of interconnected forts.
 149
  
In the case of the Muslim eastern frontier, because our sources – especially the al-
masālik wa’l-mamālik (“roads and realms”) works of Ibn Khurradādhbih and others – 
focus so strongly on itineraries it is not difficult to see connections between the 
fortifications and the network of roads. Of the fortresses along the eastern frontier 
described by our sources, many appear to be along roads, since they are listed in 
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and Qaṣr al-Rīḥ (also known as Dizbād in Persian)
152
 are on the road from Nīshāpūr to 
Marw. Qaṣr al-Aḥnaf b. Qays
153
 and Qaṣr Khūṭ
154
 are on the road from Marw to 
Tukhāristān. Qaṣr ‛Alqama is on the road from Bukhārā to Samarqand.
155
 Qaṣr Mūhnān 
is on the road from al-Shāsh to “the mine of silver” (ma‛din al-faḍḍa).
156
 Qaṣr al-Amīr is 
on the road from Marw to Balkh.
157
 These are only the fortresses which include terms 
like ḥiṣn and qaṣr in their names, both meaning “fortress,” and not those places which are 
said to include a fortress, because the names indicate that the fortresses served as one of 
the primary functions or defining features of these sites. In fact, only three of the above-
mentioned sites are said to have any non-military purpose. al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal 
mention that Qaṣr al-Aḥnaf b. Qays has running water, gardens, vineyards, and nice 
fruits.
158
 The Ḥudūd al-‛ālam, which translates the place name into Persian as Diz-i 
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Aḥnaf, also mentions fields and running water.
159
 al-Muqaddasī adds that Qaṣr al-Aḥnaf 
b. Qays has a mosque in a market, implying that this was also a site for religious and 
commercial activities though these facilities may have been meant primarily to serve a 
military garrison.
160
 Qaṣr Khūṭ is a prosperous and populated village in the midst of the 
desert.
161
 Qaṣr al-Rīḥ is identified as a village in the region of Nīshāpūr.
162
 
 It has long been thought that the via militaris of the Roman limes arabicus was a 
frontier road, running the length of the physical frontier, connecting the forts as well as 
mansiones,
163
 caravanserais, guardposts, and signal stations.
164
 As mentioned earlier, 
David F. Graf has disproved this assumption and has shown that the road actually ran a 
few kilometers behind the frontier.
165
 Even if this is so, however, this road was still 
relatively close to the actual, physical frontier. By contrast, in the case of the Muslim 
eastern frontier, the roads which connect its fortresses do not run along the physical 
frontier itself, or even within a few kilometers of it. Instead, these roads connect major 
cities located well within the frontier zone. So for instance, Qaṣr Mūhnān is the only 
fortress named above that is located beyond Samarqand. Accordingly, if we follow a line 
of reasoning similar to Benjamin Isaac‟s, we may argue that the roads that connected the 
major cities of Khurāsān and Transoxania were the reasons for these fortresses, rather 
than the establishment of a militarized frontier line.   
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 The fact that the fortresses of the eastern frontier did not form a single line along 
the frontier says something about the nature of the frontier and the threats which existed 
along it and within the zone as a whole. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the 
Muslim side of the frontier was far from homogeneous and many groups of Turks, 
including some who preyed upon the Muslim communities, lived well within the Muslim 
side of the frontier. al-Ya‛qūbī explains that the Turks “surround the province of 
Khurāsān and make incursions into all parts; in this way there is not a region of Khurāsān 
where the inhabitants are not in combat with the Turks and where the Turks of all races 
do not perform raids.”
166
 Against this widespread raiding, it was not only the extreme 
limit of the frontier which needed to be defended, as in the case of the Roman limes 
arabicus, but the entire region. The presence of these fortresses along the roads 
connecting the major cities of region indicates an emphasis on maintaining safe routes of 
travel. 
 Perhaps the most important city of early Islamic Khurāsān was Marw, the 
provincial capital from the Muslim conquests of the region in 31/651 until the Ṭāhirids 
moved their capital to Nīshāpūr in 205/821. Marw had also acted as the provincial capital 
and the seat of the Ispahbadh (military chief) under the Sāsānians prior to the Muslim 
conquests. It had been one of the furthest points of the Sāsānian domains, although cities 
further north and east were often Sāsānian allies or vassals. If we look at the fortresses 
mentioned above, six of them out of a total of eight are located on routes which radiate 
out from Marw (if we consider the Amul – Bukhārā road to be a sub-section of a larger 
Marw – Bukhārā road), though none of these are in the immediate vicinity of Marw itself. 
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Looking further into these itineraries radiating out from Marw we see that along a 
number routes or portions of routes every stop is noted as being fortified. Between 
Sarakhs and Marw, for example, every stop is protected by a fortress (ḥiṣn) where the 
local people defend against the Turks who raid there often.
167
  
It is important to note that these fortresses would be the ones furthest from the 
actual limits of the Dār al-Islām mentioned so far in this section. (An exception is Qaṣr 
al-Rīḥ which is along the route from Nīshāpūr to Sarakhs, which we may consider an 
addition to the Sarakhs-Marw route mentioned above.) On the other side of Marw, 
between Marw and Amul, every stop, with the exception of the first stop upon leaving 
Marw (Kushmāhan), is fortified, though here we find no direct mention of raids by the 
Turks.
168
 For the Marw-Amul road, besides being the only unfortified site, Kushmāhan is 
not only the only stop, but it is the only stop which is named by al-Ya‛qūbī. We can 
identify from other sources that the rest of these stops are al-Dīwāb, al-Manṣaf, al-Aḥsa‟, 
and Bi‟r ‛Uthmān.
169
 Aside from the fact that all of these sites are on roads leading to 
Marw, the only other unifying factor among them is that they are all noted as being in the 
desert.   
 Of the fortresses surrounding Marw mentioned above, Ḥiṣn Umm Ja‛far, Qaṣr al-
Najār, Qaṣr al-Rīḥ, Qaṣr al-Aḥnaf b. Qays, Qaṣr Khūṭ, and Qaṣr al-Amīr all have Arabic 
names, indicating either a post conquest construction or, at least, a rededication. In fact, 
we know that at least two of these fortresses were pre-Islamic constructions. Qaṣr al-
Aḥnaf b. Qays, according to Yāqūt, is named after al-Aḥnaf b. Qays Abu Sa‛īd 
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Muḥammad b. ‛Alī b. al-Naqāsh, whom he describes as a ghazī active in Ṭukhāristān in 
the year 32/652-653. According to Yāqūt, al-Aḥnaf led a two-year siege of the fortress 
and supervised the distribution of the spoils after it fell; the fortress was renamed after 
him.
170
 Our sources regularly refer to al-Aḥnaf b. Qays and his role in the conquests of 
the region, and not only in the context of qaṣr named after him. This is an example of the 
history of conquest leaving a strong imprint on the region, but it is also an example of 
these highway fortresses being pre-Islamic constructions.   
The naming or renaming of fortresses after important figures did not only occur in 
the context of conquest by individual military leaders. Ḥiṣn Umm Ja‛far is most certainly 
named for Ḥārūn al-Rashīd‟s wife and the mother of the Caliph al-Amīn, Umm Ja‛far 
Zubayda (d. 216/831-2). Zubayda was known for her many charitable donations, most 
famously the construction of wells at Mecca and along the pilgrimage route from 
Baghdad (known as the darb Zubayda). Some of these charitable enterprises included the 
construction of fortresses and defenses along the Arab-Byzantine thughur and throughout 
the east, the most famous being the fortress at Badhakhshān mentioned by al-
Muqaddasī.
171
 Though Ḥiṣn Umm Ja‛far is usually not listed among these, its 
construction has at least been accredited to Umm Ja‛far Zubayda through the use of her 
name in some of our sources, though we are not certain if this was a new construction 
during her lifetime or an older fortress which was rededicated in her honor.   
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al-Ya‛qūbī gives us less detailed information about another fortress with a 
possible pre-Islamic past, Qaṣr al-Rīḥ, which he says is also known as Dizbād in 
Persian.
172
 The existence of both an Arabic and a Persian name implies that this was a 
pre-existing site which was rededicated post-conquest. Dizbād is also the name of a river 
in the area, flowing towards Nīshāpūr, which could lead one to think the Persian term is 
not so specifically tied to the fortress itself, except that this is one of the three fortresses 
mentioned above noted as having a village attached to it. Here not only has the fortress 
been renamed, but perhaps the new name of the fortress had been applied to the entire 
village below it. 
 The road networks around Marw are not exclusively defended by fortresses with 
Arabic names. A number of locations between Sarakhs and Marw are said to be fortified 
while maintaining Persian names, namely Astarmu‛āth, Maksānah, Dandānqān, and 
Bakird.
173
 Through Yāqūt, who saw its ruins, we know that until Dandānqān was 
destroyed by the Ghuzz in 553/1158 the city was protected by a wall and a ribāṭ, whose 
ruins stood alone together with those of the minaret in Yāqūt‟s time. These fortifications 
were large enough that the army of Khurāsān was able to hide within them when engaged 
by the Ghuzz in 553/1158.
174
 Even though Dandānqān lies in the desert and is primarily 
noted in our sources for its military role, it was also a population center by the middle of 
the sixth/twelfth century, which we know because the Ghuzz are said to have expelled its 
population. From this we may assume that each of these fortified stops along the road 
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may have likewise been a fully developed settlement, perhaps growing out of a fortified 
site which originally had a purely military purpose.   
 Even though a number of the fortresses surrounding Marw have Arabic names 
and names which specifically note the Muslim conquests of the region, they are largely 
older constructions with pre-Islamic precedents. It is important to make note of this as we 
consider the development and role of the defensive infrastructure of the eastern frontier. 
Marw‟s long history as a center of agriculture, trade, and provincial governance in the 
region pre-dates the emergence of Islam. As the Sāsānian provincial capital and a site on 
the official imperial frontier, the defense of Marw must have been a priority. After the 
conquests, the Muslims renamed a number of these sites, especially where resistance had 
been fierce, as in Qaṣr Aḥnaf b. al-Qays, and made changes in their infrastructure, 
building mosques for example. All the while, however, this emphasis on the defense of 
Marw did not necessarily change. Marw remained the primary node of the region, at least 
until 205/821, and protecting travel to and from the city for economic and government 
purposes remained a priority. 
 As our sources move closer to the frontier, and therefore farther out from the 
Sāsānian domains, they show an increase in fortresses with Arabic names. This may 
indicate that the especially fortified road network around Marw is a remnant of a 
Sāsānian defensive network. As our sources come to the cities of Transoxania which had 
been largely independent prior to the arrival of Islam, we may be seeing indications that 
the Muslims had to be more directly involved in the foundation of new fortresses, as part 
of a process of integrating Transoxania within the broader networks of the caliphate. This 




and Amūl, on the northern side of Marw, are Arabic: al-Dīwāb, al-Manṣaf (the halfway 
point), al-Aḥsa‟, and Bi‟r ‛Uthmān (the spring of ‛Uthmān). In contrast, the majority of 
the names to the south, between Marw and Sarakhs, are Persian. This distribution of 
names may have its origins in the settlement patterns of Arab migrants during the Arab-
Islamic conquests. As Parvaneh Pourshariati has argued, Khurāsān should be seen as 
having two parts, an “Inner Khurāsān” focused on Nīshāpūr where Arab settlement was 
light, and an “Outer Khurāsān” centered on Marw where Arab settlement was much 
heavier.
175
 Those fortresses with Arabic names north of Marw are fully within “Outer 
Khurāsān,” while those with Persian names are along roads heading into “Inner 
Khurāsān” where Arab settlement was less prevalent or occurred later. 
 Though our sources discuss the fortresses which protected the network of roads 
around Marw in greater detail than those fortresses found around other cities, Marw is not 
the only city which appears to have such a network. Working from the names of city 
gates and the roads radiating out from cities, we can reconstruct similar defensive 
networks. Among the roads leaving Binkath, al-Muqaddasī lists roads with explicitly 
military names, such as Darb Ribāṭ Aḥmad and Darb Qaṣr al-Dihqān, though he doesn‟t 
refer to either a Ribāṭ Aḥmad or a Qaṣr al-Dihqān outside the names of the roads. Besides 
these, he notes that Binkath also has two fortresses (ḥiṣn), one in each of its suburbs.
176
 
This leaves us to assume that Binkath is surrounded by no fewer than four fortresses or 
fortress-like structures.  
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 An important element of the defensive infrastructure of the eastern frontier was 
the defense of the roads which linked major urban centers. Such fortifications were not 
concentrated along the frontier itself, but appeared in high concentrations around urban 
centers far from the actual frontier. In our geographical sources, especially the earlier 
texts of the Iraqī school, the highest concentrations of these fortifications are found near 
major administrative centers, such as Marw. The placement of these fortifications 
demonstrates the importance of travel to and from these urban centers and the dangers 
which threatened travelers on such roads. Other types of fortifications existed in other 
places along the frontier, contributing to a wide network which defended the frontier 
against Turkish raiders. 
 
3.7 Ribāṭs 
Before continuing to a discussion of defensive networks away from urban centers, we 
should return to the topic of ribāṭs. As stated earlier, the ribāṭ is an architectural form 
which has left scholars with a number of questions. Paul Wheatley has put the issue most 
clearly: “Ribāṭ is a term virtually incapable of unequivocal definition and consequently 
requires a… less apodictic treatment.”
177
 Understanding the meaning and use of the term 
requires careful consideration of geographic and chronological context.
178
 Ribāṭs have 
primarily been associated with guard posts or frontier outposts, but also with a number of 
other more or less specific duties. The most discussed of these extra-military duties 
involve their association with Sufis who resided in ribāṭs, combining military and 
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religious occupations, giving the ribāṭ the feel of a “military monastery,” which tends to 
stand as the common definition. While there certainly were mystics who took to the 
ribāṭs for religious purposes and urban institutions known as ribāṭs which housed Sufis, 
these were mainly a later phenomena which should not be applied to all times and 
places.
179
 The broad definition of ribāṭ as “military monastery” tends to connect the 
phenomenon to a notion of a generalized jihād, and an image of volunteer “warriors of 
the faith” launching attacks against the Turks from guard posts strewn across the eastern 
frontier.
180
   
In actuality, ribāṭs appear in a variety of forms with a variety of functions, which 
is one reason why it has been such a tricky topic for scholars. As a solution to the 
problem, scholars have provided a variety of translations for this single term based upon 
individual contexts, especially when preparing translations of single texts. Following 
phrases like “guard post” or “frontier outpost,” ribāṭ has been translated as “guesthouse,” 
“caravanserai,” or “postal relay.” Chabbi, following Albrecht Noth,
181
 has provided a 
solution to variability, stating that 
It seems that what is involved is the simple imposition of a noun, probably denoting the 
existence of danger and the need to take precautions against it, upon various pre-existing 
constructions, without any suggestion that there is, at the outset, such a thing as a unique 
type of edifice which could be called ribāṭ.
182
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The earliest usage of the term, as a maṣdar (verbal noun) of rabaṭa, implied the 
mustering of cavalry in preparation of a ghazw or raid. By the early ‛Abbāsid era, the 
term was applied to a variety of fortified edifices, ranging from observation towers to 
small fortresses, located in positions of danger. Across both sets of definitions, the 
sustaining idea is that a ribāṭ is a place where one prepares for combat, probably on a 
small scale. Picard and Borrut have recently addressed the development of both ribāṭs as 
institutions and their meaning on the western and eastern edges of the Islamic world, 
arguing that, while ribāṭs are not particular edifices, their role changed from secular 
frontier defenses to religious institutions as frontiers became increasingly stabilized and 
pacified.
183
 Following Noth, Chabbi, Picard, and Borrut‟s interests in seeing ribāṭ as a 
general function applied to non-specific constructions, we can look at places where sites 
identified as ribāṭs are located across the eastern frontier and consider what is necessary 
for a place to become a ribāṭ.  
 One situation in which we see the idea of ribāṭ as a function applied to a place 
most clearly is in cities which are described in their entirety as ribāṭs. So for instance, al-
Muqaddasī describes Badhakhshān as a fine ribāṭ (hiya ribāṭ fāḍl) while also containing 
the fortress of Zubayda mentioned above.
184
 Afrāwa is noted as an important ribāṭ as well 
as the site of three fortresses, one of them surrounded by a trench.
185
 In other cases, a 
place may be associated with a specific ribāṭ. Kūfan is said to be the ribāṭ of Abīward, 
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distinct from its fortress (ḥiṣnhā) in Mahana.
186
 With the exception of Badhakhshān, 
located south of the Alai Mountains from the Farghānā valley, these sites are all found 
between Sarakhs and Marw, far from the physical frontier and in areas with a heavy 
concentration of fortified sites, as described above. They all appear to be fortified to some 
extent, but none of them are said to have a particular edifice called a ribāṭ. Instead, it is 
the city itself which functions as the ribāṭ. 
Though not identified as the ribāṭ itself, Dandānqān, also near Marw, is the place 
of the ribāṭ against Dihistān. It is described as a fortified place with a ribāṭ outside of it 
and many fortresses.
187
 When we come to the description of Dandānqān, we see that 
independently of the city‟s being a place of ribāṭ it also contains an individual edifice 
known as a ribāṭ as well as other fortresses. Dandānqān, as the place of ribāṭ against 
Dihistān (a region north east of Herat which remained under the control of a Persian 
dihqān until the Seljuqs took control of it in 426/1035), appears to have some 
responsibilities in relationship to Dihistān beyond its own personal defense, as is implied 
by the presence of fortifications. What these specific responsibilities may be remains in 
question. For Dandānqān and other cities which act as ribāṭs, there is an activity known 
as ribāṭ which occurs there, most likely associated with some kind of marshalling or 
preparation for combat. 
 Being a ribāṭ does mean something different than being simply fortified or a 
fortress. Much as a distinction was drawn between fortresses, walled inner cities, and 
quhandiz through the highlighting of places where two or more of these different edifices 
could be found in close proximity, a similar distinction can be drawn between fortresses 
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and ribāṭs. As noted above, both Badhakhshān and Dandānqān are or contain ribāṭs while 
also possessing fortresses. The fortress (ḥiṣn) of Mīrkī has a ribāṭ outside of it, putting 
these two not only in the same city but in immediate proximity to each other.
188
 Gharj al-
Shār has fortresses or palaces (quṣūr) which contain a congregational mosque and a 
number of ribāṭs inside the fortifications themselves.
189
 The walls of Bukhārā contain not 
only villages and agricultural lands, but a number of ribāṭs as well.
190
 A number of other 
fortifications within the walls of Bukhārā have already been discussed and we may place 
these ribāṭs in the same category, associating them with particular agricultural estates 
within the walls. Farabr contains ribāṭs attached to the quhandiz.
191
 In these particular 
cases, ribāṭs cannot simply be a form of fortress, but must have a function distinct from 
the functions fulfilled by fortresses and walls. Though fortresses and ribāṭs have similar 
associations, with all of them having to do with some kind of military practice, the 
presence of both in close proximity to each other indicates a nuanced difference, much 
like the distinction between fortresses and quhandiz. 
Beyond the cities which are described as these kinds of ribāṭs writ large, we see 
other urban ribāṭs within cities. The wall of Isfījāb, for example, has four gates with a 
ribāṭ for each gate.
192
 Ibn Ḥawqal says that Kushmīhan, near Marw, includes ribāṭs 
among the amenities in the city, including fruits, markets, inns, and bath houses.
193
 In the 
neighborhood of Baykand, near the wall of Bukhārā, there are a thousand ribāṭs, some of 
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them inhabited and some ruined.
194
 Baykand is also home to a fortress which contains a 
market and the congregational mosque. The large number of ribāṭs mentioned here, 
obviously an exaggeration, does put into question what an urban ribāṭ might look like. 
Many of these must be outside Baykand itself and are probably associated with the walls 
of Bukhārā. The ribāṭs associated with other fortress types mentioned above are also 
located in urban settings. What this tells us is that the function of ribāṭs is not limited to 
that of a frontier outpost, especially when we consider that few of these sites are located 
in any real proximity to the actual frontier, but can occur within a more fully developed 
and inhabited environment.   
 The emphasis thus far on ribāṭs found in urban environments should not be taken 
to mean that this is the context in which the majority of ribāṭs are found. The majority of 
those specifically-named ribāṭs or ribāṭs that are described in detail are found in urban 
areas and villages, but this is clearly a bias of our sources, with their concern with 
describing conditions in urban centers and their subsidiary villages. Other ribāṭs are 
specifically mentioned along itineraries or in large concentrations in particular regions. 
The majority of the ribāṭs described by al-Muqaddasī, for example, are found in his 
itineraries. Here you find ribāṭs on the road from Bukhārā to Tirmidh,
195
 Bukhārā to 
Amzah,
196
 from Fāryāb to Karkū,
197
 from Marw to the Oxus,
198





 and from Ghanzīn to al-Bāmiyān.
201
 Ribāṭ Māsh receives its own 
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 Some routes have more general descriptions of ribāṭs, such as 
the route from Bukhārā to Nakhshab, where you encounter a number of unnamed 
ribāṭs.
203
 These instances are more conducive to the idea of ribāṭs as frontier outposts 
than are those ribāṭs found in the cities. Here we find them, lining the roads of the eastern 
frontier, similar to the fortresses mentioned earlier in the chapter. Instead, these ribāṭs 
located along itineraries have been seen as fortified postal stations or caravanserai.
204
 The 
activity which appears to make these places ribāṭs seems to be largely defensive. These 
are places where postal agents, merchants, and other travelers may seek refuge and safety 
from raids and bandits while traveling the roads of Transoxania and Khurāsān. 
 al-Iṣṭakhrī gives us a detailed description of the ribāṭ of Farāwa, near Sarakhs. He 
says that the murābiṭūn settle at Farāwa with their equipment, but that there is no village 
there nor is anything attached to it nor does anyone live there.
205
 In other words, this is 
neither an urban ribāṭ nor a ribāṭ on the frontier itself, but rather a ribāṭ where people 
interested in engaging in these activities gather, marking it as more of a marshalling point 
for fighters than a mere place of refuge. This is not a place for long-term settlement, since 
it lacks all amenities beyond the bare essentials necessary for a ribāṭ, which could be as 
little as a wall with a gate. 
 The urban ribāṭs have been described in terms of marshalling points in 
preparation for certain military activities. The ribāṭs found along al-Muqaddasī‟s 
itineraries appear to be more closely related to refuges for travelers. In both contexts, the 
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role of the ribāṭ implies a location of potential danger which the ribāṭ allows people 
either to avoid by hiding behind its walls or to engage by marshalling forces behind its 
walls. However, in cases where ribāṭs are found at the gates of cities, such as in Isfījāb, 
urban ribāṭs may be playing a similar role to those ribāṭs found along roads, providing 
refuge to travelers when they are unable to enter the city walls. The most important factor 
in defining a place as a location which can function as a ribāṭ appears to be the walls 
which limit access and provide safety. Such a definition, though, requires that the ribāṭ be 
differentiated from the other walled defensive structures found throughout the eastern 
frontier, especially fortresses. This distinction may be made through an analysis of what 
other functions a ribāṭ may play.   
Fortresses throughout the eastern frontier have an important connection to certain 
communal edifices, particularly mosques and markets. Very little information is given 
about the make-up of particular ribāṭs, so much so that it is difficult to tell if a ribāṭ 
makes up the entirety of a location or is just a single edifice among others. In one 
instance where we are given detailed information about the make-up of a ribāṭ, the Ribāṭ 
Dhu al-Qarnayn, located in Kālif across the Jayḥūn from Ribāṭ Dhu al-Kifl, houses a 
mosque.
206
 One ribāṭ about which we have a great deal of details makes the question of 
the make-up and function of the ribāṭ rather difficult. Kufān is described as a ribāṭ with a 
fortress (ḥiṣn) over it; in its corner is a ribāṭ in which there stands a large mosque with a 
cistern and two pools.
207
 In this one site we have a city that is identified as a ribāṭ, which 
has a physical ribāṭ as a specific edifice, in which there is a mosque, and which is located 
inside a fortress. Similarly, the quṣūr of Gharj al-Shār mentioned above contain a number 
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of ribāṭs along with a congregational mosque. Ribāṭs thus appear to have a connection 
with mosques, but in many instances the ribāṭ and the mosque are found within another 
form of fortification, complicating this relationship. 
These associations between ribāṭs and fortresses and other institutions within 
cities have led some scholars to argue that it is mistaken to ascribe a military function to 
all ribāṭs. These urban ribāṭs, it has been argued, should be seen as hospices for travelers 
and not military edifices. Claude Cahen has argued that urban ribāṭs, and specifically 
those maintained by waqf, are in fact merely hospices meant to house travelers.
208
 A 
number of ribāṭs across the eastern frontier are maintained by waqf, religious 
endowments, and named after the individual who made the donation. This association 
between ribāṭ and waqf is one point where we can draw a distinction between the ribāṭ 
and other fortifications, which do not appear to be associated with such endowments. The 
ribāṭ maintained by waqf may also act as a tomb for its donor in these situations. 
Yakānkat is known as the city of Kharākharāf, where both his ribāṭ and tomb are 
located.
209
 One of the four ribāṭs attached to the walls of Ifsījāb (see below) is named 
after the Sāmānid commander Qarātagīn. His grave is attached to it, and both are 
maintained by a waqf from a nearby market which generates 7000 dirhams monthly.
210
 
Abu al-Qāsim al-Mikālī, noted for his service as a muṭṭawwi‛ (volunteer fighter) along 
both the Byzantine and eastern frontiers,
211
 established two ribāṭs, equipping them with 
his own money and supported by a waqf, where his tomb is located.
212
 These were built 
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with treasuries, fortifications, and mosques.
213
 Provisioning a ribāṭ by waqf indicates that 
ribāṭs were intended to function for the benefit of the Muslim community as a whole. 
They provided some kind of service which was necessary for the wellbeing of the 
community. That a number of the people who established these waqfs had some kind of 
military connection with the region may imply that the purpose of these ribāṭs was also 
military in nature, possibly connected to the proper conduct of jihād along the frontier, as 
in the earliest forms of waqf which functioned as al-ḥubs fī sabīl Allāh, or “inalienable 
property dedicated to the path of God,” and often consisted of houses for the sheltering of 
frontier warriors.
214
 Even if these ribāṭs are physically found within cities, they may still 
play a role in frontier warfare as marshalling points. More likely, though, is that these 
ribāṭs, both those found in urban spaces, along roads, and spread across the frontier itself, 
are also specific forms of hospices established in areas of danger and meant to provide 
safety for travelers from raiders and bandits, while simultaneously functioning as 
marshalling points for fighters.   
These “waqf” ribāṭs have a variety of facilities attached to them, which are not 
necessarily associated with other ribāṭs, beyond the presence of tombs. The ribāṭ of 
Qarātagīn is associated with a market, although the location of this ribāṭ in an urban 
space makes the market‟s presence less surprising, as we may suppose the market to have 
been established for the maintenance of the ribāṭ. The ribāṭs of Abu al-Qāsim al-Mikālī 
have treasuries and mosques. al-Mikālī‟s ribāṭs appear more fully developed than other 
ribāṭs, in a manner which would allow them to operate independently. Though not 
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attached to a waqf endowment, Ribāṭ al-Nūr, outside Bukhārā, hosts an annual fair.
215
 
Unlike other forms of defensive infrastructure which are associated with a variety of non-
military institutions, ribāṭs seem not to have these kinds of standardized, mixed purposes. 
It is only these outlying examples which are noted for having infrastructure beyond what 
is needed for military activities. 
Another set of ribāṭs with attributes unique from other forms of fortification are 
those connected with shrines. Two farsakhs from Marw stands a ribāṭ with a small tomb, 
said to contain the head of the Shi‟ite Imam al-Ḥusayn.
216
 Ribāṭ Suhayl, between 
Nīshāpūr and Quhistān, is connected with a group of Companions of the Prophet. al-
Muqaddasī reports a story that these Companions arrived at the location of Ribāṭ Suhayl 
when cold overtook them. They prayed to God and he made a hot spring arise there. 
Some of these Companions were then buried there.
217
 Between the waqf-endowed and the 
“shrine” ribāṭs, we can detect a pattern of association between ribāṭs and certain religious 
practices that we do not see in other types of fortifications, though we cannot always tell 
if it was the waqf or shrine or the ribāṭ which came first. This association may be a 
precursor of the later association between Sufis and ribāṭs, but it also may be a result of a 
more informal system for establishing and financing ribāṭs in contrast to other 
fortifications, which may have been more closely directed by the state. 
The construction and maintenance of ribāṭs appear to be, at least in part, a 
communal responsibility. al-Iṣṭakhrī states that “The majority of the people of property in 
Transoxania direct their expenses towards the ribāṭs and the buildings along the roads 
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and the way stations in the path of jihād, except for a few of them.”
218
 He then goes on to 
make a direct association between the presence of ribāṭs and agricultural estates, stating 
that “the estates (maghna) of Transoxania have over ten thousand ribāṭs.”
219
 Beyond this 
connection between the landholders and the maintenance of the ribāṭs, there is an 
association between the people of Transoxania and their staffing. People from all over 
Transoxania head to the ribāṭs and the way stations along the roads in order to repair and 
improve them and while they stay in the ribāṭs and way stations they are supplied with 
fodder for their animals and food for themselves.
220
 
Ribāṭs appear to be defined by function more than form, though this function may 
be vague itself. In order for a place to function as a ribāṭ it must, at the minimum, provide 
safety in an area of danger. The people seeking refuge in ribāṭs may be travelers, but they 
also may be involved with military duties of some kind, in which case the ribāṭ acts as a 
marshalling point for them. The two functions may actually be combined, inasmuch as 
the presence of fighters is necessary for maintaining the ribāṭ as a point of refugee for 
travelers. 
 
3.8 Defending the Frontier 
Few of the sites that we have mentioned thus far are located directly on the edge of the 
frontier, or at any rate, we have not emphasized their location on the edge of the frontier. 
None of these sites have formed a militarized line along the frontier, like the one which 
was formerly proposed for the Roman limes arabicus. These sites did not even form a 
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line within a close distance to the actual frontier like the road reconstructed by David 
Graf. Instead these defenses have focused around urban and agricultural centers, 
sometimes deep within the Muslim side of the frontier and the roads which connected 
them. This is not to say that the frontier itself was not defended. It is important, however, 
to think about what we mean by frontier when pondering this issue. We have described 
the eastern frontier as an ill-defined zone with great depth which is neither culturally nor 
politically homogenous on either side. With that in mind, it is the entirety of the frontier 
zone which needs to be defended, especially from nomadic raids by the Turks. Still, there 
are certain aspects of the military infrastructure of the eastern frontier which have been 
more directly associated with activity along the frontier itself. 
 Our sources tend to view regions closer to the frontier as being, on the whole, 
more heavily fortified. al-Ya‛qūbī describes al-Ṣughd, for example, as made up of well-
defended and fortified towns (mudun jalīla manī‛a ḥaṣīna).
221
 Other frontier regions are 
noted for the large number of fortresses that can be found there. Ushrūsana, the kingdom 
of the Afshīn, is described as an expansive place with four hundred fortresses (ḥiṣn).
222
 
Ishtīkhān is similarly noted as having a number of fortresses (ḥuṣūn).
223
 The connection 
between expansive defensive infrastructure and specific frontier duties is made explicit 
for a number of sites. Wāshjird is an important frontier city (madīnat thaghr ‛aẓīm), the 
capital of al-Khuttal, and oversees an area with seven hundred strongly-built fortresses 
(ḥiṣn ḥaṣīna).
224
 These fortresses are there because the people of the region “raid the 
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 Isfījāb is noted for having 2,700 ribāṭs because it is “an important 
frontier and the abode of jihād.”
226
 Though not of the same magnitude, Athakhkath is 
said to have many ribāṭs.
227
 Farabr has both multiple ribāṭs inside the city, which may be 
attached to the still inhabited quhandiz, and the ribāṭ of the Sāmānid amīr Naṣr b. 
Ahmad, which is specifically stated as containing guesthouses for travelers, outside of 
it.
228
 Baykand is a region with one thousand ribāṭs.
229
 The large numbers given for 
particular areas are almost certainly exaggerations, but we can be certain that these were 
in fact areas with high concentrations of fortresses and ribāṭs.   
 As we reach the actual frontier of the Dār al-Islām, our sources give us an image 
of broad areas filled with fortified edifices of various kinds. At the same time, these 
sources also begin to give us far less detail then they do for areas further from the actual 
physical frontier. There is no pattern given for such fortifications. Are they concentrated 
near cities or along roads? Are they individually associated with particular agricultural 
estates? Who is responsible for the maintenance and staffing of these fortifications? 
Jürgen Paul, in his study of the relationship between the Sāmānid state and military, has 
made a linkage between the vast array of fortifications, which he calls castles, found 




An important aspect of claiming control over the frontier is portraying it as a zone 
of action. Our sources do this by declaring that these eastern reaches of the Muslim world 
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are an abode of jihād, a place where military struggle in the name of the Dār al-Islām 
takes place. A number of our sources make general statements about the eastern frontier‟s 
role in jihād. al-Iṣṭakhrī says that the strength and might of Transoxania stem from the 
fact that “there is not in Islam a region with a greater share in the jihād than them, 
because most of the borders of Transoxania are towards the Dār al-Ḥarb.”
231
 He then 
goes on to state that “there is not in Islam a Dār al-Ḥarb which is stronger in might than 
the Turks.”
232
 al-Muqaddasī refers to the entire region north of the Jayḥūn as Dār al-
Jihād, “Abode of Jihād.”
233
 
 The frontier appears to be highly fortified, but not in a particularly systematic 
manner. Fortifications are spread out across a broad area and the region as a whole is 
considered a place where fighting takes place, in contrast to the specific locations found 
around cities and roads. This haphazard manner by which fortifications are established 
the closer one gets to the actual frontier implies either a lack of concrete knowledge about 
the actual frontier from which our sources are working or a gradual decrease in anyone‟s 
ability to control the frontier and maintain an organized defense of the region, with 
fortifications being built by individuals in order to oversee particular lands, perhaps 
agricultural estates, or in specific locations when a certain necessity is seen. More 
importantly, this lack of organization implies a lack of state involvement in the 
construction of fortifications on the frontier. We will return to the relationship between 
frontier fortifications and estates, particularly those of the dihqāns, in Chapter Five. 
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 Having examined the network of fortifications which across the eastern frontier, 
we may now turn our attention to the people who manned these fortifications and to the 
ways in which certain populations were employed within this defensive network. 
 
3.9 Defenders of the Frontier 
Our sources attribute responsibility for defending portions of the frontier to particular 
groups. It is not always clear what this means; whether, for instance, this is an economic 
responsibility requiring the maintenance and provisioning of frontier fortresses and 
ribāṭs, or a responsibility for providing frontier fighters to man these fortresses and 
ribāṭs, or a combination of the two. The geographic relationship between the people who 
are responsible for a frontier and the frontier for which they are responsible can be 
deduced from the texts. Responsibility for maintaining frontier fortifications may be a 
local one, as in areas which are physically near the frontier taking on military 
responsibilities for defending that frontier. Wāshjird is in the middle of a region with 700 
fortresses (ḥiṣn) only four farsakhs from Turkistān. The presence of these fortresses is 
explained through the role the people of Wāshjird play in “raiding the Turks.”
234
 Isfījāb, 
called the great frontier, is “the land from where war is waged against the Turks” because 
“it is the furthest district of Samarqand.”
235
   
The people of one area may also be given responsibility for a region at a distance 
from their immediate surroundings. Marw is said to have responsibility for the frontier at 
Farabr, “[Farabr] is the frontier of the people of Marw, which means that when the Turks 
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come to this city, the people of Marw hasten to it and what is attached to it.”
236
 In this 
example, Marw‟s responsibility, at least in part, is to send men to fight along the frontier 
and defend against the Turks. al-Ya‛qūbī makes it seem that the people of Marw come 
rushing to Farabr in response to particular Turkish aggressions. Farabr is approximately 
thirty-seven farsakhs from Marw, a distance greater than a day‟s journey across the 
Jayḥūn from Āmul. al-Ṣaghāniyān, which neighbors the lands of Turks known as Kījī and 
Kinjīna, provides approximately 10,000 fighters (muqātil) with provisions and riding 
animals if the ṣulṭān were to be attacked by foreigners.
237
 
 Naming conventions can also be an indication of the origins of soldiers stationed 
at particular defensive infrastructures. The four ribāṭs attached to the mosque of Ifsījāb 
all have names which indicate the origins of their inhabitants. They are the ribāṭs of the 
Nakhshabīs, the Bukhārīs, and the Samarqandīs, implying that the people of these cities 
who in their respective ribāṭs (the fourth, which was mentioned above, is named for the 
Sāmānid commander Qarātagīn, whose grave is attached to it).
238
 
 Besides the geographic origins of the fighters who gather at these sites, we also 
have, in some instances, what we might call occupational descriptions. For example, 
many retinues (kathīr min al-ḥasham) gather at Jamshalāghū.
239
 Dāwar, on the border of 
al-Ghūr, is noted as an important frontier with salaried/organized watchmen overseeing it 
(ḥurrās murattabūn).
240
 The role of volunteers versus professionals is an important one. 
Certain elements of the descriptions of the eastern frontier seem to emphasize the 
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importance of a professional military. In the neighborhood of Ghaznīn there is a location 
simply called al-‛Askar (“the army”) where the local sulṭān resides.
241
 In other locations 
we find indications of general importance of standing armies when our sources 
specifically note the lack of such an army. Sarakhs, for instance, is cited as having no 
army.
242
 At times, the professional military can be directed by military leaders from far 
behind the frontier. Nīshāpūr is the seat of the army commanders (sipāh-sālārān).
243
 
 As Jürgen Paul has argued, much of the military of the eastern frontier consisted 
of volunteers or “peasant levies” attached to the state through various local 
intermediaries, including local dihqāns and religious leaders.
244
 The numbers of 
volunteers or conscripted soldiers in use along the eastern frontier were quite high. al-
Iṣṭakhrī provides a narrative in which the Sāmānid amīr Naṣr b. Aḥmad went on a raid in 
the steppe with 300,000 men. Later in the same passage, another Sāmānid amīr, Nūḥ b. 
Āsad, explains that it is possible to organize an army of this size because there are 
300,000 villages in Transoxania, each of which sends a cavalryman and an 
infantryman.
245
   
 Certain sites are given key roles in the mobilization of volunteer fighters, without 
any particular identification of the people who gather at these spaces. The city of Fārāb is 
described as an armory of the Muslims (musallaḥ li-l-muslimīn), indicating a point of 
gathering for war, and is matched by an armory for the Turks at al-Kharlukhiyya.
246
 Ūsh 
is said to have a great ribāṭ where volunteer fighters (muṭṭawwi‛a) come from all 
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 Afrāwa is a great ribāṭ and in it there are gallant men (rijāl shihām) and 
numerous horses and weapons, but this is a problem because they are brutes (jufāh) who 
have destroyed social life (mu‛āmala).
248
 The murābiṭūn gather at Farāwah and prepare 
themselves to man the ribāṭs.
249
 These are places where people who wish to engage in 
frontier fighting may gather in preparation for such activities. Whether this is a 
professional or volunteer responsibility or a personal commitment remains unclear. 
 The movements of people from one place to another and their assignments from 
one place to military responsibilities in another location all demonstrate that the make-up 
of the defenses of the eastern frontier were truly a network. A danger to one area was also 
a danger to others and, in order to maintain stability throughout the region, groups of 
people had to take responsibility for the defense of the region as a whole. What our 
sources leave out is how such responsibilities were assigned, whether by the state, 
tradition, or on an ad hoc basis. The large number of references to volunteer fighters and 
local conscripts demonstrate a strong communal aspect for these activities. 
 
3.10 Conclusions 
In the previous chapter, our sources gave us an image of a zone largely under Muslim 
rule but with pockets which remained outside it. In this chapter, a slightly different 
picture starts to emerge. Here we see networks of fortified positions, focusing on cities 
and then moving out along roads and major itineraries until they spread out in a broad fan 
across the frontier itself. The defensive nature of these fortified positions and the need for 
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them indicate that it is only within the walls of these fortifications that the Muslims 
actually have firm control. These fortifications form an archipelago of Muslim rule across 
Khurāsān and Transoxania, reaching out across a region otherwise dominated by the 
nomadic Turks. In the process of consolidating power along the eastern frontier, the 
building of fortifications is, much like the construction of the Gate of Iron near al-Rāsht, 
both the practical and the symbolic way of taking control. By declaring this a region of 
jihād, our sources have emphasized the active nature of this process. They have declared 
that seizing control of the frontier through military action is the primary function of the 
region. 
The fortifications of the eastern frontier created oases of security for the settled 
populations of the region. These fortifications were not built only for the safety of the 
immediately local population, but also to protect a broader network comprising the larger 
population of the eastern frontier. Cities were protected by walls and fortresses, but so 
were their agricultural hinterlands. The roads which connected cities and their 
surroundings were protected by fortifications where travelers could seek refuge as they 
moved about. Throughout the frontier region, the countryside appears to be dotted with 
similar fortifications which defended against incursions from the steppe. Throughout this 
whole network, the people of the eastern frontier moved from one place to another to 
provide the man-power necessary to maintain and to garrison this wide variety of 
fortifications. Thus, while the eastern frontier was neither homogenous nor consolidated 
under the authority of any single political entity, much of it was interconnected. It is in 








The Coins of the Eastern Frontier 
 
 
4.1 The Right of sikka 
While coins are an important source for the study of the history of the medieval Islamic 
world, our understanding of the practices associated with the minting of coins tends to be 
reconstructed from the coins themselves. Coins are only occasionally discussed by 
written sources and in these rare cases it is not the standard coinage which is discussed 
but those coins which stray far from the norm. One such case of a written source giving 
attention to the minting of coins is al-Ṭabarī‟s discussion of the coins of the Ṭāhirid 
military commander and, later, rebel Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allāh al-Khujistānī. 
In this year (267/882-883), (Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allāh) al-Khujistānī struck for himself 
dinars and dirhams. The weight of the dinars was ten dawāniq and the weight of the 
dirhams was eight dawāniq. Upon them (was written), “Sovereignty and power are for 
God and strength and power are by God.
1
 There is no god but God and Muhammad is the 
Messenger of God.” On the same side as this (was written), “the one who relies upon God 
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(dwells) in good fortune and prosperity.”
2
 On the other side (was written), “The faithful 
Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allāh.”
3
 
Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allāh al-Khujistānī had served as a military commander under the 
Ṭāhirid governor Muhammad b. Ṭāhir until 259/853 when the Ṭāhirid capital of Nīshāpūr 
fell to the Ṣaffārid Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth. Following this, al-Khujistānī led an ongoing 
military opposition against Ṣaffārid authority in Khurāsān and Ṭukhāristān until his death 
in 268/883-884.
4
 During the last two years of his life, following an incursion into the 
Ṣaffārid heartland of Sistān, al-Khujistānī minted the above mentioned coins.  
The coins of al-Khujistānī are interesting for two main reasons. First is the fact 
that he struck coins in his own name at all. As will be discussed in more detail later, the 
right to be named on coinage (known as sikka) is understood as properly belonging to the 
caliphs and only available to the caliph and those to whom he granted it, typically his 
heirs and certain viziers or military commanders. By minting coins in his own name, al-
Khujistānī claimed that he had the authority to do so, thereby stating he possessed power 
either legitimated by the caliph (whom he also, in an unusual manner, named on his 
coins) or in contradiction or opposition to the caliph. Second is the fact that he struck 
coins that were so different from the standard coins struck in the Islamic world during the 
‛Abbāsid period that al-Ṭabarī found it necessary to comment on them. These deviations 
from the typical ‛Abbāsid coins focus primarily on the program of inscriptions found on 
the coin. The choice of inscriptions found on al-Khujistānī‟s coins have no known 
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parallels on other medieval coins (the standard contemporary inscriptions will be outlined 
shortly).  
Coins are not objects that receive many references in the written sources. In fact, 
when major reforms of coinage were enacted by the caliphs, modern scholars are left to 
reconstruct the rules of minting from the extant coins themselves.
5
 Most coins which 
deviate from the “standard” coinage of the main imperial mints of Iraq tend to do so with 
regard to the people named on the coins, not in the actual content of the inscriptions. 
Examples of the coins of al-Khujistānī, close to the description given by al-Ṭabarī and 
corroborating his report, have been catalogued from the mints of Andarāba, Herat, and 
Nīshāpūr by modern numismatists.
6
 
 The tale of al-Khujistānī‟s coins highlights an important role of numismatics in 
historical research, namely their role as markers of political changes and events. The 
striking of coins, besides being an economic activity, is a political action, expressing 
one‟s right and ability to strike coins in one‟s own name, even if from a position of 
subservience to the caliph. It takes a certain level of resources, both economic and 
political, to strike one‟s own coins, especially in a number that allows them to survive 
long enough for researchers a millennium later to find and study them. Access to the raw 
materials of copper, silver, or gold is probably the least daunting of these limitations. 
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What is much more difficult is finding a market for your coins which will accept them as 
coins and not simply melt them down to be re-struck in a more acceptable form. 
 It is without question that al-Khujistānī‟s coins represented a major break from 
the norm in both the placement of his name on the coins and his changes to the formulaic 
inscriptions found on typical ‛Abbāsid coinage. That al-Ṭabarī included a description of 
these coins in his history is testament to their uniqueness. While the coins al-Khujistānī 
minted were unique, the striking of coins with the names of local rulers and notables in 
apparent contradiction to the standard practices of the time was not unique, especially 
along the eastern frontier. Throughout the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, a wide 
variety of coins featuring the names of numerous local governors and notables appears. 
Some of the individuals named on these coins are well known to us today. Others remain 
mysterious, complicating the questions surrounding who would (or could) place their 
name on coinage and under what conditions. This chapter will examine the coinage of the 
eastern frontier and situate the variety of coin types struck in this region within the 
economics and politics of the region. 
 Rather than focus on a single theme, this chapter will examine a particular body 
of material evidence for the study of the eastern frontier in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth 
century. This chapter will walk through the major developments in numismatic 
production over this period in Khurāsān and Transoxania with an emphasis on those 
coins which speak to larger economic and political trends and highlight the economic and 
political networks which connected the urban centers of the eastern frontier. Unlike the 
previous chapters, this chapter will stick much more closely to a chronological narrative 
as it covers the numismatic history of the eastern frontier. 
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4.2 The Standard Coinage of the “Second ‛Abbāsid Era” and Dynastic Variations 
Much as historians have divided the history of the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate into “early,” 
“middle,” and “late” periods,
7
 numismatists have divided the history of ‛Abbāsid coinage 
into five numbered periods.
8
 This periodization is defined primarily by major changes in 
the standard coinage of the central mints of Iraq. The “second ‛Abbāsid era,” which will 
be the focal point of the current study, begins with the reforms of al-Ma‟mūn in 206/821-
822. These reforms, which affected all mints directly under the control of the caliph until 
334/946,
9
 were focused on a new epigraphic style and program which unified the 
inscriptions found on coinage produced throughout the caliphate. The typical coin of the 
“second ‛Abbāsid era” (be they copper, silver, or gold) included the following 





                                                          
7
 Most notably in Hugh Kennedy‟s The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 2
nd
 edition (Harlow, 
England: Pearson-Longman, 2004). Kennedy‟s periodization divides the history of the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate 
into an “early” period of 132-218/750-833 and a “middle” period of 218-334/833-946. The “late” period of 
the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate is more accurately described as the periods of Būyid and then Seljūq domination up 
to the final collapse with the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 656/1258. 
8
 William Kazan, The Coinage of Islam, (Beirut: Bank of Beirut SAL, 1983), 22-28. 
9
 This is the date proposed by Kazan, connected to the accession of the Caliph al-Muṭī‛ and marked by the 
transition to the period of Būyid domination in Iraq. According to Kazan, “The Abbasid coinage between 
the accession of the Caliph al-Muti‛ in 334 h. 946 m. and that of al-Mustanjid in 555 h. 1160 m. scarcely 
exists beyond a few issues of the highest rarity, despite the fact that their names continued to be included 
on all non-Fatimid coinages of the various local dynasties in the Middle East from Syria as far as 
Khurasan.” Kazan, The Coinage of Islam, 27. Stephen Album has proposed a different periodization, 
beginning the third period in 279/892 with the accession of the Caliph al-Mu‛taḍid. This period is defined, 
according to Album, by the appearance of donative coins.  Of course, this periodization says nothing about 
developments or changes in non-donative coins. Album then marks the accession of al-Muṭī‛ as the 
beginning of an “Interim Period” when “there are virtually no proper issues of the caliphs.” This “Interim 
Period” ends in 555/1160. Stephen Album, A Checklist of Islamic Coins, second edition (Santa Rosa, CA, 
1998), 28-29. For purposes of the current study, Kazan‟s periodization will be used. 
158 
 
Table 4.1: Standard Inscriptions on Post-Reform Coinage 
 Obverse Reverse 











Inner Marginal Inscription bism Allāh ḍuriba hādha’l-
dirham bi-<insert name of 




Muḥammad rasūl Allāh 
arsalahu bi’l-hudā wa-dīn 
al-ḥaqq li-yuẓhirahu ‛alā 




Outer Marginal Inscription lillāh al-amr min qabl wa-







Under al-Ma‟mūn‟s reforms, all coinage was anonymous. Prior to these reforms, a 
variety of individuals could be named on coins depending, much like the larger 
epigraphic program of the coins, on local preferences. Beginning with the reign of al-
Ma‟mūn‟s brother and successor, al-Mu‛taṣim (r. 218-227/833-842), the name of the 
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caliph began to appear on the bottom of the reverse, below the central inscription. As 
time went on, more names appeared on coins and a hierarchy of position developed. 
Beneath the reverse central inscription was the first position, reserved for the name of the 
caliph. Beneath the obverse central inscription was the second position, reserved for the 
name of the caliph‟s heir, if included. If the name of the caliph‟s heir was not included, 
this position could be taken up by the name of a vizier, military commander, or governor. 
Third and fourth positions were included beneath the first and second respectively, if the 
coin included three or four names.  
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al-Ma‟mūn‟s reforms are most noticeable in the coinage struck at mints directly 
under the control of the caliphs themselves, Baghdad being the earliest and most 
consistently compliant mint. It can be argued from close study of epigraphic style that 
dies used in certain provincial mints may in fact have been engraved in Baghdad and then 
sent out to the provinces, demonstrating a preference for centralization in the minting of 
coins.
18
 Coins produced outside of the direct supervision of the caliph, which certainly 
include all the coinage of the eastern frontier to be discussed in this chapter, maintain or 
at least acknowledge these post-reform rules in so much as they maintain the epigraphic 
program of the standardized coins, with the minor exceptions of odd strikings such as 
those of al-Khurjistānī.
19
 For this reason, the shape and style of the coins of the eastern 
frontier is not their most important feature in relation to this study. Instead this chapter 
will focus almost exclusively on the names which appear on the coins.  
 The right to be named in the khuṭba during the Friday Congregational Prayer and 
the right of sikka, the right to be named on coinage, represented the two most prominent 
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public displays of caliphal sovereignty in the medieval Islamic world.
20
 We have a much 
clearer idea through the written sources as to how the khuṭba was used as a political tool; 
how individuals could use the khuṭba to publicly announce their opposition to political 
powers or their intention to revolt.
21
 In contrast, the use of sikka is not entirely clear. It is 
important to remember here that the inclusion of one‟s name on coins was most likely not 
in itself a propagandistic act. Political messages were much more easily spread among the 
general population through sermons in mosques or announcements in markets and other 
public spaces. As Michael Bates has argued, “by the time the public saw coins with a new 
name, it would surely be old news to them.”
22
 Having one‟s name inscribed upon coins 
was certainly a symbol of that individual‟s power and standing, but it was neither the 
most immediate nor most important way of publicizing one‟s status. On the other hand, 
looking at the numismatic evidence versus the written accounts of oral proclamations as a 
modern scholar, inscribing one‟s name on a coin is a more permanent expression of one‟s 
position. A coin could not be dismissed as hearsay or conjecture, it presented a message 
that could not be taken back or refuted once someone had seen or had possession of the 
physical coin. Of course, by the time someone had the inclination and collected the 
means to mint his own coins, he had most certainly tested the waters and had an amount 
of confidence in the expected reaction to this course of action. It was not a spur-of-the-
moment decision.  
If the striking of coins was a political act which required forethought, the question 
we must ask is what were the intentions of an individual who had his name inscribed 
upon coins and who actually put the name on the coin? These are especially important 
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questions considering that the standards of the reformed coinage were reconstructed by 
modern scholars from the coins themselves and are not laid out by any contemporary 
documents. Are our understandings of how these rules worked entirely accurate? An 
assumption is made, perhaps unintentionally, about who may put his name on a coin, the 
caliph and certain members of his inner-circle, and under what conditions, at the 
discretion of the caliph. Any coins that deviate from what is understood to be the standard 
are considered at the least “not ‛Abbāsid” if not outright rebellious. It is as if including 
the names of local notables on a coin is a symbol of revolt against or, at least, discontent 
with the caliphate. Such an understanding also implies, perhaps unintentionally, that the 
act of striking coins itself is not a locally-mandated act. The inclusion of one‟s name on a 
coin is seen in some way as equivalent to making a proclamation against the caliph in the 
khuṭba. These are people who have usurped the rights of the caliph and in doing so have 
entered into a position of opposition against him. But how can this be the case when the 
caliph‟s name is typically included in its appropriate hierarchical position on these “non-
‛Abbāsid” coins? On a deeper level, we must ask whether it is the evidence of these coins 
which tells us that certain provincial rulers sought independence from the caliphate or 
whether we are reading this understanding retroactively into the coins. 
The other set of questions we must ask pertain to how we classify coins which 
feature names of various local authorities. As mentioned above, for the most part coins 
produced along the eastern frontier during the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries 
maintained the standard epigraphic program found on coins of the second ‛Abbāsid 
period. If we did not know of the eastern provincial dynasties, their histories, and the 
names of their governors, there is no reason these coins would not be classified as 
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‛Abbāsid. Starting with Charles Frähn‟s Das Muhammedanische Münzkabinet des 
Asiatischen Museums der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu St. Petersburg, 
originally published in St. Petersburg in 1821, Islamic coins have been categorized by 
dynasties in a scheme which starts with the Umayyad and ‛Abbāsid Caliphates and then 
follows through a progression, partially chronological and partially geographical, of all 
other dynasties known to have minted coins. When determining the provenance of a 
coinage, the names inscribed on the coin take preeminence in this scheme. Therefore, for 
the second ‛Abbāsid period, coinage that matches the standardized types of al-Ma‟mūn‟s 
reforms and does not name an identifiable governor would be listed as ‛Abbāsid 
regardless of the particular circumstances of the date or location of minting, but coins that 
include the names of any dynastic governors are cataloged under the name of that 
governor‟s dynasty.  
This system creates a disjuncture, which may or may not be representative of 
historical realities, between not only the coins of Iraq and the coins of the provinces, but 
also between coins minted at the same mint, even sometimes in the same year, based 
upon the names and titles inscribed upon them. For example, in the year 260/873-874, the 
mint of Panjhīr struck silver dirhams bearing only the name of the Caliph al-Mu‛tamid on 
the reverse
23
 as well as silver dirhams with the name of al-Mu‛tamid on the reverse and 
the name of the Ṣaffārid amīr Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth on the obverse.
24
 The former would be 
categorized as ‛Abbāsid while the latter would be categorized as Ṣaffārid even though 
they are nearly identical and both were struck under the same political authorities in the 
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same mint during the same year, since the Ṣaffārids presumably maintained political 
control over Panjhīr the entire year.
25
 Are the coins that name dynastic governors really 
not ‛Abbāsid, even though they match ‛Abbāsid coins in almost every way, shape, and 
form and may even be minted by agents of the ‛Abbāsid Caliph, depending on how we 
choose to understand individual dynasties? These coins, in maintaining the epigraphic 
standards of ‛Abbāsid coinage (most importantly with regard to the arrangement of 
names), still observe the caliph as the ultimate authority under whom the coins were 
struck. On the other hand, are coins struck at mints which, we must assume by location 
and date, fell under the authority of a dynastic governor but without the name of the 
appropriate governor not to be categorized with the coinage of that dynasty? Despite the 
exclusion of their names, these coins were still struck in territories under the governor‟s 
political authority. These dynastic coins did not constitute different denominations and 
they did circulate together, both the ‛Abbāsid and the dynastic. They were equally valued 
and equally accepted as currencies of exchange, as far as we know.
26
 Yet, numismatists 
have historically catalogued these coins as markedly different, as coins which belong to 
different minting traditions entirely. 
By categorizing coins by dynasties, continuity and change in minting practices 
often disappears. The location of coin production is largely removed from the equation 
and, instead, emphasis is placed on situating individual coins within a political and 
dynastic history. Recently, efforts have been made to examine coins based on their mint 
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of origin and sylloges now organize coins chronologically by mint rather than by dynasty 
as in earlier catalogues. This allows us to study a mint or a group of mints, arrive at a 
hypothesis based upon the evidence of coin production, and then look for confirmation in 
written records. In this chapter, the coins of the eastern frontier will be examined as a 
body in this way in order to follow developments within a particular geographic area and 
then connect these developments in coin production to broader political and economic 
developments in the region.  
 
4.3 The Coinage of the Ṭāhirids 
An example of this dilemma of classification of provincial coinage is found in the 
treatment of Ṭāhirid coins by modern numismatists. In his Checklist of Islamic Coins, 
Stephen Album lists five types of Ṭāhirid coins, along with a handful of subtypes. Two of 
these are silver dirhams and three of these are copper fulūs. In the introduction to the 
Ṭāhirid portion of his checklist, he states that “Only coins of Tahir and Talha struck 
between 205 and 211, plus copper coins for Central Asian mints for the entire dynasty 
can justifiably be regarded as Tahirid coins.”
27
 This is then clarified with the following 
footnote, 
My own opinion is that there is no such thing as a Tahirid silver coin, and that all 
allegedly Tahirid dirhams should be regarded as Abbasid. Only the copper seems to be 
justifiably attributable to the Tahirids.
28
 
He then continues, “Later silver and gold coins (after 211) lack the name of the Tahirid 
ruler, and are thus indistinguishable from other Abbasid coins. They are now regarded as 
Abbasid.”
29
 Again clarifying in a footnote, 
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Nineteenth century works routinely classify as Tahirid those coins struck in Tahirid 
territories with only the name of the caliph, contrary to current convention. Even the 
Tahirid types listed here, except perhaps the later coppers, should more correctly be 




In short, Album says that in the nineteenth century it was common practice to classify 
any coins minted in territories with a Ṭāhirid governor as Ṭāhirid regardless of what 
might be written on the coins. It later became common practice to only identify those 
coins which explicitly name a Ṭāhirid governor as Ṭāhirid. In Album‟s opinion, it is only 
the later coppers which should truly be called Ṭāhirid. In the end, modern numismatists 
initially cast a wide net in classifying Ṭāhirid coins, as time went by the category has 
narrowed to the point that it is, in Album‟s opinion, extraneous. 
 On a certain level, the changing attitudes towards classifications of Ṭāhirid coins 
are a commentary on our understanding of the Ṭāhirid dynasty rather than our 
understanding of Ṭāhirid numismatics. The coins themselves have not changed since the 
nineteenth century; they maintain the same names, dates, and mints. In the broadest 
definition of Ṭāhirid coins that included any coins minted within territory under Ṭāhirid 
authority, primarily Khurāsān, with or without the name of a Ṭāhirid governor, the 
implication is that there is some kind of geo-political entity that could be called a Ṭāhirid 
state that is unique and distinct from the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate. By limiting that definition 
to only coins that include the name of a Ṭāhirid governor, the assumption of a Ṭāhirid 
state is also limited. This is no longer a geographic entity distinct from the ‛Abbāsid 
Caliphate; events which take place within its boundaries, such as striking coins, may be 
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 Ibid., 67. 
30
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claimed by or attributed to the ‛Abbāsids, but there still exists the potential for individual 
Ṭāhirid governors to assert themselves by placing their names on what would otherwise 
be ‛Abbāsid coins. This then leads us to Stephen Album‟s assertion that there are no real 
Ṭāhirid dirhams (or dinars for that matter), but only Ṭāhirid coppers.  
If the coins of the eastern frontier minted under the Ṭāhirid‟s are examined as a 
corpus, is there anything we might discover beyond these issues of changing systems of 
classification? One of the first issues that must be pointed out in posing a question such 
as this is that the reforms of al-Ma‟mūn first appear in the middle of the reign of the 
dynastic patriarch Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn (r. 205-207/821-822). Because of this, we should 
expect to see some overlap between the pre and post reform coinage. Ṭāhir‟s name 
appears on ‛Abbāsid coins as either Ṭāhir, Dhu ‟l-Yamīnayn,
31
 or both beginning in 
198/813-814, following Ṭāhir‟s military role in al-Ma‟mūn‟s victory over al-Amīn and 
his subsequent appointment as governor of the western provinces and ṣāḥib al-shurṭa 
(commander of the police) in Baghdad.
32
 In 205/820-821, Ṭāhir was appointed governor 
of Khurāsān and his name began to appear on coins minted in the east, still as either 
Ṭāhir, Dhu „l-Yamīnayn, or both.
33
 These names continue to appear on coins until Ṭāhir‟s 
death in 207/822. 
Considering that al-Ma‟mūn‟s reforms occur in the middle of Ṭāhir‟s short reign 
and there is a continuity between coins minted in Ṭāhir‟s name before and after 206/821-
822, it may be enough to assume that the reforms had not spread all the way to Khurāsān 
by Ṭāhir‟s death and, therefore, these coins do not necessarily signify the coinage of a 
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 “The possessor of two right hands” or “the ambidextrous;”an official title given to Ṭāhir b. Ḥusayn in 
acknowledgement of his role in both the military and administration. 
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 For an early example from al-Basra, see ANS 1972.169.386. 
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 For an early example from Samarqand, see ANS 1972.79.24. 
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new and distinct dynasty. It is equally important to note that the continuity between coins 
minted in Ṭāhir‟s name in the west before 205/820-821, when no one argues he was in 
rebellion and establishing his own dynasty, and in Khurāsān after his appointment as 
governor shows that the coins themselves do not represent a new direction in Ṭāhir‟s 
thinking or public presentation of himself.
34
 Taking that into consideration, we may then 
follow Album‟s logic that these coins were not in fact Ṭāhirid, but represented the 
standards of coinage struck throughout the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate during the early years of 
al-Ma‟mūn‟s reign.  
Of course, arguing this goes against the long-held view that Ṭāhir had entered into 
open revolt against al-Ma‟mūn before his death and that a number of Ṭāhirid coins that 
left off the name of the caliph are evidence of this revolt.
35
 Even Album marks the silver 
dirhams of Ṭāhir as being produced “in rebellion,” but he does not specifically mention 
anything about omitting the name of al-Ma‟mūn.
36
 Claiming that leaving al-Ma‟mūn‟s 
name off a coin is a sign of open revolt assumes that including the name of the caliph was 
an absolute requirement, both before and after the reforms of 206/821-822. Before al-
Ma‟mūn‟s reforms, the caliph‟s name was not always included on coins, even if other 
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 This may very well be the result of people giving more attention to the Ṭāhirids in Khurāsān over Ṭāhir‟s 
earlier career. Ṭāhir‟s “independent” streak can be seen in the immediate aftermath of the ‛Abbāsid Civil 
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Ṭāhirids and Ṣaffārids,” in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4, The Period from the Arab Invasion to the 
Saljuqs, ed. R.N. Frye, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 95. This quote appears 
paraphrased in C.E. Bosworth, “Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muṡ‛ab b. Ruzayḳ,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second 
edition. 
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 These were not the coins of rebels revolting in the provinces; 
even some coins struck in Baghdad omitted the caliph‟s name while including the names 
of others. This did not change with al-Ma‟mūn‟s reforms. A part of those reforms was 
making ‛Abbāsid coinage anonymous, which certainly held true for coins struck in the 
central mints from 206/821-822 until the end of al-Ma‟mūn‟s reign. It can then be argued 
that coins which include the name of Ṭāhir but not al-Ma‟mūn produced after 206/821-
822 are either a result of the reformed standards not reaching Khurāsān or a negotiation 
of what the reforms actually meant. Does the anonymity of Iraqi coins mean that the 
caliph‟s name is omitted or all names are omitted? It is important to point out that coins 
struck in Iraq remained anonymous until the beginning of the reign of al-Mu‛taṣim in 
218/833, by which point Ṭāhir has been dead for over a decade, his son Ṭalḥa (r. 207-
213/822-828) has reigned for six years and died, and his other son ‛Abd Allah (r. 213-
230/828-845) was five years into his tenure as governor of Khurāsān. Placed into the 
context of contemporary minting practices, the omission of the name of the caliph on the 
coins of Ṭāhir was neither unique nor necessarily controversial. 
The assumption that the omission of the caliph‟s name from coins was an act of 
rebellion by Ṭāhir is, in the end, an assumption that the rules of sikka were similar to the 
rules covering the inclusion of the caliph‟s name in the khuṭba. The stories of Ṭāhir 
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 A selection of examples of coins not including the names of governors and other notables but omitting 
the name of al-Ma‟mūn: a dirham of Baghdad (200/815-816) naming al-Faḍl b. Sahl as Dhu al-Riyāsatayn, 
ANS 1917.215.322; a dirham from Egypt (201/816-817) naming Ṭāhir Dhu al-Yamīnayn, ANS 
1972.79.675; and a dirham from Samarqand (205/820-821) naming Dhu al-Yamīnayn, ANS 1972.79.24. 
The earlier of these coins do appear in the years immediately following the ‛Abbāsid Civil War or Fourth 
Fitna, which ended in 198/813 with al-Ma‟mūn‟s victory over his brother al-Amīn, and therefore may 
reflect the confused political situation following the war, but in this regard it is important to note that the 
individuals these coins do name, al-Faḍl b. Sahl and Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn, were two of al-Ma‟mūn‟s most 
important supporters during the civil war and the recipients of high offices following al-Ma‟mūn‟s victory. 
170 
 
omitting the name of al-Ma‟mūn from the khuṭba are well attested, even if confused.
38
 If 
a connection is to be made between Ṭāhir‟s coins and the khuṭba incident, the issue of 
chronology between the striking of coins and the omission of al-Ma‟mūn from the khuṭba 
must be considered. Earlier, it was argued that the immediacy of a public announcement 
against the caliph, as in the khuṭba, would cause such an act to occur and elicit a response 
from the caliph, his representatives, and the public before the appearance of coins 
including an individual‟s name. That the omission of the caliph‟s name from the khuṭba 
would generate a strong and immediate response is well attested in the narratives of 
Ṭāhir‟s khuṭba.
39
 Considering that the majority of the coins produced by Ṭāhir which 
omit the name of al-Ma‟mūn were struck before he omitted al-Ma‟mūn‟s name from the 
khuṭba and that these coins received little apparent response compared to the khuṭba, at 
least in the available sources, it can again be argued that the omission of the name of the 
caliph from a coin during the reign of al-Ma‟mūn was neither a symbol of rebellion nor 
as controversial as the omission of the caliph‟s name from the khuṭba and therefore those 
coins could and should be classified as meeting the standards of ‛Abbāsid coinage and 
not be seen as the acts of a governor in revolt. Of course, none of this is to say that Ṭāhir 
did not attempt to break away from ‛Abbāsid authority; rather it is arguing that the coins 
are not evidence for such a revolt.  
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 For a detailed study of the various reports of Ṭāhir‟s khuṭba and death, see D. Sourdel, “Les 
circonstances de la mort de Ṭāhir I
er
 au Ḫurāsān en 207/822,” Arabica 5 (1958), 66-69. 
39
 See the plight of Kulthūm b. Thābit b. Abī Sa‛d, ṣāḥib al-barīd of Khurāsān, who witnessed Ṭāhir omit 
the name of al-Ma‟mūn and had the unfortunate duty of reporting the news to the caliph. He is so certain of 
his fate that he prepares for death before bringing the news to al-Ma‟mūn. Luckily the news of Ṭāhir‟s 
death comes before Kulthūm‟s execution. al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk, 3:1064-1065. 
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4.3.1 The Naming of Sub-Governors 
We are still left with the questions of why and how one came to have his name inscribed 
upon a coin. The focus thus far has been on the decision of a rather high-ranking 
governor who oversaw a large province to include his name on coins, but what about the 
inclusion of lesser local and regional sub-governors. As Ṭāhir served as governor over 
Khurāsān, he himself had a number of sub-governors who oversaw individual cities and 
regions in his name. The names of some of these local governors found their way onto 
coins as well. For the most commonly encountered local governor of Ṭāhir‟s reign, 
Album lists Ṭāhirid dirham type 1391A, minted only in Herat in the year 206/821-822, 
which includes the name of the governor of Herat al-Shukr b. Ibrāhīm.
40
 On these coins, 
the name of al-Ma‟mūn is absent and Ṭāhir‟s name appears as Dhū al-Yamīnayn in the 
first position on the reverse and Ibn Ibrāhīm appears in the second position on the 
obverse. Outside these coins, Ibn Ibrāhīm is an unknown entity, but presumably he was 
governor of Herat in good standing with the Ṭāhirids in at least the year 206/821-822.  
These coins establish a relationship between Ṭāhir and Ibn Ibrāhīm, one in which Ibn 
Ibrāhīm has the authority to strike coins at Herat in his own name, but that authority 
comes from Ṭāhir.  
A reliance purely on the names found on coins for understanding local histories 
has its own problems and a broader historical setting is necessary to understand why a 
local governor‟s name might appear on coins for a single year. In the case of the 
relationship between al-Shukr b. Ibrāhīm and Ṭāhir, the greatest complication is that it is 
commonly understood that Ṭāhir supported the governorship of the Sāmānid Ilyās b. 
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 Album, A Checklist of Islamic Coins, 67. Examples of this coin are found in Lane Poole, Catalogue of 
Oriental Coins in the British Museum, 1: no. 301 and ANS 1917.215.95. 
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Asad as governor of Herat at this time. Ilyās, it is held, had been appointed governor of 
Herat in 204/819 by the then governor of Khurāsān Ghassān b. ‛Abbād. At the same time, 
Ilyās‟ brothers Nūḥ, Aḥmad, and Yaḥyā b. Asad had been appointed governors in 
Samarqand, Farghāna, and al-Shāsh respectively. The appointment of the four sons of 
Asad is considered to be the beginning of Sāmānid political power. According to most 
discussions of the careers of the early Sāmānids, Ilyās remained governor of Herat until 
his death in 242/856, at which point his son Ibrāhīm became governor.
41
 Despite Ilyās 
maintaining power for the rest of his natural life, passing the position onto his son (a feat 
only Aḥmad was able to replicate while Nūḥ and Yaḥyā saw their governorships 
absorbed into the possessions of Aḥmad‟s line), and his son Ibrāhīm holding on to the 
governorship of Herat until 253/867 when he was defeated by the Ṣaffārid Ya‛qūb b. al-
Layth, Ilyās‟ career in Herat is largely seen as the failure of the early Sāmānids. Ilyās is 
the only one of his four brothers not to strike copper fulūs during his career.  
What is to be made of al-Shukr b. Ibrāhīm minting coins in Herat while Ilyās b. 
Asad was presumably governor? Herat is not the only mint where this kind of confusion 
takes place, interestingly during the same year. At Samarqand, while Nūḥ b. Asad is 
presumably governor, silver dirhams are minted with the names Dhu al-Yamīnayn on the 
obverse and al-‛Alā on the reverse in the years 205-206/820-822.
42
 There are two 
possible solutions to this problem. First is that Ilyās b. Asad was actually not governor of 
Herat in 206/821-822. The second is that al-Shukr b. Ibrāhīm was not governor of Herat 
when his name appeared on the coins. al-Shukr b. Ibrāhīm does not appear in any known 
histories of the period, so it is only the coins which are connecting him to Herat, the same 
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 R.N. Frye, “The Sāmānids,” in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4, The Period from the Arab 
Invasion to the Saljuqs, ed. R.N. Frye, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 136. 
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 ANS 1972.79.24 and ANS 1980.35.8. 
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can be said of al-‛Alā in Samarqand, so focus will have to be placed on locating Ilyās in 
the year 206/820-821. Here the sources provide us with a range of reports on the career of 
Ilyās. The rough outline of Ilyās‟s career given above is found in Ibn al-Athīr, where he is 
appointed by Ghassān, confirmed by Ṭāhir, and serves as governor until his death when 
his son takes over the governorship.
43
 Gardizī simply notes that Ilyās was appointed 
governor of Herat, but does not elaborate.
44
 At an opposite extreme, al-Narshakhī omits 




The text which gives the most detail about the career of Ilyās is the Tārīkh-i 
Sīstān. Here Ilyās is repeatedly mentioned serving as temporary governor of Sīstān and as 
a Ṭāhirid military commander in the ongoing battles against the Kharijites in Sīstān, but 
no connection is given between Ilyās and Herat. Unsurprisingly, the Ṣaffārid-orientated 
text omits any mention of the appointment of the sons of Asad. The earliest reference to 
Ilyās comes in 208/823 when he is briefly sent as governor of Sīstān by Ṭalḥa b. Ṭāhir. 
When his replacement, Mu‛addil b. al-Ḥuṣayn arrives, Ilyās becomes the center of a 
popular rebellion against Mu‛addil which eventually drives him out and causes Ṭalḥa to 
send Muḥammad b. al-Aḥwaṣ as the new governor.
46
 The portrayal of Ilyās throughout 
the Tārīkh-i Sīstān is primarily that of a military leader who occasionally takes over the 
governorship of Sīstān in times of crisis. The same can be said of Ilyās‟s son Ibrāhīm. 
When Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth conquers Herat, the Tārīkh-i Sīstān identifies Ḥusayn b. ‛Abd 
Allah b. Ṭāhir as governor of Herat and Ibrāhīm b. Ilyās as the commander of the army of 
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 Ibrāhīm is not even present for the fall of Herat, but is later defeated by 
Ya‛qūb at Pūshang (the Ṭāhirid homeland of Būshanj).
48
 The only other mention of 
Ibrāhīm b. Ilyās comes after Ya‛qūb has defeated the Ṭāhirids, listing Ibrāhīm as one of 
many highway robbers (sālūkān)
49
 who decide to join forces with Ya‛qūb.
50
 
Outside of Ibn al-Athīr and Gardīzī, there is no evidence to assume that Ilyās b. 
Asad was ever governor of Herat, except perhaps on a temporary basis as he had served 
as governor of Sīstān. Perhaps most important to this argument that Ilyās was never 
formally governor is that out of the four sons of Asad said to have been given 
governorships by Ghassān, Ilyās is the only one whose name never appeared on a coin.
51
 
What then can we say about the coins of al-Shukr b. Ibrāhīm? First, it is most likely that 
al-Shukr b. Ibrāhīm was governor of Herat when his name appeared on the coins. Second, 
if the history of Ilyās in Sīstān contributes anything, it is that local governorships along 
the eastern frontier could be fleeting positions. The governor of a city must cultivate 
loyalty from the local population and support from those above him, in this case from 
Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn; otherwise a figure like Ilyās b. Asad might be sent to prepare the way 
for a successor. The inclusion of a local governor‟s name on a coin for a brief run, as in 
al-Shukr b. Ibrāhīm‟s case, may show a governor trying to promote himself in both 
directions. His name circulating in the city reinforces his position to the local population, 
especially if he has newly come to the position. Such a short run of coins could also 
indicate a total failure on al-Shukr b. Ibrāhīm‟s part and that his governorship only lasted 
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 This is most likely a derogatory reference, at least in part, to remnants of the Ṭāhirid army who had taken 
to the hills following Ya‛qūb‟s victory in Nīshāpūr. 
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for a single year, or less. It could be argued that Ilyās had been appointed governor in 
204/819 as Ibn al-Athīr states, but within two years he had been replaced by al-Shukr b. 
Ibrāhīm, perhaps because he was transferred to a military position. On the other hand, al-
Shukr b. Ibrāhīm may have been demonstrating his loyalty and support for Ṭāhir by 
minting coins with both their names in an appropriate hierarchy. Probably the most 
important argument that could be drawn from a conclusion such as this is that local 
governors had the potential to direct the striking of coins in their own territories. This is a 
point we shall return to later.  
 
4.3.2 The Striking of Standad ‛Abbāsid Coins 
The issues surrounding the coinage of Ṭāhir are on the one hand unique and, on the other 
hand, set up many of the questions which must be dealt with in discussing the coinage of 
not only the remainder of the Ṭāhirid dynasty but for the eastern frontier through the 
fourth/tenth century. What we see following Ṭāhir‟s reign, possibly driven in part by 
events taking place and decisions being made in Khurāsān, is a greater standardization of 
gold dinars and silver dirhams to the point that the inclusion of the name of the caliph in 
a particular rank, along with the inclusion of certain other notables, does seem to become 
mandatory. The dirhams of Ṭalḥa b. Ṭāhir sometimes follow similar patterns to those of 
his father while others also include the name of al-Ma‟mūn along with Ṭalḥa‟s,
52
 but after 
Ṭalḥa (d. 213/828) the silver and gold coins of the eastern frontier follow the standard 
‛Abbāsid designs and omit the name of local officials until the end of Ṭāhirid rule in 
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 The inclusion of local governors follows a similar pattern. Often copper fulūs 
follow the patterns of dinars and dirhams, but not always; it is in the fulūs that you see 
the widest variety of names included on coins, for example. The variety of copper coins 
and their limited and uneven representation in the standard catalogs, unfortunately, make 
it difficult to make many general statements about the history of copper coinage along the 
eastern frontier during this period without giving them more attention than would be 
possible here. 
For both gold dinars and silver dirhams, coins appear only to be struck at three 
mints during the later part of the Ṭāhirid era, Marw, Samarqand, and al-Shāsh, until the 
end of Ṭāhirid rule in 259/873. Silver dirhams are minted regularly throughout this period 
at all three mints, but gold dinars are only struck from the 230‟s on, but not regularly 
































). The limited number of mints striking coins and the standardized 
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form of the coins make for a strong argument in favor of greater centralization in coin 
production during the later Ṭāhirid period. The selection of these three mints shows an 
interesting pattern that appears to have happened largely outside of the politics of the 
Ṭāhirid dynasty. Marw had been replaced as the capital of Khurāsān by Nīshāpūr with the 
rise of the Ṭāhirids in 205/821, but it appears that Nīshāpūr never replaced Marw as the 
primary minting center of the region. In fact, Nīshāpūr appears to stop minting coins in 
205/821 and does not resume until after the fall of the Ṭāhirids. Despite losing its status 
as provincial capital, Marw maintained an important position as a center of trade 
throughout the Ṭāhird period. Samarqand was both the most important center for trade in 
Transoxania at the time and in close proximity to the only source of native gold along the 
eastern frontier, at least according to al-Ya‛qūbī who says the only source of gold in 
Khurāsān is in the valley of the river of Samarqand.
69
 al-Shāsh was situated in proximity 
to a number of important silver mines, a possible explanation for the frequency with 
which dirhams are struck there. All three of these locations were chosen as mints for 
economic concerns over any kind of local political concerns, again implying that local 
concerns, and perhaps authority, were largely left out of the striking of these series. 
If we look at the pattern of dates when we know these mints were producing 
coins, we see further evidence of centralized management of the mints of Marw, 
Samarqand, and al-Shāsh during the Ṭāhirid period. Of the three mints producing coins 
during this period, in only two years do all three mints produce gold coins at the same 
time. Both of these years correspond to events surrounding the civil war in Iraq between 
the Caliphs al-Musta‛īn (r. 248-252/862-866) and al-Mu‛tazz (r. 252-255/866-869). In 
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251/865, Marw, Samarqand, and al-Shāsh all produce gold dinars naming the Caliph al-
Musta‛īn on the reverse and his son al-‛Abbās on the obverse. These coins match the 
general patterns of that year when mints in Baghdad and the east named al-Musta‛īn who 
had fled to Baghdad where he sought the protection of the Ṭāhirid Muhammad b. ‛Abd 
Allah b. Ṭāhir. The name of al-Mu‛tazz, who was pronounced caliph in Sāmarrā by the 
Turkish military in 251/865, appears on coins minted in Sāmarrā and the west. In this 
case, the mints of Marw, Samarqand, and al-Shāsh are following the lead of Baghdad and 
allying themselves with the Ṭāhirid-backed contender in the civil war. Following al-
Mu‛tazz‟s victory in the civil war, the mints of Marw, Samarqand, and al-Shāsh all 
produce identical dinars and dirhams in the year 253/867. These coins all include the 
name of al-Mu‛tazz as the caliph on the reverse, but mention no other names on the 
obverse.
70
 That al-Mu‛tazz is the only name included on the coins is an indication that 
these coins were struck early in the year, before al-Mu‛tazz‟s son ‛Abd Allah was 
appointed his heir.
71
 Whether or not the simultaneous production of coins at all three 
mints was particularly orchestrated, perhaps a sign of acceptance of the caliph they had 
once sided against, is a point of speculation. These are the only two years for which we 
are certain all three mints struck gold coins, but that does not mean that these are 
absolutely the only years in which this occurred. What is striking about these dates is the 
                                                          
70
 Examples of silver dirhams struck in 253/867 include, Marw: ANS 1917.215.85, 1971.49.116, and 
1992.149.2; Samarqand: Lane Poole, Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum, 1: no. 348; 
Lavoix, Catalogue Monnaies Musulmanes de la Bibliothèque Nationale, no. 987; and al-Shāsh: Lane 
Poole, Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum, 1: no. 349; Lavoix, Catalogue Monnaies 
Musulmanes de la Bibliothèque Nationale, no. 988. 
71
 There is no clear date for when al-Mu‛tazz appointed ‛Abd Allah his successor, but it would appear he 
was never formally declared walī al-‛ahd. Some coins minted throughout the caliphate do not include the 
name of ‛Abd Allāh while others do, implying that those not including his name were struck earlier in the 
year before the announcement was made. 
179 
 
way they indicate a connection to the central mints of Iraq and respond to political events 
happening in the center. 
The increased number of gold dinars struck in Khurāsān and Transoxania from 
the late 230‟s to the early 250‟s may more generally hint at the way the mints of the 
eastern frontier under the Ṭāhirids responded to developments in Iraq. Typically dinars 
were produced in the west, closer to the available sources of gold, while dirhams were 
produced in the east, closer to the available sources of silver. The increase in dinar 
production in Khurāsān occurs during a period of unrest in Iraq. The striking of dinars 
only becomes regular and expands beyond the mint of Marw after the assassination of al-
Mutawakkil in 247/861 and ends following the conclusion of the civil war between al-
Musta‛īn and al-Mu‛tazz. Is it possible that we are seeing in these coins a move by the 
Ṭāhirid authorities in Baghdad to move some gold from the former imperial capital of 
Baghdad to their brethren in the east so that a supply of dinars may be minted away from 
the threats of their Turkish rivals in Sāmarrā? Such a move would reinforce the 
connections between the two branches of the Ṭāhirid family in Baghdad and Khurāsān, as 
well as demonstrate involvement by the Ṭāhirids of Khurāsān in the politics of Iraq. 
All of this shows that, at least in regard to numismatics, the Ṭāhirids in Khurāsān 
were fairly well connected with political authorities in Iraq and responded to their 
centralized minting practices when it came to dinars and dirhams. Even the early coins of 
Ṭāhir, which have for so long been looked upon as a sign of his rebellious attitudes, did 
not stray from minting practices as seen contemporaneously throughout the caliphate. On 
the one hand, this could be an indication of loyalty to the caliphate. On the other hand, 
this could be an indication of connection to the Baghdad branch of the Ṭāhirid dynasty. 
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Especially in the coins struck during and after the civil war between al-Musta‛īn and al-
Mu‛tazz, the loyalties shown on the coins of eastern Ṭāhirids seem to fall primarily with 
Baghdad, and the branch of the Ṭāhirid family which ruled there, over Sāmarrā. If one 
focuses on gold and silver coins of the Ṭāhirids along the eastern frontier, the coinage of 
the region appears to be standardized and centrally controlled. Following the end of 
Ṭāhirid power in Khurāsān, this uniformity and connection with central minting practices 
falls apart rather quickly. 
 
4.4 Andarāba, Panjhīr, and Post-Ṭāhirid Coinage 
Ṭāhirid power came to an end in 259/873 when the Ṣaffārid Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth marched 
out of Sīstān and conquered Nīshāpūr, capturing the last Ṭāhirid amīr of Khurāsān, 
Muhammad b. Ṭāhir II, in the process. As Ṭāhirid authority gave way to the Ṣaffārids, the 
numismatics of the eastern frontier show a rapid breakdown of centralization which 
results in a shift in the centers of minting and an explosion of names represented on 
coins. The earliest signs of these changes appear at the mints of Andarāba and Panjhīr. 
These two mints are located in close proximity to each other, in the region of 
Ṭukhāristān, and the history of coin production at each mint is closely tied to the other.  
Panjhīr was both a mint and silver mine located along the Panjhīr River between 
Kābul to the south and the Khāwak Pass to the north in a valley of the Hindu Kush.
72
 
Panjhīr was known for the large quantity of silver it produced which supplied many 
nearby mints. Recently, atomic absorption spectrometry analysis has demonstrated an 
unusually high level of purity in the silver mined there compared to the silver used in 
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minting contemporaneously in other parts of the Islamic world.
73
 According to some 
speculations, the mines of Panjhīr may have been a silver source for the Indo-Greeks of 
Bactria and the Hindū Shāhīs of Kābul before its use by the Muslims.
74
 Silver Greek 
coins attributed to a mint named Panjhīr date back as far as the third century BCE, giving 
some support to these assumptions.
75
 Still, the earliest known Islamic coins listing Panjhīr 
do not appear until 259/872-873.
76
 These coins give the name of the ‛Abbāsid Caliph al-
Mu‛tamid on the reverse with the name of the Ṣaffārid amīr Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth on the 
obverse. Panjhīri silver dirhams including the name of Ya‛qūb appear also in 260-
261/873-875.
77
  These Panjhīri coins are the earliest known Ṣaffārid coins.   
Andarāba was located north of Panjhīr across the Khāwak Pass. It is known as the 
mint of Panjhīr, as much of the silver mined at Panjhīr was sent to the city of Andarāba to 
be minted, and the mint of Balkh, as Balkh was the largest city in Ṭukhāristān. Andarāba 
is known for the large volumes of silver dirhams produced there for the late third/ninth 
and early fourth/tenth centuries. In fact, of the large number of Central Asian silver 
dirhams of this period which have appeared in hordes from Northern and Eastern Europe, 
Andarāba is the third most often encountered mint, behind the mints of the much larger 
cities of Samarqand and al-Shāsh.
78





, it is not until 263/875-876 that we see evidence for 
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regular annual minting there. The relationship between Andarāba and Panjhīr poses some 
interesting questions about the relationship between mining and minting and who held the 
authority to strike coins.  
Silver dirhams minted at Andarāba in 258/871-872 neither match the standard 
coins of mints of Iraq nor name any dynastic governor. The coins simply name the Caliph 
al-Mu‛tamid on the reverse,
81
 while coins minted in Iraq in that same year name al-
Mu‛tamid on the reverse along with his heir Ja‛far on the obverse.
82
 In the years 263-
269/876-883, more silver dirhams are struck at Andarāba with only the name of al-
Mu‛tamid,
83
 while coins struck in Baghdad and the eastern half of the caliphate in those 
same years name al-Mu‛tamid on the reverse along with the name of the ‛Abbāsid regent 
al-Muwaffaq on the obverse.
84
 Similar dirhams with only the name of al-Mu‛tamid were 
struck at Panjhīr in the years 260/873-874 and 262-264/875-878.
85
 As minting moved 
away from the major economic centers of Marw, Samarqand, and al-Shāsh and towards 
the actual sources of precious metals in Andarāba and Panjhīr, they began to take a new 
form which is neither purely ‛Abbāsid nor representative of any particular provincial 
dynasty. These coins also tend to be of a rougher quality, thicker, and with less elegant 
lettering implying not just a change in inscriptions, but a total change in the methods of 
production and the authority under which they were struck. It should be noted that similar 
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Yāqūt provides us with some information about the way the mines of Panjhīr 
functioned which may shed some light on the minting practices at both Panjhīr and 
Andarāba. Yāqūt writes in his entry on Panjhīr that 
In it there is a mountain of silver. Its people are mixed (akhlāṭ). Among them there is 
partisanship (‛aṣabiyya), malice (sharr), and murder (qatl)… The silver that is in the 
highest mountain is famous across the lands. The foothills (al-sūq) and the mountain are 
like a sieve from the numerous shafts (al-ḥafr). Furthermore, if they (the miners) follow 
its veins and come across it, they are shown that it arrives at precious metals (jawahir). If 
they find a vein that has never been excavated before, they take the silver. They agree 
that for a man from among them (he invests) in (opening) a shaft three hundred thousand 
dirhams, more or less. Perhaps he finds what he is satisfied with and he is done. Perhaps 
an adequate amount (miqdār nafaqatuhu) comes to him. Perhaps it gives little and he is 
impoverished for it (the shaft) is overcome by water and other things. Perhaps a man 
follows a vein and it ends at another branch from its source. The two are taken together in 
(a single) shaft (or claim). The custom with them is such that whoever arrives first 
(sabaqa) opposes his (the other‟s) ownership. He is entitled to this vein and what comes 
from it. They work with this competition, working not unlike the work of devils (al-
shayāṭīn). If one of the men arrives first the expenditures of the other become wasted.  If 
they are equal, there is a partnership.
87
 
This passage shows that mining in Panjhīr was a competitive, cutthroat, and 
entrepreneurial endeavor. This opinion of the miners of Panjhīr is also found in al-
Iṣṭakhrī‟s text, who says the mines employ ten thousand men and the majority of them are 
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“causers of havoc and wickedness” (al-‛īth wa al-fasād).
88
 Individuals expended their 
own funds to work a silver vein and could see their gains lost if they came across 
someone else‟s claim, thus forcing them to forfeit their claim to the miner who had 
arrived at the main vein first. If mining practices were such, can we argue that coins 
struck at Panjhīr and Andarāba were minted in a similarly entrepreneurial manner? 
 In his Kitāb al-jawahiratayn al-‛atīqatayn, Abū Muhammad al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad 
al-Hamdānī (d. 334/945) discusses the mine of Andarāba, probably meaning Panjhīr, 
saying, 
It is the richest mine in Khurāsān. Every day, many pieces of silver are taken away from 
it… (The silver) is divided into three thirds. Representatives of the sulṭān take one third. 
The gatherers (al-laqaṭa) take a third. The people of the place (ahl al-mawḍi‛) seize a 
third. From among them are those who work their own claims (ḥaqqahā) and from 
among them there are those who sell (their claim) to those who trade as their profession.
89
   
Beyond reinforcing the entrepreneurial nature of minting in the region, al-Hamdānī 
highlights a system of taxation and/or mint fees in use at the mine, demonstrating some 
level of organized authority over the process. The combination of coins being struck 
directly at the mine instead of in major urban centers, as had happen under the Ṭāhirids, 
and a system of accounting and tax collection established directly at the mine indicates 
that miners were converting their silver into coins as the silver was extracted. The 
authority to strike coins and collect taxes and mint fees were moved away from regional 
economic and political centers to the mines and to those who maintained political control 
over the mines. The opportunity for “on demand” striking of dirhams by miners is also 
demonstrated, moving minting further into a private or market economic sphere. It is 
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most likely that the decline of centralized Ṭāhirid authority created an opportunity for 
other groups to lay claim to the lucrative taxation and mint fees on these mines.  
 
4.4.1 Ṣaffārid Coins and Signs of Local Opposition 
The early coins of Panjhīr and Andarāba were struck in the period between the collapse 
of the Ṭāhirid dynasty and the expansion of Sāmānid authority south of the Oxus. This is 
a period in which political authority along the eastern frontier changed hands regularly 
and often violently. It is not surprising therefore to find that the minting of coins in the 
region is notably less centralized than it had been under the much better-organized 
Ṭāhirids. This does not mean that these coins were not struck on the authority of local 
dynastic powers. The following section will address the coinage of this period, with 
particular attention paid to the dynastic coinage of the Ṣaffārids and the Bānījūrids, and 
try to connect minting practices to larger political developments in the region. 
 In 259/872-873, the first Ṣaffārid coins appear at the mint of Panjhīr. These 
dirhams include the name of Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth on the obverse and al-Mu‛tamid on the 
reverse.
90
 Similar coins appear in the two following years, 260-261/863-865.
91
 Following 
these coins, another twenty years go by before the Ṣaffārids mint more coins in the 
region. This short three-year window for the striking of Ṣaffārid coins has been viewed as 
an example of Ya‛qūb‟s restless adventuring, most noticeably by Deborah Tor, who 
wrote, “In a typical pattern of early Ṣaffārid crusading, Ya‛qūb came, fought the 
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Khārijites, and left (Panjhīr).”
92
 This analysis, while reflective of the brief appearance of 
Ṣaffārid coins at Panjhīr, demonstrates the often dismissive approach taken toward the 
early years of the Ṣaffārid enterprise, seeing Ya‛qūb as little more than a wandering 
adventurer,
93
 and fails to look at the production of these coins in a broader historical and 
numismatic context. 
 A number of events occur around 259/872-873 which highlight the importance of 
this date as the advent of Ṣaffārid coin production. First, this is the year in which Ya‛qūb 
entered Nīshāpūr and brought an end to Ṭāhirid rule. As mentioned above, we can see a 
correspondence between the collapse of the Ṭāhirids and a decentralization of minting 
practices, manifested as early as 258/871-872. As the Ṣaffārids were conquering a 
number of territories within Khurāsān, they disrupted Ṭāhird authority and the striking of 
coins at Andarāba which only included the name of al-Mu‛tamid are representative of 
this disruption.  
The pattern of Ya‛qūb‟s conquests is often difficult to decipher. The Tārīkh-i 
Sīstān has Ya‛qūb and his army moving frequently during the years leading up to the 
conquest of Nīshāpūr.
94
 C.E. Bosworth places the date for the conquest of Panjhīr 
sometime between the years 256 and 259 (869-873) during which time Ya‛qūb conquered 
Kābul, Bāmiyān, and Balkh, but is inclined towards situating the conquest of Panjhīr 
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toward the end of these events.
95
 Despite the exact date, it is clear that Ya‛qūb‟s military 
conquests of the Ṭāhirid territories had opened the door not only for the striking of 
Ṣaffārid coins, but also coins which were neither truly ‛Abbāsid nor representative of any 
particular dynasty. 
 According to our sources, another important event occurred around this time. al-
Ṭabarī tells us that in 257/870-871 al-Mu‛tamid gave Ya‛qūb investitures over Balkh, 
Tukhāristān, Kirmān, Sīstān, and Sind.
96
 The Tārīkh-i Sīstān puts these same events in 
the year 258/871-872 and includes an investiture for Fārs.
97
 These events lead us to 
wonder whether these investitures gave Ya‛qūb the right, or at least the perceived right, 
to strike coins in his own name. Perhaps more importantly, this reinforces our questions 
over who was actually striking coins at Panjhīr in the late third/ninth century. The 
Ṣaffārid coins struck at Panjhīr, much like the contemporary coins minted at Andarāba, 
do not include the name of the ‛Abbāsid heir, but rather replace the name of Ja‛far with 
the name of Ya‛qūb. This would imply that these were not coins minted under instruction 
from Iraq. Complicating this matter further is the fact that in 260/873-874, as mentioned 
earlier, coins are struck at Panjhīr both with the name of Ya‛qūb and without the name of 
Ya‛qūb (or anyone else‟s name on the obverse for that matter). 
 These Panjhīrī coins can be compared with Ṣaffārid coins minted elsewhere 
during the reign of Ya‛qūb. Coins minted at al-Muḥammadiyya (near Rayy) in 262/875-
876,
98
 al-Ahwāz in 263-265/876-879,
99
 and Fārs in 264-265/877-879
100
 also replace the 
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name of Ja‛far or al-Muwaffaq with Ya‛qūb‟s name. That no Ṣaffārid coins minted 
during Ya‛qūb‟s life feature the name of the ‛Abbāsid heir demonstrates a pattern of 
divergence by the Ṣaffārids beyond the inclusion of Ya‛qūb‟s name. This uniformity 
shows that the Ṣaffārids may have had some control over the coins which were minted in 
their name and that it was not simply a matter of local mint officials placating the new 
local military power. This argument is especially attractive considering the rivalry 
between Ya‛qūb and al-Muwaffaq, whose name is most often omitted. 
 Returning to the eastern frontier, the question of why Ṣaffārid coins disappeared 
so suddenly from Panjhīr remains. Tor argued that this was a matter of Ya‛qūb‟s 
adventurous whimsy and that he established himself in Panjhīr and immediately gave his 
attention to new military exploits. The counter argument to Tor‟s statement is that 
Ya‛qūb‟s army had moved on well before the striking of coins in his name ceased, or in 
some cases even began. If we look at the pattern of Ya‛qūb‟s minting (Panjhīr 259-261, 
al-Muḥammadiyya 262, al-Ahwāz 263-265, and Fārs 264-265), the coins always follow 
far beyond the path of his army. By the time the first coins appear at Panjhīr, Ya‛qūb has 
already taken Nīshāpūr. He is in Fārs before coins appear at al-Muḥammadiyya and has 
been defeated by the ‛Abbāsid army outside Baghdad and has retreated to Jundīshāpūr 
before coins appear in al-Ahwāz or Fārs. That these coins were minted at all is a sign of 
sustained Ṣaffārid presence in the areas Ya‛qūb‟s army had conquered, a notion enforced 
by the Tārīkh-i Sīstān which consistently details the people Ya‛qūb leaves behind to 
govern in his absence as he moves on with his army to new fronts. 
 Perhaps more important to the sudden decline of Ṣaffārid minting at Panjhīr is the 
local opposition faced by Ya‛qūb throughout Khurāsān. This chapter began with the story 
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of Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allāh al-Khujistānī and the coins he minted in Andarāba, Herat, and 
Nīshāpūr between 267 and 268 (882-884). al-Khujistānī was just one of a number of 
opponents to Ṣaffārid authority in Khurāsān. If we follow the mint of Panjhīr beyond the 
last Ṣaffārid coins, remembering along the way that Ṣaffārid coinage had already been 
“interrupted” by non-dynastic coins in 260/873-874, it is clear that other groups were 
ready to step in and take control of the mints, but identifying these new authorities is 
somewhat difficult. 
 
4.4.2 The Bānījūrids and Lack of Uniformity between Mints 
In the years 261/874-875, 263/876-877, and 264/877-878, coins are struck at Panjhīr with 
the name Muhammad on the obverse and al-Mu‛tamid on the reverse.
101
 Alongside these 
coins, other coins appear with only the name of al-Mu‛tamid in the years 262-264/875-
878.
102
 Minting appears to cease at Panjhīr for the years 265-267/878-881. The 
Muhammad named on these coins is difficult to identify with any certainty. Panjhīr is not 
a site that appears often in textual sources and Muhammad is much too common a name 
to narrow down the list of candidates. Coins struck at Panjhīr in 268/881-882 may 
provide us a clue. These coins include the name Muhammad b. ‛Umar or ‛Amr (only the 
first two letters are visible) on the obverse.
103
 Bosworth, following Vasmer, argues that 
these are Bānījūrid or Abū Dāwūdī coins referencing Abū Dāwūd Muhammad b. Aḥmad 
b. Bānījūr.
104
 The Muhammad b. ‛Umar or ‛Amr coins complicate this identification, but 
these are an outlier separated by four years from the “Muḥammad” coins. Supporting this 
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identification, though, is the appearance in 265/878-879 of coins minted at Andarāba with 
the fuller name Muhammad b. Aḥmad on the obverse.
105
 
 The connections between Panjhīr and Andarāba and the coins produced by their 
respective mints are surprisingly complex. As mentioned earlier, Andarāba is often 
referred to as the mint of Panjhīr because the Andarāban coins are minted with silver that 
has come from the mines of Panjhīr. This connection implies close geographic proximity 
and cooperation between those who control mining at Panjhīr and minting at Andarāba. 
With an assumption like this in mind, one would expect to see some uniformity between 
the coins minted at these two locations, but a comparison of these coins does not support 
this assumption at all. 
 












263  al-Mu‛tamid  al-Mu‛tamid 
Muḥammad al-Mu‛tamid 
264  al-Mu‛tamid Muḥammad al-Mu‛tamid 
 al-Mu‛tamid 




266  al-Mu‛tamid n/a n/a 
267  al-Mu‛tamid n/a n/a 
Aḥmad b. ‛Abd 
Allah 
al-Mu‛tamid 
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268 Aḥmad b. ‛Abd 
Allah 






269  al-Mu‛tamid n/a n/a 
270 Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad 
al-Mu‛tamid  al-Mu‛tamid 
Sa‛īd al-Mu‛tamid Abū Dāwūd al-Mu‛tamid 
 
Of the five years in which coins were produced at both Andarāba and Panjhīr and the 
dozen coin types struck over those five years, there are only two years in which the two 
mints produced identical coins. In the years 263 and 264 (876-878), both mints produced 
coins which listed only the name of the Caliph al-Mu‛tamid on the reverse.
108
 This is not 
evidence of cooperation between the two mints during these years for two reasons. First, 
coins which only include the name of the caliph should be considered as a sort of default 
coinage. They make no statements on their own and say nothing about the identity or 
motivations of the people striking the coins. Second, in both years Panjhīr also strikes 
coins with the name Muḥammad on the obverse while Andarāba does not, meaning that 
for at least part of the year the two mints were operating under different conditions. 
 This leads us back to the identification of the Muḥammad listed on Panjhīr coins 
as Abū Dāwūd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. Abū Dāwūd is named on the coins of Andarāba as 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad in 265, 270, 275, 277-280, and 282-284.
109
 He more clearly 
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appears as Abū Dāwūd on coins from Panjhīr in the year 270
110
 and from Andarāba in the 
years 282-283 and 285.
111
 The obvious question is why would he appear on coins under 
so many different names? One explanation is that they are not in fact the same person. 
Two series of coins put the theory of a single man with multiple names into question. The 
earliest are the coins minted at Andarāba and Panjhīr listed above in the year 270/883-
884. Abū Dāwūd was the head of the branch of the Bānījūrid dynasty which ruled Balkh 
in the years 260-285/874-898.
112
 As the ruler of Balkh, Andarāba and Panjhīr fell under 
his possession. This presumably means that coins struck at Andarāba were struck under 
the same authority as were coins struck at Panjhīr and that in both cases this authority 
was derived from Abū Dāwūd in Balkh. The Andarāban dirhams name Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad while the Panjhīrī dirhams name Abū Dāwūd, meaning that two mints which 
were working under the same authorities in close geographic proximity to each other 
decided to mint coins giving the same man two different names in the same year. The 
second series of coins come from Andāraba in 282-283/895-897, naming Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad on the obverse and Abū Dāwūd on the reverse along with the caliph al-Mu‛taḍid. 
These may be an example of muled coins mixing the obverse and the reverse of two 
different series, but this is unlikely since these coins are struck over two years. What 
reason could be given for presenting two names for the same person on the same coin? In 
287/900 there is a similar example at Andarāba in which an Abū Ibrāhīm, the Sāmānid 
Isma‛īl b. Aḥmad, is named on both the obverse and the reverse.
113
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 Another explanation for this confusing mix of dirhams with the names of 
Muḥammad, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, and Abū Dāwūd is that these mints were either not 
under a centralized Bānījūrid authority or were not taking direct orders from Balkh as to 
whose name should appear on what coins or under what title. This also opens the door to 
a re-identification of Muḥammad and Muḥammad b. Aḥmad as someone other than Abū 
Dāwūd. If we examine the full run of names appearing on coins from Andarāba for the 
years 263-290/876-903, from the beginning of regular minting at Andarāba to the 
appearance of the first strictly Sāmānid coins, we see that the complexity of the situation 
goes beyond the multiple Muḥammads. 
 
Figure 4.4: Names appearing on Andarāban dirhams, 263-290/876-903
114
 
Date Obverse Reverse 
263  al-Mu‛tamid 
264  al-Mu‛tamid 
265  al-Mu‛tamid 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Mu‛tamid 
266  al-Mu‛tamid 
267  al-Mu‛tamid 
Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allah al-Mu‛tamid 
268 Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allah al-Mu‛tamid 
 al-Mu‛tamid 
269  al-Mu‛tamid 
270 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Mu‛tamid 
Sa‛īd al-Mu‛tamid 
271 Sa‛īd b. Shu‛ayb al-Mu‛tamid 
272 n/a n/a 
273 Sa‛īd b. Shu‛ayb al-Mu‛tamid 
274 Sa‛īd b. Shu‛ayb al-Mu‛tamid 
275 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Mu‛tamid 
276 n/a n/a 
277 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Mu‛tamid 
278 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Mu‛tamid 
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279 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Mu‛tamid 
280 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Mu‛tamid 
 al-Mu‛taḍid 
281 n/a n/a 
282 Abū Dāwūd al-Mu‛taḍid 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad 
283 Abū Dāwūd al-Mu‛taḍid 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad 
‛Amr b. al-Layth al-Mu‛taḍid 
284 ‛Amr b. al-Layth al-Mu‛taḍid 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Mu‛taḍid 
285 Abū Dāwūd al-Mu‛taḍid 
Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allah 
286 Ḥamdān al-Mu‛taḍid 
‛Amr b. al-Layth 
Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Mu‛taḍid 
287 Abū Ibrāhīm al-Mu‛taḍid 
Abū Ibrāhīm 
Abū Ja‛far al-Mu‛taḍid 
Abū Ibrāhīm 
288 Abū Ibrāhīm al-Mu‛taḍid 
Abū Ja‛far 
Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Mu‛taḍid 
Isma‛īl b. Aḥmad 
289 Isma‛īl b. Aḥmad al-Mu‛taḍid 
Aḥmad b. Muḥammad 
290 Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad 
al-Muktafī 
Isma‛īl b. Aḥmad 
 al-Muktafī 
Isma‛īl b. Aḥmad 
 
 Over the first seven years listed above, coins are produced with only the name of 
the caliph on the reverse. In one year, 265/878-879, a second series is struck including the 
name of Muḥammad b. Aḥmad on the obverse.
115
 In the year 270/883-884, a second 
series including the name of Muḥammad b. Aḥmad on the obverse is struck.
116
 In 267-
                                                          
115
 ANS 1959.165.14. 
116
 Sylloge numorum arabicorum Tubingen: Balk und die Landschaften am Oberen Oxus: XIV c Hurasan 
IV, no. 2. 
195 
 
268/880-882, coins appear with the name of Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allāh al-Khujistānī.
117
 
Despite the presence of Muḥammad b. Aḥmad or al-Khujistānī at Andarāba, and more 
importantly at its mint, the al-Mu‛tamid-only dirhams persist for this entire seven year 
period. The attempts by different individuals to include their names on coins during this 
period, with Muḥammad b. Aḥmad continuing to promote his own name over the course 
of twenty years, shows that the “caliph-only” dirhams lacked the name of a governor, but 
not for lack of trying by individuals who felt that their name could appear on coins. These 
coins show that either political control over Andarāba was so tenuous during this period 
that no one could sustain authority long enough to include his name on coins beyond a 
brief moment or that the decisions about who was to be named on coins were normally 
being made by a politically unaffiliated mint official. 
From the reconstructed timeline of names appearing on Andarāban coins we can 
try to come to some conclusions about the history of Andarāba and the identity of the 
individuals named on its coins. The earliest date that can be given for Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad‟s control over the mint is 265/878-879. If we presume he is the same Muḥammad 
who appeared on Panjhīrī dirhams in the two previous years, a pattern emerges in which 
Muḥammad strikes coins at Panjhīr for two years, alongside coins which only name al-
Mu‛tamid, and then shuts down the Panjhīr mint, which produces only one series 
between 265 and 269 (878-883), and moves production to Andarāba. Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad‟s coin production is then immediately stopped, even though Andarāba continues 
to produce coins regularly with only the name of al-Mu‛tamid, but the appearance of al-
Khujistānī in the area and on the coins explains this interruption. It is important to note 
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here that one of the rare references to Abū Dāwūd in the chronicles appears in 
conjunction with his role in fighting against al-Khujistānī.
118
 Following the period of al-
Khujistānī‟s control of Andarāba, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad returns for less than a year 
before his name is replaced with that of Sa‛īd b. Shu‛ayb, who controls the mint for five 
years (270-274/883-888).
119
 At this point, caliph-only dirhams disappear for a decade, 
indicating a firming-up of local control over the mint. The identity of Sa‛īd b. Shu‛ayb is 
difficult to uncover, but he was most likely governor over Andarāba in the early 270‟s. At 
the very least, he was capable of establishing his own control over the mint of Andarāba 
for an extended period. Then, beginning in 275/888-889, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad‟s name 
appears again on dirhams struck at Andarāba regularly until 284/897-898.
120
  
Clearly Muḥammad b. Aḥmad did not have firm control over the mint of 
Andarāba until 275/888-889, a decade after his name initially appeared on Andarāban 
dirhams. In 280/893-894, caliph-only dirhams returned to Andarāba listing only the name 
of the Caliph al-Mu‛taḍid.
121
 Other coins struck that year included the name of 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad and al-Mu‛tamid, interesting in that al-Mu‛tamid had died in the 
previous year, evidence that the Muḥammad b. Aḥmad coins come from the earlier part 
of the year. This is followed by a year in which there are no known Andarāban coins, 
after which Muḥammad b. Aḥmad returns to the coins alongside Abū Dāwūd in the years 
282-283/895-897. It is clear that up until 275/888-889, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad had 
struggled to retain control over Andarāba. Could it be that the al-Mu‛taḍid coins of 
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280/893-894 are a sign that Muḥammad b. Aḥmad‟s authority was once again contested? 
Is it possible that, having lost control of the city (if he was not in fact himself Abū 
Dāwūd) he went to Balkh and requested the support of Abū Dāwūd in regaining control 
of Andarāba? Muḥammad b. Aḥmad‟s place in the presumed third position on these coins 
would indicate a position of subservience to Abū Dāwūd, making this plausible. We 
know from the textual sources that, in the early 280‟s, Abū Dāwūd was governor of 
Balkh and was involved in reinforcing his position in the region. According to al-
Nashakhrī, following the ascension of al-Mu‛taḍid, Abū Dāwūd made an alliance with 
the Ṣaffārid amīr ‛Amr b. al-Layth.
122
 This alliance is seen in the Andarāban dirhams of 
283-284/896-898 which name ‛Amr along with al-Mu‛taḍid.
123
 
The majority of the evidence argues toward the identification of Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad as Abū Dāwūd. An important aspect of this identification is that they both appear 
to die around the same time. The last coins naming Muḥammad b. Aḥmad appear in 
284/897-898 while the last coins naming Abū Dāwūd appear the following year. Over the 
next five years the number of names appearing on the coins of Andarāba continues to 
expand. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad‟s son, Aḥmad, appears on coins in the years 286/899 and 
288-290/900-903.
124
 Vasmer believes that the Abū Ja‛far who appears on Andarāban 
dirhams of 287-288/900-901 is also Aḥmad b. Muḥammad.
125
 Aḥmad b. Muḥammad‟s 
appearance on dirhams from Balkh in 292/904-905 and 297/909-910 also reinforce the 
connection between Muḥammad b. Aḥmad and Abū Dāwūd.
126
 ‛Amr b. al-Layth appears 
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 but in the following year the Sāmānid Ismā‛īl b. Aḥmad appears on 
Andarāban coins, first as Abū Ibrāhīm.
128
 It is of interest to note that Isma‛īl‟s victory 
over ‛Amr occurred in 287/900 outside of Balkh, in close proximity to the mint of 
Andarāba. After 290/902-903, the coins of Andarāba become purely Sāmānid. 
 The numismatic evidence shows that the rise of the Ṣaffārids, or perhaps more 
importantly the decline of the Ṭāhirids, was a politically traumatic experience along the 
eastern frontier. The Ṭāhirids had presided over a period of fairly centralized and uniform 
control along the eastern frontier, at least as represented by the presumably state-run 
production of coins and its close connection to Iraq. During the thirty years between the 
collapse of the Ṭāhirids and the expansion of Sāmānid authority into Khurāsān, the 
authority to strike coins became more localized, centered around the sources of silver 
rather than politically and economically important urban centers, and local authorities 
were able (whether by permission or by force) to dictate the inscriptions found on coins 
minted in their territories. On the micro level represented by this detailed look at minting 
at Panjhīr and Andarāba during this period, uniformity of coin types was not always 
possible. Even when there is evidence for the prolonged reign of a single governor, his 
name may appear, disappear, change, and be replaced by others over time. 
 Still, this was not entirely a period of anarchy. Coins largely stuck with the 
standards of ‛Abbāsid coinage, even if the coins themselves, along with their inscriptions, 
became rougher. The main epigraphic program remained intact and the name of the 
caliph remained in the primary position of authority. The only noticeable break was the 
removal of the name of the caliph‟s heir and, in most cases but not all, its replacement 
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with the name of a local authority. As we move this study of the numismatics of the 
eastern frontier into the Sāmānid era, we will see a move back towards uniformity while 
at the same time a continued divergence from the standard coinage of Iraq. 
 It may be important to note that, during this period, gold dinars continued to be 
produced at Samarqand maintaining the Iraqī standards, including the name of the heir al-
Muwaffaq. These coins have been attested for the years 271-276/884-890.
129
 This is an 
indication that despite what was occurring with the production of silver dirhams, 
information about the expected standards of Iraq was still available along the eastern 
frontier. This stability shown at Samarqand is also interesting for the study of early 
Sāmānid history. In the midst of the struggles occurring in Khurāsān, the Sāmānids 
appear to have been able to maintain a more centralized Transoxania despite the collapse 
of the Ṭāhirids.  
 
4.5 Sāmānid Uniformity 
The early Sāmānids had minted copper coins in their own names as early as the 240‟s, 
but it is not until 282/895-896 that Isma‛īl b. Aḥmad began striking silver dirhams at 
Samarqand and al-Shāsh including the name of the Caliph al-Mu‛taḍid and his own name 
on the reverse.
130
 These coins return the production of dirhams to the economic centers 
which had been so important during the Ṭāhirid period. However, the Sāmānids do not 
limit their minting to these major urban centers; rather, under the Sāmānids minting 
expands to an unprecedented number of mints. In the 290‟s, as the Sāmānids consolidated 
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their positions not only over Transoxania but also Khurāsān, the minting of Sāmānid 
coins expands to Andarāba, Balkh, Ma‛din, and Nīshāpūr, each of which begin striking 
Sāmānid coins between 290/902 and 293/906. By the 330‟s, the mints of Badakhshān, 
Bukhārā, Farwān, al-Khuttal, Marw, and Panjhīr also struck Sāmānid dirhams, bringing 
the total number of mints to twelve. While gold dinars are attested for a number of these 
mints, during the early Sāmānid period the striking of dinars is primarily centered on 
Nīshāpūr and Samarqand. Interestingly, the striking of dinars appears to cease at 
Samarqand in the first decade of the fourth century, but carries on with regular strikings 
through the 330‟s at Nīshāpūr. Despite this expansion of mints, there is a great amount of 
uniformity in the coins struck by the Sāmānids. The old minting centers do maintain a 
certain preeminence and Samarqand and al-Shāsh remain the most prolific and persistent 
Sāmānid mints, followed closely by Andarāba. 
 The consistency of the coins struck across all these mints is one of the most 
notable aspects of Sāmānid coins. The Sāmānids maintain the practice established during 
the post-Ṭāhirid period of omitting the name of the ‛Abbāsid heir, but instead of 
replacing the heir‟s name on the obverse with the name of a governor or local authority, 
they typically leave the obverse anonymous. Unlike earlier dynastic coins, the name of 
the Sāmānid amīr appears on the reverse below the name of the caliph. This pattern first 
appears on the earliest Sāmānid dirhams of Samarqand and al-Shāsh in 282/895-896 and 
continues until the first appearance of coins which include the name of the Ghaznavid 
amīr along with the name of the Sāmānid amīr. In this pattern, the Sāmānids still place 
their own names in a position of subservience to the caliph; in fact according to the 
traditional positioning they have situated themselves in the tertiary position, but they 
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have clearly broken from traditional epigraphic standards. Interestingly, Būyid coins 
similarly move the name of the amīr to a position directly beneath that of the caliph. This 
change comes much later, in 334/946 with the succession of al-Muṭī‛ to the ‛Abbāsid 
caliphate. When al-Muṭī‛ does not name an heir, the Būyids do not shift their own names 
on subsequent coins so that Mu‛izz al-Dawla remains on the obverse but is now in the 
second position, while ‛Imād al-Dawla remains on the reverse in the third position. In 
effect, this makes the last name on the reverse the secondary position and the first name 
on the obverse the tertiary position. It is as if they change the epigraphic program so that 
there is a first and second ‛Abbāsid position on the reverse and obverse respectively 
followed by a first and second Būyid position also on the reverse and obverse 
respectively. Any meaning behind this change is difficult to understand with certainty. 
Luke Treadwell appears to ignore the problem in his die corpus study of Būyid coins.
131
 
 Only two mints break from the pattern of the Sāmānid amīr appearing on the 
reverse alongside the caliph, namely Andarāba and Balkh. As mentioned above, 
Andarāban dirhams continue to include the name of the Bānījūrid Aḥmad b. Muḥammad 
until 296/908-909. Dirhams struck at Balkh also include the name of Aḥmad b. 
Muḥammad until 297/909-910.
132
 Despite the rise of the Sāmānids, Balkh and Andarāba 
remain directly under Bānījūrid authority, even though the Bānījūrids are now 
subservient to the Sāmānid amīr. Due to the unusual positioning of the name of the 
Sāmānid amīr, these coins would traditionally be read as identifying the Sāmānids as 
subservient to the Bānījūrids, but it is highly unlikely that these coins would have ever 
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been read in such a mistaken manner. If we examine the actual coins, a better explanation 
for this arrangement of names may appear. 
 




Obv: Aḥmad b. 
Muḥammad 
Rev: al-Mu‛taḍid, 














Obv: Aḥmad b. 
Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad 
Rev: al-Muktafī,  




Obv: Aḥmad b. 
Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad 
Rev: al-Muktafī,  




Obv: Aḥmad b. 
Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad 
Rev: al-Muqtadir,  










Aḥmad b. Ismā‛īl 
 
 
If we consider the epigraphic programs of the standard dirham of the period, all the 
variable information is found on the obverse, namely the date and the mint. The reverse 
inscription is static, except for the name of the caliph and whoever occupies the tertiary 
position. It is only with the ascension of a new caliph, or amīr in the case of Sāmānid 
coins, that the inscription on the reverse die needs to change. Now if we look at the coins 
pictured above, we can see, especially on the later coins, that the hand used to inscribe 
the obverse, at least the name of the Bānījūrid, is different from the hand used to inscribe 
the reverse. We can speculate from this that the reverse dies were engraved by the 
Sāmānids and distributed to the mints while the obverse dies were engraved at the mint, 
in these cases by the Bānījūrids. A decision could be made at the mint to include the local 
authority on the locally produced obverse while maintaining the centrally mandated 
reverse. This helps to explain also why it is only at these two mints where a local dynasty 
has held control for twenty five years prior to the advent of Sāmānid coins that you see 
local governors named on the coins. 
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 Perhaps supporting this assessment, or perhaps complicating it, is a series of 
dirhams that are struck contemporaneously at Andarāba and Balkh which move the name 









 and at Balkh in the year 294/906-907
137
 
dirhams are struck with the name of the caliph on the obverse. Among these coins are 
those that also include the name of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad, listed as only Aḥmad, on the 
reverse beneath the name of Isma‛īl b. Aḥmad from both Andarāba and Balkh in the year 
294/906-907. On these coins, the name Aḥmad appears at the very bottom of the central 
inscription, as if it was added to the die at a later time after it was initially cast. While 
there is evidence from every Sāmānid mint for the inclusion of the name of the amīr on 
the reverse alongside the name of the caliph, these are the only known Sāmānid coins that 
place the name of the caliph on the obverse. Because of this, it cannot be argued that the 
Sāmānids attempted to write the ‛Abbāsids off of the coins, but some kind of 
experimentation was happening at Andarāba and Balkh during these early years of 
Sāmānid rule. These experiments may have been dictated by the Sāmānids, but they 
apparently involved a negotiation over the place of the Bānījūrids in the Sāmānid realm. 
 Aside from Aḥmad b. Muḥammad, only one other local governor appears beyond 
any outlier strikings on Sāmānid silver or gold coins. From 303-307/915-920, an 
individual named Aḥmad b. Sahl is named on the obverse of dirhams struck at 
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 Interestingly, Aḥmad b. Sahl appears on one series of coins minted outside 
Andarāba, gold dinars struck at Nīshāpūr in the year 306/918-919.
139
 The connection 
here between Andarāba and Nīshāpūr is rather unusual and it is difficult to understand 
what relationship Aḥmad b. Sahl‟s appearance at these two mints in the same year may 
indicate, or even if they are the same Aḥmad b. Sahl. That Sāmānid coins featuring the 
name of local governors are primarily limited to the mints of Andarāba and Balkh is 
symbolic of a struggle which has been seen throughout the numismatic history of the 
eastern frontier throughout this period.  This struggle represents a tension between major 
political and economic centers such as Marw, Samarqand, and Nīshāpūr and the major 
mining centers around Panjhīr. Immediate access to the largest source of silver in the 
region and the location of these mines on the fringes of the Islamic world provided local 
authorities with the ability to use this wealth to their own advantage. Local authorities, 
most notably the Bānījūrids, used access to the mines as a means of self promotion and 
strength that afforded them a certain notoriety, most noticeable on the coins they struck in 
their own name, for half a century. 
 Returning to the question of coins which shifted the name of the caliph to the 
obverse, there is one moment in the history of Sāmānid numismatics where we clearly 
see the Sāmānids acting against the ‛Abbāsids, or perhaps more clearly the Būyids at this 
point, and breaking away from the standards of Iraq in a meaningful manner. When the 
Būyids deposed the Caliph al-Mustakfī and replaced him with al-Muṭī‛, the Sāmānids 
never acknowledged the new caliph. Instead, coins minted throughout the Sāmānid realm 
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continued to include the name of al-Mustakfī on the reverse. These coins appear from the 
moment of al-Muṭī‛‟s ascension in 334/946, beyond al-Mustakfī‟s death in prison in 
338/949, until the rise of Manṣūr b. Nūḥ in 350/961.
140
 Both silver dirhams and gold 
dinars continued to include al-Mustakfī‟s name after he had been deposed.
141
 The refusal 
to acknowledge the ascension of a new caliph is a political action whose meaning is fairly 
obvious. The question is whether this was an action directed specifically in favor of al-
Mustakfī, against al-Muṭī‛, or, most likely, against the Būyid amīrs. The most powerful 
element of these dirhams is the uniformity with which they were struck across the mints 
of the Sāmānids. 
 The inscriptions on Sāmānid coins remain rather static during the early 
fourth/tenth century. In the latter half of the century, as the Turkish military becomes 
more prominent in the east and Sāmānid commanders break away to form the Ghaznavid 
dynasty, a proliferation of names appears. These are primarily the names of military 
commanders who were granted administrative positions over portions of the Sāmānid 
domains. The transition to the Ghaznavid period falls outside of the scope of the current 
study, but it is sufficient to note that as Sāmānid power gave way in the middle of the 
fourth/tenth century, the uniformity which defined early Sāmānid coinage also dissolved. 
This lack of uniformity is most noted in the history of the Sāmānid oversized dirhams 
which were struck from the 360‟s into the 390‟s. These unusual dirhams have received a 
great deal of attention in the literature, most notably in Michael Mitchiner‟s The Multiple 
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Dirhams of Medieval Afghanistan.
142
 Relevant to the current discussion is the way the 
oversized dirhams have been seen as a breakdown of standardized coin production during 
the latter years of the Sāmānid dynasty when their political authority was similarly 
breaking down. 
 A final issue that has been the subject of much work on Sāmānid numismatics is 
the appearance of numerous Sāmānid dirhams in Northern and Eastern European hordes. 
These finds are typically connected with the Vikings and Volga Bulghars and 
demonstrate a pattern of trade from Central Asia towards the northwest.  
 The coinage of the Sāmānids is a demonstration of one dynasty‟s ability to 
reunify the eastern frontier after the divisions of the post-Ṭāhirid period. The amount of 
uniformity found among the coins produced at such a wide number of mints shows that 
this region maintained a connected political identity under a unified political authority. If 
the number of mints had been fewer, as in the earlier periods, the numismatic evidence 
could only be used to argue unified authority in those limited regions. The rearrangement 
of names on the coins may demonstrate some kind of reconfiguration in the ways the 
Sāmānids understood their relationship to the caliphate, but the precise meaning of that 
reconfiguration cannot be taken from the coins themselves. Finally, the limited number of 
mints including the names of local governors and their focus on the mints near the mines 
of Panjhīr continue a long-term tension between major urban centers, especially those 
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which have acted as political centers under various dynasties, and the important centers 
of economic production such as mines.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
On the whole, the most surprising aspect of the numismatics of the eastern frontier in the 
third/ninth century through the first half of the fourth/tenth century is the tendency 
towards uniformity. On the one hand, this uniformity is a drive towards the striking of 
coins which meet the standards of contemporary ‛Abbāsid coinage. On the other hand, 
this uniformity, especially in the ways coins diverge from the standardized coins of Iraq, 
is representative of broadly accepted political authority along the frontier. 
 Whether or not the striking of coins close to the standard ‛Abbāsid coins of Iraq is 
a sign of loyalty to the caliphs or at least symbolic of an attitude which favors the 
preservation of at least the semblance of a unified caliphate is difficult to decipher solely 
from the coins. Trends in the political history of the eastern frontier and its relationship 
with Iraq show that the striking of these coins often occurs within a gray area between 
loyalty and independence. Under the Ṭāhirids, the acceptance of Iraqī standards after the 
reign of Ṭalḥa
143
 perhaps had more to do with the relationship between the two branches 
of the Ṭāhirid family in Baghdad and Khurāsān respectively than it did with the 
relationship between Khurāsān and the caliph. After the collapse of the Ṭāhirids in 
Khurāsān, the coinage struck along the eastern frontier goes through a number of 
changes, but certain key aspects of the standardized ‛Abbāsid coinage remain. The 
general epigraphic program of the coins does not change and the name of the caliph 
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appears, in almost every series, in the appropriate position, proclaiming that these coins 
are struck under the caliph‟s authority. Whether or not this represented any meaningful 
sentiments in favor of the caliph is questionable and one may make the comparison 
between the employment of the name of a distant caliph on a coin outside of his real 
jurisdiction and the use of the Athenian owl motif on coins of the Ancient Mediterranean 
within Athens‟ economic sphere of influence but outside of the reach of its political 
authority. In both of these cases, it is sometimes better just to make your money look like 
money. 
 Even in the points of divergence from the standard ‛Abbāsid coins of Iraq in the 
post-Ṭāhirid period, there is a surprising amount of uniformity within the divergences. 
The omission of the ‛Abbāsid heir remains strikingly consistent throughout the period. 
On the one hand, this can be seen as a major divergence from the rules of sikka which are 
meant to define the methods of coin production. Lack of acknowledgement of a known 
heir, in a sense, temporally limits the allegiance of the people striking coins to the 
‛Abbāsids by failing to proclaim one‟s loyalty to the next generation of ‛Abbāsid rulers. 
On the other hand, the long history of intrigue in Iraq during the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries shows that the acknowledgement of a particular heir was not even 
firm at the ‛Abbāsid court. The problematic relationship between al-Muwaffaq and 
Ya‛qūb b. al-Layth at the time the heir was first left off the coins of the eastern frontier 
makes for a neat explanation as to the beginning of this practice. Despite the fact that 
these coins were recognizable as coins of the “Second ‛Abbāsid period,” as described in 
the early parts of this chapter, the omission of the heir is a clear demonstration that 
representatives of the ‛Abbāsid authorities were not involved in their striking. 
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 Finally, we see in the coins of the eastern frontier not only a tension between the 
larger dynasties which ruled over Khurāsān and Transoxania, the Ṭāhirids, Ṣaffārids, and 
Sāmānids, but also a tension between these dynasties and more localized authorities on 
the ground. These tensions are most noticeable at those mints which are in closest 
proximity to the sources of the precious metals used in the striking of coins, namely 
Panjhīr, Andarāba, and Balkh. These tensions run between the centers of political and 
economic power and demonstrate the influence smaller dynasties such as the Bānījūrids 
may wield when they are able to maintain control over mines and the minting centers 
associated with the mines. More importantly, the coins of Panjhīr and Andarāba show an 
important move towards centralizing minting not at political centers but rather at the 
sources of precious metals. One conclusion which can be drawn from this is that we need 
to pay more attention to the groups who control sources of material wealth such as mines. 
Much attention has been paid to the role of dihqans along the eastern frontier (and will be 
in the following chapters) and their importance has often been limited to their roles as 
owners of agricultural lands, but we need to include the masters of other forms of 
immobile wealth in the same calculations of economic and political influence in the 
region. 
 A major question which was posed at the beginning of this chapter was the 
question of who has the right to include his name on coins and under what circumstances. 
After a detailed analysis of the numismatics of the eastern frontier, the answer to this 
question is still fairly elusive. There is a cynical answer: those who could include their 
names on a coin did so. The lack of silver and gold coins naming any Ṭāhirid after Ṭalḥa 
and the inconsistency of coins naming a Bānījūrid governor during their quarter century 
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of authority complicates such a simple response. One missing piece of evidence to help 
explain changes in minting practices, especially those changes which seem most 
irrational, is a solid understanding of exactly how these coins moved. Was the 
proclamation made on a coin by including one‟s name meaningful in a way that had 
serious repercussions which required those with authority over mints to think carefully 
about the final destinations of the coins they were striking? 
 This chapter has used a particular set of material evidence, coins, to pose and 
explore a number of questions about the economic and political conditions on the ground 
along the eastern frontier during the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. In the 
following chapters these two themes, economics and politics, will be explored in greater 
detail, in the context of the development of local networks during the early centuries of 
Muslim rule along the eastern frontier. The questions posed here will be readdressed and 
elaborated upon, along with new and different questions, approaching them primarily 
from textual sources. By bringing into conversation material and textual evidence in this 
manner, it is hoped that new light will be shed on a number of important problems in 







Settling the Eastern Frontier 
 
 
5.1 The Death of Yazdigird III and the Arrival of Islam 
The arrival of Islam in Khurāsān in the year 31/651 coincided with the end of the 
Sāsānian Empire. Fleeing the advancing armies of the Arabs who had ventured out from 
the Arabian Peninsula in a series of conquests against the Byzantine and Sāsānian 
Empires, the last Sāsānian Shānshāh, Yazdigird III, found himself seeking the protection 
of the marzbān or “warden of the marches” of the frontier city of Marw, Māhūī Sūrī. 
Instead of finding protection, however, Yazdigird was murdered shortly after his arrival 
in Marw, an event which marked the end of the Sāsānian dynasty and empire. 
Meanwhile, by this time, the Arabs had moved through southern Iran, conquering the 
major cities and seizing control of the highways of Fārs, Kirmān, and Sīstān from the 
Sāsānians, either by force or through treaty with local populations, and had already 
entered the fringes of Khurāsān.  
There are many variations on the tale of Yazdigird’s (and the Sāsānian Empire’s) 
final days - al-Ṭabarī alone gives no fewer than five versions of it
1
 - but the narrative 
remains generally consistent. Yazdigird was killed in a mill along the Murghāb River, by 
                                                          
1




most accounts at the hands of a miller. Almost all versions of the tale, however, implicate 
his military commander Māhūī.
2
 Yazdigird’s body was dumped into the river and later 
recovered by a group of monks who provided him with proper funeral rites. According to 
al-Ṭabarī, Yazdigird’s murder earned Marw the title of khudāh-dushman or “the Lord’s 
Enemy.”
3
 Soon afterward, the armies of the Arab governor of al-Baṣra, ‛Abd Allāh b. 
‛Āmir b. Kurayz arrived at Marw. 
 The initial conquest of Marw in 31/651-652 was achieved through ṣulḥ or treaty. 
Māhūī or his son (depending on the report) made contact with Ibn ‛Āmir as the Arabs 
progressed through Khurāsān and agreed to a truce which paid them between one and two 
million dirhams along with 200,000 jarībs of wheat and barley.
4
 Some of the initial 
tribute was paid in kind, including female and male slaves, mounts, and cattle (waṣā’if 
wa wuṣafa’ wa dawābb wa matā‛).
5
 The treaty recognized Arab overlordship in Marw 
and its environs, but it also confirmed the position of the local Persian aristocracy, 
especially the dihqāns or small land-holding gentry who were given the responsibility to 
assess and collect taxes in the name of the Arabs.
6
 At the same time, this treaty  created 
the first Arab garrison in Khurāsān by requiring the people of Marw to quarter Arabs in 
their homes (manāzilihum); 4,000 fighters were garrisoned there in 31/651-652.
7
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landowners and tax collectors under the Sāsānians make them the only group capable of effectively 
organizing the collection of taxes and tributes from the population.  
7
 Ibid.; al-Ya‛qūbī, Ta’rīkh, 2:193. 
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 The conditions of the treaty concluded between the Arabs and the people of Marw 
were at once typical and unique in the history of the Arab conquests, both in Khurāsān 
and throughout the areas which fell under Arab rule in the first/seventh century. The 
confirmation of local elites as the collectors of taxes and the primary local authorities 
outside the garrison cities where Arab fighters were stationed occurred throughout the 
domains of the early caliphate. Even though the dihqāns or other local elites were not 
specifically mentioned in these treaties made with other cities in the region, we can 
assume that they had a role in the collection of taxes beyond Marw, because of their 
status as the primary land-owning class in the region, and their former position as tax 
collectors under the Sāsānians. The decision to garrison Arab fighters in an existing and 
populated city contrasted sharply with the Arabs’ practices in Iraq and Syria, where they 
built new garrison cities (amṣār) to centralize and segregate the fighters of the conquests 
from conquered subject populations. The mixing of Arab-Muslims and non-Muslim 
Persians in close confines in Marw during the earliest years of the conquests of Khurāsān 
and Transoxania set a pattern that would continue throughout the early history of Muslim 
Central Asia and would contribute greatly to the unique character of the region in the 
early centuries of Muslim rule. 
 Frontiers are not only places where dynamic territorial change is possible, as we 
have discussed in previous chapters, but they are also the results of previous dynamic 
territorial change. A frontier becomes a frontier through a process in which a political or 
social unit expands from a center until it reaches a particular, and possibly temporary, 
limit. The eastern frontier of the Islamic world in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth 
centuries is no different. In this instance, the frontier is the result of the Arab conquests of 
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the Sāsānian Empire and its immediate neighbors, the small kingdoms and principalities 
of Transoxania, during the first/seventh and early second/eighth centuries. Many of the 
conditions that resulted from these earlier conquests, especially those involving land 
tenure, the settlement of Arab fighters, and the establishment of systems of taxation and 
tribute collection, had on-going effects which shaped the frontier region for centuries 
following the initial conquest. 
 As the frontier became increasingly connected and attuned to the new cultural and 
political centers in the central Islamic lands of Syria and Iraq, the region and its 
inhabitants went through a process of reconfiguring economic and political relationships, 
both old and new. One place where this process can be seen is in the physical 
transformation of the frontier region through patterns of settlement. In cities, the urban 
fabric was altered by new migrants in a way which fit the necessities of the political and 
cultural sphere which was beginning to dominate the region. In the countryside, away 
from the largest clusters of new migrants and the agents of the new political authorities, 
these processes were much slower and perhaps less noticeable. This chapter looks at 
these processes as issues of settlement and renovation of existing spaces during a time of 
political and cultural change. It will examine issues of settlement of new migrant 
populations, preservation of older elite networks, changes in the urban fabric, and 
redefinition of older patterns of land use, particularly the redefinition of the rural estates 
of the dihqāns as ribāṭs will be examined. Here the old debate about the definition of 
ribāṭs, addressed in Chapter Three, will be reexamined in a context where we can track 
the origins of numerous ribāṭs in their pre-Islamic forms. 
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 Unlike the previous chapters, which have focused on the “environment” of the 
eastern frontier in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, when the Ṭāhirids and 
Sāmānids held political authority over the region, this chapter will examine the 
development of settlement and land tenure in Khurāsān and Transoxania from the Arab 
conquests of the first/seventh century through the Sāmānid era. The focus of this 
examination will be on the relationship between Arab settlers and the local, Persian-
speaking,
8
 pre-Islamic land-holding elites, in particular the group of petty landholders 
known as the dihqāns. Previous chapters have explored the conceptualization of the 
eastern frontier by medieval geographical writers, the built environment of the frontier 
through the networks of military edifices which dotted the landscape of the frontier, and 
the economic and political networks which linked various frontier centers, perceptible to 
us now through the study of coinage. These previous chapters have attempted to illustrate 
the conditions along the eastern frontier during a particular historical juncture, when local 
dynasties arose in Khurāsān and Transoxania as the ability of the ‛Abbāsid Caliphs in 
Iraq to rule these provinces directly waned. By stepping back and taking a deeper 
historical perspective, this chapter will focus on some of the underlying conditions which 
contributed to the development of the frontier environment described in earlier chapters 
as well as the political conditions that will be the focus of the final chapter. 
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5.2 The Dihqāns Before Islam 
The peasants (al-fallāḥūn), the roads (al-ṭuruq), the bridges (al-jusūr), the markets (al-
aswāq), the arable lands (al-ḥarth), and leadership (al-dalāla) were with a group (of 




The dihqāns, as their title (which literally translates as “pertaining to the village/land”) 
indicates, were a class of Persian-speaking, small landholding gentry who held authority 
over villages and the countryside. Their origins as a notable political, economic, and 
social group date to the sixth century.
10
 Their appearance coincides with the reign of 
Khusraw I (r. 531-579), who made the dihqāns the backbone of the Sāsānian army and 
the official tax collectors.
11
 It has been argued that their rise at this time was an attempt 
by Khusraw to limit the power and authority of the great noble houses and the landed 
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Arthur Christensen, especially his L’Iran sous les Sassanides, (Copenhagen, 1944). More recent studies 
have questioned the very idea of a centralized state under Khusraw, most notably the work of Zeev Rubin, 
“The Reforms of Khusrow Anūshirwān,” in Averil Cameron and Lawrence I. Conrad (eds.), The Byzantine 
and Early Islamic Near East, III: States, Resources, and Armies, pp. 227-297, (Princeton, 1995). The 
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understanding that these reforms did stabilize the military and tax collection under the dihqāns, to a degree, 
but actually decentralized the state and increased the importance of local political and economic concerns. 
As Zeev Rubin and Parvaneh Pourshariati have both demonstrated, this did not mean that the dihqāns 
created an effective military force which could be called upon in times of crisis without large-scale support 
from other segments of Sāsānian society and foreign mercenaries. See Rubin, “The Reforms of Khusrow 
Anūshirwān” and Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian 
Confederacy and the Arab Conquests, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008). 
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 Attempts to limit the power of the aristocracy in this way have often been seen as 
a continuation of the Mazdakite revolt of Khusraw’s father and predecessor, Qubādh. 
Qubādh had sought to use the religion of Mazdak, which promoted communal property 
and a more egalitarian social structure in comparison to the state-sponsored 
Zoroastrianism,
13
 in order to alter the social order of the Sāsānian Empire by bringing 
down the aristocracy, which constituted the economic and military backbone of the 
empire and which held considerable influence over the Shāhanshāh, and by replacing 
them with a more pliant class which held less individual power and wealth.
14
 Even 
though Khusraw was adamantly anti-Mazdakite and brought about the downfall and 
execution of Mazdak and his followers, he still sought to achieve the same goals as his 
father had before him, namely the limiting of the power of the large noble families and 
the creation of a stable military and tax base. In Khusraw’s case, instead of altering the 
state religion, he used the small landholding dihqāns to break the hegemony of the 
greater aristocratic houses. 
 The rise of the dihqāns as a prominent force in the Sāsānian army and, more 
importantly, as imperial tax collectors had a localizing effect on the Sāsānian state and 
economy by the late sixth century. As the empire faced multiple crises, especially those 
related to the revolt of Bahrām Chūbīn in 589 and the Byzantine intervention on behalf of 
Khusraw II in 591, this localizing effect meant that disruptions at the imperial center in 
Iraq did not cause great upheavals in other parts of the empire.
15
 Despite revolts, the rapid 
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important to note that during Qubādh’s reign severe drought weakened the military base of the empire and 
Hephthalite incursions further diminished the army and forced the empire to make tribute payments which 
further weakened it. 
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succession of monarchs, and the intervention of a foreign power, order was maintained in 
the provinces and taxes continued to be collected. These reforms of Qubādh and Khusraw 
became rapidly entrenched over the course of the sixth century and created an important 
buffer between, on the one hand, the functioning of the state and the wellbeing of the 
people and, on the other hand, the conflicts and fluctuations among the upper levels of 
the nobility. Since the dihqāns were locally based and collected taxes within small 
jurisdictions, and as they become more important to the imperial economy, local affairs 




 It can be argued that this localization of politics and economics became most 
apparent when the Sāsānian Empire suffered collapse and conquest by the Muslims. As 
will be discussed in more detail shortly, as the Muslims advanced though the Sāsānian 
lands, the dihqāns, as well as other local notables and regional authorities such as the 
marzbāns of the frontier cities of Khurāsān, were able to negotiate on behalf of the local 
communities over which they held authority. Daryaee has suggested that the localism 
which developed under the dihqāns put the interests of local landowners over those of the 
Sāsānian state. The dihqāns were perfectly willing, therefore, to submit to Muslim rule 
and pay jizya or poll-tax if that meant they could retain their property rights and their 
authority over the local populations.
17
 In fact, the strength and stability of Khusraw’s 
reforms can best be seen after the Sāsānian Empire collapsed. The dihqāns did not 
depend on the Sāsānian state, and after its collapse the “system” of dihqān-centered local 




 Ibid., 54-55. 
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authority continued under the Muslim governors.
18
 Parvaneh Pourshariati has recently 
argued that a similar effect occurred not because of the dihqāns themselves, but rather 
because of competition between the Sāsānians and their eastern confederates, the 
Parthians, who, in Pourshariati’s reading of these events, actually orchestrated the 
submission of Khurāsān to the Arabs.
19
 
 Another sign of the power held by the dihqāns at the end of the Sāsānian Empire 
was that by the time of the Arab conquests, a mere century after Khusraw I’s reforms, the 
term dihqān had become nearly synonymous with “local ruler” or “headman.” In our 
sources for the Arab conquests of Iran, written for the most part centuries after the events 
they report, and by Muslim authors,
20
 there is much confusion about the use of dihqān 
and other titles such as marzbān
21
 and the individual titles of local princes with multiple 
tittles assigned to the same individual in different reports within a single text. The reports 
of the murder of Yazdigird in Marw, for example, have al-Ṭabarī identifying the local 
ruler, Māhūī Sūrī, as both a dihqān and a marzbān.
22
 In the third/ninth and fourth/tenth 
centuries, geographical writers continue to wrestle with this use of dihqān alongside other 
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 Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire. Chapter Three focuses specifically on the Arab-
Muslim conquests of Iran. In Pourshariati’s reading of the later years of the Sāsānian Empire, the Parthians 
can be viewed as an intermediate level of nobility between the Sāsānians and the dihqāns in the east, but it 
is important to remember that the Parthians were also one of the great noble houses which Qubādh and 
Khusraw I tried to undermine. 
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 It is important to note that while the early historians writing on the Arab-Muslim conquests, including 
those who provided important accounts of the conquests as parts of larger universal histories, were 
Muslims writing in Arabic, they largely came from a Persian background or had important political 
connections to the Persianate world. al-Ṭabarī was born in Āmul in Ṭabaristān, where his father was a small 
landowner, perhaps a dihqān. al-Balādhurī is presumed to have Persian origins, but appears to have spent 
most of his life in Baghdad. al-Ya‛qūbī spent time in the service of the Ṭāhirids in Nīshāpūr. al-Dīnawarī’s 
grandfather was a Persian name Wanand. This list does not include the large number of local historians 
who were more likely to write in Persian. We will return to this issue in the following chapter. 
21
 Marzbān roughly translates to “margrave.” The marzbāns of the Sāsānian Empire had authority over 
border provinces. In Khurāsān there were a number of marzbāns attached to major cities of the frontier, 
such as Marw and Herat. 
22
 al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk, 1:2872-2877. 
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local titles. al-Ya‛qūbī, for example, refers to the Shīr of Bāmiyān as a dihqān, even 
though the position he held as ruler of Bāmiyān and its dependent regions meant he must 
have been more of a king than a petty landholder.
23
 
 In Transoxania, beyond the direct reach of the Sāsānian state, dihqān clearly came 
to mean “local ruler” as well as “small landholder.” Barthold suggested this was because 
local rulers in pre-Islamic Transoxania were merely “first noblemen” and largely on par 
with the mass of small landholding dihqāns.
24
 Barthold saw local rulers or princes rising 
out of a larger body of dihqāns, and actually put more emphasis on the competition 
between the landholding dihqāns and the wealthy merchants whom al-Ṭabarī ranked 
among the princes (mulūk) of Transoxania,
25
 and who owned large estates and lived in 
rural manors like the dihqāns.
26
 The relationship between dihqāns and merchants, as well 
as other moneyed and urban elites, will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 This conflating of dihqān and “local ruler” results from the evolving role of the 
dihqāns in late Sāsānian society. As the dihqāns took on increased military and tax 
collection roles, they became the immediate representatives of state authority in their 
local areas, so much so that dihqān came to mean “authority” to local populations. The 
confusion on the part of Muslim sources must be connected to the introduction of the 
Arabs to the dihqāns as the individuals who could negotiate treaties with them. The 
                                                          
23
 al-Ya‛qūbī, Kitāb al-buldān, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, 7. ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 
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Brill, 1889), 39. 
24
 Vasily Vladimirovich Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, 3
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Arabs’ earliest forays into Sāsānian territory targeted the lands of the dihqāns of the 
Sawād in southern Iraq and from this early date it was the dihqāns who negotiated with 
the Arabs to protect their lands and local populations.
27
 It is thus not difficult to infer that 
the dihqāns were in fact the local authorities. 
 
5.3 Preservation of Elite Networks during the Arab Conquests 
The conquest of Khurāsān and Transoxania by the Arabs is rightfully considered one of 
the more complex chapters in the history of the Arab conquests of the first/seventh 
century.
28
 A large part of this confusion stems from the pattern of “capture-rebellion-
recapture” which occurred partially as a result of the Arabs’ inability to garrison large 
numbers of fighters throughout the area.
29
 The arrival of the Arab armies in Khurāsān 
under the command of the governor of al-Baṣra, ‛Abd Allāh b. ‛Āmir b. Kurayz, in the 
year 31/651, corresponded with the final years of the reign of the Caliph ‛Uthmān (r. 23-
35/644-655) and the beginnings of the First Fitna. The conflicts arising at Medina at the 
end of ‛Uthmān’s reign complicated the conquest of the region. It prevented the Arabs 
from committing large numbers of fighters to maintain control over Khurāsān, until the 
conclusion of the fitna and the beginnings of the reign of the first Umayyad Caliph, 
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 Tafazzoli, “Dehqān.” 
28
 I will not attempt to reconstruct a narrative of the Arab conquests of Khurāsān and Transoxania here, 
rather this portion of the chapter will take a more generalized look at these events with specific focus on the 
role of the dihqāns as local authorities and tax-collectors in the aftermath of the conquests. A few recent 
studies have focused on different aspects of the conquest of Khurāsān and Transoxania and the early years 
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Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In, 
(Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007). For Transoxania, see the classic study by H.A.R. Gibb, The Arab 
Conquests in Central Asia, (London, 1923). 
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 Luce, “Frontier as Process,” 114. The phrase “capture-rebellion-recapture” used by Luce originates with 
Donald Hill’s discussion of the conquest of Fārs: D.G. Hill, The Termination of Hostilities in the Early 
Arab Conquests: 634-656, (London: Luzac & Company, 1971), 135. 
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Mu‛āwiya (r. 41-60/661/680). The Arabs only entered Transoxania in earnest in 61/681 
under the governor Salm b. Ziyād; prior to that we have evidence for small-scale raids 
which always returned to Khurāsān before winter. Even then, it was not until the arrival 
in the east of the military commander and governor Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhilī in 
86/705 that the Arabs could establish anything resembling firm control over any parts of 
Transoxania.
30
 During the half century between the first conquest of Khurāsān in the 
30’s/650’s and the arrival of Qutayba b. Muslim, areas which had been nominally 
conquered now revolted and had to be re-conquered. A similar pattern of “capture-
rebellion-recapture” occurred in Transoxania between 86/705 and the Battle of Talas in 
133/751.
31
 At the same time, conflicts among the Arabs continued well into the 
second/eight century, as tribal rivalries and conflicts within the Umayyad family spread 
among the Arab fighters stationed in Khurāsān, culminating in the ‛Abbāsid Revolution 
which initially broke out there. Reports of the conquests of Khurāsān and Transoxania are 
often confused with later events when Arab armies returned to different regions in order 
to put an end to rebellions, which often amounted to little more than refusals to pay taxes 
or tribute at times when the Arabs’ attention was focused away from the region. 
Meanwhile, narratives of multiple individual events, of conquests and re-establishment of 
Arab authority, are often combined into a single narrative. Our sources tend also to have 
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 It is worth noting here the case of Musā b. ‛Abd Allāh b. Khāzim who conquered Tirmidh in 70/689-690 
and ruled the city with the support of a mixed army of Arab and Persian rebels until he was ultimately 
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Tirmidh Shāh. al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk, 2:1144-1162. 
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 This battle between the Muslims and the Chinese Tang Dynasty, fought largely by proxy armies of 
Turkic groups allied with either side, is often cited as marking the end of imperial expansion in Central 
Asia by both the Muslims and the Tang, although it took another century for the Sāmānid Amīr Ismā‛īl b. 
Aḥmad to fully bring Talas (known in Muslim sources as Ṭarāz) under Muslim authority in 280/893. 
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more interest in the conflicts occurring between the Arabs themselves, which makes it 
difficult to focus on the effects of the conquests on the conquered populations. 
 The conditions under which Khurāsān and Transoxania were conquered are 
important for understanding how post-conquest settlement occurred. The conditions of 
the conquests not only determined the rights of local populations, especially with regard 
to property rights and taxation, but also determined the rights of the Arab fighters to take 
ownership of the lands which they had conquered. Conquest by ṣulḥ or treaty (as opposed 
to conquest by force or ‛anwa conquest), in most cases, allowed local populations to 
maintain their property rights and negotiate their rates of taxation with the Arabs, often in 
terms of tribute. It was this ability to negotiate favorable terms with the new imperial 
authorities which appears to have encouraged local populations, primarily under the 
authority of dihqāns and marzbāns, to negotiate treaties of surrender or submission with 
the Arabs during the early conquests. As Løkkegaard has noted in his study of early 
Islamic taxation in Iraq, “we have even frequent instances given in Balâdhurî of dihqâns 
being very eager to enter on ṣulḥ. In short, at the outset we have few indications of the 
‛anwa conquest or conquest by force having been prevalent.”
32
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5.3.1 Taxation, Land Tenure, and the Historiography of the Conquests 
Here it may be useful to say a few words about Arabic historiography relating to the 
conquests. The genre, and later the theme,
33
 of futūḥ or conquest narratives played an 
important role in the early development of historical writing in the Islamic world. One of 
the earliest genres of historical writing consisted of conquest narratives, first as texts 
which specifically dealt with reports of the conquest of specific regions,
34
 and later as 
compilations of reports of the entire period of the conquests.
35
 As the broad genre of 
history evolved, these early futūḥ texts were integrated into composite histories during 
the third/ninth century.
36
 The early, regionally-specific futūḥ works often acted much like 
later local histories, in that they sought to glorify the region under study and attempted to 
elevate the position of a particular region within the context of an Islamic historical 
worldview.
37
 The books which were compiled and devoted entirely to futūḥ, together 
with the conquest narratives which became included in universal histories, local histories, 
and geographies, often conveyed a more administrative view of these events, with 
emphasis on the precedents of taxation, tribute, and land tenure set by the conditions 
under which a region was conquered.
38
 The conquest narratives integrated into texts with 
                                                          
33
 By “genre,” we mean a body of literature whose focus is futūḥ such as Ibn ‛Abd al-Ḥakam’s Futūḥ Miṣr. 
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al-Madā’inī (d. ca. 228/843). 
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 These broadly imagined studies of the conquests are best exemplified by al-Balādhurī’s Futūḥ al-buldān 
(d. ca. 279/892). 
36
 Either as composite futūḥ texts like that of al-Balādhurī or as a part of larger universal histories such as 
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much of al-Madā’inī’s Futūḥ Khurāsān. Chase Robinson, Islamic Historiography, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 34-35. 
37
 Tarif Khalidi’s analysis of Ibn ‛Abd al-Ḥakam’s Futūḥ Miṣr illustrates this tendency nicely. Tarif 
Khalidi, Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 65-67. 
38
 Again, we can look at Tarif Khalidi’s analysis, this time of al-Balādhurī’s Futūḥ al-buldān, for a 
discussion of how this process worked. Ibid., 67-68. 
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a scope broader than the conquests themselves often present the conquests as an 
important formative moment in the development of the Islamic community, setting the 
conditions by which different regions were integrated into the Islamic world.
39
 
 Besides being a source for information about the history of the early Muslim 
community and its geographic expansion, reports of the Arab conquests, especially those 
which make a distinction between conquest by ṣulḥ and ‛anwa, were important in 
determining the legal and administrative rights of the conquered regions. This is doubly 
so in the cases where a report provides details of the treaties negotiated between local 
populations and the Arabs. Albrecht Noth has noted that reports related to the conquest of 
a particular region fit into two thematic groups. The primary group is that of futūḥ or 
conquests and the secondary thematic group is that of law and administration.
40
 As these 
reports describe the conditions under which a territory was conquered, they address 
important legal questions regarding the incorporation of conquered lands into the Islamic 
state. 
Above all, questions pertaining to law and administration had to be solved: what status 
was to be accorded to the conquered cities and newly acquired land? For the latter there 
arose yet another distinction, namely, between territories which remained with the 
original (non-Muslim) owners and those which had become the property of the Muslims. 
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Beyond all this lay legal questions pertaining to the personal status of the Muslims who 
settled in the conquered lands, and that of the subjugated non-Muslim population.
41
 
Evidence from local histories demonstrates that this concern with the legal and 
administrative aspects of futūḥ narratives was an overriding concern centuries after the 
conquests themselves. The Tārīkh-i Nīshābūr of al-Khalīfa al-Naysābūrī includes a 
passage in which ‛Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir, Ibn ‛Āmir’s deputy in Nīshāpūr, attempted to 
collect kharāj from the inhabitants of the city worth a quarter of the produce of the region 
while Ibn ‛Āmir was away in al-Baṣra. The locals refused, saying that the city had been 
conquered by ṣulḥ and therefore owed no kharāj.
42
 The local population threatened to 
rebel, saying they would let war decide the matter, unless ‛Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir agreed that 
they owed no kharāj, which he then did. The passage ends with a declaration that this 
report confirms the status of Nīshāpūr as a city taken by ṣulḥ and not by force, here using 
the Persian jang rather than the more technical Arabic term ‛anwa.
43
 It is not so much the 
story of a conflict between ‛Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir and the local population of Nīshāpūr 
which matters in the context of this local history, but rather the confirmation, through a 
historical account, of the nature of the conquest of Nīshāpūr and its impact on the legal 
status the city and its dependent regions. In this case, it is not even the historical account 
of the conquests that matters most, but rather a later confirmation by a deputy governor of 
one version of the story. The complications of the conquest of Nīshāpūr and the reasons 
                                                          
41
 Ibid., 48. 
42
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why the settling of this issue might have been such an important issue to al-Khalīfa al-
Nīsābūrī and his predecessor Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī before him will be examined shortly. 
 
5.3.2 The Dihqāns and ṣulḥ or Conquest by Treaty 
The most common understanding of the conquest of Khurāsān is that it involved a 
combination of conquest by force (‛anwa) and treaty (ṣulḥ). Even in cases where a 
particular city or region was brought under Arab authority by treaty, a military 
engagement or siege may have preceded the negotiation of a treaty.
44
 Due to the 
confusion in our sources over the specific events related to the conquest of a particular 
region, some regions are said to have been conquered both by force and by treaty. This 
may be the result of confusion between an initial conquest and the later re-establishment 
of Arab authority following a period of rebellion. In all cases, the limited number of 
fighters available to maintain Arab control over Khurāsān and Transoxania in the years 
immediately following the conquests meant that local notables maintained considerable 
authority over local populations and, perhaps, considerable autonomy as well. It also 
meant that local landowners were able to keep possession of much of their land. The 
small numbers of Arab fighters stationed in the region and the rights retained by local 
authorities contributed to a history of Arab settlement in Khurāsān and Transoxania that 
was slow and uneven. 
 The rapid decline of Sāsānian fortunes must have been a key contributor to the 
quick surrender of local authorities across Khurāsān; Transoxania’s history of 
independent rule makes for a different story which will be examined later in this chapter. 
From our sources, it appears that Yazdigird III was an unwelcome guest in many of the 
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cities where he attempted to find refuge and to organize a counter attack against the 
Muslims. At least one tradition explains this response by local rulers as a result of 
Yazdigird’s bloated entourage, which he could not even pay for himself.
45
 Hugh Kennedy 
has suggested that Yazdigird suffered from a lack of loyalty in the east. He had only been 
Shāhanshāh for a short period (he had reigned for nineteen years at the time of his death 
in 31/651, but had spent all but four of those years on the run from the Arabs), had 
probably never traveled to Khurāsān before, and was tainted with a history of failure in 
the western half of the Sāsānian domains.
46
 The only reason why local authorities in 
Khurāsān might have supported the Sāsānians once their western lands had been 
conquered was to preserve their own status, and not necessarily to preserve the dynasty 
itself. 
 From reports of treaties made between local authorities and the Arabs in 
Khurāsān, we see that the marzbāns and dihqāns were interested in maintaining their 
personal status and property, but were perfectly willing to do so under a new overlord. 
According to al-Ṭabarī, when the armies of al-Aḥnaf b. Qays approached Marw al-Rūdh, 
the marzbān sent an ambassador to meet with the Arabs and present them with the 
following demands. 
I call on you to make a treaty between us on the conditions that I pay you kharāj
47
 of 
sixty thousand dirhams, that you confirm to me what the Shāhanshāh
48
 Khusraw granted 
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 This report, in which Yazdigird traveled with an entourage of 4,000 including nobles (khāṣagān), free 
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by al-Ṭabarī or one of his informants who translated the ambassador’s Persian proclamation into Arabic. 
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my great-grandfather when he had killed the serpent that would eat people and block the 
roads between the lands and the villages and the people who lived in them, that you do 
not take from anyone from among the people of my house anything by way of kharāj, 
and that the office of marzbān does not leave the people of my house for another.
49
 
al-Aḥnaf agreed to these terms on the condition that the marzbān and his family convert 
to Islam.
50
 The primary interest of the ruler of Marw al-Rūdh in this report was a 
guarantee that the Arabs would preserve his family’s status and his own. The reports 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter regarding the ṣulḥ made with Marw show a 
similar interest in preserving the status quo of the local elites. In the case of Marw, these 
interests are demonstrated first through Māhūī Sūrī’s plots to eliminate Yazdigird III (at 
least from the city, but eventually from this life entirely) before the Arabs had even 
reached Marw; and second, through the role given to the dihqāns in collecting tribute for 
the Arabs. Ibn ‛Āmir asked the people of Marw to pay tribute and to quarter Arab fighters 
in their homes in return for this acknowledgement of the status of the local elites. As 
treaties were concluded with the Arabs, the ruling classes of Khurāsān were willing to 
exchange one overlord for another as long as they did not lose much of their wealth or 
prestige in the process. 
 In reports where the status of local elites is not specifically addressed, we can still 
see a situation where local elites became supporters of the Arabs, administratively, 
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economically, and militarily. In a treaty concluded between Ibn ‛Āmir and the marzbān 
of Herat, which offered the ṣulḥ to Herat, its plains and mountains, and the cities of 
Bādghīs and Būshanj, Ibn ‛Āmir demands that the local population advise the Muslims 
(munāṣaḥat al-muslimīn), care for the lands covered by the ṣulḥ, collect the jizya or poll-
tax, and apportion the payment of the jizya fairly. Anyone who refused to pay his share of 
the jizya would be denied protection (lā ‛ahd wa lā dhimma).
51
 In this case, the treaty of 
ṣulḥ is tied directly to obligations placed upon the marzbān of Heart; and we may assume 
that these obligations, especially in regard to the collection of jizya from the surrounding 
regions and the cities of Bādhghīs and Būshanj, were delegated to other individuals who 
had previously stood in a position of loyalty and subservience to the marzbān under the 
Sāsānians. In the rural areas and villages, this was most likely the dihqāns. That the 
Arabs were able to appropriate existing networks in Khurāsān is seen in the collection of 
the tribute, amounting to between 400,000 and 700,000 dirham, owed by Balkh. 
According to al-Balādhurī, after negotiating the ṣulḥ with Balkh, al-Aḥnaf b. Qays 
attempted to cross the Oxus and to enter Khwārazm, leaving Usayd b. al-Mutashammis 
as his deputy. al-Aḥnaf failed to cross the Oxus and returned to Balkh to find that the 
entire tribute had been collected.
52
 Presuming that al-Aḥnaf took the bulk of his army 
with him, leaving only a minimum number of troops to assist Usayd, and presuming that 
his failed attempt to cross the Oxus was merely a short march to the river and back, we 
must assume that pre-existing local networks were employed to raise this considerable 
tribute in such a short amount of time. 
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 If it appears that so many marzbāns and dihqāns were willing to transfer their 
allegiances from the Sāsānians to the Arabs and to collaborate with the Arabs in 
administering Khurāsān so quickly, what can we say about the combination of conquest 
by ṣulḥ and ‛anwa which we find in our sources? A close reading of the sources for the 
initial conquest of Khurāsān by Ibn ‛Āmir in the 30’s/650’s shows that the confusion 
between conquests by force and by treaty may be over-stated.
53
 Of the places in Khurāsān 
mentioned in the early conquest narratives, there is a total of 32 named locations. Fifteen 
of these locations are said to have been taken either ‛anwatan or without a specified 
treaty and five were taken purely by ṣulḥ. For the remaining twelve we find reports of 
conquest by both ‛anwa and ṣulḥ - depending on the particular report. Of the places 
conquered only by force, or rather without ṣulḥ, twelve are specifically mentioned as 
dependencies of Nīshāpūr and appear in only four reports, three of which form a single 
continuous passage in al-Balādhurī leading up to the conquest of Nīshāpūr itself.
54
 In this 
report, the rural districts of Zām, Bākharz, Khuwayn, Bayhaq, Busht, Ashband, Rukhkh, 
Zāwa, Khuwāf, Asbarā’in, and Arghiyān
55
 are conquered with no reference to the 
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Nīshāpūr, al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk, 1:2887. 
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 According to Yāqūt, Arghiyān is a region of seventy-one villages (Yāqūt, Mujʽam al-buldān, (Beirut, 
1957), 1:153) ; Bākharz is a region of 168 villages (1:316); Busht is a region of 226 villages (1:465); 
Bayhaq is a region of 321 villages (1:537-538); Khuwayn (listed as Juwayn) is a region of 189 villages 
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conclusion of treaties, but also with little reference to fighting: Zām is said to be 
conquered ‛anwatan, prisoners are taken at Khuwayn, and there is fighting at the walls of 
Bayhaq, in the course of which the commander al-Aswad b. Kulthūm is killed. The rest 
consist of rather short references to certain commanders “opening” (fataḥa) different 
regions, without any sort of detail. 
 Since the importance of each individual (rural) region’s conquest is overshadowed 
by the conquest of Nīshāpūr itself, the real focus of al-Balādhurī’s narrative is on the 
conquest of Nīshāpūr or Abarshahr, the old city of Nīshāpūr. According to al-Balādhurī, 
Ibn ‛Āmir laid siege to Abarshahr until representatives from the quarters of the city 
negotiated amān or protection for the people of each quarter. They then allowed the 
Arabs into the city, who then surrounded the marzbān and his supporters in the quhandiz. 
The marzbān, under siege and having lost control of the city, negotiated the amān and 
ṣulḥ for all of Nīshāpūr, agreeing to pay between 700,000 and one million dirhams 
annually.
56
 Operating with the understanding that when a city or town entered into ṣulḥ, 
the treaty applied to the neighboring dependent regions (rustāq) as well,
57
 the lack of 
detail in the conquest of Nīshāpūr’s dependent districts is more understandable. Whatever 
might or might not have happened in the countryside in the events leading up to the 
conquest of Nīshāpūr, it was only the ṣulḥ made with the marzbān of Nīshāpūr in 
Abarshahr that had any lasting impact on the rights of those living in the dependent 
regions. Therefore, despite what had happened earlier, the dependencies of Nīshāpūr had 
been conquered by ṣulḥ and had to be treated as such. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(2:192); Khuwāf is a region of two hundred villages and three cities (Sinjān, Sīrāwand, and Khurjird) 
(2:399); Zām is a region of 180 villages (3:127); and Zāwa is a region of 220 villages (3:128). 
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 al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ al-buldān, 395. 
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 Løkkegaard, Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period, 167-168. al-Balādhurī makes a similar statement 
about the villages of Marw. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ al-buldān, 396. 
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 The reason for looking at this one case in greater detail is to highlight the interests 
on both the Arab and Persian sides of the conquests in settling on a ṣulḥ agreement. For 
the Persians, ṣulḥ meant that they could preserve their status and property. For the Arabs, 
ṣulḥ meant they did not have to install a garrison and administration in each place they 
conquered. Despite their having fought at Bayhaq, for example, the Arabs were able to 
make the administration of Bayhaq the responsibility of the marzbān of Nīshāpūr.
58
 
Military force was an important part of the conquests, but more often than not the army’s 
goal was not to conquer by force, but rather to encourage the local populations to agree to 
a treaty with the Arabs. al-Ṭabarī’s report of the ṣulḥ of Marw al-Rūdh quoted above 
begins with the arrival of al-Aḥnaf b. Qays’ army outside the city. Both sides prepared 
for an engagement before the marzbān sued for peace, telling al-Aḥnaf, “Oh you Arabs 
(yā ma‛shar al-‛arab), you are not what we expected.”
59
 The placement of this statement 
in the account implies that the marzbān’s willingness to fight went away once he saw the 
forces of the Arabs. In addition to the opportunity presented to him to preserve his 
personal and familial status, the marzbān had few options at this point, other than to sue 
for peace. In the end, though, it appears that in most cases the Arab fighters moved on 
shortly after the submission of a city, Marw being the one notable exception. It is this 
aspect of the conquests of Khurāsān, namely the lack of fighters to garrison cities 
conquered by force, along with the widespread use of ṣulḥ, which contributed greatly to 
the autonomy granted to local authorities throughout the region.  
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5.3.3 The Conquest of Transoxania 
The political situation in pre-Islamic Transoxania was rather different from that of 
Khurāsān, and the outcomes of the conquests reflect these differences. Sāsānian political 
authority stopped at the Oxus and numerous small kingdoms and principalities were 
scattered across the region north of the river.
60
 These kingdoms were often centered on 
major cities and held authority over rural districts and villages which were, in turn, ruled 
by vassal princes and dihqāns. Perhaps the best-known court of pre-Islamic Transoxania 
was that of the Queen of Bukhārā, Khātūn. The Tārīkh-i Bukhārā describes the 
interactions between Khātūn and her vassals in great detail, including reports of 
audiences in which she received hundreds of representatives of these princes and dihqāns 
every morning so that she might enquire into the conditions in their territories.
61
 While 
most of the inhabitants of the cities along the rivers of the region, most notably Bukhārā 
and Samarqand, had cultural affinities with the Sāsānians of Khurāsān, especially in 
language, the remainder of the region was dominated by Turkic lords, while nomadic 
Turkish tribes inhabited much of the land between the settled kingdoms. Across the entire 
region, there was a strong sense of independence among these kingdoms which differed 
greatly from Khurāsān where recognition of a distant overlord was the norm, despite the 
amount of freedom individual local rulers and landowners may have possessed. 
 Competition and resentment among the various kingdoms of the regions and 
between local rulers and their vassals played an important role in the Arab conquests of 
the region. In the first permanent conquest in Transoxania by an Arab commander, Musā 
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 Many of these kingdoms were generally under the authority of regional overlords, such as the Turkish 
Jaghbū of Ṭukhāristān. 
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 al-Nashakhrī, Tārīkh-i Bukhārā, (Tehran, n.d. [ca. 1939]),  8. 
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b. ‛Abd Allāh b. Khāzim – who was something of a rebel
62
 - managed to conquer 
Tirmidh in 70/689-690 largely because of the aid of a disgruntled dihqān in the service of 
the Tirmidh Shāh who offered Musā and his fighters access to the city.
63
 Almost from the 
beginning, Musā’s force was composed, on the one hand, of Arabs, who were, to a large 
extent, supporters of his father who had been governor of Khurāsān and had often been in 
open conflict with other Arabs (most notably the Banū Tamīm, as Ibn Khāzim was a 
member of Muḍar); and also of Persians, who were largely bandits (sa‛ālīk) who rallied 
under Musā’s banner. In another case, when the governor of Khurāsān, Umayya b. ‛Abd 
Allāh b. Khālid b. Usayd, needed funds for an expedition against Bukhārā, he is said to 
have borrowed the money from Soghdian merchants, who appear to have been financing 
the conquest of their own people.
64
 The support of Soghdian merchants seems to have 
waned during the later conquests,
65
 but was replaced by the support of the dihqāns. When 
Qutayba b. Muslim reconquered Bukhārā,
66
 he forced the population to give half of its 
houses and estates over to the Arabs. The houses he confiscated belonged to a wealthy 
group of traders of foreign origins known as the Kashkathah; and Qutayba deliberately 
left the homes and the estates of the dihqāns, dislocating one part of the population while 
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 Musā b. ‛Abd Allāh b. Khāzim did not conquer Tirmidh in the name of the Muslims, but rather as a 
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 al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk, 2:1145-1147. 
64
 Ibid., 2:1022. 
65
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 According to Narshakhī, this was the fourth time Qutayba had to reconquer the city, sometime before 
94/712-713. Nashakhrī. Tārīkh-i Bukhārā. 52. Bukhārā repeatedly fought Arab invaders and then sued for 
peace only to fight them the next time they arrived. 
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leaving the another to their lands.
67
 The dislocated population built 700 palaces outside 
the city, each of which was surrounded by houses for their clients and servants, together 
with gardens and fields.
68
 A similar division can be seen in Samarqand. Sometime before 
91/710, the king of Samarqand, Ṭarkhūn, began paying tribute to the Arabs, but in that 
year an anti-Arab party in the city deposed him and killed him. Another Soghdian prince 
was presented to rule the city, but with an Arab garrison in his city.
69
 
From the earliest advances into Transoxania, we see signs of treaties being signed 
between local rulers and the Arabs at the conclusion of expeditions, even though the 
Arabs did not remain in Transoxania and did not establish direct rule over the region. As 
early as 54/674, when ‛Ubayd Allāh b. Ziyād defeated the armies of the Bukhār Khudah, 
we see Arabs returning with tribute: in this case ‛Ubayd Allāh brought 2,000 archers, as 
prisoners, all the way back to Baṣra, using them to form a personal bodyguard.
70
 During 
later expeditions, the army of Bukhārā is seen fighting alongside the Arabs.
71
 As 
mentioned above, these treaties with Bukhārā were never long-lasting and each new 
campaign meant another open conflict with the people of Bukhārā. In the midst of these 
military expeditions against the kingdoms of Transoxania, it appears that personal 
relationships were also developing between the Arab governors of Khurāsān, their 
military commanders, and the nobility of Transoxania. In 61/681, Salm b. Ziyād led a 
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successful campaign which led to treaties of ṣulḥ from Khwārazm and Samarqand: this 
was the first time any significant Arab army spent the winter across the Oxus.
72
 During 
this campaign, Salm’s wife gave birth to a son in Samarqand, whom he named Ṣughdī; 
the queen of Samarqand gave Salm’s wife her crown as a gift for the child.
73
 
 When the kingdoms of Transoxania threw off Arab rule, they solicited a much 
harsher response then had occurred in Khurāsān, and the punishments that the Arabs 
inflicted were much more severe. Of course, whether this should be referred to as 
“throwing off” Arab rule is questionable. Since the Arabs did not establish garrisons or 
install governors in Transoxania for the first decades of their conquests of the region, 
these early conquests established a relationship between the Arabs and the kingdoms of 
Transoxania, where the Arabs appeared to be only seeking tribute and then returning to 
Khurāsān. As we have seen in Qutayba’s reconquest of Bukhārā and Samarqand, one 
response to this pattern of attack, treaty, and attack again was the establishment of 
garrisons on land that had previously belonged to locals who were seen as opposing Arab 
rule. On the one hand, this altered the social fabric of individual cities and may have 
aggravated divisions within the local populations; on the other hand, it also allowed these 
displaced social groups to establish themselves and to retain levels of authority and 
wealth in the countryside. In the case of Bukhārā, those displaced from the city were able 
to establish new estates and bring their supporters with them. These new estates appear to 
have shifted these urban merchants into a category of rural dihqān; our geographical 
writers comment on their estates, some centuries after their establishment. 
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 In the end, while the Arab conquests eventually brought Khurāsān and 
Transoxania under Muslim political authority and into the Islamic political and cultural 
sphere of the caliphate, they failed to effectively break the economic, political, and social 
networks which existed in the region before the arrival of Islam. This “failure” resulted in 
a two-tiered society where Persian elites, sometimes converts but often not, were able to 
hold economic and political authority alongside and sometimes over Arab settlers. All 
this will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Here, meanwhile, we will look at 
the patterns of settlement and examine how Persian elites, especially the dihqāns, 
maintained ownership over the greater part of the eastern frontier in the centuries 
following the Arab conquests. 
 
5.4 Arab Settlement Before the Ṭāhirids 
The question of Arab settlement in Khurāsān during the centuries following the conquest 
of the region has long been at the heart of historiographical questions related to the nature 
of the ‛Abbāsid Revolution and the popularity of the ‛Abbāsid movement in Khurāsān. 
For the most part, the modern literature on Arab settlement in Khurāsān has been 
dominated by studies that focus on the origins of the ‛Abbāsid Revolution, as 
summarized by Parvaneh Pourshariati, 
One of the central premises of the current scholarship on the ‛Abbāsid revolution has 
been the notion that Arab settlement in Khurāsān was not only substantial, but also 
widespread. This assumption has itself been partially reinforced by the belief in the 
popularity of the ‛Abbāsid revolution. The reasoning here has been somewhat circular. If 
the revolution was a popular Khurāsānī movement, it followed, almost by necessity, that 
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the Arabs – subsequent to whose arrival the transformations in the region are thought to 
have occurred – must have settled in the vast extent of the Khurāsānī territory.
74
 
 The origins of the ‛Abbāsid Revolution are not the focus of this study, though the 
revolution’s aftermath will be a concern both here and in the following chapter. Instead, 
the debates revolving around issues of the ‛Abbāsid Revolution will be discussed here as 
a means to understand the patterns of Arab settlement in the period between the Arab 
conquests and the rise of the Ṭāhirids. 
 Many have argued that the settlement of Arabs in Khurāsān was a widespread 
phenomenon.
75
 In fact, we often see this point accepted as a given.
76
 This idea of 
widespread settlement is partially the result of historiographical peculiarities. As Elton 
Daniel writes, “No traditional Muslim source, Arabic or Persian, deals directly with the 
subject of Arab settlement in Iran. Various incidental details may be gleaned and pieced 
together from the standard chronicles and narrative histories.”
77
 Parvaneh Pourshariati 
adds that since these sources “chronicle the movements and wars of the Arabs in 
Khurāsān, the presence of Arabs in the region seems indeed overwhelming. The trails of 
the Arabs are to be found everywhere in Khurāsān in these works.”
78
 Much the same cand 
be said about the way our available sources treat Arab settlement in Transoxania. 
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 The scattered evidence for Arab settlement during the conquests converges on 
large migrations of fighters, relocated to Khurāsān by the state.
79
 The first settlement of 
Arabs in Khurāsān occurred in Marw in 31/651-652. The treaty which gave the Arabs 
authority over the city demanded that its people quarter Arab fighters in their homes (fī 
manāzilihim); accordingly, 4,000 fighters were garrisoned in the city at that time.
80
 It is 
commonly understood that this garrison did not involve large-scale permanent settlement 
and that fighters were rotated between Khurāsān and Iraq during this early period. There 
is incidental evidence that settlement took place around this time in other parts of 
Khurāsān as well. Ibn A‛tham writes that, during the reign of Mu‛āwiya, Ziyād b. Abīhi 
appointed Sa‛īd b. ‛Uthmān as governor of Khurāsān. When he arrived in Nīshāpūr, Sa‛īd 
found a colony of Arabs from the days of Ibn ‛Āmir.
81
 A garrison which presumably 
housed Arab fighters was built two farsakhs outside of Balkh.
82
 Evidence such as this is 
sparse and gives little reference to the numbers of Arabs involved, the conditions under 
which they settled, or the nature of their settlement. We have to assume, however, that 
these settlements primarily consisted of male fighters, that they were small in number 
(with Marw’s 4,000 fighters being the largest group), and that migration to these 
garrisons was considered temporary, at least in the early period when these garrisons 
were regularly rotated. 
 The first large scale, permanent Arab settlement came in 51/671 when Ziyād b. 
Abīhi settled 50,000 fighters from Kufa and al-Baṣra, together with their families, along 
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the river of Marw.
83
 It has been estimated that the total number of Arabs migrating to 
Khurāsān at this time, including the wives and children of the fighters, was in the 
neighborhood of 200,000.
84
 Even if these new arrivals were dispersed throughout 
Khurāsān, they were still primarily concentrated in Marw, the seat of the governor and 
the staging area for the upcoming conquest of Transoxania. Many scholars have noted 
this concentration of Arab settlement in Marw in these early years, but they have not 
often elaborated on the conditions under which it occurred.
85
 The vast majority of settlers 
must have remained either within the city or very near it, while those who settled 
elsewhere may have amounted to little more than garrisons. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, garrison fortresses appeared outside the walls of many cities along the eastern 
frontier. The earliest dateable garrison outside Marw was that of Balkh, built in 43/663-4, 
two farsakhs outside the city at a place called Barūqān. This garrison was later moved 
into the city itself in 107/725, on the orders of the governor Asad b. ‛Abd Allāh al-
Qasrī.
86
 We find a number of other fortresses which appear to be garrisons outside the 


















should consider these fortresses Muslim garrisons because they combined mosques and, 
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occasionally, markets within the confines of a fortress.
95
 The fact that the majority of 
these garrisons are found in Transoxania gives an indication of the approach of later Arab 
military commanders, especially Qutayba b. Muslim. Unlike in Khurāsān where fighters 
were concentrated around Marw with the intention of sending them into Transoxania and 
were often sent back to Iraq, the Arabs who arrived in Transoxania during Qutayba’s 
governorship were more concerned with establishing a permanent presence. 
 Those who argue for a widespread Arab presence in Khurāsān also emphasize that 
migration to the region continued after the conquests.
96
 Such arguments are, once again, 
based on scanty information. If we want to take our sources for the early history of 
Muslim Khurāsān at face value, it appears that the Arab population actually shrank 
between 51/671, when Ziyād b. Abīhi settled 50,000 fighters and their families in and 
around Marw, and 86/705, when Qutayba b. Muslim arrived to find a force of only 
47,000.
97
 It is probable that fighters, administrators, and their families were regularly 
migrating to Khurāsān during these years, and later on to Transoxania, but that many of 
them remained only for a limited time. The complicated narratives of the Arab conquests 
show us that conflicts in Iraq and Syria often drew much of the Arab population of 
Khurāsān back west, and that these fighters and their families were replaced by others 
when the political situation stabilized or when a new governor arrived, bringing along 
with him an entourage of fighters, administrators, and family members. Moreover, tribal 
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conflict seems to have been an important cause of the movement of early settlers away 
from Marw. Conflicts broke out among Muḍar, Rabī‛a, Bakr, and Tamīm following the 
death of the Umayyad Caliph Yazīd I in 64/683. When the Muḍarī Ibn Khāzim took over 
the governorship of Marw and began imprisoning and executing his rivals from Rabī‛a 
and Bakr, many Arabs fled the city and settled in Herat.
98
 These flights from tribal 
conflict appear to be temporary and not a full-fledged settlement, since we find the 
migrants returning to the garrisons of Marw to participate in later military campaigns. 
In contrast to this notion of widespread Arab settlement, Parvaneh Pourshariati 
has advocated a division of Khurāsān into an “Inner Khurāsān” centered on the region of 
Nīshāpūr and those areas south of the Greater and Lesser Balkhān Mountains, and an 
“Outer Khurāsān” north of the Balkhān ranges, extending into Transoxania and 
containing the cities of Marw, Sarakhs, Nasā, Abīward, and Bukhārā.
99
 Pourshariati has 
then argued that Arab settlement predominantly occurred in “Outer Khurāsān,” and that it 
was only in the later years of Umayyad rule that settlement extended to “Inner 
Khurāsān.”
100
 If we take the evidence found in the scanty reports of settlement in our 
sources, this is clearly the case, but it is most likely that settlement outside Marw and its 
dependent regions was extremely limited. The earliest and largest settlements of Arabs in 
the region were concentrated in Marw and it was only later, during the governorship of 
Qutayba b. Muslim, that large-scale migrations of Arabs occurred. Now, however, the 
Arabs migrated to Transoxania, particularly Bukhārā and Samarqand. 
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Confirming this argument against widespread settlement is the fact that the 
dihqāns, for the most part, had successfully maintained their property rights and that 
consequently, any settlement outside the large-scale garrisons dating back to the time of 
the conquests would have involved the purchasing or renting of property from locals. In 
the rural areas, these would have been the dihqāns. The rights of dihqāns to hold onto 
their lands, and questions regarding taxes and tribute owed by lands in their possession 
appear to have been a very serious issue. This is largely because Khurāsān had been 
conquered primarily by ṣulḥ, and that accordingly its lands were considered ‛ahd, not 
liable to taxation but obligated to pay an annual tribute, negotiated at the time of the 
conquest. Land and poll taxes, or market taxes on merchants for that matter, were not 
differentiated within this tribute; local authorities were simply expected to collect a 
certain amount to remit to the Arabs. According to al-Ṭabarī, by 110/728-729, the proper 
application of this tribute on the population was becoming problematic and tribute which 
should have been removed from converts, and potentially from Arab settlers who had 
purchased lands from Persians, was still being collected by the dihqāns so they could 
meet their annual tribute payments.
101
 Daniel Dennett, who discussed these passages in 
detail in his Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam, came to the conclusion that in 
order to facilitate conversion, the land of Khurāsān and then Transoxania (the application 
of these reforms to Transoxania are actually at the heart of al-Ṭabarī’s report) was shifted 
from the category of ‛ahd to kharāj; the shift lifted the tribute payments, imposed an 
annual land tax (kharāj) on all lands, and placed a poll tax (jizya) specifically on non-
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 Dennett focused on the mistreatment of converts by dihqān landlords who 
continued to collect tribute from them.  
Other sources dealing with dihqāns who had Arab or Muslim tenants show that 
these same issues were generally involved in the sale of lands to Arabs who settled in 
conquered territories. The Kitāb al-amwāl of Abū ‛Ubayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām is 
informative here on the transformation of tribute-paying land into kharāj-paying land, as 
conversion took place. These traditions cited by Abū ‛Ubayd confirm that dihqāns were 
responsible for raising a collective tribute from the lands under their authority.
103
 They 
also demonstrate a process in which conversion by dihqāns required a readjustment of the 
fiscal terms employed, from tribute to kharāj (land tax), in order to prevent lands from 
moving beyond the treasury’s reach.
104
 In most cases, the terminology used implies that 
conversion to Islam conferred ownership of a piece of land formerly in possession of a 
dihqān to the new convert, who now became liable for the kharāj.
105
 Abū ‛Ubayd 
provides a number of traditions relating to the sale of land by dihqāns to Arabs and 
Muslims, particularly in Iraq. For instance, Ibn Mas‛ūd once bought land from a dihqān, 
which ought to have relieved the dihqān from paying the tribute associated with the land, 
but Ibn Mas‛ūd stipulated that the dihqān must now pay jizya.
106
 As the status of land in 
Khurāsān and Transoxania changed from ‛ahd to kharāj, we see a change in the status of 
the collectors of those taxes. al-Ṭabarī reports that taxes were collected from Arabs by 
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 Until the beginning of Ṭāhirid rule in 205/821, Marw continued to be the 
administrative center of Khurāsān and, by extension, Transoxania. Marw remained the 
central focus of Muslim rule in the region and the most important city of the region. The 
largest migrations to the region during the ‛Abbāsid period, those associated with the 
entourages of caliphs and their heirs, continued to concentrate on Marw. Over time we 
should assume that the conditions which concentrated Arab settlement in Marw to such 
an overwhelming extent over other parts of the region weakened, and that Arabs spread 
out from the provincial capital. Focus will now be moved to conditions during the 
third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. Using our geographical sources, we can get a 
picture of how settlement patterns developed through the periods of Ṭāhird and Sāmānid 
rule, and whether these patterns were significantly different from the period following the 
conquests. 
 
5.5 The Population of the Eastern Frontier During the Third/Ninth and 
Fourth/Tenth Centuries 
Our geographical sources give us a variety of indications about the extent of the Arab 
population and settlement in Khurāsān and Transoxania during the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries. The earliest geographical authors, most noticeably in al-Ya‛qūbī, 
make direct note of cities and villages with a mixed population of Arabs and Persians (al-
‛ajam). The list of cities with an Arab population is not surprisingly small and conforms 
in part to the areas discussed above as centers of Arab settlement in the first centuries of 
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 Ṭūs and Nīshāpūr stand out in this list as cities 
with little evidence for Arab settlement following the conquests, but two events may help 
to explain this shift. Ṭūs became home to the shrine of the Eighth Shi’ite Imām ‛Alī al-
Riḍā, who died near the site of the tomb of Hārūn al-Rashīd in 203/818. Over the 
following centuries, Ṭūs, later renamed Mashhad in honor of al-Riḍā’s tomb, became an 
important pilgrimage site and attracted a number of ‛Alīds seeking to live near the 
shrine.
117
 At around the same time, Nīshāpūr became the capital of Khurāsān under the 
Ṭāhirids, and consequently attracted a new migration of administrators, soldiers, and 
others associated with the Ṭāhirid court.
118
 Many of thesel may have only been migrating 
from Marw, but another source of new arrivals was probably Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn’s courts 
in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Nonetheless, we still have the sense that those Arabs who lived 
in Khurāsān and Transoxania were far outnumbered by the Persians. Of Ṭūs, it is 
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specifically stated that the majority of the population is Persian.
119
 In Būshanj, the Arabs 
are described as migratory (wa bi-hā ‛arab yasayra), probably herders; accordingly, the 
impact of their settlement as settlers and landowners may have been minimal.
120
 al-
Ya‛qūbī describes the Persians and Arabs who live in Marw, saying that the people of 
Marw are the nobles of the Persian dihqāns (ashrāf min dahāqīn al-‛ajam) and Arabs 
from the tribes of Azd, Tamīm, and others.
121
 Here al-Muqaddasī seems to describe the 
upper classes and not the majority of the population. 
 The sense we get from certain reports is that Arab settlement did not take place 
without input or permission from the local populations. al-Ya‛qūbī makes a point of 
saying that the people of Usrūshana rejected Arab settlement until the arrival of the Banu 
Shaybān: 
In the majority of the cities of Khurāsān there are groups of people from among the Arabs 
of Muḍar and Rabī‛a and others from the tribes of Yemen, except in Usrūshana for 
[there] they used to prevent the Arabs from settling near them until some men from the 
Banu Shaybān arrived and settled there and intermarried with them.
122
 
Here we see the acceptance of a certain group of Arabs as neighbors, to the extent that 
intermarriage became common. This may also be a polite way of describing resistance to 
the Arab conquests, which was rather harsh around Usrūshana. There may have been as 
many as five attempts to conquer the region between 94/712 and 207/822, when the 
region finally came under Muslim authority.
123
 It may thus have been only with the later 
attempts at conquest that Arabs managed to settle in or around Usrūshana. 
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 As we move towards the later geographical texts, we begin to see a shift. The 
presence of Arabs and Persians no longer receives so much notice. It appears that by the 
time we reach the Balkhī School of geographical writers, the presence of a mixed Arab 
and Persian population, including people of both Arab and Persian descent as well as the 
products of inter-marriage, may be taken for granted, and it may be that by that time, the 
two groups have intermingled to such an extent that it becomes difficult to distinguish 
between them. That is not to say that Arab populations are completely ignored. 
Barmādwā, a crossing point of the Oxus, is noted as being the village of the Bedouin (al-
‛arab).
124
 The area around Balkh appears to be a major exception of al-Muqaddasī. 
Khulm is the village of Arabs from the Azd tribe, while neighboring Siminjān is the 
village of Tamīm. There are Bedouins in Khast.
125
 In cases where it appears that our 
sources are talking about Arab migration, as when al-Muqaddasī says there are many 
émigrés (ghurabā’) in Shiljī, further details complicate this reading, among the migrants 




Instead of focusing on Arab and Persian populations, it appears that the most 
important populations to mention in later geographical texts are those which are non-
Muslim. In the earlier texts, non-Muslim populations are presented as groups living 
beyond the reach of Muslim authority. But as the geographical tradition matures, our 
sources appear to be more open about the diversity of the lands under Muslim authority. 
As early as Qudāma (d. before 337/948), we are told of non-Muslims living near the 
center of Muslim rule along the eastern frontier, together with descriptions of their 
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economic contributions to the region. In many cases, however, their remoteness from the 
actual centers of population is emphasized. The people of al-Qaraytīn, in the desert 25 
farsakhs from Marw, are Magians who hire out donkeys.
127
 On the peak of the mountain 
of Herat is a Zoroastrian fire temple known as Sirishk that, as al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal 
note, is populated. Between this mountain and the city lies a Christian church.
128
 
Barakdiz, on the bank of the River of Marw, has a population of Zoroastrians called Bih-
Afrīdhī.
129
 These groups are near centers of Arab settlement and Muslim political 
authority, but they are living in the remotest parts of those regions, in the deserts or 
mountains. There are some examples of non-Muslims living in the midst of the most 
important cities of the region. Within Samarqand there is a Manichaean monastery.
130
 On 
the furthest fringes of Transoxania, a mixture of vakhī Zoroastrians, Tibetans, Indians, 
and Muslims are found in R.kht.j.b, Sikāshim, Khamdādh, Samarqandāq.
131
 
 The names of city gates give us some indication of non-Muslims living within the 
city as well, but in many cases this may be a population which is no longer in the city. 
The gates of Balkh include Bāb al-Yahūd, which, one would assume, is connected to the 
Jewish quarter of the city, and Bāb al-Nawbahār, which is the name of the famous 
Buddhist shrine the Barmākid family used to oversee before the arrival of Islam.
132
 It is 
assumed that al-Nawbahār was destroyed in the early centuries of Muslim rule, but its 
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memory was still strong enough to make it a landmark which could identify a 
neighborhood. Many other important cities also continued to invoke the name of the 






 Areas at the furthest extent of the Muslim world sometimes see this dynamic in 
reverse. Here it is the presence of Muslims which receive emphasis, because these are 
Muslims who have settled beyond the direct reach of Muslim authority. Muslims live in 
Kābul, but its suburbs are for Hindus. Later traditions emphasize the connection between 
Kābul and India, describing a tradition in which the kings of India, called the raja of 
Qinnauj
135
 by the Ḥudūd al-‛Ālam, must visit the Kābul Shāh before they may rightfully 
claim their throne.
136
 In Chapter Two we similarly discussed al-Ghūr, a region called the 
Dār Kuffar, in descriptions of the Muslim world.
137
 al-Ghūr appears to be a place of 
conversion since, by the time of the writing of the Ḥudūd al-‛Ālam (372/982-983), most 
of its population is Muslim, as is the population of neighboring towns such as Baghnī.
138
 
Still, the foreignness of al-Ghūr receives emphasis: al-Iṣṭakhrī says that its language is 
not like that of Khurāsān.
139
 Even if Muslim political authority is no longer spreading, the 
Ḥudūd al-‛Ālam makes it appear to have actually been waning, as individual Muslims 
spread beyond the eastern frontier and increased in numbers in areas where they had once 
been minorities. 
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 al-Muqaddasī lacks much of the specificity of our other authors when he speaks 
of Muslims and generally categorizes non-Muslims as heathens (kuffār). Half of the 
population of Takābkath is “heathen” (kuffār).
140
 The majority of the population of al-
Ḥarrān is similarly “heathen” (kuffār), but its sulṭān is a Muslim. Interestingly al-
Muqaddasī also implies that this sulṭān is a Persian by mentioning that there is a dihqān 
living in the quhandiz, whom we may presume to be the local ruler.
141
 
 The Ḥudūd al-‛Ālam provides a picture of a complicated region with overlapping 
identities. The villages of Bik Tigīn, for example, located in the lands of the Tughuzghuz, 
fall under the authority of the Soghdians and are home to Christians, Zoroastrians, and 
heathens (ṣābiyān).
142
 Interestingly, it is the Ḥudūd al-‛Ālam that brings back the 
discussions of Arab settlement, but specifically at the fringes of Muslim political 
authority and beyond. Here Herat is singled out as a place with many Arabs (tāziyan).
143
 
Twenty thousand Arabs are said to live in the territory of the king of Gūzgānān, to whom 
they pay tribute. These are sheep and camel herders, said to be richer than all the other 
Arabs in Khurāsān.
144
 In other words, these are Muslims who live beyond the political 
authority of Islam and pay tribute to a foreign king, apparently doing well economically 
from their movement beyond the lands of Muslim political authority. 
 Throughout our geographical sources, it appears that the image of the eastern 
frontier is shifting from a situation in which Arabs settle among Persians to a situation in 
which Arabs and Persians combine into a single population primarily noted for its 
religious affiliation, that of Islam, while Muslims encroach on the territory of non-
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Muslims. Muslims are settling in non-Muslim lands and Muslims have taken control over 
regions with stronger connections to lands beyond the Islamic world than to the Islamic 
world itself. 
 
5.6 Mosques as Symbols of Settlement and Conversion 
 One factor that Pourshariati has used to calculate the extent of the Arab settlement 
pattern in Khurāsān is the presence of mosques and the narratives of their construction in 
local histories.
145
 However, using mosque construction for measuring the Arab 
population is a tricky business, because if we arrive at a number based entiretly on the 
presence and size of mosques, we do not account for the fact that the conversion of local 
inhabitants began, if only to a limited extent, immediately after the conquests. 
Accordingly, when our geographical sources give detailed information on mosques, they 
help us to understand the spread of Islam and Muslim practices in Khurāsān and 
Transoxania, but perhaps not the spread of Arabs.  
In these descriptions we can follow two important trajectories. First, we can 
follow the inclusion of mosques in descriptions of cities, as the geographical genre 
develops. Ibn Khurradādhbih, our earliest geographical writer, does not mention any 
mosques in Khurāsān and Transoxania. Neither does al-Ya‛qūbī, except indirectly: in 
describing Balkh and its dependent regions, al-Ya‛qūbī states that there are 47 minbars 
(pulpits) in its cities.
146
 The presence of a minbar not only indicates a mosque, but it also 
indicates a congregational mosque and a Muslim political authority that is strong enough 
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to oversee the pronouncing of the khuṭba.
147
 al-Ya‛qūbī’s description thus implies that 
not only does Balkh have a large enough Muslim population to support a congregational 
mosque, but that across the region the Muslim population is large enough to support 47 
congregational mosques in which the khuṭba can be given. This, moreover, is a region in 
which al-Ya‛qūbī only knows of twelve cities worth mentioning by name as dependents 
of Balkh.
148
 Qudāma mentions a minbar in al-Shubūrqān, a heavily-populated settlement 
in the desert outside Marw.
149
 According to al-Iṣṭakhrī, Marw has two minbars, while 
among its dependent towns Kushmayhin, Hurmuzfarrah, Sinj, Jīranj, al-Dandānaqān, al-
Qarīnayn, Bāshān, Kharaq, and al-Sawsaqān also possess minbars.
150
 Ibn Ḥawqal says 
that Marw has a minbar attached to a hostel (minbar maḍafa).
151
 Sarakhs has a minbar, 
which  al-Iṣṭakhrī mentions in his discussion of the city’s role as a frontier and a meeting 
place of the murābiṭūn.
152
 The Ḥudūd al-‛ālam lists M.ghkān, Khujādak, Zandana, 




As time goes by, the presence of congregational mosques in most cities become 
taken for granted. al-Muqaddasī seems to locate a congregational mosque in almost every 
city and village he describes in Khurāsān and Transoxania, quite unlike the sparse 
presence of mosques in earlier texts. In the rural districts of Nīshāpūr, consisting of six 
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thousand villages, there are one hundred and twenty minbars.
154
 al-Muqaddasī presents 
even the remotest of regions along the frontier as engaged in mosque construction during 
this period. Transoxania generally comes across as a region with numerous mosques and 
minbars.
155
 Farghānā alone contains 40 mosques.
156
 If we accept this widespread 
appearance of mosques by the late fourth/tenth century, then we cannot ascribe it to 
renewed, widespread settlement from outside. Instead, it can only be the result of the 
conversion of the local populations.  
These dates fit nicely into Richard Bulliet’s assessment of conversion in Iran, 
which reached its peak in the middle of the third/ninth century and reached a plateau 
where Islam had spread throughout the majority of the population by the beginning of the 
fourth/tenth century.
157
 From anecdotal evidence, we can see that this was also a period 
of large-scale mosque construction throughout Iran. The Ṣaffārid ‛Amr b. al-Layth is said 
to have built over 500 mosques throughout Iran during his reign (r. 265-287/879-900).
158
 
While few if any of these were built in Khurāsān, where ‛Amr’s control was limited by 
rebellions, and none of them were built in Transoxania, where his power never extended, 
we can still see that the late third/ninth century was a period of widespread mosque 
construction throughout Iran, and that this process must have taken place in Khurāsān and 
Transoxania at roughly the same time. 
The widespread nature of mosque construction during this period is such that by 
al-Iṣṭakhrī’s time it was just as important to mention when a city or village had no 
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mosque as it was to mention when it did. Khūst, for example, is said to not have a 
mosque, but there is a minbar available nearby in Khūr.
159
 al-Marzubān has no 
mosque.
160
 al-Muqaddasī makes special note of the lack of mosques in the villages 
around Baykand due to their adherence to the Ḥanafī madhhab which requires 
appropriate authorities to lead a mosque, which they happen lack. al-Muqaddasī adds that 
as a result of these juridical preferences, Baykand had to work hard to earn its own 
mosque.
161
 By Ibn Ḥawqal’s time, specific features of mosques are discussed, implying 
that as mosque construction spreads, certain aspects of mosque architecture may have 
become more or less formalized. In al-Fārayāb, the congregational mosque lacks a 
minaret but the nearby city of al-Yahūdiyya has two.
162
 
Second, we can look at descriptions of the conditions in which particular mosques 
were constructed, and from there we can reconstruct a timeline of Muslim presence in the 
region. Sometimes the time and place of the construction of a mosque can be calculated 
from the parts of a city in which it is located. For example, the congregational mosque of 
Nīshāpūr is located in a suburb known as al-mu‛askar or “the military encampment.”
163
 
This name implies that at some point it was the location where an army encamped on the 
outskirts of the city; then, as the army stayed on, the encampment grew into a 
neighborhood. That fact that this is the location of the congregational mosque indicates 
that the encampment originally belonged to a Muslim army, perhaps consisting of Arabs 
who settled in Nīshāpūr following the conquest of the city, dating of which would be 
difficult since we understand that Arab settlement in Nīshāpūr came rather late. Earlier in 
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this chapter a number of mosques which similarly appear to be a part of older garrisons 
were mentioned, these mosques were considered parts of garrisons because they had been 
built within fortifications, often on the outskirts of cities or villages. 
 Examining the location of a mosque within the greater context of a city might tell 
us more about the impact of Muslim settlement and conversion in a city. We may be able 
to see from clues about the location of the mosque whether or not the mosque was 
established within a small community or garrison, or whether the coming of Islam to a 
particular location had a wide-spread impact on the urban fabric. Key to looking for this 
kind of information from the location of mosques is searching for places where the 
mosque is part of a larger architectural complex which fits the form of Islamic cities in 
the central Islamic lands of Iraq and Syria, particularly those which were founded as 
Muslim cities such as the amṣār of Iraq. What we understand to be the traditional 
formulation of an Islamic city includes a central complex containing the mosque in 
proximity to the marketplace, the governor’s palace, and, perhaps, the prison or a bath 
house.
164
 This type of complex represents a planned renovation to a city which tied the 
mosque to the centers of political (governor’s palace and prison), economic (market), and 
social (bath house) life.  
 Descriptions of Marw provide us with a genealogy of mosque construction in a 
city which we know was home to the earliest Arab and Muslim settlers in Khurāsān. 
According to al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal, Marw had three congregational mosques. The 
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first of these was built inside the madīna in the early days of the Islamic presence in the 
city (fī awwal al-Islām). The second, known as al-masjid al-‛atīq or the “Old Mosque,” 
was built when the Muslim presence had grown (lammā kithara al-Islām), along one of 
the gates of the madīna near the markets, while the majority of the people left the earlier 
mosque for the newer one. Finally, Abū Muslim built a third congregational mosque in 
the suburbs, which by that point had become the real hub of the city, along the Mājān 
Canal together with a market and governor’s palace.
165
 Here we see that over time Marw 
began to look more and more like what we would consider a “typical” Islamic city. The 
first congregational mosque, built in the inner city, was clearly connected to the early 
Arab garrison whom the people of Marw were required to quarter after the conquest of 
31/651-652. It is quite possible that al-masjid al-‛atīq was connected to the settlements of 
Ziyād b. Abī Sufyān in 51/671 or, more generally, to a growth in the Muslim community 
through conversion sometime prior to the ‛Abbāsid Revolution. Abū Muslim’s 
congregational mosque was part of a larger urban project which created a new center of 
religious, political, and economic life. 
 We also have evidence that these were not the only mosques in Marw. Our 
geographical sources tend to mention only the central congregational mosque (masjid al-
jamā‛a) of a city, but as Pourshariati has pointed out in her discussion of mosque 
construction in local histories, early Arab settlement tended to mean that individual 
mosques were built for particular tribal groups, but these would not have been 
congregational mosques.
166
 Since Marw was the site of the greatest early Arab settlement, 
and the site of many tribal conflicts among these early settlements, we must assume that a 
                                                          
165
 al-Iṣṭakhrī., al-Masālik wa’l-mamālik, 147; Ibn Ḥawqal, Ṣurat al-arḍ, 434. 
166
 Pourshariati, “Local Histories of Khurāsān and Patterns of Arab Settlement,” 51. 
261 
 
similar pattern took place there. These mosques did not warrant the attention of our 
sources and probably, if they still existed in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, 
they had assumed the role of small neighborhood mosques in the time our geographical 
sources are describing. In these contexts, where multiple mosques were scattered across a 
city, it was required that a muṣallā be identified, typically in a public square, for the 
communal celebration of the two major festivals of ‛Īd al-fiṭr and ‛Īd al-aḍhā.
167
 al-
Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal describe such a muṣallā in Marw, in the neighborhood of Ra’s 
al-maydān in the quarter of Abū al-Jahm.
168
 Beyond the construction of a series of 
congregational mosques, we can assume that there were numberous tribal or 
neighborhood mosques in the center of the largest Arab settlements, and that larger 
spaces were dedicated to communal religious celebration. 
Nīshāpūr provides an interesting example for this exercise because, as mentioned 
above, its congregational mosque was established outside of the city in an area known as 
the military camp. al-Iṣṭakhrī tells us, however, that the markets of the city run alongside 
the mosque.
169
 This means that besides the neighborhood where we assume the early 
Muslims established a military encampment being the center for Muslim religious life, it 
also eventually drew the center of urban economic life out of the madīna or inner city and 
brought it into geographic proximity with the mosque in the suburbs. Knowing the 
location of a particular edifice or complex of edifices does not necessarily tell us about 
the order in which they were constructed or when any of them were constructed. It is the 
rare case when we are given dateable information about construction of particular 
buildings. In the case of Nīshāpūr, we have this information for the dār al-umāra, said to 
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have been built by the Ṣaffārid ‛Amr b. al-Layth, which would place its construction 
sometime between 280/893 and 287/900.
170
 This palace was located next to the prison on 
the maydān al-Ḥusayn which was on the opposite end of the markets from the 
congregational mosque. Even though the dār al-umāra was built two centuries after the 
assumed foundation of al-mu‛skar and, potentially, the congregational mosque, we still 
see a drive over this period to create a connection between the governor’s palace, the 
markets, and the mosque. 
 In other cities where we do not have as much detail, we can still decipher 
something of the origins of congregational mosques from their location. The mosque of 
Qayīn is located in the quhandiz along with the dār al-imāra.
171
 The establishment of 
centers of authority within the quhandiz of a conquered city happened early after the 
conquest of the city by the Muslims. By placing the mosque in the quhandiz, the founders 
essentially separated it from the community at large, from which we may infer that this 
mosque had an earlier life as a garrison mosque. Meanwhile, other cities have their 
mosques located alongside rather than within the quhandiz.
172
 In some of them, the 
mosque is located in an appropriate architectural program, connected to the markets and 
dār al-imāra, but within the city itself. Herat’s congregational mosque lies in the center 
of the madīna, surrounded by the markets and attached to the prison.
173
 Balkh’s 
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congregational mosque is similarly in the center of the city, surrounded by markets.
174
 al-
Muqaddasī provides us with a great amount of detail about the location of specific 




 in a particular quarter,
177
 near the 
markets
178
 or far from them.
179
 Without having firm dates or conditions for the 
construction of any of these individual mosques, we may still note that the majority of 
mosques for which whose location we have information conform to the practices of a 
planned mosque in a city with a planned Muslim character. 
 While we see the construction of mosques as a transformative experience for the 
fabric of a city or village, it is only on rare occasions that we see a history of a single 
building which became a mosque. The mosque of Mīrkī, for example, is said to have 
originally been a church.
180
 Such refurbishments of pre-existing houses of worship are 
not out of the question, but our sources lead us to believe that these were the exception 
instead of the norm. 
 Following the construction of mosques as a sign of the spread of Arab settlement 
and later the spread of Islam along the eastern frontier gives us certain patterns. Mosques 
were constructed following the early conquests in areas where we presume Arab 
settlement to be the greatest, Marw most notably, and where we see signs of small 
garrisons of Arab fighters developing, primarily in fortresses. Larger congregational 
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mosques were then built as these communities expanded. It was not until the third/ninth 
century, when we presume conversion to have been at its peak, that mosques were 
constructed in many smaller cities and villages. By the late fourth/tenth century, the 
presence of a mosque in any community in Khurāsān or Transoxania appears to be the 
norm. While al-Muqaddasī mentions many mosques throughout the region, their position 
must have become more solidified by the writing of the Ḥudūd al-‛ālam in which much 
less attention is placed on the locations of mosques. The construction of mosques 
changed the urban fabric of the cities and villages where they appeared. Their proximity 
to sites of government authority such as the governor’s palace and, as is most often the 
case, centers of economic life such as markets show that these mosques quickly became 
important parts of the social life of these cities at a time when Islam was equally 
becoming an important part of the identity of the eastern frontier. 
 
5.7 Fulānābād and Fulānjird: Ethnicity and Toponyms 
Recently, Richard Bulliet has argued that Iranian villages with names following the 
pattern of fulānābād can be traced back to landed gentry, who Bulliet identifies as the 
original owners of the village. These gentry would have founded new agricultural centers, 
usually through the production of qanāts or underground canals. This process also 
included the hiring of a large number of engineers and laborers for the construction of the 
qanāts, after which cultivators began to exploit the land.
181
 Bulliet further argues that the 
appearance of predominantly Arabic names in the fulānābād pattern implies that these 
were largely Muslim constructions, involving either Arabs or Persian converts. Bulliet 
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later carries this argument into his thesis on the connections between the rise of Islam and 
the rise of cotton production in Iran.
182
  
If we examine the place names in our geographical sources, located along the 
eastern frontier and following the fulānābād pattern, we find that a number of these 
toponyms show a connection to founders with Arabic names, but that a number of them 
also have Persian names or do not include any personal name at all.  
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Bulliet also examines villages which follow the pattern of fulanjird, noting that 
the fulān in these toponyms tends to be a Persian name or word. He then states that 
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 The lists of fulānābād and fulānjird toponyms that we find in our geographical 
sources, along with other place names, can provide us with some insight into the patterns 
of Arab and Muslim settlement in Khurāsān, while reinforcing our previous conclusions. 
For instance, in the itineraries of Ibn Khurradādhbih and Qudāma, if we follow the route 
from Marw to Balkh and then from Balkh to al-Rāsht, we form an image of Arab 
settlement focused on Marw. The stops along these itineraries are as follows (distances 
between locations have been omitted): 
Marw – Fāz – Mahdī Abādh – Yahya Abādh – al-Qarīnayn – Asadābādh - Ḥawzān - Qaṣr 
al-Aḥnaf b. Qays – Marw al-Rūdh – Araskan – al-Asrāb - Kanjābādh – al-Ṭālaqān - 
Kansaḥāb – Arghayn - Qaṣr Khūṭ - al-Fārayāb – al-Qā‛ - al-Shubūrqān – al-sadra min 
Balkh – Dastjird
216
 – al-Ghūr – Balkh – Sayājird - Jayḥūn River – al-Tirmidh - Ṣarminjān 
– Dārazanjī – Barnjī – al-Ṣaghāniyān – Būndhā – Hamwārān – Ābān Kaswān – Shūmān 
– Wāshjird – al-Rāsht
217
 
Here we can see a pattern forming. From Marw to Qaṣr Khūṭ, there are a number of stops 
with toponyms which imply Arab or Muslim settlement. First there are a number of place 
names using the fulānābād pattern: Mahdī Abādh, Yahyā Abādh, Asadābādh, and 
Kanjābādh. If we follow Bulliet’s reasoning, then we can decide that these villages were 
founded by Muslims, but we still do not know when they were established. Of these sites, 
only Asadābāth appears in Yāqūt’s geographical dictionary. Here Yāqūt identifies the 
founder of the village as Asad b. ‛Abd Allāh al-Qasrī, said to have founded the village in 
106/724-725
218
 when his brother, the well-known Umayyad governor Khālid b. ‛Abd 
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Allāh al-Qasrī, sent him to Khurāsān.
219
 Similarly, other toponyms may allow us to infer 
foundation by highly-placed individuals within the early Muslim administration of 
Khurāsān. It would be fair to assume, for example, that the Mahdī of Mahdī Abāth is the 
‛Abbāsid Caliph al-Mahdī (r. 158-169/775-785), sent by his father al-Manṣur to govern 
Khuāsān from 141/758 to 151/768. Then we have the two qaṣr place names. We have 
seen in Chapter Three that Qaṣr al-Aḥnaf b. Qays was named after the commander of the 
earliest Muslim conquests of Khurāsān al-Aḥnaf b. Qays, and that it received this name 
after al-Aḥnaf conquered it in 32/652-653.
220
 It is important to note that in all these cases 
of a personal name included in a toponym for which we can identify a namesake, these 
are people associated with Muslim rule in Khurāsān during the first centuries after the 
conquests. 
 We can identify the origins of one other fulānābād from the list above (Table 5.1), 
but this case involves an estate founded much later and, unlike the identifiable founders 
of estates near Marw, by a Persian. According to al-Muqaddasī, Naṣrābādh, located in 
Farghānā, was built by a king for his son who was named Naṣr.
221
 Most likely, this king 
was the Sāmānid Aḥmad b. Asad, governor of Farghānā from 204/819 and Naṣr was his 
son, the first Sāmānid to rule all of Transoxania. Identifying Naṣr b. Aḥmad as the 
namesake of Naṣrābādh places its founding somewhere in the early third/ninth century 
and shows that the use of fulānābād toponyms had expanded by this period far beyond 
Marw among the converted Persian population. As Bulliet has suggested, it appears in 
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this case that the fulānābād pattern traveled together with Islam. Khurāsānābādh, outside 
of Herat, may also be connected to a Persian convert, in this case the dihqān of Herat in 
the early second/eighth century, Khurāsān.
222
 According to Ibn Ḥawqal, the dār al-imāra 
was located in Khurāsānābādh.
223
 Herat was conquered by treaty and the presence of the 
governor’s palace in the estate of the dihqān may be a tradition predating the conquests. 
 Our geographical sources usually do not emphasize the agricultural nature of 
fulānābād locations, but in instances where they do, we can see a connection between 
these regions and intensive forms of agriculture. Regarding Mārābādh, outside Herat, al-
Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal say that it has many gardens and much water and that much rice 
is exported from it.
224
 Since rice is both a labor- and resource-intensive product, the 
description of Mārābādh as a major rice exporter fits into Bulliet’s argument that 
fulānābād locations require significant investment in order to bring in irrigation and 
establish fields. However, al-Muqaddasī does not note any particular abundance of water 
at Mārābādh.
225
 In other cases, these fulānābāds appear more like typical agricultural 
regions. Kūghnābādh, the seat of the sulṭān of Bādhghīs, has gardens and water, and 
grows many small leafy plants (mabākhas).
226
 
 Locations with fulānābād names do not necessarily retain their agricultural 
character throughout their history, and new functions may be added to or even supplant 
their original agricultural function. This may be the case for Yahyā Ābādh, which 
Qudāma describes as a stopping point (manzil) in a valley with a caravanserai and an 
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office of the post (khānāt wa sikka).
227
 The majority of fulānābād locations appear to be 
concentrated around urban centers, particularly Marw.  
We can also see fulānābād locations consumed by expanding cities. One place 
where we see this phenomenon most clearly is in the naming of city gates and roads. One 
of the gates of Nīshāpūr is named Bāb Aḥwaṣābādh, for example.
228
 It is not hard to 
imagine that an agricultural estate was established near Nīshāpūr and that, as the city 
expanded, this agricultural estate also grew until it became an urban neighborhood or 
suburb. Similarly, the southern gate of Herat is known as Bāb Fayrūzābādh, the most 
heavily-populated of the city’s gates.
229
 Roads provide us with similar names, but these 
may be simply roads leading out from the city to a particular agricultural estate. One of 
the roads of Binkath is Darb Dār Thugharabādh (more on this interesting place name 
shortly).
230
 In Bunjikath, we find Darb Kahlabādh.
231
 Darb Kilābādh is a road leading out 
of Numūjkath.
232
 Even though our geographical sources are not primarily interested in 
these fulānābād locations, their presentation of these locations reinforces an image of 
landed estates clustering around urban spaces. 
 While most fulānābād locations are founded or owned by an individual whose 
name appears in the toponym, Dār Thugharabādh does not. Instead, this toponym 
translates roughly as “estate of the frontier.” Binkath is a region connected with the 
frontier, as the names of many of its roads imply: besides Darb Dār Thugharabād, we find 
named after fortifications such as Darb Ribāṭ Aḥmad, Darb Qaṣr al-Dihqān, and two 
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“iron roads,” Darb al-Ḥadīd.
233
 We may ask how the frontier can come to “own” an estate 
called Thugharabādh? Is this simply an estate close to the frontier, or is it an estate 
charged with supplying and funding fighters on the frontier? We will return shortly to the 
estates of Binkath. 
 Returning to our itinerary between Marw and al-Rāsht, as we approach Balkh, the 
pattern changes and we begin to see toponyms on the fulānjird pattern: Dastjird, Sayājird, 
Wāshjird. Unlike the fulānābād villages, here we cannot connect a single known 
individual with the foundation of the village. In at least one case, Dastjird, a place name 
is exceptionally common throughout the Iranian world. Yāqūt says that, according to al-
Sam‛ānī, Dastjird is the name of numerous scattered places, including two near Marw, 
two near Ṭūs, one near Sarakhs known as Dastjird Luqmān, and one near Balkh known as 
Dastjird Jumūkiyān.
234
 There are also, according to Yāqūt, Dastjirds near Isfahan and 
Nihāwand in western Iran. The name itself, Dastjird, is not far from the basic meaning 
implied by Bulliet in his use of fulānjird, namely, something “possessed” or “owned” 
(jird). However, it is interesting to see so many sites that have forgotten or lost the name 
of their owner/founder and have instead replaced a proper name with the generic dast. 
The Dastjird mentioned by Ibn Khurradādhbih and Qudāma is located closer to Balkh, 
possibly the Dastjird Jumūkiyān mentioned by Yāqūt. Another Dastjird is listed by al-
Muqaddasī in the area of Kish near Bukhārā.
235
 Even though it is difficult to identify any 
of these fulānjird places with a single individual, they are still a sign that by the time the 
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itinerary reaches Balkh we have left an area of heavier Arab settlement and entered an 
area which has, to a greater extent, retained its Persian identity. 
 The connection between villages with fulānjird place names and private estates 
owned by Persians comes out more clearly in other instances. al-Ya‛qūbī refers to 
Kunūkard
236
 outside Marw and the first stage on the route to Sarakhs, and shows that 
Arab settlement there did not completely displace the native Persian landowners. He 
describes Kunūkard as the estates (ḍiyā‛) of the family of ‛Alī b. Hishām b. 
Farrakhusraw.
237
 Here al-Ya‛qūbī makes the connection between fulānjird place names 
and private estates clear, even though the place name and the family name of the land 
owners do not appear to be connected. By providing the full family name of the owner of 
the estate going back to ‛Alī’s grandfather, al-Ya‛qūbī also emphasizes the Persian 
origins of fulānjird locations.  
The identification of Kunūkard as a Persian family estate near Marw brings up 
interesting questions due to the pattern of toponyms in the itinerary of Ibn Khurradādhbih 
and Qudāma and its implication that Marw was a region of Arab settlement.
238
 If we look 
back at the narratives of the conquest of Marw, we see that on the one hand Arabs were 
settled in Marw (in the homes of Persians) as early as 31/651-652.
239
 This early date 
gives us a context for the foundation of fulānābād villages and estates during the first 
century of Muslim rule. On the other hand, the ṣulḥ made between the residents of Marw 
                                                          
236
 al-Ya‛qūbī spells the name of this location Kunūkard, but this appears to be an alternate spelling of 
Kunūjird or, at least, a synonymous name. The meaning of “kard” is similar to “jird,” a sown field.  
237
 al-Yaʽqūbī, Kitāb al-buldān, 279. 
238
 It is important to note here that Ibn Khurradādhbih and Qudāma do list a “fulānjird” settlement as the 
last stage before Marw on the itinerary from Nīshāpūr, Banūjird, meaning that Kunūkard is not alone in the 
immediate environs of Marw. Ibn Khurradādhbih, Kitāb al-masālik wa’l-mamālik, 24; Qudāma, Kitāb al-
kharāj wa ṣinā‛at al-kitāba, 97. 
239
 al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ al-buldān, 396;  al-Ya‛qūbī, Ta’rīkh, 2:193. 
274 
 
and the Muslim conquerors protected the Persians’ status and property rights.
240
 The 
presence of fulānjird place names indicates continued ownership of family property 
throughout the period of the conquests. The conversion to Islam of the current property 
holder and his assuming an Arabic name may point to the desire of high-status Persians 
to integrate themselves within Muslim society following the conquests. However, this 
retention of a fulānjird place name indicates that the man did not give up his Persian 
identity entirely. 
 Much like fulānābād locations, descriptions of fulānjird locations rarely 
emphasize their agricultural character. Kharkard, a dependent town of Būshanj, is noted 
by al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal for its many gardens and its access to water.
241
 Farkard, 
also a dependent of Būshanj, is noted not for its agriculture but for its livestock. al-
Iṣṭakhrī says that it has running water and that its people are masters of livestock 
(sawā’im).
242
 The Ḥudūd al-‛ālam likewise notes that the inhabitants of Farkard own 
cattle.
243
 Wāshjird appears to be an example of a very successful agricultural estate which 
became a center of trade and commerce for the agricultural regions around it, perhaps 
losing its own agricultural base in the process. According to al-Iṣṭakhrī, Wāshjird is the 
place where goods from al-Ṣaghāniyān were gathered for export, including saffron (al-
za‛farān), sable, squirrel, and fox fur (al-awbār min al-sammūr wa’l-sinjāb wa’l-
tha‛ālib), and fine products made of iron, horn, and linen (ṭarā’if min al-ḥadīd wa’l-khutū 
wa’l-bizāza).
244
 Just as Yahyā Ābādh and the surviving fulānābād names are retained 
only in the names of gates and roads, Wāshjird may be an example of an estate which 
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outgrew its initial purpose. In fact, in some of our sources Wāshjird is described as the 
capital of the region of al-Khuttal.
245
 
 Finally, if we look further into al-Ya‛qūbī’s description of Kanūkard, we see that 
it is one in a series of locations between Sarakhs and Marw, each of which, according to 
al-Ya‛qūbī, is protected by a strong fortress.
246
 This part of al-Ya‛qūbī’s description 
brings up the idea that private estates were protected with fortifications. Wāshjird has 
been discussed in Chapter Three for its military significance; it was a city of the great 
frontier (madīnat thaghr ‛aẓīm), the capital of al-Khuttal, and chief place within an area 
with 700 strongly built fortresses (ḥiṣn ḥaṣīna).
247
 We discussed Wāshjird as part of a 
phenomenon of regions on the extreme frontier which, we are told, became the site of 
hundreds of fortifications, whether they were called ḥiṣn or ribāṭ. We will return to this 
point in a moment. 
 While the private estates discussed here have were obviously rather large, the vast 
majority of the estates which covered the eastern frontier must have been too small for 
inclusion as named places in our geographical sources. Still, the patterns which we have 
seen in the small percentage of estates which were named in our geographical sources 
most likely applied to many of the smaller estates as well. The primary pattern that we 
have identified here is that the largest concentration of Arab or Muslim estates, those 
with a fulānābād name, clustered around the largest and oldest center of Arab settlement, 
Marw. As we travel further away from Marw, we see a greater number of fulānjird place 
names, indicating Persian origins. This pattern is important for understanding the make-
up of the frontier itself and the extension of the Arabs and Islam to the edges of their own 
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world. Second, we see that these estates had a variety of purposes and were associated 
with a variety of architectural structures. The most interesting of these structures turn out 
to be fortifications, and it is accordingly to the fortifications of the private estates to 
which we now turn.  
 
5.8 Rural Estates and Ribāṭs 
In Chapter Three, we introduced ongoing questions regarding the nature of the ribāṭ as a 
military architectural form. Following Albrecht Noth, Antoine Borrut, Christophe Picard, 
and Jacqueline Chabbi,
248
 we discussed the ribāṭ - commonly understood as a uniquely 
Muslim edifice – more as a function applied to a place than as a particular edifice in and 
of itself. Along the eastern frontier, despite the connection between ribāṭs and Islam, the 
largest number of ribāṭs are found away from the major centers of both Arab settlement 
in Khurāsān and the early spread of Islam.
249
 This indicates that the ribāṭs of the eastern 
frontier were not originally Muslim constructions, but rather predated the arrival of Islam. 
If we look closely at the locations of these ribāṭs and the terminology our geographical 
sources used for them over time, we see that they were fortified rural estates which 
assumed a Muslim identity as Islam spread among the dihqāns. 
 Ribāṭs in Khurāsān and Transoxania are noticeably absent from the earliest 
geographical sources, much like mosques. This is not the case for other regions. If we 
look south to Sīstān, for example, Ibn Khurradādhbih lists Ribāṭ Ba‛īda on the road from 
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 Qudāma includes Ribāṭ Kūmakh along the same itinerary.
251
 It is not 
until the Balkhī School that we see ribāṭs appearing along the eastern frontier, but the 
majority of the ribāṭs found in our geographical sources do not appear until al-
Muqaddasī, where they seem to be everywhere, again, much like mosques.
252
 For 
example, Isbījāb, which rarely finds its way into earlier geographical texts, is said to 
contain two thousand seven hundred ribāṭs by al-Muqaddasī.
253
 This implies either that 
al-Muqaddasī had a greater interest in ribāṭs than his predecessors, or that ribāṭs did not 
appear in Khurāsān or Transoxania until a later date. 
 The ribāṭs which appear in al-Muqaddasī’s text are overwhelmingly centered on 
Bukhārā. Associated with Bukhārā itself, there are ribāṭs among the villages inside the 
city’s wall.
254
 The neighboring city of Baykand is said to have a thousand ribāṭs, some of 
them in ruins and some inhabited.
 255 
The city is said to be home to many murābiṭīn, 
which is contrasted with its lack of ignorant people (jāhilūn).
256
 Ribāṭ al-Nūr, one of the 
few named ribāṭs in the immediate neighborhood of Bukhārā, is also the host of an 
annual fair.
257
 The majority of the named ribāṭs are found along roads leading from 
Bukhārā. On the road to Tirmidh there are Ribāṭ ‛Atīq and Ribāṭ Khwārān.
258
 On the road 
to Kāth there are Ribāṭ Tāsh, Ribāṭ Ṭughān, Ribāṭ Jikarband, Ribāṭ Ḥasan, Ribāṭ Māsh, 
and Ribāṭ Sandah.
259
 Along the route from Bukhārā to Nakhshab, al-Muqaddasī says one 
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 The picture we get from al-Muqaddasī is that Bukhārā is 
surrounded by a network of ribāṭs, much like the image we had of Marw surrounded by a 
network of fortifications in Chapter Three. Such a network of ribāṭs cannot have 
appeared suddenly, which leads us to ask what the neighborhood around Bukhārā looked 
like in our earlier sources. 
 Besides the walls of Bukhārā discussed in Chapter Three, the earliest references 
to the defenses of the city are found in al-Ya‛qūbī, who describes the region as well-
defended in general.
261
 Ibn al-Faqīh mentions the quhandiz.
262
 al-Iṣṭakhrī gives a detailed 
description of what can be found inside the wall surrounding Bukhārā and its dependent 
villages, including fortresses (quṣūr).
263
 As he begins to detail what is found along the 
rivers within the wall, al-Iṣṭakhrī makes a connection between thousands of fortresses and 
thousands of estates and gardens.
264
 al-Iṣṭakhrī makes this connection more generally for 
Transoxania as a whole. The owners of agricultural estates built fortresses or fortified 
palaces (quṣūr) on their estates.
265
 These fortresses and their associated agricultural 
estates are the closest any of our earlier texts come to al-Muqaddasī’s description of 
ribāṭs within the walls of a city. 
 In the cases of Bukhārā and Baykand, we know the origins of many of these 
estates. A large number of them date from the time of Qutayba b. Muslim’s conquest of 
Soghdia. In the year 88/706, Qutayba marched on Baykand, then a rich city dominated by 
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 After a long siege the city was conquered and a garrison was put in place 
while Qutayba and his army moved on. However, the people of Baykand revolted and 
killed Qutayba’s governor. Qutayba returned, destroyed the city, and made off with 
prisoners and spoils including a number of exotic luxuries which have been detailed in 
accounts of the conquest of the city. Most of the men of Baykand, by which our sources 
must mean the upper class of merchants, were in China on a trading expedition when this 
occurred and when they returned to find their city destroyed, they ransomed their families 
and began to rebuild in the area around the city.
267
 We might assume that the fortresses 
and later ribāṭs that were built around Baykand are associated with this resettlement of 
the native population after the city had been destroyed. One interesting aspect of this 
resettlement is that if these fortifications were built by merchants who had resettled in the 
hinterlands of the city, are we seeing the merchants of Baykand recreating themselves 
after the destruction of their city as rural landholders or dihqāns. 
 We may find answers to this question in the aftermath of Qutayba’s fourth and 
final conquest of Bukhārā, which was discussed in detail above. At this time, Qutayba 
confiscated half the houses in Bukhārā in order to create a permanent Arab garrison. The 
houses he confiscated belong to a wealthy group of merchants known as the 
Kashkathah.
268
 The dislocated population built 700 palaces outside the city, around which 
they built houses, gardens, and fields for their clients and servants in the style of the 
estates of the dihqāns.
269
 There is evidence that in the process of building these estates, 
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the Kashkathah merchants became, essentially, dihqāns themselves, managing large 
estates with many dependents under their authority. In 150/767, descendents of a dihqān 
named Kadra-i Khīna presented a deed to the ‛Abbāsid Caliph al-Manṣūr for a certain 
quarter of the city that Qutayba had confiscated.
270
 If Kadra-i Khīna was the rightful 
owner of this confiscated quarter, then he may well have been one of the Kashkathah 
merchants; by settling outside the city and building an agricultural estate he had, in fact, 
become a dihqān, and his descendents were acknowledged as such. 
 The experience of Bukhārā shows that it was possible for merchants to build 
agricultural estates on the patter of dihqāns. Accordingly, a similar pattern may have 
occurred in nearby Baykand after its destruction. This shift in career paths among such a 
large and prominent segment of the population in both cities may have also have been a 
result of the conquests. The merchants of Baykand were said to have been on a trading 
expedition to China when Qutayba conquered their city. Earlier it was proposed that the 
assistance given to the Muslims by some factions of Soghdian merchants during the 
conquests was the result of competition between groups of merchants who traded with 
China and others who traded with Iran and India, or more broadly the lands south of 
Transoxania.
271
 The Muslim conquest of Soghdia would have made trade to the south 
easier and trade with China, which prior to the conquests had strong ties to Transoxania, 
more difficult.
272
 Besides losing their homes, it is possible that the merchants of Baykand 
and Bukhārā also lost their livelihood if their main trading partners were in China.
273
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 Besides the Arab conquests, the eighth century was also a time of contraction for the Tang Empire, 
especially following the An Lushan Rebellion of 755-763 during which the Tang Empire lost direct control 
over most of its western provinces, thus making trade with China doubly difficult for the Muslims. 
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 The correspondence between areas with high numbers of ribāṭs and high numbers 
of fortified estates can also be demonstrated for the other major center of ribāṭs in the 
fourth/tenth century, al-Khuttal. al-Khuttal is a region located along the Oxus to the south 
and east of Bukhārā. In our earliest geographic sources, al-Khuttal is described as a 
region with many fortresses. al-Ya‛qūbī states that al-Khuttal with its capital in Wāshjird 
is a region of 700 fortresses, because it defends the frontier.
274
 He also emphasizes that 
al-Khuttal is in the midst of a region where political authority is divided among a number 
of local rulers and dynasties outside of the networks of authority across the caliphate. 
From Balkh to al-Khuttal, there are the territories of the Bānījūrids.
275
 When al-Ya‛qūbī 
reaches al-Khuttal itself, he describes it as the kingdom of Khumār Beg, the prince of 
Shiqinān and Badakhshān.
276
 al-Muqaddasī connects this region to three specific ribāṭs, 
Firabr
277
 and Ribāṭ Dhu al-Kifl and Ribāṭ Dhu al-Qarnayn, which lie across the river 
from each other.
278
 While al-Muqaddasī only names a single ribāṭ, the ribāṭ of Naṣr b. 
Aḥmad, he more generally mentions plural ribāṭs associated with the area.
279
 
Additionally, two of the ribāṭs listed under Bukhārā were on the road to Tirmidh, in al-
Khuttal, namely Ribāṭ ‛Atīq and Ribāṭ Khwārān.
280
 The number of ribāṭs found in al-
Khuttal is not nearly as high as the number of fortresses described by al-Ya‛qūbī, but as 
in the case of the landed estates, we are looking at the largest and most important 
instances of a phenomenon that must have been much more widespread, even though it 
does not appear in our sources with such detail. If we follow the assumption that even 
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though ribāṭs are not a specific form of architectural edifice, but rather a function of a 
place, and that the function ribāṭs served was associated with defense of the frontier, we 
have to consider that many more fortresses in al-Khuttal, a region specifically designated 
as a region concerned with defending the frontier, would have made a similar conversion 
from a fortification associated with an estate to a ribāṭ as the handful explicitly 
mentioned. 
 Another important center of ribāṭ construction according to al-Muqaddasī is the 
region of Isbījāb. This region, mentioned only briefly in earlier texts, makes up the 
furthest frontiers of Transoxania, north of Farghāna along the Jaxartes. In general, Isbījāb 
is said to have some 2,700 ribāṭs, but al-Muqaddasī also specifically mentions particular 
ribāṭs in both Isbījāb
281





 While no specific mosque is mention, 
Jamshalāghū is the place where the military retinues (al-ḥasham) repair.
284
 For most of 
the region, al-Muqaddasī emphasizes the presence of ḥuṣūn rather than ribāṭs, including 
ḥuṣūn which are inhabited by dihqāns, such as the fortress of Ḥarrān.
285
 Interestingly, 
Isbījāb is a region where al-Muqaddasī gives us much information about personal 
affiliations to ribāṭs. In Isbījāb itself, there is the ribāṭ of Qarātakīn (d. 317/929), the 
Sāmānid military commander of Turkish origins who later formed his own principality in 
Bust and Rukhkhaj.
286
 Yakānkath is home to the ribāṭ and grave of another notable of 
apparently Turkish origins, Kharākharāf.
287
 In Mīrkī there is the ribāṭ of the amīr ‛Amīd 
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al-Dawla Fā’iq, the use of the title ‛amīd implies that he was a non-military governor 
under the Sāmānids.
288
 These ribāṭs attached to specific individuals appear not to be 
associated with dihqāns, per se, but rather with individuals attached to the Sāmānid state, 
but these are but a few of the many fortifications referred to as ribāṭs located in and 
around Isbījāb. Other evidence shows that the region around Isbījāb was going through a 
process of conversion at roughly this time. Ḥarrān is noted for its largely kuffār 
population, but its ruler, a dihqān who resides in the quhandiz (which itself is found in a 
fortress), is a Muslim.
289
 This is evidence that even though conversion had yet to spread 
widely throughout the population, the land-owning classes and the local rulers were 
beginning to engage more closely with the Islamic world. 
 The appearance of ribāṭs in our geographical sources at approximately the same 
time as mosques is a clue that both structures were becoming increasingly popular at the 
same time. As mentioned above in the context of mosque construction, this would have 
been the period in which conversion to Islam became increasingly widespread along the 
eastern frontier, and the character of its population increasingly Muslim. Khurāsān and, 
even more so, Transoxania were covered with small fortresses associated with 
agricultural estates in the pre-Islamic period. What appears to have happened is that as 
Islam spread throughout the region, the new Islamic practice-tradition of ribāṭ 
fortification
290
 was overlaid upon an existing tradition of private estate fortifications, 
giving this traditional practice of the dihqāns a level of Islamic identity and acceptance. 
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A development such as this works nicely with an understanding of ribāṭ as the name of a 
function which can be placed on a pre-existing edifice. 
 The question we cannot answer from the information available is whether or not 
these fortresses actually went through any substantial changes as they became 
transformed into ribāṭs. In Chapter Three we highlighted a handful of ribāṭs for the 
presence of mosques and Islamic shrines on their grounds, as well as a few said to have 
been funded by waqf. In these cases, certain Muslim practices were clearly becoming 
associated with these fortresses, but this process may also have been connected to the 
general spread of Islamic practice throughout the region. 
 The history of the Arab conquests of Khurāsān and Transoxania was such that the 
majority of the local populations in the region were able to preserve their personal and 
familial status and property into the Islamic period. This limited the spread of Arab 
settlement to those areas which had taken on large scale garrisons during the period of 
conquest itself, most notably Marw and Bukhārā, but even there Arab settlement was 
primarily concentrated in the city and not in the countryside. Over time, Arabs were able 
to settle further away from the garrisons, as their presence shifted away from that of a 
garrison and became more normalized. At the same time, conversion to Islam by local 
populations gave an Islamic flavor to the eastern frontier region. This process can best be 
seen in the building of mosques and in the transformation of fortified agricultural estates 
into ribāṭs. Here, we see the eastern frontier behaving like frontiers the world over. The 
arrival of the Arabs and Islam brought a new cultural and political reality to the region 
which eventually came to dominate the pre-existing population. Political and economic 
interests were directed towards new centers and certain cultural practices were changed to 
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accommodate the new dominant authority. The next chapter will take up this issue of 
change on the frontier by examining the inclusion of the local Persian population into the 
politics and culture of the caliphate, culminating in the appearance of the local dynasties 
which arose out of the old networks of pre-Islamic dihqāns in the third/ninth and 











al-Muqaddasī reports that he one asked a man from Khwārazm why the people of 
Khwārazm have such oddly-shaped heads. The man replied, 
(Our ancestors) would raid (yaghzūna) the Turks, and they would have an easy time with 
them (yāsarūnahum). Some of them resembled the Turks
1
 and they did not know that, 
perhaps, they would come to Islam and they would be sold into slavery. So they ordered 
that their women, when they gave birth, they were to fasten (yarabaṭūn) a sack of sand to 
the heads of the boys on both sides until it flattened the head. After this, they were no 
longer enslaved and any one of them who was captured was returned to his district.
2
 
In many ways, this short passage, which stands out in al-Muqaddasī’s text as a curious 
piece of information, encapsulates the frontier experience, broadly speaking. The people 
of Khwārazm, long before the arrival of Islam, had interactions with the Turks along their 
own frontier. This man from Khwārazm wants to emphasize to al-Muqaddasī that the 
relationship between the two was appropriately one of the Khwārazmīs attacking and 
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raiding the Turks, and that they were perfectly able to handle them. Then the Muslims 
arrived and thought that the Khwārazmīs were Turks themselves; accordingly, they used 
to enslave them as if they were Turks. The Khwārazmīs responded with a form of pre-
modern plastic surgery, altering their appearance so that the Muslims could recognize the 
difference between them: the good guys who should not be enslaved, and the bad guys 
who could be enslaved. 
 The Khwārazmīs in this anecdote are described as engaging with two different 
frontiers at two different times. First, there is the frontier between the settled populations 
of Khwārazm and the Turks of the steppes outside the reach of the Oxus, its tributaries, 
and the networks of irrigation. This frontier appears to be old and well established; 
raiding across the frontier is described as an activity of the Khwārazmī’s ancestors 
(qudamā’unā).
3
 Second, the Khwārazm-Turkish frontier is then met by the expanding 
Arab-Muslim frontier during the period of the conquests of Central Asia. As this change 
occurs, the Khwārzamīs found themselves caught between the Muslims and the Turks. In 
fact, the Muslims would confuse the Khwārazmīs with the Turks and treat them as Turks 
by enslaving them, until the Khwārazmīs took actions which separated themselves from 
the Turks in the eyes of the Muslims, quite literally so by changing their physical 
appearance. In this anecdote, we see the Arab-Muslim conquests disrupting and 
complicating a long-standing or matured frontier arrangement, forcing peoples from the 
frontier region to respond to the Muslim presence by choosing to associate themselves 
with the Muslim authorities and finding a way to openly display this choice. 
 The previous chapter focused on the effect that the arrival of the Arabs, in the 
first/seventh and second/eighth centuries, had on Khurāsān and Transoxania. The settling 
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of Arabs and the spread of Islam changed the physical landscape of the eastern frontier. 
People were displaced and new populations were inserted into certain cities and regions. 
The urban landscape was altered by the construction of mosques which resulted in a 
rearrangement of the patterns of urban life, moving the centers of political and economic 
life into positions of proximity with these mosques.  
This chapter will shift the focus toward the way that the arrival of Islam changed 
the very nature of the eastern frontier. The eastern frontier, as it stood after the arrival of 
Islam, was geographically not that different from the Sāsānian frontier of Khurāsān and 
the broader Persianate frontier of Transoxania of earlier centuries, but the meaning of the 
frontier and the language that was used to describe the frontier and the interactions across 
the frontier between the settled communities and the Turks of the steppe were altered as 
the eastern frontier was converted and became a Muslim frontier. 
 
6.2 Maturing Frontiers 
Chapter Two addressed a number of approaches to the study of frontiers. This discussion 
culminated in a definition of frontiers as loosely-organized liminal zones of transition on 
the periphery of states, where territorial expansion or contraction is possible. As a state 
expands to a particular and, perhaps, temporary, limit, the newly incorporated territory 
begins a process of integration and assimilation into the cultural, political, and economic 
networks of the expanding state. We often see this “frontier process” as primarily 
affecting the frontier itself, but as Fredrick Jackson Turner and his followers showed, 
interaction with the frontier often affects the dominant culture of the center as well.
4
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Along the eastern frontier of the Islamic world and across the Iranian world more 
broadly, this process has been discussed by Richard Bulliet in his Islam: A View from the 
Edge.
5
 Here Bulliet has argued that it was not the practices which developed in the 
political and religious centers of the Islamic world - the Hijaz, Syria, and Iraq - during the 
first centuries following the rise of Islam which became the dominant expression of 
Sunni Muslim religious belief, but rather the practices and beliefs which developed over 
later centuries in Iran, on the edge of the Islamic world. In the aftermath of territorial 
expansion, a frontier zone or borderland is created in which the new, dominant culture 
mixes with local cultures and with the culture of those who live immediately beyond the 
frontier. This interaction changes the character of both the conquerors and the conquered. 
In this context, Friedrich Ratzel argued that the border (Grenzlinie), as a division 
between distinctly different entities, running through a frontier zone created by such an 
expansion was an abstraction of a reality in which there exists a borderland (Grenzraum) 
with varying degrees of association with the dominant political and cultural centers on 
either side of the frontier.
6
 In Ratzel’s model, it is the goal of the expanding power to 
integrate newly conquered territories along the frontier into the culture and identity of the 
center. In order for territorial expansion to be successful and long-lasting, those living 
along the frontier must eventually accept their association with a new political and 
cultural center. Michael Bonner has outlined such a process of integration of a frontier 
zone along the Arab-Byzantine frontier, where a specific region of settlement existed 
behind the militarized frontier, the ʽawāṣim.
7
 As the frontiers of the Islamic world had 
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expanded into Byzantine territory, the ‛awāṣim became the zone in which the processes 
of a maturing frontier changed the character of northern Syria from that of a Byzantine 
territory to that of a Muslim territory. 
 This process by which a frontier region becomes increasingly integrated within 
the culture and identity of its related political center is considered a process of maturing. 
Conquest and expansion do not happen overnight, nor do conquered territories and their 
inhabitants necessarily welcome the transformations which come with such a conquest. 
Over years, decades, or, perhaps, even centuries, acceptance of the new political and 
cultural alignment which follow a period of conquest increases, while the frontier region 
becomes increasingly associated with the practices, traditions, and identities of its new 
center. As the frontier “matures,” it becomes more firmly associated with the political 
center; meanwhile the territorial changes which created the frontier in the first place 
acquire a sense of permanence. In the previous chapter, this process of maturing along the 
eastern frontier became a major theme. As Khurāsān and Transoxania were conquered by 
the Arabs and integrated into the Islamic world, the attachments of the people living in 
these regions slowly shifted away from the no longer extant Sāsānian Empire towards 
that of the Muslim Caliphate.
8
 This transformation was most noticeable on the ground in 
the spread of mosques and the re-identification of the rural fortresses of the dihqāns as 
ribāṭs. Through this process, we see Khurāsān and Transoxania maturing as a Muslim 
frontier. 
 On the other hand, the Arab conquest of the Sāsānian Empire during the 
first/seventh and second/eighth centuries brought the reach of the Muslim world to the 
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limits of an already mature frontier, that of the Persianate world. By conquering the 
entirety of the Sāsānian Empire
9
 and the neighboring states of Transoxania, the Arabs 
inherited a mature and complex frontier between the settled societies of Khurāsān and the 
river valleys of Transoxania and the Turks of the Inner Asian steppes. In the centuries 
following the conquests, the history of this older incarnation of the frontier became a part 
of a spreading Persian cultural identity, notably in Firdawsī’s Shāhnāma, which addresses 
the conflict across the Oxus between Iranian Khurāsān and Tūrān, the land of the Turks 
in Transoxania. Just as people living along the eastern frontier converted to Islam in the 
centuries following the Arab conquests, reaching a majority of the population around the 
beginning of the fourth/tenth century,
10
 the very nature of the frontier itself was similarly 
transformed. This chapter will focus on the process by which the Persianate side of the 
frontier, the side of Iran, became transformed into a Muslim frontier and recast the 
negotiations occurring between the settled Persianate communities and the Turks in terms 
of Islam against non-Muslims rather than in terms of a conflict between Iran and Tūrān. 
 
6.3 Dihqāns as Preservers of Persian Culture and the Creation of a Dual Society 
In the previous chapter, an important issue under discussion was the ability of the 
dihqāns to preserve their lands and their positions as tax collectors and local authorities 
following the Arab conquests. As they continued in these positions, they were likewise 
able to maintain many aspects of the culture and society of Sāsānian Iran within the 
territories over which they continued to hold authority. This role of the dihqāns is most 
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often connected to their place as a collective source for the tales which eventually became 
the Shāhnāma. As Richard Bulliet wrote, “By the eleventh/fifth century [the dihqāns] 
were no longer at the peak of the social pyramid except in a sentimental way. Their last 
important act was the bequeathing to world literature of their epic poetry in the form of 
Firdausī’s Shāhnāmeh.”
11
 Throughout a variety of early Islamic sources, the lifestyle of 
the dihqāns continues to be described as if it were still that of the landed gentry of the 
Sāsānian Empire. For example, al-Jāḥiẓ describes the table manners of the dihqāns in 
favorable contrast with the crude table manners of scoundrels (shuṭṭār), in the same terms 
that he otherwise used for the Sāsānian court.
12
 Here we see that al-Jāḥiẓ used the 
dihqāns as an example of proper manners, recognizing that they lived according to 
different social rules from those of their neighbors. 
These descriptions of dihqāns and their lifestyle also show signs of interaction 
between Muslims and the dihqāns in which the dihqāns treat Muslim rulers in a manner 
similar to their Sāsānian predecessors. al-Ṭabarī reports that in 120/738 the dihqāns of 
Khurāsān presented gifts to the governor Asad b. ‛Abd Allāh al-Qasrī on the occasion of 
the Mazdaean festival of Mihragān in Balkh. These gifts, which included gold and silver 
models of palaces (qaṣrān), pitchers (abārīq), and bowls (ṣiḥāf) and silk brocade from 
Marw, Qūhistān, and Heart, were presented to Asad al-Qasrī while he sat before a group 
of Khurāsānī by the governor of Heart, Ibrāhīm b. ‛Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥanafī, and the 
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 Following the presentation, an unnamed dihqān gave a speech praising 
the pre-Islamic rulers of Iran, who ruled the world for four hundred years, and praised 
Asad for the noble traits he shared with them.
14
 Asad’s presence in this narrative is 
interesting because of his assimilation into the landholding classes of Khurāsān during his 
tenure as governor. In 106/724-725, Asad founded a village outside Marw known as 
Asadābādh, which made him essentially an Arab dihqān, a petty landholder.
15
 Asad and 
his brother, and fellow governor, Khālid al-Qasrī, were noted for their close connections 
to the dihqāns of Khurāsān and their use of them as tax collectors and officials.
16
 This 
connection to the dihqāns had contributed to questions of Khālid al-Qasrī’s commitment 
to Islam.
17
 Asad, furthermore, is not the only Muslim in this report celebrating a non-
Muslim holiday. The key figure among the notables of Khurāsān who presents the gifts to 
Asad appears to be the governor of Herat, Ibrāhīm b. ‛Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥanafī, whose 
name clearly marks him as a Muslim. Asad al-Qasrī and his connection with the dihqāns 
is an early example of the dual society which developed along the eastern frontier 
following the arrival of Islam, one in which Islamic and pre-Islamic Persian culture 
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mixed openly. Gifts were similarly presented by dihqāns to Hārūn al-Rashīd while he 
was traveling from Bayhaq before his death near Ṭūs, at the rural estate of Sanābādh.
18
 
As an Arab-Muslim elite developed in the large garrisons of Marw and later in the 
garrisons of Transoxania, primarily Bukhārā and Samarqand, the cultural and religious 
practices of these Arabs spread among some Persians who converted and attached 
themselves to the political institutions of their new masters. At the same time, there was 
always an effort to protect and preserve the local pre-Islamic culture. As preservers of 
Sāsānian cultural practices and institutions, the dihqāns were also valuable advisors to the 
Arabs who used them to transition into positions of authority within the Persianate world. 
In the previous chapter, emphasis was placed on the role of the dihqāns as tax collectors 
under the early Arab governors.
19
 The reports of dihqāns as tax collectors tend to focus 
on the transitional aspects of their position: how they bridged the gap between the 
administrative practices of the Sāsānian Empire through the experience of the conquests 
into a period where taxation and administration along the eastern frontier were dominated 
by Muslim ideals and, eventually performed by Muslims. Here the dihqāns were 
responsible for the collection of taxes or tribute in the same territories they had 
administered for the Sāsānians. As Khurāsān and Transoxania became increasingly 
Muslim, the methods by which taxes were calculated and collected became increasingly 
based on Muslim notions of appropriate administrative practice.
20
 The support provided 
by the dihqāns went beyond their positions as tax collectors, Arab governors used them 
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as advisors in a more general sense. Bayhaqī reports that the Umayyad governor of 
Khurāsān Ziyād b. Abīhi employed three dihqāns as advisors, who told him stories of 
Sāsānian rulers which made Ziyād question the quality of Arab rule.
21
 
 The connection between Arabs and the dihqāns was not always so positive and 
we often see reports which imply that the title dihqān was used as an insult among the 
Arabs. al-Ṭabarī reports that the governor Sa‛īd b. ‛Abd al-‛Azīz b. al-Ḥārith was called 
khudhayna or the dihqān’s wife, on account of the colorful silk robes he and his 
companions wore and for his long hair.
22
 The fashion of the dihqāns, especially their 
preference for silk robes, was increasingly seen as un-Islamic and a sign that they were 
not integrating into the new culture of Khurāsān and Transoxania.
23
 When the tax 
structures of Khurāsān and Transoxania were being changed from one which focused on 
the collection of tribute by dihqāns from ‛ahd lands into one which collected kharāj on 
all lands and jizya from non-Muslims, the dihqāns who had formerly collected taxes from 
Muslims in Bukhārā and Samarqand were brought to Marw and ‛Umayra b. S‛ad, who 
now held authority over them, publically tore their silk robes and tied their belts around 
their necks.
24
 This act was clearly meant to insult the public display and abuse of their 
noble status by damaging the symbol of their status, their distinctive dress, at a time when 
their actions and authority were coming under question by the Muslims. It is in moments 
like this that we see a chafing between different elements of the mixed society of the 
eastern frontier during the early centuries of Muslim rule. 
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 The process by which the eastern frontier developed into a Muslim frontier 
involved an extended period of interaction between the conquerors and the conquered, 
during which these two belonged to different cultural spheres. Portions of the local 
population connected themselves to their conquerors soon after the conquests, but the 
majority appear to have held onto their pre-Islamic Persian identity, or at least important 
aspects of it, for centuries following the conquests. This meant that we must think about 
Khurāsān and Transoxania during the first centuries of Muslim rule as a dual society, one 
Muslim, including both Arabs and Persian converts,
25
 and one part Persian. Gradually, 
elements of these two societies mixed and we can eventually see a single society which is 
both Muslim and Persian simultaneously, but this process was long and uneven. 
 
6.4 Cotton and Silk 
We can confirm existence of such a dual culture throughout the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries by examining the products which our geographical sources list as 
being exported from Khurāsān and Transoxania. Richard Bulliet has recently made an 
argument for increased production of cotton throughout Iran and Central Asia during the 
third/ninth century, connecting it to the spread of Islam in the east and Muslim 
preferences for cotton and prohibitions against the wearing of silk.
26
 As a part of this 
argument, Bulliet has identified a cotton boom in Iran initiated by the migration of Arabs, 
especially from Yemen, who brought with them the techniques for growing of cotton. 
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Bulliet has also argued that, as a part of this process, cities in the east became important 
producers of cotton cloth, perhaps to the detriment of silk production, with Nīshāpūr 
emerging as a major center for cotton production. The geographical sources do indeed 
emphasize the importance of Nīshāpūr as a producer of finished cotton robes.
27
 However, 
Bulliet’s arguments are based on the professional designations of religious scholars as 
demonstrated by their nisbas in the biographical dictionaries. Through their emphasis, 
Bulliet’s data imply a shift during the third/ninth century away from the silk favored by 
Persians and prominent in Sāsānian fashions, towards the more austere cotton preferred 
by Muslims and, especially, Muslim religious scholars, which was only reversed later, in 
the fourth/tenth century, under the Sāmānids, when Persian styles returned.
28
 What this 
focus on the biographies of Muslim religious scholars may not answer is whether or not 
the production and popularity of silk actually fell while the production of cotton rose. If 
cotton became more popular among a growing number of Muslims in the east, especially 
religious scholars, how far was the reach of such a change in the economy of the eastern 
frontier, and did the increased popularity of cotton necessarily mean that silk fell out of 
fashion entirely?  
Our geographical sources seem to imply that silk production remained steady 
throughout this period and, in the case of Nīshāpūr, cotton and silk robes are mentioned 
in the same breath in texts written throughout the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries.
29
 
In fact, you rarely see a reference to Nīshāpūr’s cotton production without a matching 
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reference to its silk production, implying that both were exported throughout the Islamic 
world. In these paired references, the quality of each is emphasized, as if they are 
naturally connected. al-Iṣṭakhrī, for example, says that the best quality (anfas) robes of 
cotton and silk are those which come from Nīshāpūr.
30
 Often the clothing produced in 
Nīshāpūr is referred to in the generic, without reference to specific materials, as when al-
Muqaddasī describes Nīshāpūr’s light and radiant clothing (li-bizzat nūr wā ishrāq) with 
which the people of Iraq and Egypt adorn themselves.
31
 
What Nīshāpūr exported was primarily finished cloth and garments. The growing 
of cotton had to take place somewhere outside the city. Our geographical sources provide 
us with the necessary evidence for cotton production in the rural regions around 
Nīshāpūr. For example, the Ḥudūd al-‛ālam notes that Kurī produces the same kind of 
cotton Nīshāpūr is best known for, the rough karbās.
32
 So do Būzhagān, Khāymand, 
Sangān, Salūmidh, and Zūzan, all specifically mentioned as within the borders of 
Nīshāpūr.
33
 The products which are emphasized by our geographical sources tend to 
concentrate on three categories: cloth, agricultural goods, and the products of mines. In 
comparison to the larger number of locations which produce agricultural goods, the 
production of cotton and silk garments appears to focus primarily on larger urban centers 
rather than the agricultural regions where raw cotton and silk were produced. From this, 
we can read a division of labor between rural and urban regions along the eastern frontier 
in which more rural agricultural estates produced raw materials which were then sent to 
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the larger urban centers to be processed and turned into final products, in this case cloth 
and robes. Cities like Nīshāpūr were “bellies” that consumed the products of surrounding 
regions, digested them into finished products, and then shipped these finished products to 
markets far and near. This creates a mutual dependency between the cities and the 
agricultural hinterlands where the cities rely on associated districts for raw materials and 
necessities such as foodstuffs, while the rural districts rely on the larger cities as markets 
for their goods. al-Muqaddasī clearly describes Nīshāpūr in these terms, as a “belly” with 
great reach. Beyond the movement of cotton, silk, and finished cloth and clothing, 
Nīshāpūr imports fruits from the agricultural regions.
34
 From a broader perspective, 
Nīshāpūr also is the place where people come to trade, and thereby becomes the entrepôt 
for goods from all the regions of the east, namely Fārs, al-Sind, Kirmān, Khwārzm, al-
Rayy, and Jurjān.
35
 Nīshāpūr’s reliance on its agricultural hinterland leaves it susceptible 
to problems in the rural regions and along the routes which connect them to the city. 
During al-Muqaddasī’s time, Nīshāpūr appears to be facing such problems as he 
describes the city as facing excessively high prices and shortages of food and firewood 
(khālaṭahā al-ghalā qalīla al-adāmāt wa-l-ḥaṭab).
36
 In such a model, it is the demand 
found at the urban centers, the centers of consumption, production, and trade, which 
comes to define the goods which have been produced in associated agricultural regions. 
The theory of an expansion of cotton production inspired by the arrival of Arabs 
in Nīshāpūr may be difficult to support, if we consider the strong evidence that Nīshāpūr 
did not become a center of Arab settlement until late in the Umayyad period, and most 
likely remained secondary to Marw until the Ṭāhirids made it the capital of Khurāsān in 
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the early third/ninth century.
37
 Bulliet’s argument that cotton production increased in and 
around Nīshāpūr matches the data found in our geographic sources, but it is perhaps not 
an explosion of Arab settlement which is at its root. The dihqāns who acted as headmen 
over Nīshāpūr in the fourth/tenth century, the Mīkālī family, did not convert to Islam 
until the Ṭāhirid period.
38
 They are noted, however, as being among the main cotton 
dealers
39
 in the city with a network which extended to Ghazna and with a particular style 
of boots being named after them.
40
 While there certainly were Muslims involved in the 
production and trade of cotton cloth in Nīshāpūr, the trade in cotton, and perhaps the 
production of cotton on the estates of the dihqāns, must have also extended to non-
Muslims who were looking to increase trade with Baghdad and the central Islamic lands. 
As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, the Arab conquests reconfigured trade 
patterns in Khurāsān and Transoxania, while the markets of Iraq became an increasingly 
important destination for goods from the east. This increased dependency on Iraqī 
markets would have encouraged local producers and merchants to focus on goods with 
appeal for a Muslim customer base. 
Like Nīshāpūr, Marw is noted as a producer and exporter of both cotton and 
silk.
41
 Interestingly, while our sources want to promote Nīshāpūr’s textiles as having the 
finest quality, Marw’s textile industries seem to have a greater role in the production of 
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luxury goods. Marw is described as the origin of Jurjān and Ṭabaristān’s silk industries, 
with the seed worms coming originally from Marw.
42
 Unlike the rough cotton Nīshāpūr is 
known for, Marw produces soft cotton (al-quṭn al-layyin) which is used for robes around 
the world.
43
 No less a fashion setter than the Caliph al-Ma’mūn himself praised the 
softness of the cotton of Marw.
44
 Marw produces outstanding robes, known as Khurāsānī 
robes, interestingly giving Marw the “name-brand” of robes of Khurāsān over 
Nīshāpūr.
45
 The Ḥudūd al-‛ālam emphasizes that Marw produces not just cotton but two 
different types of silk, qazzīn and mulḥam.
46
 When our sources make a direct comparison 
between Marw and Nīshāpūr, Marw’s cotton and silk come in second, but Marw is 
acknowledged as surpassing Nīshāpūr in its production of linen.
47
 Marw’s connections to 
the broader Islamic world as the original Arab garrison following the conquests and the 
seat of the governor’s of Khurāsān until the rise of the Ṭāhirids makes it a natural site for 
trade with the Islamic lands to the west. If the Arab conquests and the spread of Islam 
inspired a cotton boom, its earliest instances would have come from Marw as the center 
of both Arab and Muslim settlement in the first centuries of Muslim rule. 
 Other kinds of textiles also seem to originate in areas known for their cotton 
production, which further supports the idea that cotton was produced in addition to more 
traditional local goods as a specific export good. Qūhistān, a region regularly noted for its 
lack of easily accessible water, is said to produce items made of karābīs (rough cotton) as 
well as course wool (musūḥ) and carpets (nakhākh), none of them high-class goods (laysa 
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 Herat produces linen which is widely exported,
49
 but also 
karbās cotton.
50
 As our sources move away from the major production and trade centers 
of Marw and Nīshāpūr, they list a variety of textiles among the goods produced and 
exported from the eastern frontier. Ṭālaqān manufactures felt known as Ṭālaqānī felt.
51
 
al-Jūrjān exports leather to the rest of Khurāsān.
52
 Most of the people of Dārzanjī are 
wool merchants (ṣawwāfūn) who make clothing (aksiya) from the wool.
53
 As our sources 
move away from the centers of early Arab settlement and of widespread conversion, 
goods which dominated the economy of Khurāsān and Transoxania before the arrival of 
Islam continue to play a large role in local production. 
 This is not to say that areas with smaller numbers of Muslims did not also engage 
in cotton production at this time. al-Iṣṭakhrī emphasizes the quality and importance of 
cotton and other textiles to Transoxania over Khurāsān, saying that “as for clothing, in 
(Transoxania) robes of cotton are what is best from there, such that they are carried to the 
ends of the world, and for (the clothing of Transoxania) there are also furs (al-firā’), wool 
(al-ṣūf), and camel hair (awbār).”
54
 On the one hand, as al-Iṣṭakhrī moves into 
Transoxania, he finds more evidence of animal-based materials such as, fur and wool, 
implying either increased access to herding along with farming and/or increased access to 
trade with the Turks of the steppe. On the other hand, as cotton grew in importance as an 
export good, the favorable conditions for cotton production along the river valleys of 
Transoxania, conditions which would allow Transoxania to remain a major cotton 
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producer into the twentieth century, would have led the dihqāns of Transoxania to shift 
their production to meet this growing demand. Isbījāb has a cotton market.
55
 Even areas 
like Kāth, the capital of the Khwārazm Shāh and largely outside the direct rule of 
centralized Muslim authorities, produced karbās cotton.
56
  
 The continued importance of both cotton and silk in the cities of the eastern 
frontier throughout the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries indicates that while the 
eastern frontier was maturing as a Muslim frontier, its Persian identity remained strong. 
Groups of people who followed Muslim and Persian styles shared the same geographical 
space and interacted with each other intensively. Literary evidence, which illustrates the 
self-image of the ruling classes of the eastern frontier, shows that an effort was in place 
during the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries to fuse these identities. The more 
successful of the local ruling dynasties of the eastern frontier were those who had most 
success in attaching themselves to both the Muslim and the Persian elements of the 
eastern frontier.  
 
6.5 al-Ṭabarī, Bal‛amī, Firdawsī, and Muslim-Persian Culture 
When Maḥmūd of Ghazna (d. 421/1030) captured Rayy in 420/1029, he asked its Būyid 
ruler, Majd al-Dawla, “Have you not read the Shāhnāmah, which is the history of the 
Persians, and the History of al-Ṭabarī, which is the history of the Muslims?” Majd al-
Dawla replied that he had, and Maḥmūd chastised him: “Your conduct is not that of one 
who has.”
57
 Maḥmūd was a man of the eastern frontier: a Turk who had served under the 
Sāmānids as a commander along with his father Sebüktigin who became the ruler of 
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Khurāsān during the later years of Sāmānid rule, and then the founder of the Ghaznavid 
Dynasty. During his own reign, Maḥmūd unified Khurāsān and Ghazna under his rule 
and expanded Ghaznavid territory into Sind and northern Iran. Maḥmūd’s question to 
Majd al-Dawla is likewise rooted in the eastern frontier. He wished to know if Majd al-
Dawla was familiar with both the history of the Persians and the history of the Muslims 
and implied that knowledge of both was a necessary prerequisite for rule. 
 This connection between Persian and Muslim history had been developing for 
centuries and was a part of a general fusing of Persian with Muslim culture and identity. 
Perhaps the best-known piece of evidence for this is al-Ṭabarī’s Tārīkh al-rusūl wa’l-
mulūk. al-Ṭabarī was born in 224 or 225/839, the son of a dihqān from Āmul in 
Ṭabaristān. The income from his family’s estates allowed him to study and travel. Still at 
a relatively young age al-Ṭabarī relocated to Baghdad, having studied in Ṭabaristān, 
Rayy, Kūfa, al-Baṣra, Egypt, and Syria. In his universal history, al-Ṭabarī attempts to 
bring together the two sides of his own identity, that of the son of an eastern landholder 
and that of a religious scholar living in the capital of the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate. al-Ṭabarī 
did this bycollating the Islamic religious history of the prophets (al-rusūl) and the Persian 
secular history of kings (al-mulūk). While this portion of his history only accounts for the 
first part of his text, while the majority of his work deals with the Islamic world 
following the Prophet Muḥammad’s revelation, these early sections of his text are 
significant for their attempt to legitimate pre-Islamic Persian history by connecting it to a 
monotheist prophetical history. As Fred Donner has noted, al-Ṭabarī attempts to create a 
master narrative of the Muslim community, in order to explain how that community 
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reached the condition in which it stood during al-Ṭabarī’s own lifetime.
58
 This 
combination indicates that, at least for al-Ṭabarī, the Islamic world was entwined within 
both these pasts. al-Ṭabarī’s history was immediately popular and influential for future 
historical writing in the Islamic world, finding many imitators among later historians.
59
 
The fact that no complete manuscript of the text is extant today is most likely due to its 
length (the modern edition by M.J. de Goeje and others takes up sixteen volumes).
60
 
 In 352/963, under the patronage of the Sāmānid amīr Manṣūr b. Nūḥ, Abū ‛Alī 
Bal‛amī produced an abridged Persian translation of al-Ṭabarī’s history. Bal‛amī’s 
translation, known as the Tārīkhnāma-i Ṭabarī, “was one of the most popular historical 
works of the Islamic world, with well over 160 manuscripts extant.”
61
 At roughly the 
same time, Manṣūr b. Nūḥ also commissioned a similar translation of al-Ṭabarī’s Tafsīr.
62
 
In both cases, the translator’s explicit intent was to make Islam, as both a religion and a 
cultural heritage, available to Persian speakers and thereby to legitimate Persian rulers, 
namely the Sāmānids, within a political environment which was increasingly connected 
with Islam. Both prefaces cite Qur’ān 14:4, “We have never sent a messenger except (that 
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he spoke) in the language of his people,”
63
 emphasizing the claim that the translations 
would make the religious and historical legacy of Islam available to a Persian population 
increasingly integrated into the Islamic world. Translations such as these expose 
moments when the Islamic world, previously dominated by Arabs and the Arabic 
language, began to meld together with the Persian world. 
 It has been argued that Manṣūr b. Nūḥ intended for these translations to help 
legitimate his rule in the face of growing rebellion from his governors and military 
commanders, together with the spread of heterodox Islamic movements throughout the 
East.
64
 By using al-Ṭabarī’s works this way, Manṣūr b. Nūḥ tried to position himself as a 
ruler who represented the combined Persian-Muslim culture then developing along the 
eastern frontier. It has also long been argued that the appearance of these translations 
marked the beginning of a Persian literary renaissance, and even (in some extreme views) 
that the appearance of Persian literature under the Sāmānids was anti-Arab in its 
character and perhaps a form of linguistic or literary shu‛ūbiyya.
65
 Other scholars, 
however, have countered or, at least tempered these views. Jan Rypka has called the idea 
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of a “rebirth” of Persian literature “a fallacy and merely a fictitious invention of later 
epochs.”
66
 Julie Scott Meisami has argued that large portions of the population in 
Khurāsān and Transoxania, the dihqāns in particular, had little attachment to Arabic 
culture or society, and that it was within these communities that New Persian developed 
as both a lingua franca and as a literary language.
67
 New Persian, written in Arabic script 
and incorporating many Arabic loan words, was not invented by writers and translators 
like Bal‛amī, but rather grew during the centuries after the Arab conquests, when the 
political system in Khurāsān and Transoxania was dominated by Arabs and the Arabic-
centered religion of Islam. The New Persian language itself, created from this mingling, 
is deployed first in projects which seek to connect these two cultures. 
It is important to look at these developments in the context of the eastern frontier. 
The intention of these translation projects was not to separate Persian and Islamic 
identities, but rather to incorporate the two into a single whole. Much as al-Ṭabarī 
attempted to situate Persian history within Islamic history, while writing in Arabic, the 
translation projects under the patronage of Manṣūr b. Nūḥ showed that the combining of 
Persian and Islamic identities was not limited to Arabized Persians living in Iraq, but was 
also of interest to Persians living along the eastern frontier, where Persian rulers, such as 
the Sāmānids, have often been portrayed as more akin to their Sāsānian predecessors than 
their Muslim contemporaries.   
Meanwhile, more specifically Persian genres were also being produced during the 
fourth/tenth century. Firdawsī’s Shāhnāma and other works devoted to the pre-Islamic 
history of the Persian world are often seen as at odds with the Islamic character of other 
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texts produced at the same time, and many scholars have understood them as representing 
an Iranian nationalism.
68
 In response, Julie Scott Meisami has noted that despite its focus 
on pre-Islamic themes and its contrast to works of purely Islamic history written in 
Persian, such as Bayhaqī’s Tārīkh-i Ma‛sūd-i,
69
 the Shāhnāma has a “clear Islamic tone,” 
which is “seen especially in meditations on worldly transience and on divine omniscience 
as contrasted to human ignorance.”
70
 Texts like the Shāhnāma do not stand in opposition 
to Islamic culture or Arab culture, for which we might see Islam standing as a proxy in 
the early centuries of Muslim rule, even though they do promote a specifically Persian 
history. As C.E. Bosworth has argued,  
On the intellectual plane, much of the Persian epic and the lore concerning the Persian 
emperors had, by the ninth and tenth centuries, been absorbed into the common fabric of 
Islamic civilization, especially when the Persian-inspired literary genre of adab and its 
principal exponents, the secretary class, had been accepted into the cosmopolitan society 
of the Abbasid Caliphate.
71
 
As Persian culture became increasingly influenced by Islam, Islamic civilization also 
became increasingly tolerant towards Persian elements. There may have been an agenda 
behind the employment of pre-Islamic Persian history during the fourth/tenth century, but 
it was not necessarily in opposition to Islam. We will return to this matter shortly.  
 
6.6 Muslim and Persian Genealogies and Legitimation on the Eastern Frontier 
Ṭāhir has left us three marvels, which put everyone’s wits into a whirl. 
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Three wretched ones, with a common father and mother, but with distinguishing features 
to set each one apart. 
One group says, “My people is Quraish”; but both the clients and those of pure blood 
refute this. 
Another group traces its genealogy to Khuzā‛a, [although this is] a clientship old and well 
known. 
A third group inclines towards the house of Kisrā, but these are considered to be vile 
foreigners. 




As the dihqāns preserved pre-Islamic Persian culture into the Islamic era, together with 
their own positions of authority, they were also interested in preserving personal, 
individual genealogical connections to the pre-Islamic past. This is most noticeable in the 
efforts taken by notable Persians of the early Islamic era to establish lineages connecting 
them to important figures of the pre-Islamic past. At the same time that pre-Islamic 
lineages were being deployed to legitimate authority, the most successful local rulers 
along the eastern frontier managed to combine a pre-Islamic lineage with an Islamic one, 
often in terms of clientage and meritorious service to Muslim rulers. In this way they 
showed they held their positions of authority through a combination of the two dominant 
groups of the frontier. 
 Much like the narratives of the conquests discussed in the previous chapter, these 
lineages were often connected to reaffirming particular positions of authority, especially 
in periods of conflict. A clear example of this is found in the following. In 346/957, Abū 
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Manṣūr Muḥammad b. ‛Abd al-Razzāq Ṭūsī commissioned his vizier Abū Manṣūr 
Ma‛mārī to compile a Shāhnāma in prose.
73
 In the preface, Ma‛mārī included a 
genealogy of his patron and of himself, both of which led back to the Kanārang (“Lord of 
the Eastern March”) under the Sāsānian Shāhanshāh Khusraw II.
74
 Through this lineage, 
Abū Manṣūr Ṭūsī claims the rights to rule both Ṭūs, which had been given to the 
Kanārang by Khusraw II,
75
 and Nīshāpūr, which Ibn ‛Āmir gave to the Kanārang when 
he and his son negotiated the surrender of the city’s quhandiz.
76
 Through a single 
genealogy, Abū Manṣūr thus legitimated himself as both a Persian and a Muslim ruler. 
An examination of the situation of Abū Manṣūr Ṭūsī at this time shows that such 
a lineage was meant to clarify contemporary political conflicts over the rightful 
governorship of Ṭūs. The preface concludes with a notice that control of Ṭūs had fallen 
out of the hands of the descendents of the Kanārang when the city was taken by the 
‛Abbāsid governor of Khurāsān Ḥumayd b. Qaḥṭaba al-Ṭā‛ī (r. 152-159/769-775), but 
that Abū Manṣūr then recaptured it.
77
 Abū Manṣūr, noted at the beginning of his career as 
a dihqān of Ṭūs, had first retaken control of Ṭūs as the deputy of the Sāmānid governor of 
Khurāsān Abū ‛Alī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Muẓaffar Chaghānī sometime after 
329/940. He was eventually put in charge of Nīshāpūr as well in 334/945 while Abū ‛Alī 
was on campaign. When the Sāmānid Amīr Nūḥ b. Naṣr (r. 331-343/943-954) replaced 
Abū ‛Alī as governor of Khurāsān with the Turkish military commander Abū Isḥāq 
Sīmjūrī in 335/946-947, Abū Manṣūr joined Abū ‛Alī in rebelling against the Sāmānids 
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and fled to the Būyid court in Rayy, where he held a number of governorships for the 
Būyids, most importantly in Azerbaijan. In 339/950-951, Abū Manṣūr received a pardon 
from Nūḥ and returned to Ṭūs and was eventually made governor of Khurāsān only to be 
replaced by the Turkish commander, and founder of the Ghaznavids, Alptigīn in 349/961. 
Following this, Abū Manṣūr returned to the Būyids in Rayy, where he was poisoned by 
his physician who may have been bribed by the local ruler of Vushmagīr in 350/962.
78
 
The writing of the prose Shāhnāma with its genealogy of Abū Manṣūr came in the period 
between his return to Ṭūs in 339/950-951 and his eventual return to the Būyids in Rayy 
after being ousted by Alptigīn a decade later. This was a period in which his connection 
to the ancestral lands the prose Shāhnāma claimed for him was in flux. As several 
analysts of the preface to the prose Shāhnāma have noted, the effort of writing this work 




The genealogies of Abū Manṣūr and his vizier go beyond the Kanārang and 
include a number of military commanders and heroes, down to a son of Jamshīd.
80
 
Genealogies such as these glorified the author or patron who was connected to important 
pre-Islamic figures, but these genealogies were often seen as blatant fabrications intended 
to increase the status of an individual or his family. Abū Manṣūr’s near contemporary, al-
Bīrūnī, used Abū Manṣūr as an example of the widespread practice “to invent laudatory 
stories, and to forge genealogies which go back to glorious ancestors.”
81
 Instead, it is 
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often the service of an individual ancestor to Muslim rulers which truly define their 
descendents’ claims to authority. While Ṭūs is clearly presented as Abū Manṣūr’s 
hereditary right, and while it appears that despite his loss of authority over the region he 
continued to maintain his personal property rights, it is Ibn ‛Āmir’s reconfirmation of the 
Kanārang’s right to Ṭūs and Nīshāpūr that carries the family’s authority beyond the 
Sāsānian period and into the Muslim era. 
Abū Manṣūr is but one example of this practice of creating genealogies which 
reinforce particular rights to rule. The independent eastern dynasties all attempted to 
connect themselves to a notable pre-Islamic lineage, but they only succeeded in gaining 
power by connecting themselves to notable figures of Islamic history. In the previous 
chapter, the importance of maintaining the family status of notable Persians was 
emphasized in the immediate aftermath of the conquests. Dihqāns, marzbāns, and others 
who held titles and authority under the Sāsānians or who ruled independent principalities 
on the fringes of Khurāsān and Transoxania used treaties of ṣulḥ to preserve their own 
and their families’ status, often on a very local scale. This is the experience we see with 
Abū Manṣūr’s ancestor, the Kanārang. As we go further away from the immediate 
aftermath of the conquests and we examine the claims of rulers who rose to positions of 
prominence over entire provinces, the connections made with pre-Islamic Persian 
notables become grander. The Ṭāhirids claimed descent from the epic hero of the 
Shāhnāma, Rustam b. Dāstan.
82
 As C.E. Bosworth mentions, the Ṭāhirids were highly 
Arabized and generous patrons of Arabic learning and literature, almost every member of 
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the dynasty was noted as being a competent poet and/or prose stylist in Arabic.
83
 Even 
though the Ṭāhirids were so closely connected to Arab culture, a lineage to Persian 
heroes and kings was an important part of their legitimation, and their courtly life focused 
largely on the Persian social networks of Nīshāpūr, among whom such claims held 
greater importance.
84
 Contemporaries may have seen the claims of the Ṭāhirds to descent 
from Rustam as fantastic,
85
 but similar claims by the Sāmānids appear to have been 
universally accepted. The patriarch of the Sāmānid dynasty, Sāmān-Khudā was a dihqān 
from the area of Balkh and a descendent of Bahrām Chūbīn, a member of the Mihrān 
family
86
 who led a revolt against the Shāhanshāh Hormizd IV in 589 and ruled Iran for a 
little more than a year as Bahrām VI before being ousted by Khusraw II. Sāmān-Khudā’s 
genealogy was known by his contemporaries and the Sāmānid dynasty’s claim to descent 
from Bahrām Chūbīn appears to be widely accepted by later writers.
87
 In both of these 
cases, while a genealogy which connected the Ṭāhirids or the Sāmānids to the heroes and 
kings of pre-Islamic Iran helped solidify their positions of power over the regions they 
ruled, these were not necessarily the means by which they achieved their positions of 
power. Rather, they did this through connections to prominent Arab families following 
the conquests and, later, connections to the ‛Abbāsid Caliphs. 
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The Ṭāhirids first enter our historical sources with Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn’s 
grandfather, a Persian named Ruzayq. Ruzayq was a mawlā or client of Ṭalḥa b. ‛Abd 
Allāh al-Khuzā‛ī, the governor of Sīstān in 62-64/681-684. It is from this connection of 
clientship that the Ṭāhirids are sometimes noted as taking the nisba of al-Khuzā‛ī for 
themselves, despite being of Persian ancestry.
88
 This connection between the Ṭāhirids 
and the Khuzā‛īs gave the descendents of Ruzayq their first positions of power in Islamic 
Khurāsān. Muṣ‛ab b. Ruzayq served as the secretary of the ‛Abbāsid dā‛ī Sulaymān b. 
Kathīr al-Khuzā‛ī, which ingratiated him into the ‛Abbāsid fold, eventually leading to 
governorships over Būshang, which al-Ya‛qūbī notes is the birthplace of Ṭāhir b. al-
Ḥusayn,
89
 and Herat. The fortunes of the Ṭāhirids spread as Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn attached 
himself to the court of al-Ma’mūn. In 194/810, Ṭāhir supported al-Ma’mūn, in the service 
of Harthama b. A‛yān, against the rebel Rāfi‛ b. al-Layth. He later led al-Ma’mūn’s 
armies against his brother al-Amīn, whom Ṭāhir captured and executed in Baghdad. It 
was in return for these services that Ṭāhir was first made governor of the western 
provinces, establishing his capital in al-Raqqa, and the ṣāḥib al-shurṭa in Baghdad before 
being given the governorship of Khurāsān in 205/821. These positions, which became 
hereditary among Ṭāhir’s family, were earned through service and clientage to the 
‛Abbāsids that served to legitimate their rule.
90
 
Similarly, the earliest appearance of the Sāmānids in our historical sources has 
Sāmān-Khudā attaching himself to the Arab governor of Khurāsān Asad b. ‛Abd Allāh 
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al-Qasrī, for whom he names his son Asad.
91
 We can imagine Sāmān-Khudā participating 
in the Mihragān festivities in honor of Asad al-Qasrī discussed earlier in this chapter. 
While little is known of the remainder of Sāmān-Khudā’s career, or that of his son Asad, 
his four grandsons, Aḥmad, Ilyās, Nūḥ, and Yaḥyā b. Asad, establish the Sāmānid 
dynasty as the dominant power in Khurāsān and Transoxania. In 204/829, the governor of 
Khurāsān, Ghassān b. ‛Abbād, appointed these four brothers to the governorships of 
Farghāna, Herat,
92
 Samarqand, and al-Shāsh respectively. In return, Ghassān demanded 
the Sāmānid brothers’ support for al-Ma’mūn against the rebel Rāfi‛ b. al-Layth.
93
 In 
their opposition to Rāfi‛, we see the first connection between the careers of both the 
Ṭāhirids and the Sāmānids. After Ghassān was replaced by Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn as 
governor of Khurāsān, the Sāmānids retained their administrative positions and, 
eventually became virtual rulers over Transoxania as vassals of the Ṭāhirids, until the 
Ṣaffārids brought an end to Ṭāhirid rule in Khurāsān, at which point the Sāmānids 
received official investitures for the governorship of Transoxania. 
 This coming together of the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids in support of al-Ma’mūn 
against Rāfi‛ b. al-Layth is an important moment in the transition of the eastern frontier. 
Rāfi‛ was the grandson of the last Umayyad governor of Khurāsān Naṣr b. Sayyār. His 
revolt began in Samarqand in 190/806 in opposition to the ‛Abbāsid governor of 
Khurāsān, ‛Alī b. ‛Īsā b. Māhān, and centered on accusations that Ibn Māhān was 
exploiting the population of Transoxania financially. Rāfi‛ mobilized support from the 
local Persian population while gaining assistance from the Toghuz-Ghuz and Qarluq 
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Turks. Hārūn al-Rashīd had traveled to Khurāsān to take command personally of the 
forces against Rāfi‛ when he died in 193/809. It was shortly after al-Rashīd’s death that 
Rāfi‛ surrendered to al-Ma’mūn, then governor of the east.
94
 In their support for the 
‛Abbāsids against Rāfi‛, the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids sided with the Caliphate against an 
uprising that appears to have been largely supported by their Persian compatriots. In 
return, al-Ma’mūn brought these Persian families into the ‛Abbāsid fold; eventually they 
would rise to the hisghest rank seen by Persians since the collapse of the Sāsānian Empire 
a century and a half earlier. 
 Maintaining genealogical connections between important families of the eastern 
frontier and their pre-Islamic ancestors was an important element in legitimating their 
authority, but it was not the means by which they gained that authority. The Persian 
families which rose to the highest rungs of the political and social ladder during the 
Islamic period were those who simultaneously fostered connections to the Islamic world. 
As Richard Bulliet argued regarding the Maḥmī family of Nīshāpūr - a family of dihqāns 
whose ancestors included a (most likely illegitimate) child of Sa‛īd b. ‛Uthmān b. ‛Affān 
governor of Khurāsān for a brief time in 56/676, “the combination of dihqān status and 
caliphal descent had produced in the course of intervening generations an elevation of the 
family to the highest ranks of the patriciate.”
95
 As the eastern frontier matured and the 
dual cultures found in Khurāsān and Transoxania merged, connections to the old Persian 
nobility became, in practice, less important than connections to the new Muslim rulers, 
but these pre-Islamic genealogies still mattered when negotiating positions on the local 
level, among other Persians. If we look at the picture of the eastern frontier in our 
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medieval geographical sources, we see that it is those Persian families which fostered 
such a connection with important figures of the early Islamic community who are 
portrayed as the ones who build the frontier and who shaped the region physically.  
 
6.7 The Builders of the Frontier 
If we look for the ways in which our geographical sources represent the actual physical 
formation, the building in a literal sense, of the eastern frontier, we find that they follow a 
trend similar to what we saw in their representation of the spread of Islam. Our earlier 
sources focus on pre-Islamic precedents and it is only later, as Islam becomes a more 
important part of life on the eastern frontier that the actual shaping of Khurāsān and 
Transoxania is attributed to figures of the Islamic era. Most interesting in this 
development, however, is that the figures who do appear represent the transitions which 
are happening more broadly within the society of the region. These are a combination of 
notable Persians who have risen to prominence in the service of the ‛Abbāsids. The most 
noticeable exceptions are figures who act as facilitators of this transition, especially the 
caliph al-Ma’mūn. 
In the earliest geographical texts, major construction projects are almost 
exclusively assigned to pre-Islamic rulers. Many of these reports, tying pre-Islamic 
figures to building projects, have a legendary feel to them. Ibn Khurradādhbih 
emphasizes the reach of the Sāsānians as builders, describing Khusraw I as the founder of 
Farghāna, which was then called Azharkhāna because people came there to settle from 
every city (az har khāna).
96
 In fact, however, Sāsānian rule never extended into 
Transoxania, which means that Khusraw could not have founded any cities in Farghāna. 
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More believable is Ibn al-Faqīh’s crediting the foundation of Marw al-Rūdh to Khusraw 
I.
97
 Ibn al-Faqīh, with his broad interest in issues of adab and in various traditions 
connected to different places, begins to incorporate large numbers of reports about the 
foundation of important cities. He reports that Ardashīr settled Nabateans in Marw after 
he became impressed by their skill with camels.
98
 Ibn al-Faqīh is especially interested in 
reports which connect Alexander the Great to building projects, identifying him as the 





The one set of traditions which first appear in Ibn al-Faqīh and which then appear 
regularly in later geographic texts are those connected to the foundation of the quhandiz 
of Marw. As discussed in Chapter Three, Ibn al-Faqīh, al-Iṣṭakhrī, Ibn Ḥawqal, al-
Muqaddasī and the Ḥudūd al-‛ālam all report that the quhandiz of Marw was built by the 
legendary king Tahūmarth.
101
 We also discussed the variant of this report found in the 
Balkhī School, crediting Alexander with the construction of Marw itself.
102
 In many 
ways, this identification of both Tahūmarth and Alexander as founders of the city which 
would become the earliest center of Muslim rule in Khurāsān mirrors the dual nature of 
the eastern frontier itself. By presenting both a Persian king and a king claimed for the 
Muslim heritage through his appearance in the Qur’ān, Marw gains significance as both a 
Persian and a Muslim site long before the arrival of the Arab conquests. 
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As our geographical sources begin to focus on Khurāsān and Transoxania during 
the Islamic era, their interest falls on Persian converts who were involved in important 
construction projects. They largely ignore projects which occurred as part of the Arab 
conquests: it is only in passing that individuals from before the ‛Abbāsid Revolution are 
associated with construction projects, and more often than not this is only in situations 
where they have lent their name to a particular place, such as Qaṣr al-Aḥnaf b. Qays or 
Asadābādh. In this way the conquests are not presented as a physically transformative 
experience; instead, it is the rise of Persian converts to important positions of power that 
transforms the region.  
One of the most notable groups of builders and shapers of the eastern frontier in 
our geographic sources, the Barmakid family, first appear as the custodians of a pre-
Islamic Buddhist edifice. Their connection to the Nawbahār Buddhist shrine near Balkh 
is first noted by al-Ya‛qūbī.
103
 Ibn al-Faqīh provides the most detailed description of 
Nawbahār and the Barmakids role as the custodians of the temple. He describes the 
Nawbahār and its role in pre-Islamic Khurāsān as a site of pilgrimage, attracting 
patronage from the kings of China and Kābul, and the Barmakids’ as the custodians of 
the temple. This leads directly into the story of the conversion of Barmak Abū Khālid 
‛Abd Allāh b. Barmak to Islam by the Caliph ‛Uthmān.
104
 This tale, as found in Ibn al-
Faqīh, is likely apocryphal, involving a trip by Barmak to Mecca where he sees the truth 
of Islam and then returns to Balkh where people try to force him into apostasy. But in any 
case, this family’s conversion is crucial for their presentation as builders of the eastern 
frontier, connecting the region’s pre-Islamic and Islamic histories. It is interesting to note 
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that before presenting the story of the Barmakids conversion, Ibn al-Faqīh begins his 
chapter on Khurāsān with lavish praise for the family, saying that no Khurāsānī matches 
their greatness. They are described as the gateway to authority, with no one coming close 
to the sulṭān who is not already close to the Barmakids.
105
 This representation of the 
Barmakids takes them from their pre-Islamic history as the custodians of a Buddhist 
shrine directly into their central role in the Muslim history of Khurāsān and Transoxania, 
as conquerors and builders along the eastern frontier. According to al-Ya‛qūbī, 
Ghūrawand was conquered during the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd by al-Faḍl b. Yaḥya b. 
Khālid b. Barmak.
106
 al-Ya‛qūbī later elaborates on the conquest of Ghūrawand, first in 
the context of the conversion of the shīr of al-Bāmiyān, who participates in these 
conquests,
107
 and second in the context of al-Faḍl’s leading a number of dihqāns on 
expeditions against the territory of the Kābul Shāh, culminating in the destruction of 
many idols.
108
 In al-Ya‛qūbī’s text, the Barmakid family begins as the keepers of a 
Buddhist temple near Balkh, and later become involved in the conversion of local people 
to Islam; finally, they lead an army of Persian nobles, including those in whose 
conversion they have personally been involved, against the Kābul Shāh in the name of 
the Caliphate. The Barmakid family is transformed from Buddhist authorities to Muslim 
authorities and, in the process, become major shapers of the region. Returning to Chapter 
One and the discussion of the building of the “Gate of Iron” at al-Rāsht, in most of the 
versions of the construction of this gate, it is al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā al-Barmakid who builds 
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this barrier between the lands of the Islam and the Turks.
109
 Not only is al-Faḍl the figure 
who expands the frontier into Ghūrawand and the territory of the Kābul Shāh, he 
physically marks the extent of the frontier. 
 Interestingly, these reports of the Barmakid family focus on the earlier texts, Ibn 
Khurradādhbih, al-Ya‛qūbī, and Ibn al-Faqīh. In the Balkhī tradition of geographical 
writing, the Barmakids are less present. Here the Nawbahār is presented as an important 
landmark, not through direct descriptions of the temple but rather through its appearance 
in the names of gates and roads.
110
 By the time of the Ḥudūd al-‛ālam, the Nawbahār 
remains an important part of the landscape of Balkh, but the Barmakids are left out of its 
description. Instead, the Nawbahār is remembered as the buildings of the Sāsānians, who 
once resided in Balkh, and as a place filled with paintings and other wonderful works 
(kārkird).
111
 Even in the descriptions of the “Gate of Iron” at al-Rāsht, after Ibn al-Faqīh 
the matter of its foundation is ignored by geographical writers. In our geographical 
sources, the role of the Barmakids as shapers of the frontier appears to be most important 
in the third/ninth century, at the point when Persian converts are coming into their own as 
governors and as founders of provincial dynasties. In these earlier texts, the Barmakids 
are offered as a template for the role that Persian converts can play in shaping the Islamic 
world. It is interesting to note, in this context, here the tragic story of the Barmakids’ 
downfall is never discussed.
112
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 In later texts of the Balkhī School, the Barmakids are replaced by Abū Muslim as 
an important builder. While al-Faḍl al-Barmakid is associated, as a builder, directly with 
the frontier itself, expanding it and building walls and gates, Abū Muslim transforms the 
center of Muslim Khurāsān in Marw. The role of Khurāsān in the ‛Abbāsid Revolution is 
a part of the descriptions of the region, beginning with Ibn al-Faqīh who highlights its 
role as the home of the ‛Abbāsid da‛wa and the starting point of the revolution.
113
 al-
Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal both make the ‛Abbāsid Revolution a part of their descriptions 
of Marw, making special mention of the home of Abū al-Najm, where the first black 
robes of the ‛Abbāsids were dyed.
114
 As described in the previous chapter, both al-
Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal discuss how Abū Muslim reconfigured Marw following the 
‛Abbāsid Revolution, building a new congregational mosque along the Mājān Canal and 
then relocating the city’s markets and the governor’s palace into the same 
neighborhood.
115
 Instead of expanding or fortifying the frontier, Abū Muslim is a builder 
in these texts who changes the fabric of Khurāsān, altering urban patterns to fit those of 
an Islamic city focused on the congregational mosque. 
The one figure who appears to build both in the urban center of Khurāsān and 
along the frontier is the Caliph al-Ma’mūn, whose construction projects include both 
urban renovations and the building of fortresses and gates. In al-Jurjānīyya, al-Ma’mūn 
built the fortress (qaṣr) Bāb al-Ḥujjāj, and his son ‛Alī built another fortress nearby.
116
 
On the extreme frontiers of Islamic world, in Ghazna, al-Ma’mūn is said to have built the 
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Dar-i Tāziyān or “The Gate of the Arabs” through which caravans go out.
117
 It is al-
Ma’mūn’s connections with Marw that often seem incredible. al-Ya‛qūbī credits al-
Ma’mūn as the first ruler to make Marw the capital of Khurāsān,
118
 whereas it was 
actually during al-Ma’mūn’s reign that Marw ceased being the capital of Khurāsān as the 
Ṭāhirids moved their capital to Nīshāpūr. al-Muqaddasī comes closer to this reality in 
showing al-Ma’mūn as a destroyer rather than a builder. al-Muqaddasī tells of a woman 
who told al-Ma’mūn to leave Marw and its villages because he had destroyed the city, 
and no one could reside in Marw without the consent of its people.
119
 al-Ma’mūn’s role 
as a builder along the eastern frontier is important in the context of his role as the caliph 
who oversaw the rise of the Ṭāhirids and the Sāmānids. It was during al-Ma’mūn’s reign, 
through his victory over al-Amīn, that these Persian dynasties expanded their authority. 
In these ways, al-Ma’mūn shaped Khurāsān and Transoxania. 
 The presentation of the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids as builders along the eastern 
frontier in our geographical sources is interesting in that these dynasties, despite their 
being largely contemporary with our sources, are assigned less importance than the older 
builders just described. For the Ṭāhirids, focus is placed on the transformation of 
Nīshāpūr into the new capital of Khurāsān. al-Ya‛qūbī connects ‛Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir 
directly with the renovation and expansion of Nīshāpūr. He is noted as the governor who 
moved the capital from Marw to Nīshāpūr and as the builder of a splendid edifice known 
as al-Shādhiyākh and a minaret.
120
 Despite his being the third Ṭāhirid governor of 
Khurāsān, ‛Abd Allāh is represented in multiple facets throughout our geographical 
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sources as the key figure of the Ṭāhirid dynasty, and not only as a builder. The listings of 
kharāj revenues in the Iraqī School texts all provide them for ‛Abd Allāh’s reign.
121
 Here 
‛Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir is also described as a generous benefactor, giving away a million 
dinārs, by which he is compared with ‛Abd Allāh b. al-Mubārak in generosity.
122
 In this, 
the Ṭāhirids are not presented so much as builders as reformers who altered the center of 
authority in Khurāsān and set the standard by which the lands of the region would be 
regulated and taxed. 
These geographical writers also seem to downplay the contributions of the 
Sāmānids as builders. In our earliest sources this is not surprising, since the Sāmānid 
enterprise was then still in its infancy. In Ibn Khurradādhbih, the Sāmānids appear as 
village headmen. While providing the details of the kharāj for Khurāsān during the 
region of ‛Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir, Ibn Khurradādhbih states that al-Sughd is better known as 
the district of the Sāmānid Nūḥ b. Asad.
123
 In later texts, their contributions are still 
observably few. When al-Muqaddasī describes Naṣrābādh in Farghāna, he says a king 
built it for his son, Naṣr, and named it for him.
124
 In the previous chapter, we speculated 
that this king was the Sāmānid Aḥmad b. Asad, who had been governor of Farghāna from 
204/819, and that the son was Naṣr b. Aḥmad, the first Sāmānid amīr to rule over all of 
Transoxania. We know from other references that this would have been close to Naṣr b. 
Aḥmad’s birthplace, which the Ḥudūd al-‛ālam tells us was Khatlām in Farghāna.
125
 
Even though al-Muqaddasī takes pains to praise the Sāmānids, here he does not take the 
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opportunity to praise them as builders, except indirectly. Only one building is directly 
associated with a Sāmānid amīr, a ribāṭ in Firabr built by Naṣr b. Aḥmad.
126
 More than 
the Sāmānid amīrs themselves, their commanders and governors are ntoed as builders. In 
the region of Isbījāb, a number of ribāṭs are associated with figures known to be members 





or local governors, such as ‛Amīd al-Dawla Fā’iq.
129
 The activity of Turkish commanders 
as builders of ribāṭs will be discussed shortly. These Sāmānid building projects, unlike 
the Ṭāhird ones, are closely associated with the frontier and consist largely of ribāṭs. 
Perhaps the image of the Sāmānids as conquerors on the frontier prevails over their image 
as builders. al-Muqaddasī makes special note of Ismā‛īl b. Aḥmad’s conquest of Dih 
Nūjīkath, which caused damage to the region.
130
 
 The people who are presented as the shapers of the built environment of the 
eastern frontier throughout our geographical sources are primarily either Persian converts 
or figures who facilitated the political advancement of Persians, al-Ma’mūn above all. 
These narratives appear, in a way, to use building as a metaphor for the larger social 
impact of these groups of Persian converts. The Barmakids represent the expansion of 
Muslim rule along the eastern frontier and the integration of old Persian networks into the 
Islamic world through their conquest and conversion of Persian local rulers and their 
construction of the “Gate of Iron” which defined the frontiers of the Islamic world. In a 
similar way, the Sāmānids and, perhaps more importantly, their Turkish commanders also 
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expand the frontier and fortify it with ribāṭs. On the other hand, Abū Muslim and the 
Ṭāhirids are associated with construction projects based in the capitals of Khurāsān. In 
this way they engage in a transformation of the state and perhaps of lands that occupy a 
more central place in the Islamic world than those of the Barmakids and the Sāmānids. 
Here it is most important to note that it is those Persians who converted to Islam and who 
entered into the service of the ‛Abbāsids who receive the most credit for shaping 
Khurāsān and Transoxania. 
 
6.8 The Eastern Frontier as a Land of Islam and Dār al-jihād 
As the eastern frontier went through a process of maturing into a Muslim frontier, even 
while maintaining many aspects of its pre-Islamic culture, Khurāsān and Transoxania 
became associated increasingly with notions of orthodox Sunni Islam and received praise 
from our geographical sources as a land of correct belief. In the earliest instances of such 
praise, found in Ibn al-Faqīh, it comes in two forms. Ibn al-Faqīh begins his praise for 
Khurāsān with an eye towards its military prowess, associated with the defense of Islam. 
Ibn al-Faqīh begins with a tradition from Sharīk b. ‛Abd Allāh, calling Khurāsān God’s 
quiver. “If he becomes angry with a people, he flings [arrows] from his quiver.”
131
 He 
then highlights Khurāsān’s role in the death of numerous Persian kings and in the 
overthrow of the Umayyads,
132
 before ending with a description of Khurāsān as the shield 
of Islam against the Turks.
133
 In all these descriptions, Khurāsān and its people are 
praised as righteous warriors who correct abuses by rulers and protect the lands of Islam 
from the Turks, but it is important to note that the term jihād is never mentioned. On the 
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other hand, Ibn al-Faqīh’s praises are interspersed with references to the good judgment 
and intelligence of the people of Khurāsān, matching their military talents with their 
intellectual talents and religious practices. 
As we move further into the texts of the Balkhī School, we see such praises 
applied directly to the Sāmānids, while the language used to describe the frontier focuses 
more specifically on the practice of jihād along the frontier. al-Iṣṭakhrī is the first to use 
praises similar to those that Ibn al-Faqīh heaped on Khurāsān, both in general and 
specifically for the Sāmānids, whom he praises for their justice and their support of 
proper religion.
134
 Ibn al-Faqīh’s respect for the Sāmānid amīrs is emphasized by his use 
of the blessing “raḥimahu llāh” after the names of all deceased amīrs, a practice that he 
does not follow with any other figures in his text.
135
 Speaking in a more general way, al-
Iṣṭakhrī portrays Transoxania as a land of jihād. He says that “there is not in Islam a 
region with a greater share in the jihād than them, because most of the borders of 
Transoxania are towards the Dār al-Ḥarb.”
136
 al-Iṣṭakhrī adds that the majority of the 
people of wealth (ahl al-amwāl) of Transoxania spend their money on establishing ribāṭs 
and improving the roads and stopping-places in the path of jihād.
137
 By the time of the 
Balkhī School, the eastern frontier has been integrated into an Islamic worldview. It is no 
longer a region which is being incorporated into the Islamic world, but in many ways it is 
becoming paradigmatic of the Islamic world and a region respected for its proper practice 
of Islam. Similarly, the frontier itself has been recast in Islamic terms, as a Dār al-jihād. 
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These patterns continue in texts which follow al-Iṣṭakhrī. al-Muqaddasī begins his 
discussion of al-Mashriq, which he defines as Khurāsān, Transoxania, and Sīstān, by 
praising the region’s contributions to Islam. He describes it as the support of Islam (rukn 
al-Islām) and its fortress (ḥiṣn). In religion the people are correct and justice is 
enduring.
138
 He makes similarly broad statements about the subregions of al-Mashriq. Of 
Transoxania, al-Muqaddasī states that its people are most correct in religion (istaqāma fī 
al-dīn).
139
 al-Muqaddasī also emphasizes al-Mashriq’s role as the defense of Islam. It is 
“the barrier of the Turks, the shield against the Ghuzz, the terror of the Byzantines, and 
the glory of the Muslims.”
140
 When it comes to al-Muqaddasī’s general description of 
Transoxania, jihād is a part of his language. The people of Transoxania are the most 
persistent in jihād.
141
 Transoxania is the dār al-jihād and the place of closing the frontier 
(mawḍi‛ sadād).
142
 al-Muqaddasī also applies this description to particular localities in 
Transoxania. Isbījāb, in a region with 2,700 ribāṭs, is described as dār al-jihād.
143
 Such 
engagement in religiously motivated warfare is placed in contrast to people ignorant of 
Islam. In Bukhārā, there are many murābiṭūn and few people ignorant of Islam 
(jāhilūn).
144
 It is important to note that while these praises are often given for Greater 
Khurāsān, which includes Transoxania, it is Transoxania itself which is most often 
characterized as being the actual dār al-jihād. 
The Ḥudūd al-‛ālam also sees Transoxania as a region of jihād, or at least of 
religiously motivated fighting. Its people are warlike and active fighters for the faith 
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(ghāzī pīsha), with a pure faith (pāk dīn).
145
 Similar sentiments are expressed regarding 







 The development of this language describing Transoxania as a land of Islam and 
jihād demonstrates a maturing of the eastern frontier, a point at which the eastern frontier 
has fully become a Muslim frontier and is therefore described in Islamic terminology. 
Our geographical sources have as their goal the systematized presentation of the Islamic 
world as a single body. Within that system, each region must have its role to play in 
support of the broader Islamic world. By the fourth/tenth century, the place of 
Transoxania and the eastern frontier as a whole had been defined in terms of the conduct 
of jihād for the betterment of the entire Islamic world. This language is not just the 
language of authors connected with the central lands of the Islamic world, but rather 
appears to have been adopted by the people of Khurāsān and Transoxania as well. In the 
following section, the connection made between the conduct of jihād and the collection 
of kharāj will be used as an example of how this idea of the dār al-jihād played into the 
rhetoric of the inhabitants of the frontier. 
 
6.9 Use of Islamic Language: Taxation and the Frontier 
In 355/966, a group of 20,000 ghāzīs from Khurāsān arrived at al-Rayy, then the capital 
of the Būyid ‛Amir Rukn al-Dawla, and demanded that Rukn al-Dawla’s vizier, Ibn al-
‛Amīd, give them the kharāj of the city and its dependencies so that they might travel to 
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the Arab-Byzantine frontier to fight against the Byzantines who had recently taken 
Aleppo, Ma‛rash, al-Maṣṣīṣa, and Ṭarsūs.  
They (the leaders of the ghāzīs) said: “We want the kharāj of this land, all of it. For it 
belongs to the treasury. You have heard of what the Byzantines have done to the 
Muslims, as they seized possession of your land; likewise the Armenians (have done such 
things against you). Meanwhile, since we are ghāzīs and mendicants and sons of the path, 
we are more deserving of (this) wealth than you are.” They demanded that an army go 
out with them. They were excessive in their demands.
149
 
When Ibn al-‛Amīd refused, fearing that they were in fact agents of the Sāmānids looking 
to conquer the territory for their masters, the ghāzīs accused the Būyids of being infidels 
and stormed the city, pillaging the palace of Ibn al-‛Amīd and almost killing both Rukn 
al-Dawla and his vizier. In the end, the Būyid ‛amīr was able to gather his troops and 
chase the invaders out of Rayy, dispersing this force of ghāzīs. There is no report of their 
having actually reached the thughūr, at least not in the numbers in which they had 
originally begun. 
 This short narrative is interesting on a number of levels. First, traveling from 
Khurāsān and Transoxania to fight along the Arab-Byzantine frontier was a popular 
activity throughout the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. Many volunteered to fight 
against the Byzantines as a religious duty and this event illustrates that these large 
numbers of volunteers would gather on occasion to participate in this form of holy 
warfare in a somewhat organized fashion (there are many references, for example, to 
leaders of the ghāzīs throughout the narrative). The reasons why these ghāzīs would 
abandon Khurāsān and the dār al-jihād that was in their own region, across the Oxus, is 
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 More important in the context of the current chapter, a question 
arises here about a connection between jihād or frontier warfare in general and the 
collection of kharāj. In a broader sense, this question regards the relationship between 
volunteer fighters engaged in frontier warfare and the state. In this narrative, it seems 
clear that even though these ghāzīs were irregular volunteers unaffiliated with the local 
ruling power, they thought that the state had a duty to finance their mission even though 
it was not the state that had ordered their campaign. The story of the ghāzīs coming to 
Rayy also raises the question of whether or not kharāj was levied on frontier territories 
engaged in jihād at all and, if it was, how it was used for fighting along the frontier. Our 
geographical sources refer to areas that are free of the kharāj, most explicitly when 
describing regions directly on the eastern frontier. The wording and explanation of these 
descriptions often imply that exemption from the kharāj is associated with a wider notion 
that the kharāj is primarily intended for fighting the jihād along the frontier and that 
therefore, individuals engaged in frontier warfare should be exempt from paying kharāj. 
 One example of a region free from kharāj is Isbījāb. We have already mentioned 
Isbījāb’s connection to jihād and the eastern frontier many times, but if we read al-
Muqaddasī’s report on the region in more detail, we see that he connects Isbījāb’s frontier 
status to an exemption from kharāj.  
[Isbījāb] is an important frontier and the dār jihād, with fortresses (ḥiṣn) over its suburbs. 
In it there is a quhandiz, in  ruins. They do not know of drought, nor kharāj, and among 
them there are many kinds of fruits of pleasant price/quality.
151
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al-Muqaddasī makes a connection here between a frontier region engaged in jihād and 
exemption from kharāj, but he does not make the connection directly. Writing much 
later, in the seventh/thirteenth century, Yāqūt does make this direct connection in his 
entry on Isbījāb. 
There is not in Khurāsān, nor in Transoxania, a land which does not have the kharāj 
levied upon it except for Isfījāb because it is a great frontier (thaghran ‛aẓīman). It is 
relieved from the kharāj and this is because the people spend the kharāj in the cost of 
arms and aid for the stations in that land.
152
 
These two passages clearly imply that the people of Isbījāb do not need to pay the kharāj  
because, being a frontier territory, they already spend the money they earn from their land 
on fighting the jihād. These passages localize the practice and deal with the exclusion of 
one particular area from the kharāj; the broader region’s exemption is tied to the notion 
that they are already performing the very activities that the land tax is supposed to 
support. 
 A few other areas give the same impression. According to Ibn Khurradādhbih, 
Kābul is able to pay part of its kharāj with Ghuzz Turks captured during frontier raids.
153
 
Further south, al-Ya‛qūbī says that the kharāj of Sīstān is nearly ten million dirhams, 
divided among its army, its police (shinhatihā), and its frontier, implying that the money 
does not leave Sīstān and is instead immediately reinvested in local defense.
154
 There is 
also evidence for the Arab-Byzantine frontier, where Qudāma tells us that the kharāj is 
spent on fortifications and general improvements to the frontier in preparation for the 
annual raids; however, the amount of money raised locally by the kharāj is only a third to 
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half of what is spent in fighting the Byzantines.
155
 The picture we get from these 
sampling of regions where kharāj funds are linked to frontier warfare is that the ideas 
promoted by the ghāzīs at Rayy were in broad circulation at the time. 
 If we look back at the conditions specific to Isbījāb, we are reminded of our 
discussion in the previous chapter, in which Isbījāb was noted for its high concentration 
of ribāṭs, apparently connected with the private estates of dihqāns and of Sāmānid 
commanders and administrators. Isbījāb is said to have some 2,700 ribāṭs.
156
 Along with 
these there were numerous fortresses (ḥuṣūn) associated with personal estates. The 
argument was made that there is a direct connection between personal agricultural 
estates, primarily owned by dihqāns, and the building of ribāṭs and other fortifications 
connected with defending the frontier in general, and with jihād more specifically. These 
agricultural estates would have been the primary source of kharāj funds in and around 
Isbījāb, so the connection between the source of kharāj income and the expenditure of 
money in the name of frontier warfare and jihād in the region is fairly clear. 
 Returning to the argument that the ribāṭs found in regions like Isbījāb were 
primarily not originally constructed by Muslims as ribāṭs, but were rather the fortresses 
of dihqāns which became rededicated as ribāṭs following a period of widespread 
conversion in Khurāsān and Transoxania, can we then see a connection between the new 
identification of these rural estates as Islamic frontier fortifications with a new idea that 
such estates are free from kharāj because of their new role as sites of jihād? This appears 
to be a case of an Islamic language of frontiers being used by landholders to improve 
their status, by freeing them from taxation. If it was in fact the landed estates of dihqāns 
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which made up the bulk of the ribāṭs along the eastern frontier, did an understanding 
emerge of jihād and its relationship to the state that held particular appear for these 
dihqāns? If so, this understanding would most likely have given increased rights and 
benefits to dihqāns involved in frontier warfare. It also may be that it was this 
understanding, and the language used to describe it, which spread to the ghāzīs of 
Khurāsān who appeared at the gates of Rayy demanding the local-kharāj for themselves. 
 In the end, that such a language developed in a context in which dihqāns were 
converting their estates into outposts for the conducting of jihād is a sign that by the 
fourth/tenth century the eastern frontier had matured as a Muslim frontier. It had taken on 
an Islamic identity and its purpose, as the frontier between the settled lands of Khurāsān 
and Transoxania and the steppe lands of the Turks, had become framed in the ideology of 
Islam. If such a development took place during the fourth/tenth century, under the rule of 
the Sāmānids, what does this tell us about the idea that the Sāmānid interest in Persian 
language and literature and the epics of pre-Islamic Iran was “nationalist” and part of a 
broader project of breaking away from the direct authority of the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate? 
 
6.10 The Turks, Persian Genealogies, and the New Eastern Frontier 
At the beginning of this chapter, we discussed how the experience of the Arab conquests 
created a new frontier region within the confines of an older, more established frontier. 
From there, we explored the ways in which these two frontiers merged into a single 
eastern frontier, dominated by Islamic cultural, political and economic networks, 
identities, and ideologies. This process, as it has been detailed here, primarily took place 
on the Muslim side of the frontier through interactions between Arab conquerors, the 
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local Persian population and, over the course of centuries, their descendants. What has 
been left out of this discussion is the one constant dynamic along the frontier, the 
interaction between the settled populations of Khurāsān and the river valleys of 
Transoxania, whether pre-Islamic or Muslim, and the Turks of the steppe. The 
relationship across the frontier went through its own changes over the course of the 
third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, as the Turks became an increasingly important and 
influential part of Muslim society. 
 From the beginning of Arab expansion into Transoxania, Turks had been living 
within the lands of Islam and, over the course of time, groups of Turks became an 
important part of the Islamic world, much like the Persians. Our view of the integration 
of the Turks most often focuses on the use of Turkish mamlūk slave soldiers by the 
‛Abbāsids and by the governors of Khurāsān and Transoxania. Beginning with the reign 
of the caliph al-Mu‛taṣim (r. 218-227/833-842), Turkish slaves formed the core of an 
imperial bodyguard in Iraq, but this practice seems to have been adopted from Turkish 
usage along the eastern frontier. During the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, some 
Turks who had entered the Islamic world as slave soldiers and commanders, while others 
entered through other means, in some cases simply from living in regions which were 
conquered by the Arabs, and in other cases from migration into the Islamic world. All, 
appear to have gone through a process of conversion and integration similar to that of the 
Persians.  
 Our geographical sources give us evidence for Turks living within the lands of 
Islam under a variety of conditions. The Ḥudūd al-ʽālam describes the Khallukh Turks 
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living in the steppes of Ṭukhāristān
157
 and the Khalaj Turks living in Ghaznīn, Balkh, 
Ṭukhāristān, Bust, and Gūzgānān.
158
 Shiljī, Ṭarāz, Takābkath, Farūnkath, Mirkī, 
Navīkath, and Afrūnkat are also home both to Muslims and to numerous Turks.
159
 
Khwārazm is home to a number of Ghuzz and other Turks, to the extent that, as 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the local, non-Turkish, population is said to 
have Turkish features.
160
 Sometimes the Turks living within the lands of Islam are 
described as dangerous or problematic for other local populations. The Kunjīna Turks 
live in the mountains between Khuttalān and Chaghāniyān and are professional thieves 
and looters of caravans, conducting predatory expeditions at a distance of forty to fifty 
farsakhs from their district, even though they make a show of loyalty to the amīrs of 
Khuttalān and Chaghāniyān.
161
 Sometimes, these Turks may be living within Muslim 
lands under an agreement with the Muslims, such as the trucial Turks (jā-yi Turkān-i 
āshtī) of Sutkand, many of whom have converted to Islam.
162
 Turkish converts inhabit a 
thousand felt tents on the grazing land around Isbījāb.
163
 Even the Turks who have 
converted to Islam may not have integrated into local society to the extent that they no 
longer constitute a danger. Barūkat and Balāj are described as frontier posts against the 
Turkomen, indicating a need to defend against these people, but it is also said that the 
Turkomen have converted to Islam out of fear.
164
 Along the eastern frontier, there are a 
variety of Turks living within the Islamic world under a number of different 
circumstances. 
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 Those Turks who lived within the Muslim side of the eastern frontier and 
integrated into Muslim society did so in ways similar to the Persians who became 
increasingly associated with Muslim society. One important example of this trend is 
found in the region of Isbījāb. Here two Turkish commanders of the Sāmānids, Qarātakīn 
and Kharākharāf built ribāṭs, one in Isbījāb itself and the other in Yakānkath 
respectively.
165
 More than merely military buildings, both of these ribāṭs include other 
facilities which demonstrate their founders’ personal attachments to the ribāṭs and the 
Islamic identity that they represent. The graves of both Qarātakīn and Kharākharāf are 
found at their ribāṭs. In the case of Qarātakīn, his ribāṭ is financed through a nearby 
market which has been dedicated to it as a waqf.
166
 This is one of the earliest examples in 
our geographical sources of a waqf employed along the eastern frontier, and it is 
interesting that such an early example of this practice should be associated with a Turk. 
Qarātakīn was an early adopter of Islamic practices among the Turks of the eastern 
frontier. 
 The integration of Turks into the Islamic society of the eastern frontier and their 
rise to positions of importance as governors and commanders appears to have created 
problems for those Persians who had recently gone through a similar process. We can see 
in evidence from the fourth/tenth century, as the process of cultural conversion was 
reached its peak among the Persians but was steadily increasing amongst the Turks, that 
as these two groups met and competed for positions of influence within Islamic society, 
conflict arose between them. For one of the clearest examples of this conflict, we will 
return to the prose Shāhnāma of Abū Manṣūr Ma‛mārī and the career of his patron Abū 
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Manṣūr Ṭūsī. In this case, it is important to think beyond the interactions between Arabs 
and Persians and the molding of Persian and Islamic culture in both the lineages rulers 
constructed for themselves and the texts they patronized to reinforce these lineages. Abū 
Manṣūr Ṭūsī’s traumatic experiences, which forced him to leave the Sāmānids for the 
Būyids, were not conflicts between Arabs and the Islamicized Persians, but were instead 
the result of the integration of Turks into the ruling classes of Khurāsān. In the first case, 
Abū Manṣūr followed the governor of Khurāsān Abū ‛Alī Chaghānī to Rayy in 335/946-
947 when the Sāmānids ousted Abū ‛Alī and replaced him with the Turkish commander 
Abū Isḥāq Sīmjūrī. In the second case, Abū Manṣūr was stripped of his position over 
Khurāsān by the Sāmānids in 349/961, to also be replaced by a Turkish commander, 
Alptigīn.
167
 In the midst of this competition over governorships between Persian dihqāns 
and Turkish commanders, Abū Manṣūr’s response included his patronage of a book 
which, on the one hand, glorified his own Persian ancestry and his ancestral connections 
to Ṭūs and Nīshāpūr and, on the other, emphasized the epic deeds of pre-Islamic Persians 
in their war against the Turks of Tūrān. 
 Considering that by the time New Persian literature was developing in the 
fourth/tenth century, Persian culture had already been largely integrated within Islamic 
culture and that the dual society of the eastern frontier had become unified with a mixture 
of Persian and Islamic elements, the notion that New Persian literature and the growing 
importance of pre-Islamic epics were a sign of anti-Arab and/or anti-Muslim Persian 
nationalism needs to be rethought. Focusing on the frontier dynamic in Khurāsān and 
Transoxania, we can see that the fourth/tenth century was a period of two transitions 
along the frontier. On the one hand, the eastern frontier matured as a Muslim frontier and 
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assumed a Muslim identity. On the other hand, the frontier dynamic was shifting as Turks 
began to cross the frontier and become important players in the Islamic world. It has 
often been noted that Firdawsī presented his Shāhnāma not to the Persian Sāmānids, but 
rather to the Turkish Ghaznavids. The irony of this situation is notable because the pre-
Islamic epics which make up the Shāhnāma and much of the early New Persian literature 
as a whole emphasized the (supposedly ancient) conflict between Persians and Turks. 
The point was not to distinguish the Persians from the Muslims, but to elevate the role of 
the Persians over the newest arrivals in the Islamic world, the Turks. 
 
6.11 Maturing Frontiers versus Dynamic Frontiers 
This chapter has focused primarily on the process by which the eastern frontier matured 
from a region recently conquered by the Arabs and brought into the Islamic cultural 
sphere, into a fully engaged part of the Islamic world. In many ways, the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth century represented an end point in this frontier process. This is the point at 
which the eastern frontier became a recognizably Muslim frontier. Such an understanding 
of the eastern frontier is faulty, however, because frontier processes do not really have 
neat conclusions: frontiers, as ongoing processes, are continually changing. During the 
same period that the eastern frontier became a Muslim frontier, its dynamics shifted once 
again. This shift focused on the older, pre-Islamic frontier dynamic, the balance between 
the Persians of Khurāsān and Transoxania, now intermingled with Arabs and integrated 
within a shared Muslim culture, and the Turks of the steppe. This dynamic shift saw the 
Turks entering the Muslim world in larger and larger numbers and increasingly gaining 
positions of power and influence within Muslim Khurāsān and Transoxania, often to the 
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detriment of Persian notables. As one process came to a conclusion, another began, and 
these two dynamics overlapped. Understanding this dynamic nature of frontiers, it is 










At the outset of this project, it was explained that while this was not directly a study of 
the “independent” provincial dynasties of the eastern frontier, it was one which hoped to 
situate those dynasties which ruled Khurāsān and Transoxania in the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries within the context of the frontier zone they ruled. While the 
dynasties of the Ṭāhirds, Ṣaffārids, and Sāmānids (as well as some smaller dynasties such 
as the Bānījūrids) have been referenced throughout the preceding six chapters, their 
histories have not been the focus. This project has instead told the story of the eastern 
frontier as a frontier region over the first centuries of Muslim rule, a period which 
culminated in the rise of the eastern dynasties. In this brief concluding chapter, I would 
like to first overview the major themes presented in the previous chapters and, then, 
explore some of the implications of this study on our understanding of these dynasties. 
 In Chapter One, previous scholarship on the eastern dynasties was briefly 
examined. It was said that this scholarship tended to focus on the eastern dynasties as 
peripheral to the history of the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate and, in many cases, the result or 
response to the weakening of central imperial authority in the provinces. Looking at the 
eastern dynasties from the perspective of Baghdad during the decline of ‛Abbāsid 
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authority provides us with a particular image of the eastern dynasties, one which 
emphasizes their perceived distance from the authority of the caliphate, both in a 
geographical sense and in a figurative sense. In other words, this approach sees the 
eastern dynasties taking advantage of a weakened caliphate to promote their own agendas 
in distant provinces, most importantly the creation of independent kingdoms. 
 If we instead look at the eastern dynasties as ruling the eastern frontier, rather 
than ruling distant provinces of the ‛Abbāsid Caliphate, does this image change? It has 
been argued throughout this project that the rise of the eastern dynasties was the end 
product of the frontier processes which integrated and acculturated the eastern frontier 
into the broader Islamic world, as described in Chapters Five and Six. The Ṭāhirds, 
Ṣaffārids, and Sāmānids, each in their own way, negotiated the development of the 
frontier during the early centuries of Muslim rule and their relationship to the frontier was 
an important component of their reigns. By situating the eastern dynasties within these 
frontier processes, we have forefront their relationship to the frontier and to the regions 
they ruled rather than their relationship to Iraq. 
The frontier approach taken by this project began in Chapter Two with a close 
examination of the way the eastern frontier was represented by medieval geographical 
writers, writing in Arabic and Persian. A definition of frontiers as loosely-organized 
liminal zones of transition on the periphery of states where territorial expansion or 
contraction is possible was proposed and applied to the eastern frontier of the Islamic 
world. This examination of representations of the eastern frontier also required us to 
differentiate the terms “border” and “frontier,” as well as their Arabic equivalents ḥadd 
and thaghr. In the context of the eastern frontier of the third/ninth and fourth/tenth 
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centuries, this differentiation led us to think of borders or ḥudūd as the limits of effective 
state power and frontiers or thughūr as points of entry or exit, points where someone else 
lives on the opposing side of the frontier. Chapter Three gave us a window into the 
physical layout of the eastern frontier by examining the built environment of defensive 
networks. By laying out the pattern of defensive infrastructure, made up of various 
fortifications and walled cities, we saw a network of cities sharing common defensive 
infrastructures with dependent villages and agricultural regions, most importantly large 
walls encircling the hinterlands of cities, connected to each other by roads dotted with 
fortified resting places. This network demonstrated the interconnected nature of the 
eastern frontier, which was reinforced by the shared responsibilities for staffing and 
provisioning these fortifications. In Chapter Four, we moved away from textual sources 
to focus on numismatics. The history of coin production in Khurāsān and Transoxania 
during the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries also implied complex networks, this time 
economic and political, spreading out across the eastern frontier. Emphasis was placed on 
the names which appeared on coins, demonstrating the complex relationships between 
different minting and mining centers and the political authorities who ruled over various 
regions of Khurāsān and Transoxania and those who supervised the striking of coins, or, 
perhaps more importantly, the engraving of dies used to strike coins. 
 Chapters Two, Three, and Four focused on the “environment” of the frontier, 
presenting the eastern frontier as a geographic, perhaps geo-political, space. These 
chapters described Khurāsān and Transoxania as they appeared in the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries. In these descriptions, the most important theme to arise was that of 
networks which integrated the various regions and urban centers of the eastern frontier 
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into a whole. These networks connected agricultural regions to villages, villages to cities, 
cities to each other, and, finally, the eastern frontier to the centers of imperial power in 
Iraq. In order for these networks to work successfully, relationships had to exist between 
various levels of local authorities along all branches of these networks. Governors had to 
rely on the heads of cities, who, likewise, relied upon the heads of villages and the 
owners of rural estates and vice versa. The second half of this project took a more 
consciously historical approach, focusing on the people who populated these networks. 
Continuing with the frontier approach, Chapters Five and Six emphasized certain frontier 
“processes,” in the sense invoked by Frederick Jackson Turner, which impacted 
Khurāsān and Transoxania into the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries; namely the 
“processes” of settlement and acculturation following the Arab conquests of the 
first/seventh and second/eighth centuries. 
 The Arab conquests and the settlement of Arabs, or lack thereof, in Khurāsān and 
Transoxania in the following centuries were the focus of Chapter Five. The experience of 
the conquests, especially the frequency of conquest by treaty or ṣulḥ, left pre-Islamic 
networks of local authorities in place following the conquests and, in exploring this 
aspect of the history of conquest and settlement, special attention was paid to the petty 
landholding dihqāns who were responsible for tax collection and levying troops in 
villages and rural regions during the late Sāsānian period. The conquest and settlement of 
Khurāsān and Transoxania, despite preserving many local networks, had a transformative 
effect on the eastern frontier; reconfiguring cities and villages through the construction of 
mosques and the agricultural hinterlands through the re-identification of fortifications 
attached to the estates of dihqāns as ribāṭs. Following the Arab conquests, Khurāsān and 
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Transoxania went through a period of integration and acculturation with the larger 
Islamic world. This process was the focus of Chapter Six. Here it was not the conversion 
of the people of Khurāsān and Transoxania which was most important, but rather the 
process by which the eastern frontier itself took on an Islamic identity as Dār al-jihād 
against the Turks. The transformation of the eastern frontier into a Muslim frontier did 
not occur evenly and we see moments of transition where the Persian and Islamic identity 
of the region coexisted, as in the equal emphasis placed on both cotton and silk 
production during the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. These processes involved the 
integration of the local networks of Khurāsān and Transoxania with the networks of the 
larger Caliphate and the redefinition of terms of power and authority in an Islamic 
language.  
 While the political, social, and economic networks of the eastern frontier have 
appeared throughout as the major focus of this project, the question remains how these 
networks related to the frontier. Can we call these “frontier networks?” In many ways, the 
networks described in this project were not unique to the eastern frontier or to frontiers in 
general. Rather, it is the processes of integration and acculturation occurring after the 
Arab conquests which are unique to a frontier experience. The Arab conquests changed 
the political, economic, and cultural orientation of the eastern frontier. No longer part of 
the Persian Sāsānian Empire, Khurāsān and Transoxania found themselves a part of the 
Muslim Caliphate. Over the following centuries, the eastern frontier became increasingly 
integrated into the Caliphate and acculturated with the greater Islamic world. These 
processes involved a mixing of Persian and Islamic identities and practices, with both the 
conquered and the conquerors borrowing and influencing the lifestyles of each other. 
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These processes are unique to frontier environments and their impact on the networks of 
Khurāsān and Transoxania are the result of the region’s position as a frontier. 
 One aspect of this transformation which is of great importance to this study is its 
impact on conflict between the settled populations of Khurāsān and Transoxania and the 
Turks of the Inner Asian steppe across the eastern frontier. Here it is important to look at 
the experience of the dihqāns, especially as we see them in the middle and late 
fourth/tenth century, the point at which the majority of the population of Khurāsān and 
Transoxania had converted to Islam. The dihqāns, since their earliest appearance in 
Sāsānian documents, were the owners of agricultural estates and the heads of villages. A 
feature of most of these estates was fortifications, called ḥusūn in our earlier geographical 
sources, built to protect stockpiles and the farmers and villages under the care of a dihqān 
from raids by Turks. By the late fourth/tenth century, our later geographical sources 
appear to call these same fortifications ribāṭs and the conflict they are engaged in is cast 
as jihād, making the eastern frontier the Dār al-jihād. This change in terminology is 
symbolic of the transformation happening across the eastern frontier following the Arab 
conquests. A pre-Islamic practice, the fortifying of privately held rural estates, is recast in 
Islamic terms, these fortifications are ribāṭs engaged in jihād. 
 There are a number of potential explanations for this transformation of fortified 
rural estates into ribāṭs. The most basic explanation would be that the influence of Islam 
had spread so deep into the society of the eastern frontier that attempts were being made 
to bring local practices into alignment with Islamic principles. If we would rather view 
the dihqāns as shrewd entrepreneurs, we may see this transformation as an attempt by 
dihqāns to improve their condition by appeasing or appealing to certain groups, most 
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notably Muslim religious scholars and volunteer fighters or muṭṭawwi‛a. By re-
identifying their fortified estates as ribāṭs and the protection of their personal property as 
jihād, the dihqāns may have been able to draw on the support of these religious groups. 
Speculating further, it was noted in Chapter Three that one unique aspect of ribāṭs 
compared to other forms of fortifications was their endowment through waqf. This re-
identification of fortifications as ribāṭs may have allowed dihqāns to dedicate their 
agricultural lands as waqf in support of the ribāṭs, thus preserving their family’s rights to 
the property. In these cases, the dihqāns may have been taking advantage of Islamic 
practices to their own benefit. In all possible explanations, we see a pre-Islamic practice, 
the fortification of rural estates, being transformed by the spread of Islam in the region in 
a manner which ties it to an Islamic practice, in this case those of ribāṭ and jihād. This 
demonstrates how the networks of the eastern frontier were able to transform themselves 
in response to changes along the frontier. 
 Taking into consideration the image of the eastern frontier constructed in the 
previous chapters, let us now look at how the eastern dynasties fit into the networks of 
the eastern frontier. From the Arab conquests until the rise of the Ṭāhirids in 205/821, the 
political structure of Khurāsān and Transoxania featured a series of predominantly Arab 
governors overseeing the pre-Islamic network of Persian local authorities, most notably 
the dihqāns. With the rise of the Ṭāhirds, the governors of Khurāsān and Transoxania 
come from the local population. In the cases of the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids, an important 
element of their rise was their membership in the networks of local authorities before the 
arrival of Islam in Khurāsān and Transoxania, and, it can be argued, that it was their 
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employment of these local networks which led to their successes.
1
 While little is known 
about the Ṭāhirid family before they became clients of the Khuzā‛ī, we are certain of the 
Sāmānids’ background as dihqāns in the area of Balkh. We can see this employment of 
local networks in support of the eastern dynasties on the highest levels of governance in 
Khurāsān and Transoxania, most notably in the Ṭāhirids use of the Sāmānids as 
commanders and sub-governors in Transoxania. 
 The eastern dynasties also made use of the transformation of Khurāsān and 
Transoxania into a Muslim frontier and connections made with important Arab figures 
alongside their connections to pre-Islamic local networks. The ancestors of the Ṭāhirids 
and Sāmānids both entered into the service of important Arab governors in the early years 
following the Arab conquests. As they achieved positions of power themselves, the 
eastern dynasties promoted themselves in ways which emphasized their connections to 
the larger Islamic world. The Ṭāhirids are often noted as being highly Arabized in their 
identity and cultivated positions in Baghdad alongside their governorships in Khurāsān; 
the Ṣaffārids cast themselves as holy warriors and defenders of the Islamic world; and the 
Sāmānids are often viewed as staunch supporters of orthodox Sunni Islam during a period 
when the Islamic world was increasingly under the authority of Shi’ite rulers, namely the 
Fāṭimids and the Būyids. At the same time, the rise of both the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids 
can be linked directly to associations they made with the ‛Abbāsid Caliph al-Ma’mūn and 
his commanders, governors, and administrators while he acted as governor of Khurāsān 
and during the Civil War with his broth al-Amīn. The success of the eastern dynasties can 
be found in their ability to bridge this transformation, at one point appealing to local 
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networks while, at another, appealing to the broader Islamic world and the representatives 
of the Caliphate. 
 The eastern dynasties did not arrive overnight as the authority of the ‛Abbāsid 
Caliphate waned. In the cases of the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids, they had been using their 
local authority as dihqāns to cultivate their positions within the Caliphate for well over a 
century before they appeared as governors in Khurāsān and Transoxania. Neither was the 
idea of granting the right to bequeath governorships of outlying provinces within a single 
family a new innovation under the eastern dynasties. The Aghlabids had been given 
similar rights over Ifrīqiya twenty years before Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn had become governor 
of Khurāsān and had exercised these rights successfully nearly a decade before the rise of 
the Ṭāhirids. There is no doubt that ‛Abbāsid power was in decline during the third/ninth 
and fourth/tenth centuries, but is the rise of Persian dynasties made up of families with 
long ties to the Caliphate as governors on a similar pattern to that employed by the 
Caliphate earlier in other provinces really a result or response to this decline? I would 
argue that the rise of the eastern dynasties was rather an attempt to shore up support for 
the Caliphate as its power declined. As Hugh Kennedy has said, “Ṭāhirid rule was the 
most successful solution the ‛Abbasids ever devised for integrating (Khurāsān) into the 
caliphate.”
2
 The Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids should be seen in the context of the frontier 
processes outlined in Chapters Five and Six as local Persian elites who had successfully 
integrated themselves into the networks of the Caliphate. By allowing the eastern 
dynasties to rule Khurāsān and Transoxania, the ‛Abbāsids elevated a segment of the 
local networks of authority which had proven their loyalty to the Caliphate within the 
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imperial network, thereby creating governors who bridged local and imperial networks. 
The Ṣaffārids obviously do not fit into this model and, as mentioned above, their lack of 
status within the local political and economic networks of Khurāsān may be the reason 
they faced such harsh opposition in the region. 
 Does viewing the eastern dynasties as the integrators of local networks of 
authority with the imperial networks of the Caliphate give us a different view of these 
dynasties and their histories? In the case of the Ṭāhirds and Sāmānids, I believe it does. 
They were not necessarily independence minded nationalist movements, but rather the 
end result of a long frontier process which integrated the populations of the eastern 
frontier into the networks of the Caliphate. Understanding the Ṭāhirids and Sāmānids as 
such, we can continue to refer to them as eastern dynasties, but many of the adjectives 
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